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I,  ROD  KEMP,  Assistant  Treasurer,  pursuant  to  Parts 2 and 3  of  the  Productivity
Commission Act 1998 and in accordance with the Government’s Legislation Review
Schedule, refer Part X of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and associated regulations to the
Productivity Commission for inquiry and report within six months of receipt of this
reference.  The Commission is to hold hearings for the purpose of the inquiry.
Background
2. Part X of the Trade Practices Act 1974 is the regulatory regime for international
liner cargo shipping operations in Australia. It describes the conditions under which
international liner cargo shipping operators are permitted to form conferences to provide
joint liner shipping services for Australian exporters and importers.
Scope of Inquiry
3. The Commission is to report on the appropriate arrangements for regulation of
international cargo shipping services, taking into account the following objectives:
a)  legislation/regulation should be retained only if the benefits to the
community as a whole outweigh the costs; and if the objectives of the
legislation/regulation cannot be achieved more efficiently through other
means, including non-legislative approaches;
b)  regard should be had to the effects on: the access of Australian exporters
to competitively priced international liner cargo shipping services that are
of adequate frequency and reliability; public welfare and equity; economic
and regional development; consumer interests; the competitiveness of
business including small business; and efficient resource allocation; and
c)  the Government’s commitment to accelerate and strengthen the
micro-economic reform process, including through improving the
competitiveness of markets, particularly those which provide
infrastructure services, in order to improve Australia’s economic
performance and living standards.
4. In making assessments in relation to matters in paragraph (3), the Commission is
to have regard to the analytical requirements for regulation assessment by the
Commonwealth, including those set out in the Competition Principles Agreement.  The
report of the Commission should:VI TERMS OF
REFERENCE
a)  identify the rationale for Part X, quantifying issues as far as reasonably
practical;
b)  assess whether Part X satisfies the rationale identified in (a);
c)  identify if, and to what extent, Part X restricts competition;
d)  identify  relevant  alternatives  to  Part X,  including  the  authorisation
processes in Part VII of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and non-legislative
approaches, and the extent to which these would achieve the rationale
identified in (a);
e)  analyse and, as far as reasonably practical, quantify the benefits, costs,
impacts (including with respect to predictability of outcome on the
standards of shipping services provided), and cost effectiveness of Part X
and the alternatives identified in (d);
f)  identify the liner cargo shipping regimes of Australia’s major trading
partners and determine the compatibility of  the alternatives identified in
(d), and Part X, with those regimes;
g)  identify the different groups likely to be affected by Part  X and
alternatives identified in (d);
h)  list the individuals and groups consulted during the review and outline
their views;
i)  determine a preferred option for regulation, if any, in light of objectives
set out in paragraph (3); and
j)  examine possible mechanisms for increasing the overall efficiency of
Part X.
5. In undertaking this review, the Commission is to advertise nationally, consult with
key interest groups and affected parties, and publish a report.
6. The Government will consider the Commission’s recommendations and its response
will be announced as soon as possible after the receipt of the Commission’s report.
ROD KEMP
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ACA Australian Consumers’ Association
ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
ACCI Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
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Billion The convention used for a billion is a thousand million (109).
Findings Findings in the body of the report are paragraphs high-
lighted using italics, as this is.
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An operator who is an Australian citizen or a body
corporate incorporated by or under Commonwealth, State
or Territory Law who provides shipping services,
employing a ship that is registered in Australia.
Accord An agreement or arrangement between conference and
non-conference carriers on a trade route, resulting from





An adjustment in freight rates for fluctuations in bunker
(fuel) prices.
Carrier shipping line
Cartel An association of competitors that, by agreement, limits
the degree of competition that would otherwise prevail in
the buying or selling of goods or services by members of
the cartel.
Comity The courtesy by which a nation allows another’s laws to
be recognised within its territory.
Conference Defined in Part X as an unincorporated association of two
or more ocean carriers carrying on two or more businesses
each of which includes, or is proposed to include, the
provision of liner cargo shipping services. Conferences
may either be ‘open’ or ‘closed’.
open conference — involves a legal entitlement for any
line to become a conference member, subject to that
shipping line satisfying conference requirements.
closed conference — where the entry of new shipping
lines must be approved by existing conference members.XVI GLOSSARY
Consortium A joint venture by members of a conference signifying a
higher degree of cooperation in service arrangements such








An association representing the interests of Australian
exporters generally for the purposes of negotiations under





The association, designated by the Minister for the
purpose of negotiations under Part  X, representing the
interests of all or any of the following:
·  Australian shippers in a particular trade;
·  Australian shippers of particular kinds of goods;
·  shippers in a particular part of Australia;
·  producers of goods of a kind exported, or proposed to
be exported, from Australia.
Discussion
agreement
An agreement between conference and non-conference
lines to reach a non-binding consensus over, for example,
the charging of common freight rates and a variety of
service arrangements.
Extra-territorial Outside Australia’s territorial jurisdiction.
Intermodal Transport involving transfer between two or more modes
to exploit the comparative advantages of each mode.
Landbridging The movement of containerised cargo between sea ports
by road and rail rather than sea, thus enabling more
efficient utilisation of containerships.
Liner service A service prearranged on a particular trade route.
NVOCC non-vessel operating common carrier (term used in the US
Shipping Act of 1984).GLOSSARY XVII
Port service
charge
A land-based charge for statutory port costs that is passed
on to the shipper by the shipping line.
Reefer refrigerated container
Ro-ro roll-on roll-off vessel
Shipper The party on whose account goods are consigned (a
shipper can be an importer or an exporter, but the ‘shipper
body’ provisions in Part X relate solely to exporters).
Stevedoring The loading and unloading of ships’ cargoes. Generally,
stevedoring of container vessels is carried out at a









Container port charge levied by container lines for the
service of moving a container from a ship to a position
within the container terminal, enabling clearance from the
port.
Transhipment Transfer of cargo from one ship to another at an
intermediate port between the port of origin and port of
destination.XVIII KEY MESSAGES
Key messages
·  As an importer of liner cargo shipping services, Australia’s national interest is
served by obtaining liner shipping services that meet shippers’ diverse needs at the
lowest-possible price.
·  Because transport costs and service levels directly affect their competitiveness,
Australian exporters and importers have a direct interest in obtaining the
best-possible deal from foreign liner carriers. Thus pursuit of their self interest in
relation to liner shipping also serves the national interest.
·  Conferences — groupings of liner carriers which coordinate services on individual
trade routes — can be an efficient way of meeting an important part of shippers’
diverse demands (in terms of frequency, reliability etc). But any form of market
cooperation increases the potential for market power.
·  The tension between the benefits and potential costs of conference arrangements
has led to special treatment of conferences worldwide. Part X of the TPA is an
industry-specific, legislated industry code which exempts conferences from some
general provisions of the TPA, provided they meet certain obligations to Australian
exporters and they do not misuse any market power. Exporters also are allowed to
form collective buying groups to enhance their negotiating power, backed up by
regulatory intervention as they see fit.
·  The current regulatory approach has promoted the national interest because Part X
allows the efficiencies of conference arrangements while letting competition from
non-conference lines and the countervailing power of Australian exporters constrain
their potential market power.
·  Repeal of Part X in favour of a potentially more interventionist approach under the
general (authorisation) provisions in Part VII of the TPA, is unlikely to deliver greater
net national benefits. Scope for successful intervention appears limited and,
moreover, the general provisions of the TPA are likely to involve greater
administrative and compliance costs than Part X.
·  While a Part X-type outcome for regulation of liner shipping could, in principle, be
replicated under Part VII (especially if block authorisation were allowed) or under a
special notification procedure, there can be no certainty that these alternatives
would, in practice, meet the criteria as well as Part X does. Nor could they be
introduced at negligible transitional cost.
·  The ultimate test for any regulation or legislation is whether it promotes the national
interest and does so more efficiently than alternatives. Part X passes this test.KEY MESSAGES XIXOVERVIEW XIX
Overview
The Commonwealth Government has asked the Productivity
Commission to review Part  X of the Trade Practices Act
1974 (TPA) and report on the appropriate arrangements for
regulation of international liner cargo shipping services.
Part  X describes the conditions under which international
liner shipping operators are permitted to cooperate as
‘conferences’ to provide coordinated shipping services to
Australian exporters and importers.
This inquiry stems from the Commonwealth, State and
Territory Governments agreement of April  1995 — the
Competition Principles Agreement (CPA) under the National
Competition Policy. Under the CPA, Commonwealth and
State Governments agreed to review all legislation which
restricts competition, by the year 2000.
In making its assessment, the Commission is required to take
into account three objectives:
(a) legislation/regulation should be retained only if the
benefits to the community as a whole outweigh the
costs; and if the objectives … cannot be achieved more
efficiently by other means [emphasis added];
(b) regard should be had to the effects on: the access of
Australian exporters to competitively priced
international liner cargo shipping services that are of
adequate frequency and reliability; public welfare and
equity; economic and regional development; consumer
interests; the competitiveness of business including
small business; and efficient resource allocation; and
(c) the Government’s commitment to accelerate and
strengthen the micro-economic reform process,
including through the competitiveness of markets,











retained only if the
benefits exceed the
costs and there is no
better option.XX OVERVIEW
Background
  International shipping is an essential intermediate service
input for Australia’s merchandise trade. Around 79 per cent
of merchandise exports and 71  per  cent of merchandise
imports (by value) were transported by sea in 1997-98.
Liner services are provided by container (including
refrigerated container), roll-on roll-off (ro-ro) and
conventional and multi-purpose ships, which operate regular,
scheduled services to set timetables. In 1997-98, liner
services carried 4 per cent of the volume and 48 per cent of
the value of Australia’s seaborne exports, and 23 per cent of
the volume and 74  per  cent of the value of Australia’s
seaborne imports. Bulk shipping services carried the
remainder.
Conferences, or groupings of liner shipping operators which
coordinate services, account for more than half of liner
services on major global routes. It is estimated that in the
mid-1990s, conferences accounted for around 60 per cent of
total global liner capacity. On Australian trades, conferences
currently carry more than 50  per  cent of liner exports and
more than 60 per cent of liner imports by value. However,
conference shares in terms of both the volume and value of
liner cargoes have fallen since the early 1980s.
Non-conference operators providing direct or transhipment
services (that is, where containers change ships at an
intermediate port) serve the remainder of the market.
Australian liner trades are described as ‘long’ and ‘thin’, a
product of Australia’s relative isolation and the size of its
economy. Australia is not located on the major round-the-
world or northern hemisphere east–west trade routes — its
major trade routes run north–south. Ranked 15th in the world
in terms of container movements, the Australian coastal and
international liner trade amounted to 2.74 million twenty foot
container equivalents (TEU) or only 1.67  per  cent of the
























































































a A series break exists in mid-1994.
Figure 2 Conference shares of the value of




































Australia’s major liner exports are commodities (meat,
cereals and dairy products), whereas imports are largely
manufactured goods (machinery, vehicles and chemicals).
Many export cargoes require refrigeration, whereas imports
generally do not. Not only do export tonnages exceed import
tonnages, but Australia’s exports tend to be heavier per unit
of volume than its imports. These differences create
imbalances in container requirements between inward and
outward legs.
Major trade partners for Australian liner exports and imports
are East Asia, Europe, Japan and North Asia, New Zealand,
North America, and South-East Asia.
Trends in liner shipping markets
Global and Australian liner shipping markets have changed
significantly since Part  X was last reviewed in 1993,
continuing a process of change initiated by containerisation
in the 1960s. In line with many other industries, liner
shipping is becoming more concentrated via mergers and
acquisitions, while average vessel size continues to grow as
carriers attempt to capture scale economies. Rationalisation
is being driven by technological change and intense
competition in most trades which has seen freight rates fall
significantly in real terms and profitability decline.
The trend towards greater industry concentration via mergers
and acquisitions does not appear to have reduced
competition. On the contrary, it appears the expansion of
global shipping companies has increased competition on
individual routes — Asian lines have entered the North
Atlantic trade, east–west lines are entering north–south
markets and the feeder services of large carriers (especially
transhippers) are competing with traditional regional lines.
Thus conferences compete with each other, with















Australia relies almost entirely on foreign shipping lines for
international liner cargo shipping services — liner cargo
shipping therefore is an essential imported service.
In general, a reduction in the (inward or outward) cost of
liner shipping to Australia for a given quality of service, or
improved service for a given cost, will increase Australian
national income. This is achieved by reducing the cost of
imports to Australian consumers and users of importable
inputs, and by making Australian exports more competitive
in world markets.
Exporters benefit directly from lower (effective) shipping
costs in terms of the price they receive for their exports
and/or increased export sales. Importers are able to sell more
goods at lower prices to Australian customers. Therefore the
interests of Australian shippers (that is, exporters and
importers) in obtaining more efficient shipping services
broadly coincide with the national interest and, at least in this
context, serve as a good proxy for that community-wide
interest.
It is difficult to conceive of a situation, in practice, where
Australian exporters and importers will not have an interest
in obtaining a better deal from liner carriers, or where pursuit
of that interest will not translate into national gains.
Role of shipping conferences
Liner shipping is characterised by a range of economies of
scale and scope suggesting that low-cost supply is likely to
require some form of industry integration and hence
concentration or cooperation. In principle, this could be














liner shipping is likely
to involve industry
concentration …XXIV OVERVIEW
However, in practice, conferences have been the preferred
form of integration in liner shipping markets for over
100 years. Conferences provide a looser form of cooperation
than a merged company and usually are trade specific (and
may even be limited to one direction on each route). They
may engage in joint price setting, capacity rationalisation,
revenue and/or cost pooling arrangements, discriminatory
pricing structures, and customer loyalty agreements.
In contrast to bulk shipping where each vessel carries one
commodity on a charter basis, demand for liner shipping is
diverse. The costs of coordinating these diverse demands
virtually rule out ship chartering as an efficient form of
service delivery. On the other hand, the supply of regular,
scheduled liner services provides a means of reducing
transactions costs so that shippers with diverse demands are
able to access liner shipping services.
Lower costs of provision of such services require the various
economies of scale and scope to be captured. A single
shipping line may be loath to commit several large vessels
(and incur correspondingly large fixed costs) in order to
provide a comprehensive, regular, scheduled service where
demand is uncertain and where that uncertainty is
exacerbated by the possibility of rivals encroaching on the
trade.
Cooperation with potential rivals offers a way of reducing
uncertainty, although not eliminating it as liner shipping is
contestable. A lower risk premium will mean that larger
ships can be utilised and filled to optimal capacity (thus
capturing economies of vessel size), while a large conference
fleet may generate additional economies while providing the
coordinated, frequent scheduling valued by shippers. In this










shipping services …OVERVIEW XXV
Box 1 What is a liner shipping conference?
In conventional usage, a ‘conference’ is an unincorporated association between two or
more companies coordinating services on a specific trade route (either return or
one-way). Members seek to rationalise their shipping schedules, arrange the vessel
capacity deployed on that route, and to set a common price to charge their customers
(‘shippers’) as a device to coordinate services and minimise commercial risks. They
may pool their revenues and costs. They may be ‘open’ (any shipping line can join or
leave the conference at short notice) or ‘closed’ (membership is by invitation only).
Under Part  X of the TPA, a conference is defined as any two or more companies
offering shipping services. This therefore includes, in addition to the customary use of
the term, consortia, alliances, slot charters, non-vessel operating common carriers
(NVOCCs) and discussion agreements (in which the conference and one or more
non-conference lines discuss (but do not enter binding agreements on) schedules, port
coverage, prices and capacity management).
Not only do all major trading countries permit conferences to operate in carrying
cargoes to and from their ports, but each has a system of blanket exemption or
immunity from its national competition or anti-monopoly legislation.
At the same time, however, conference structures (like a
company merger) may give shipping operators a degree of
market power.
The key to the impact of conferences in practice is whether
they face effective competition or, at least, potential effective
competition. Given such competition, conferences will be
constrained to charge prices that do not yield excess profits
and to operate efficiently over the long run.
Conferences and competition
By definition, conferences constrain competition between
member lines. But it is highly unlikely that, if conferences
(and other cooperative arrangements which are covered by
Part  X) were prohibited, equivalent levels of (coordinated)
service would (or could) be provided by all former
conference members operating individually on each trade. It
is more likely that, if conferences were proscribed, carriers
would merge, thus internalising the conference, or that some
lines currently operating within a conference would exit the
trade, allowing remaining providers to expand and take a
… but may give
conference members
market power.






but other forms of
cooperation.XXVI OVERVIEW
larger share of the trade. In other words, the economics of
liner shipping are such that there will be market cooperation
and concentration in some form in order to provide the
service currently provided by conferences.
In assessing the extent of competition, the Commission has
examined a range of indicators.
Conference shares of major inward and outward trades have
declined over the 1990s, though some trades and
commodities have moved against this trend. Conferences
carried 64 per cent of Australia’s liner imports by value in
1997-98 (compared with 73  per  cent in 1989-90) and
56 per cent of liner exports by value in 1997-98 (compared
with 73  per  cent in 1989-90). On very thin trades (for
example, East India–Australia) conference shares currently
exceed 70 per cent but have exhibited considerable volatility
from year to year.
Overall, however, there is no trade route into or out of
Australia in which a conference has a monopoly or close to a
monopoly — in other words, shippers always have a choice
(see figure 3 which illustrates available liner services on the
Australia–Europe trade). Increasing trade shares for non-
conference operators reflect an improvement in the quality of
non-conference services. This improvement has been driven
by the emergence of several large global operators in the
1980s and 1990s which provide direct or transhipment
services to Australia, usually (though not invariably)
choosing to operate outside the conference system — for
example, Evergreen Lines, Maersk, COSCO, Hanjin, Fesco
and MSC. This development appears consistent with a
market that is dynamic and competitive.
There are other indicators that suggest that Australia’s liner
trades are contestable and subject to competitive forces.
There have been numerous entries and exits on Australian
trades during the 1990s, though mergers and takeovers
appear to account for major changes in carrier line-up. The
comparatively poor profitability of many liner carriers, both
on Australian trades and globally, including conference











Figure 3 Australia–Europe trade: services available
in 1999
Commercial incentives applying to potential new entrants
apply equally to individual conference members. Demand by
large shippers for individual service contracts has reduced
the practice of common rate setting, though common rates
continue to apply for some types of cargo.
The potential for conferences to exercise market power also
appears to have been constrained to some degree by
countervailing power exercised by Australian exporters. For
example, evidence from shippers suggests that scope for
collective rate negotiation, and the requirements for shipping
operators to negotiate minimum service levels and provide
information to shippers, have bolstered their negotiating
position. At the same time, individual large shippers
increasingly appear to be negotiating directly with shipping























Freight rates for conference and non-conference liner
shipping services on most major Australian trade routes have
declined steadily and significantly in nominal and real terms
since the early 1990s, continuing a trend evident since the
late 1970s. Many participants in this inquiry claimed that
freight rates are historically low on major trade routes (see
figure 4). While freight rate movements do not of themselves
indicate the state of market competition, it appears that
aggressive competition has been a driving force.
Participants also have claimed that service levels to Australia
have improved in recent years. Evidence gathered by the
Commission relating to service reliability, capacity,
frequency, port coverage and transit times generally supports
this assessment.
While the quality of service provided by non-conference
operators has improved since the 1993  Brazil Review,
conferences as a whole continue to offer a better quality
service than individual non-conference lines in terms of their
overall frequency of services, reefer and dry capacity and
port coverage. The difference between conference and non-
conference freight rates has narrowed, though conference
services typically continue to attract a premium reflecting the
higher level of service provided.
While these and other indicators examined by the
Commission are partial and therefore imperfect, the range of
evidence available to the Commission consistently suggests
that conferences are subject to effective competition from
independent operators. Australian shippers claim that they
enjoy a wide range of choice regarding service levels and
prices, with conferences, on the whole, providing higher
quality services. The shipping market in this respect is like
many others where a range of differentiated services and












one of a number of
service types.OVERVIEW XXIX























Although market forces appear to have ensured good
outcomes for Australian shippers, there are two main reasons
for regulation of conferences. First, several conference
practices constitute prima facie breaches of Part  IV of the
TPA. Therefore, if conferences are to operate at all, they
require some form of exemption or authorisation. Second,
and more fundamentally, as an importer of liner shipping
services, it is in Australia’s interests to exercise
countervailing power appropriately. This may be facilitated
by legislation or regulation.
The ultimate objective of any regulation must be to enhance
the national interest. For this inquiry the national interest is
congruent with the interest of Australian shippers in






If it is accepted that conferences and other cooperative
structures which characterise liner shipping services can
promote efficiency and service levels, an appropriate
regulatory regime will be one that allows such arrangements
but which, at the same time, ensures that the efficiency gains
and lower costs made possible by such arrangements are
shared with Australian shippers and, through them, the
Australian public.
To this end, and drawing on the terms of reference for this
inquiry and accepted guidelines for good regulation, the
Commission considers that a desirable regulatory regime
will:
·  allow a variety of market arrangements that generate
efficient outcomes for Australian shippers;
·  minimise adverse impacts on competition;
·  promote Australia’s bargaining power and provide
effective constraints against abuses of market power by
conferences;
·  involve minimal regulation to achieve desired outcomes;
·  be compatible with international regulatory regimes (that
is, be workable and enforceable);
·  promote predictable outcomes for Australian shippers (in
the sense of predictable standards of shipping services
provided); and
·  involve low compliance and administration costs, and be
transparent and flexible.
An appropriate regulatory regime also will need to be able to
adapt to future developments in international liner shipping
markets — including the possibility of a reduction in
competition — and introduction of new technologies.












… and be able to
adapt to future
developments.OVERVIEW XXXI
Some participants suggested that the decision regarding
appropriate regulation should take into account possible
developments in the WTO regarding international rules for
liner shipping. However, a global framework is unlikely to
be agreed in the next few years and, consequently, the
Commission does not consider that the choice of regulatory
arrangement should be based on possible developments in
the WTO.
Regulatory options
There are two major alternative approaches to regulation of
international liner shipping — that currently embodied in
Part X of the TPA, and application of the general provisions
of the TPA, including Part VII authorisation provisions.
Other options include an industry-specific notification
procedure, block authorisation or an industry code.
Part X
Part  X allows individual shipping firms to enter into
cooperative arrangements that otherwise would contravene
certain sections of the TPA. To this end, Part  X provides
registered liner cargo shipping conference agreements (very
broadly defined) with exemptions from section 45 and, with
the exception of third-line forcing, section  47 of the TPA.
These exemptions allow conferences to set joint freight rates,
pool earnings and costs, rationalise capacity and restrict new
entrants to the agreement (but not the market). Loyalty
agreements with customers also are permitted.
Though the exemptions from the TPA allow shipping lines to
enter into conferences and similar arrangements (which
prima facie restrict competition), it does not compel them to
do so. Nor does it constrain liner carriers from entering the
market and operating outside the conference, as is the case
for most other legislation deemed to restrict competition. In
this sense, Part X could be described as taking a permissive
stance towards production of liner shipping services.
Part X or Part VII of
the TPA are the two
major regulatory
options.
Part X exempts liner
conferences from
some provisions of the
TPA …





However, Part X does not take a permissive approach to the
effects of cooperative arrangements on Australian exporters.
Indeed, the overriding objective of Part X is to promote the
interests of Australian exporters (and thus the national
interest). Specifically, Part  X attempts to promote the
negotiating strength (countervailing power) of Australian
exporters by:
·  allowing (but not requiring) them to form buying groups
and requiring outward conferences to negotiate with and
to provide information to these groups;
·  providing for ACCC investigations of breaches of Part X
by shipping lines (with scope for full or partial
deregistration of conference agreements); and
·  not exempting liner shipping operators from application
of section  46 of the TPA (which prohibits misuse of
market power).
While Part X does not contain an explicit ‘public interest’
test, in effect, the public interest is monitored and promoted
by exporters who have a vested interest in ensuring they
obtain the best-possible outcomes. Exporters can request
intervention by the regulators — the Minister and the ACCC
— at any time they consider that conferences have breached
their obligations under Part X, including the requirement that
shipping services are ‘economic and efficient’. The ACCC
also can take independent action under section 46 of the TPA
but it has never exercised this option. It also should be noted
that Part  X has been subject to regular formal scrutiny to
assess whether it serves the national interest — in addition to
the current public inquiry, it has been reviewed in 1977,
1986 and 1993.







Part X does not
contain an explicit
public interest test but
the public interest is
upheld by shippers.OVERVIEW XXXIII
Part VII
The general provisions of the TPA prohibit certain actions
such as joint price-setting. If Part  X were repealed, the
general provisions of the TPA would apply to liner shipping.
Conferences and other cooperative arrangements in liner
shipping would need to be authorised under Part VII, almost
certainly on a case-by-case basis, and demonstrate, ex ante,
that they would operate in the ‘public interest’. To satisfy the
ACCC that the public interest would be served, it is possible
that conferences would be required to give price or other
undertakings (to negotiate with shippers, for example). While
authorisation usually is given for a set period, it can be
revoked if the ACCC considers that circumstances have
changed ‘materially’.
Other options
Notification as it currently operates is a procedure that allows
notification to the ACCC of conduct that may breach
section 47 of the TPA. Notification provides immunity from
prosecution unless the ACCC decides to review and revoke
the notification. To accommodate liner shipping conferences,
the TPA would require industry-specific amendment to
extend the range of notifiable conduct. In practice, a
notification procedure could follow either the Part X or the
case-by-case authorisation models.
An industry code might operate in a similar fashion to Part X
but probably would be subject to (possibly block)
authorisation under Part  VII. An authorised industry code
also might codify behaviour to a greater extent than Part X.
As with a notification procedure, block authorisation would
require amendment of the TPA which could be industry-
specific or available to industry generally.
Under the general












In assessing the regulatory regime most likely to deliver the
best outcomes for Australians generally and shippers
specifically, the Commission has taken into account a
number of factors relevant to liner shipping (see box 2).
The regulatory approach embodied in Part  X is tailored to
these market characteristics. Part X essentially operates as an
industry code, where the market operates relatively free of
day-to-day, third-party intervention. Regulators take action
in the event that Australian shippers are dissatisfied with the
behaviour or performance of conferences. Evidence available
to the Commission suggests that this approach has been
successful, promoting commercial relationships and dispute
resolution and facilitating good service and price outcomes
for Australian exporters. Moreover, it has done so at
comparatively low administrative cost and has not caused
international jurisdictional conflicts.
That said, however, Part  X has been criticised by some
participants because it does not impose an explicit ‘public
interest’ test, its range of sanctions against market power is
limited to full or partial deregistration of the conference,
importers do not receive the same rights as exporters, and the
scope of some of the exemptions from the TPA is not
precise. A general criticism is that Part  X may be too
permissive in relation to the formation and conduct of
conferences and discussion agreements and that application
of the general provisions of the TPA could produce better
price and quality outcomes for Australian exporters and
importers.
The Commission has explored in some detail how
authorisation and other options might operate with respect to
liner shipping but any discussion necessarily is hypothetical.




… though it has been
criticised for being
too permissive.OVERVIEW XXXV
Box 2 Features of liner shipping
·  Shippers’ interests in relation to shipping services coincide with the public interest
and shippers as profit-maximisers generally will have a strong incentive to obtain
the best-possible service for the lowest-possible price (failure to do so typically will
mean lower sales and/or producer prices);
·  Australia relies almost entirely on foreign liner services. If participation in the
Australian shipping market became relatively costly, foreign carriers (whose assets
are highly mobile) could reduce their commitment to Australian trades or even
discontinue the conference service;
·  Evidence of substantial production economies in liner shipping coupled with the
need for regular, coordinated services suggests that cooperation in some form
would characterise the industry even if conferences were proscribed;
·  Consistent evidence of effective competition in liner shipping markets and low
barriers to entry in liner trades suggest that market forces provide, and will continue
to provide, effective regulation of conference market power; and
·  All countries with which Australia trades currently not only allow the formation of
conferences but also provide general, automatic exemptions from competition law.
There is no indication that this situation will change in the foreseeable future.
As noted above, a key difference between Part  X and
authorisation (Part VII) is that the authorisation mechanism
provides greater scope for direct third-party intervention on
‘public interest’ grounds. Some participants regard this as a
major advantage of authorisation. The Commission agrees
that promotion of the public interest is paramount. But is
third-party intervention likely to enhance that interest? If
competitive forces in liner shipping trades were weak, the
case for stricter regulation would be strengthened.
However, given the degree of market competition (and
market contestability) and the fact that the public interest
coincides with the interest of shippers, it is not clear that
scope for discretionary third-party intervention is necessary
or even desirable. The national interest is vigilantly
represented by the shippers themselves, coupled with
apparently effective self-regulation by the market. The
suggestion that precisely because there is intense
competition, conferences could be removed at little cost, is
not accepted by the Commission. If conferences survive









risk of market failure
appears low.XXXVI OVERVIEW
competition they must be producing a valued service
efficiently.
There also are serious doubts as to whether Australia could
enforce its competition laws in the event that authorisation
were not granted. Administrative and compliance costs also
would appear to be significantly higher under authorisation.
It is feasible that the authorisation process could function in a
similar manner to Part  X. Protection of shippers could be
achieved by authorising agreements between shipping lines
subject to conditions (such as negotiating minimum service
levels with a shipper body, and providing advance notice of
changes in price and service levels). Carriers also could opt
to give the ACCC undertakings regarding protection for
shippers. Indeed, the Commission is of the view that, were
Part X to be repealed, eventually a Part X-type regime (that
is, conditional industry-wide block exemption) would re-
emerge. The transitional process could be uncertain,
protracted and costly, however, and probably would require
legislative amendment to allow block authorisation. Indeed,
the approach of Part X appears antithetical to the approach of
Part VII as the latter currently operates.
The Commission notes the argument that liner shipping
should not be treated differently from other Australian
industries. The Commission is not persuaded by this
argument principally because:
·  international liner shipping is an imported service for
Australia. If Australia, as a comparatively small user of
international liner shipping, were to impose
comparatively onerous regulatory requirements on (some
of) these imports, reducing the profitability of Australian
trades relative to other trades, service levels could
decline. Doubtless other forms of service would expand
to fill the gap in the market, but it is difficult to see why
this would promote the national interest if conferences
had been providing a service valued by shippers and
providing that service efficiently;
Though Part VII
could work in a








considered an end in
itself.OVERVIEW XXXVII
·  while it is desirable that no industry or sector of the
economy is given special favours which may result in
resource misallocation, inefficiency or undesirable
income transfers, virtually all liner shipping to and from
Australia is provided by foreign carriers who use very
few Australian resources. The major potential for
resource misallocation is if Australian shippers cannot
access adequate quality liner shipping at competitive
rates; and
·  uniformity of regulation is not an end in itself — the
ultimate objective must be a regulatory regime which best
serves the national interest.
Moreover, and of overriding importance in this case, the
Commission’s terms of reference direct that the legislation
should be retained if, having passed the test of benefits
outweighing costs, its object cannot be achieved more
efficiently by other means.
The Commission also has considered other options including
notification, a block authorisation and an industry code. With
notification, or with an industry code (unless it had block
authorisation), there would be an additional level of
uncertainty — that is, the uncertainty of not knowing
whether, in practice, it would be administered in a manner
similar to Part X, or similar to Part VII authorisation. In the
event of the latter type of application, the advantages and
disadvantages of a Part  VII authorisation, as already
discussed, would apply.
Even if the Part X-type approach could be replicated in an
industry code or notification procedure, at the very least
transitional costs would be incurred for no apparent gain.
Moreover, liner shipping, in effect, would continue to receive
the special treatment that most proponents of change regard





Unlike other legislation deemed to restrict competition,
Part X does not give liner conferences a protected monopoly.
Rather it applies competition principles in an unusual way,
albeit a way designed to ensure that the interests of
Australian shippers, and the community overall, are
protected. The Commission’s conclusion as to appropriate
regulation for this industry is based on an assessment of the
past and present operation of liner shipping markets and also
how they are likely to develop.
For these reasons, on balance, the Commission considers that
the regulatory approach encapsulated in Part X is likely to
produce better outcomes for Australian shippers, and hence
consumers and the community at large, than Part VII of the
TPA, or available alternatives, and do so more efficiently.
That said, the operation of Part  X could be improved
somewhat, by amendments which clarify the scope of the
exemptions from the TPA with regard to land-based
activities and which extend the range of sanctions available
to the Minister in the event of a breach of an undertaking by
a conference. The Commission has set out the appropriate









than other options ...
… but its operation





The Commission has been asked to report on appropriate regulation for
international liner cargo shipping taking into account, inter alia, the objective
that regulation/legislation should be retained only if the benefits exceed the costs
to the community and if alternatives cannot achieve the objectives of the
regulation/legislation more efficiently.
The Commission concludes that, given competition and market contestability, the
benefits to Australian shippers (and hence the community overall) of allowing
conferences and other cooperative arrangements to operate exceed any costs.
Moreover, given the fact that the interests of Australian shippers are aligned with
the national interest, and that they will vigilantly represent their interests, the
Commission considers that regulation of conferences under Part X is appropriate.
In particular, Part X:
·  involves minimal — but adequate — regulation and promotes commercial
relationships and commercial dispute resolution;
·  is neutral with respect to market arrangements and has not hindered efficient
market outcomes or hindered competitive forces in liner shipping markets;
·  has supported the negotiating position of Australian shippers and assisted in
providing them with predictable service outcomes;
·  is compatible with international regulatory regimes; and
·  is low cost.
Repeal of Part X and its replacement by the general provisions of the TPA (as
they currently stand and as they have been applied) is unlikely to produce
outcomes as good or better than Part  X, or do so more efficiently. While the
Commission accepts that, in principle, a Part X-type approach could be applied
within the general provisions of the TPA, this may require industry-specific
legislation (a notification procedure) or possibly general amendment of the TPA
(block authorisation). However, inevitably uncertainty would remain as to
whether these options would be implemented in the manner of the regulation
which the Commission assesses is appropriate, as embodied in Part X.XL RECOMMENDATIONS
AND FINDINGS
The Commission therefore concludes that the alternatives would not achieve the
objectives of the legislation more efficiently than the current legislation.
Accordingly, Part X should be retained.
The Commission also recommends that the situation be re-examined in 2005 to
ascertain whether the conclusions of this review are substantially altered as a
result of technological or institutional changes in the international liner shipping
market.
Other recommendations
In addition, the Commission considers that operation of Part X could be improved
by the following amendments:
Clarify that the exemption relating to rate setting extends to land-based charges
that normally form part of a ‘terminal-to-terminal’ shipping contract (that is, one
that includes not only the ‘blue water’ component but also the sorting and stacking
of containers within a container terminal). The Commission favours widening the
definition of terminal from the present ‘within the limits of the wharf as under the
Customs Act 1901’ to include terminals located within the metropolitan area of port
cities.
Confirm existing practice allowing members of shipping conferences to negotiate
collectively with stevedores.
Delete sections 10.14.2 and 10.22.2 which allow the fixing of door-to-door freight
rates for outward and inward liner conferences respectively, recognising that the
deletion of these sections will make it necessary for insertion of a clause in
sections  10.14.1 and 10.22.1 permitting conferences to set terminal-to-terminal
rates.
Repeal section 10.05 which prohibits price discrimination in certain circumstances.
The Commission considers that the price discrimination provisions of Part X serve
no useful purpose and indeed are potentially harmful if they discourage efficient







Add a ‘national interest’ test, similar to that in section  10.67, to apply to any
determination by the Minister in relation to sections 10.45(a)(v) and 10.53. This
amendment would ensure that shippers’ interests were taken into account explicitly
in a Ministerial determination as to whether a conference or non-conference carrier
with substantial market power was misusing market power in order to hinder an
efficient Australian carrier.
Provide for more effective and flexible enforcement of undertakings. The provisions
of section 87C of the TPA could serve as a useful model.
Findings
The Commission also examined a range of other issues relating to Part X on which
it decided not to recommend amendments to the current legislation:
The issue of whether or not terminal handling charges should be itemised
separately in the freight charge is a matter for negotiation between shippers and
carriers rather one to be determined within the ambit of Part X.
While accepting the principle that inward shippers should be able to organise in
order to exert countervailing power, the Commission considers that imposing
registration requirements and obligations on inward conferences equivalent to
those imposed on outward conferences would impose some costs, and possibly lead
to significant jurisdictional problems, for little benefit. However, the Commission
does not consider that importers should be precluded from forming a collective







Discussion agreements should not be treated differently from other forms of
cooperation among carriers. The Commission has not been able to identify clear
benefits to offset the costs and difficulties (including problems of definition) that
would be created by not allowing discussion agreements the exemptions currently
provided under Part X. Safeguards exist to protect shippers against any exploitive
practices under discussion agreements.
The current Part X approach, which permits (but does not require) carriers to form
closed conferences, offers efficiency gains through the employment of larger vessels
and cooperative vessel scheduling. The Commission considers that sufficient
competitive pressures exist (notably through internal competitive pressures, the
operation of non-conference carriers, the threat of entry, the operation of
transhipment carriers, and the countervailing power of shippers) to negate any
potential monopoly power of closed conferences.
Division  9 (which relates to declaration of a non-conference carrier with
substantial market power) should be retained because, if used judiciously, it does
not appear to impose costs on shippers, while offering them additional defences
against misuse of market power by any carrier which might come to dominate a
particular trade.
The processes for registering conference agreements and variations to these
agreements provide important transparency benefits and should be retained.
Measures to expedite the registration process are matters for negotiation between
shippers and conferences, not for regulation.
Funding for APSA should come from the beneficiaries of its activities, namely
Australian shippers.
Regulations governing international liner shipping should be retained in the TPA








This chapter provides background to this inquiry and the major issues dealt with in
the report. It also outlines how the Commission has approached its task.
1.1 Australia’s liner cargo shipping task
  Australia’s demand for shipping services is a derived demand, stemming from
domestic demand for imports and foreign demand for Australian exports.
International shipping therefore is an essential intermediate service input for
Australia’s exports and imports.
  Around 79 per cent of merchandise exports and 71 per cent of merchandise imports
(by value) were transported by sea in 1997-98. Liner services are provided by
container (including refrigerated container), roll-on roll-off (ro-ro), conventional
and multi-purpose vessels, and provide regular, scheduled services to set timetables.
Liners tend to carry relatively high value/low volume cargoes (see table 1.1), though
they may carry relatively low value bulky cargoes as ballast. In 1997-98, liner
vessels carried 4 per cent of the volume and 48 per cent of the value of Australia’s
seaborne exports, and 23 per cent of the volume and 74 per cent of the value of
Australia’s seaborne imports. Remaining Australian seaborne trade consists of
commodities shipped by bulk carriers (for example, grains and minerals) and
tankers.
  Within the liner trades, shipping conferences (groupings of liner shipping operators
— see section 1.2 below) tend to carry more valuable cargoes than non-conference
vessels (see table  1.1). Though conferences remain important, currently carrying
more than 50 per cent of liner exports by value and more than 60 per cent of liner
imports, conference shares of both the volume and value of liner trade have fallen
since the early 1980s.2 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
Table 1.1 Australian sea freight, 1997-98
  Australian exports   Australian imports
  By value   $ billion   % of total
by sea
  % of liner
shipping
  $ billion   % of total
by sea
  % of liner
shipping
  Total carried by sea   69.6   –  –  64.1   –  –
  Bulk shipping   36.1   52   –  16.8   26   –
  Liner shipping   33.5   48   –  47.3   74   –
  — Conference   18.8   27   56   30.1   47   64
  — Non-conference   14.8   21   44   17.3   27   36
  By weight   million
tonnes
  % of total
by sea




  % of total
by sea
  % of liner
shipping
  Total carried by sea   427.1   –  –  51.7   –  –
  Bulk shipping   408.8   96   –  39.6   77   –
  Liner shipping   18.2   4.3   –  12.1   23   –
  — Conference   8.1   1.9   45   6.5   13   54
  — Non-conference   10.1   2.4   55   5.5   11   46
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
1.2 Liner shipping conferences
  The principal reason for regulating international liner shipping is the industry’s
propensity to form ‘conferences’.1 Conferences are groupings of liner shipping
operators which coordinate the supply of shipping services. Currently there are
approximately 300 conferences operating worldwide. Each conference tends to limit
its activities to one leg of a particular route or trade between two or more countries.
Most conferences have fewer than ten members, although some have as many as
fifty. Some shipping companies choose to join conferences on all or most of the
routes in which they operate. Other companies choose to operate independently in
all or most trades.
  There is a range of views regarding the rationale for, and effect of, shipping
conferences. As outlined in chapter 3 and appendix B, conferences may enhance
efficiency by allowing carriers to capture economies of scale and scope which in
turn allow them to provide low-cost, reliable, regular, scheduled services to
shippers. On the other hand, conference behaviour may be consistent with the
actions of producer cartels and, as such, facilitate monopolistic or oligopolistic
practices and pricing. In practice, conferences may display desirable and undesirable
characteristics simultaneously.
                                             
1 Shipping generally is subject to international regulatory codes on matters such as safety and
pollution. Conference arrangements, however, exist only for (scheduled) liner shipping.INTRODUCTION 3
This tension between the potential benefits and costs of shipping conferences has
motivated the special regulatory arrangements which typically apply to conferences
worldwide. Thus most countries allow conferences to operate but attempt either to
regulate conference behaviour directly (for example, the United States requires
conferences to be ‘open’ to the entry and exit of members) and/or indirectly, by
promoting the interests of domestic shippers. Australia exempts liner shipping
conferences from the application of some provisions of the Trade Practices
Act 1974  (TPA) while, at the same time, imposing certain obligations on
conferences to negotiate minimum service levels as well as provide information to
Australian shippers. Australian shippers also are allowed to form buying coalitions.
It is this special treatment of international liner shipping within the general
Australian competition laws which has prompted this inquiry.
1.3 Background to the current inquiry
The Commonwealth Government has asked the Productivity Commission to review
Part X of the TPA and to report on the appropriate arrangements for regulation of
international liner cargo shipping services.
This inquiry stems from the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments’
agreement of April 1995 to extend competition policy — the National Competition
Policy. One of the agreements implementing National Competition Policy reforms,
the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA), establishes guiding principles for
reviewing legislation that restricts competition (see box 1.1). The terms of reference
for this inquiry are drawn from these principles.
There have been three reviews of Part X — in 1977 (the ‘Grigor’ Report), 1986 and
1993. Recommendations of the industry taskforce’s Review of Australia’s Overseas
Liner Shipping Legislation in 1986 formed the basis for amendments enacted in the
Trade Practices (International Liner Cargo Shipping) Amendment Act 1989. The
changes were designed to encourage a more competitive environment whilst
permitting exporters and importers continued access to liner conference shipping
services.
To this end, the 1989 modifications to Part X:
·  reduced the scope of the exemptions conference agreements could obtain from
Part IV of the TPA;
·  introduced public registration of outward conference agreements;




·  required negotiation of minimum service levels with shippers in outward trades;
and
·  provided Part IV exemptions for the designated peak shipper body.
Box 1.1 Legislation review requirements
Under the CPA all Australian governments agreed to review and, where appropriate,
reform existing legislation that restricts competition by 31 December 2000.
The Commonwealth Government released its review timetable in June  1996. The
Legislation Review Schedule nominated 98  separate reviews, and foreshadowed,
amongst others, the review of Part X.
In announcing the Review Schedule, the Commonwealth Government also outlined a
number of requirements for reviews. In particular, the Government stipulated that each
review is to be approached according to clause 5(1) of the CPA which states that:
The guiding principle is that legislation (including Acts, enactments and Ordinances or
regulations) should not restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that:
a)  the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and
b)  the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting competition.
The CPA also outlines how reviews should be conducted (clause 5(9)). Specifically, a
review should:
·  clarify the objectives of the legislation;
·  identify the nature of the restriction on competition;
·  analyse the effect of the restriction on competition and on the economy generally;
·  assess and balance the costs and benefits of the restriction; and
·  consider alternative means for achieving the same result including non-legislative
approaches.
The terms of reference for this inquiry are drawn from these broad requirements.
Source: PC (1998c).
  An independent review of Part  X, known as the Brazil Review, was conducted
in 1993. This review recommended that Part X be retained in amended form. The
proposed amendments were designed to strengthen the protection of exporters (that
is, users of outward shipping services), and importers where feasible, and to provide
a commercially-oriented procedure to deal with disputes. However, no changes were
made to the regulatory regime in response to this review.
As already noted, the current review forms part of the scheduled legislative review
process. Many of the issues covered in previous reports have been re-examined withINTRODUCTION 5
a view to assessing whether circumstances have changed, or are likely to change,
such as to warrant modification of the current regulatory approach to the industry.
1.4 Scope of this inquiry and the Commission’s
approach
The terms of reference stipulate that the legislation (Part X) should be retained only
if the benefits to the community as a whole outweigh the costs and if the objectives
of the legislation cannot be achieved more efficiently through other means, including
non-legislative approaches. Accordingly, the Commission has applied this test when
making its final assessment.
In assessing costs and benefits, the Commission was asked to take into account
several objectives, including access of Australian exporters to competitively-priced
international liner cargo shipping services that are of adequate frequency and
reliability, public welfare and equity, economic and regional development, the
competitiveness of business including small business, consumer interests and
efficient resource allocation. In conducting the inquiry, as well as referring to the
general policy guidelines in the Productivity Commission Act 1998 (see chapter 3,
box  3.2), the Commission also was required to have regard to the analytical
requirements for regulation assessment by the Commonwealth, including those set
out in the CPA (box 1.1).
In most legislative reviews under the CPA, the arrangements under review involve a
clear restriction on competition. The current inquiry is somewhat unusual in that it
reviews an exemption (Part  X) to general competition law allowing individual
shipping firms to enter into cooperative arrangements that otherwise would
contravene that law (unless specifically authorised). Though the exemption allows
shipping lines to enter into conferences and similar arrangements (which reduce
competition between members) it does not require them to do so. Nor does it
explicitly constrain market entry, as is the case for most other legislation deemed to
restrict competition.
In this sense, Part X could be described as taking a comparatively permissive stance
towards market structure. However, Part X also puts in place several mechanisms
designed to ensure that cost savings generated by conferences are shared with
Australian shippers.
The Commission’s approach in this inquiry has been to:
·  develop principles for regulation of liner shipping operations, based on: an
assessment of the public interest; the role of shipping conferences in service6 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
delivery and their potential beneficial and harmful effects; an appreciation of the
nature of liner shipping (especially that it is an international industry); and the
fact that Australia relies almost entirely on foreign liner shipping services;
·  assess market outcomes under current regulatory arrangements, and how Part X
has contributed to those outcomes, with a view to establishing strengths and
weaknesses of the current approach;
·  identify and assess possible alternative mechanisms, most importantly, repeal of
Part X and reversion to the general provisions of the TPA, including the Part VII
authorisation provisions; and
·  recommend the regulatory approach which, on balance, best serves the public
interest (and which does so most efficiently).
Report structure
Developments in global and Australian liner shipping markets since the 1993 Brazil
Review are outlined in chapter 2. Principles for assessing the various regulatory
options are developed in chapter 3. Current regulatory arrangements in Australia and
overseas are presented in chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains an evaluation of the quality
and competitiveness of liner shipping to and from Australia. The effectiveness of
Part  X is considered in chapter  6. Major regulatory alternatives to Part  X are
assessed in chapter  7, while possible modifications to the existing Part  X are
canvassed in chapter  8. The Commission’s overall assessment is presented in
chapter 9.
1.5 Conduct of the inquiry
The terms of reference for this inquiry were received on 12  March  1999. The
inquiry was to be completed within six months — that is, by 12 September 1999.
As required by the terms of reference, and in line with normal Commission inquiry
procedures, the Commission encouraged maximum public participation. Soon after
receipt of the terms of reference, advertisements were placed in the national and
specialist industry press and a circular was sent to a range of individuals and
organisations thought likely to have an interest in the inquiry. An issues paper was
released in late March to assist participants in preparing their submissions.
The Commission held informal discussions with organisations, companies and
individuals to seek information and to discuss the characteristics of international
liner cargo shipping. A list of those visited by the Commission is set out in
appendix A.INTRODUCTION 7
Twenty-five submissions were received in response to the issues paper (see
appendix  A). All non-confidential submissions (or non-confidential parts of
submissions) were made available on the internet, at Commission and State libraries
and from Expo Photo Bition copy centres.
Due to the tight timeframe for the inquiry the Commission released an interim
position paper for comment rather than a full draft report. This paper was released
on 29  June  1999 and circulated to all interested parties. Fifteen supplementary
submissions were received in response to the position paper.
Public hearings were advertised in the national and specialist industry press and held
in Sydney on 28 July 1999 and in Melbourne on 29 July 1999. Transcripts of the
hearings and all non-confidential supplementary submissions (or non-confidential
parts of submissions) were made available on the internet, at Commission and State
libraries and from Expo Photo Bition copy centres.
Appendix A provides a list of participants at public hearings, submissions and a
summary of participants’ views.
Associate Professor Keith Trace of Monash University and Ms Frances Hanks of the
University of Melbourne were engaged to assist with technical and legal aspects of
the inquiry.
Dr Neil Byron was Presiding Commissioner for this inquiry. Dr Robin Stewardson





2 Trends in liner shipping
Significant changes have occurred in liner shipping markets since the 1993 Brazil
Review. Major trends and developments in the global liner shipping market as well
as developments in Australian liner trades are discussed in this chapter. Most of the
global trends are mirrored in the Australian context, although the Australian market
differs from the international market in several significant ways.
2.1 Global liner shipping market
World seaborne trade recorded its twelfth consecutive annual increase in 1997,
reaching a new record high of 4.95 billion tonnes (UNCTAD 1998, p. xiii). Of this
total, approximately one third was general cargo, of which about half (that is,
825 million tonnes) was containerised liner cargo. The rate of containerisation of
general cargo, and the proportion shipped by liners, is expected to grow to
65–75 per cent by the second decade of the next century. (Hoffmann 1998)
The number of containers shipped globally also has increased steadily in recent
years (see table 2.1). In 1997, the number of containers shipped was 163.7 million
twenty foot equivalent units (TEU).









1984 52.7 15.7 1991 93.6 9.3
1985 55.8 5.8 1992 102.9 9.9
1986 59.4 6.5 1993 113.2 10.0
1987 67.3 13.3 1994 128.3 13.3
1988 73.8 9.7 1995 137.2 6.9
1989 78.5 6.4 1996 147.3 7.4
1990 85.6 9.0 1997 163.7 11.1
a An 8 foot by 8 foot by 20 foot container is 1 TEU.
Sources: Containerisation International Yearbook (various issues, quoted in LSS, sub.  10, p.  8); DTRS
(sub. 3, p. 6).
The majority of cargo shipped by liners is traded between the northern hemisphere
industrialised regions of Europe, North America and East Asia — the so-called10 INTERNATIONAL
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east–west trades. East–west trades account for around 45 per cent of world liner
traffic — north–south trades make up almost 22 per cent and intra-regional trade the
remaining 33 per cent. (Hoffmann 1998)
Conferences account for the majority of liner shipping capacity on major global
routes. It is estimated that in the mid-1990s conferences accounted for
approximately 60  per  cent of total liner shipping capacity. This share has fallen
markedly since the mid-1970s. For example, at the end of the 1970s the conference
share of the Europe–Far-East trade was around 85 per cent compared to 57 per cent
in 1990 and around 60 per cent currently. (Meyrick & Associates, sub. 5, p. 16)
Independent carriers have improved their quality of service and now some of the
largest container lines operate outside the conference system. Maersk and
Evergreen, the world’s two largest container shipping lines, operate independently
on most trade routes. Several other large  container lines — COSCO, Hanjin,
Hyundai, Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), United Arab Shipping
Company (UASC), Yangming and Zim Israel — have built their businesses, and in
general continue to operate internationally, as independent carriers. (Meyrick &
Associates, sub. 5, p. 18)
Trends in the global liner shipping market
Liner shipping, like other industries, is evolving into a more complex and integrated
international industry. Some liner shipping firms are seeking global status through
bigger ships, larger fleets and expanded services or through mergers or strategic
alliances with other liner shipping firms. (BTCE 1995b, p. 7)
Increased vessel size
The size of container vessels has increased dramatically since the late 1960s and
early 1970s (see table 2.2). Whereas the capacity of early container ships was less
than 1000 TEU, by 1997 vessels of greater than 4000 TEU capacity accounted for
15 per cent of the world container fleet and orders for vessels with a capacity greater
than 4500 TEU comprised almost 60 per cent of container ship orders in that year.TRENDS IN LINER
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Table 2.2 Growth in the size of ships in the world container fleet
Year Class or type Capacity (TEU)
1964–1967a First generation 1 000
1967–1972 Second generation 1 500
1972–1984 Third generation 3 000
1984–1995 Fourth generation 4 500
1995–present Fifth generation (post-Panamax) 6 000
a First generation vessels were first introduced in the Australian market in the late 1960s.
Sources: Trace (1998b, p. 11); Hoffmann (1998, figure 1).
Two factors contributing to the increase in the size of container ships are the
increase in worldwide demand for liner shipping and the existence of economies of
vessel size — see box 2.1 for a discussion of the latter. As yet, neither diseconomies
of vessel size nor constraints on the use of large vessels, such as the inadequacy of
land-based infrastructure to handle ships over a certain size and the cost of widening
and deepening channels to accommodate larger vessels, have deterred the trend to
larger tonnage (Trace 1998b, p. 11).
Box 2.1 Economies of vessel size
Economies of vessel size exist when the unit costs of operating a ship decrease as the
size of the vessel increases. Economies of vessel size are present in each of the three
major components of ship costs — capital costs, crew costs and fuel costs.
In capital costs, economies are driven primarily by the physical fact that as the size of
a vessel increases the ratio of the surface area of the hull to its volume, and hence the
quantity of steel required per unit of volume, declines. There are also significant scale
economies in other capital components including the costs of engines, crew
accommodation, information technology and navigational equipment.
With respect to crew costs, there is little variation in crew numbers as the size of liner
vessels varies. The relationship between fuel costs and vessel size is such that fuel
consumption tends to increase less than proportionally, implying the cost of fuel per
unit of cargo carried tends to fall.
Meyrick & Associates (sub.  5, p.  7, based on figures from Jansson and
Shneerson  1985) estimates that for every 10  per  cent increase in vessel size, unit
costs fall by about 3–4 per cent.
The above economies of vessel size all point in the same direction — a trend toward
increasingly larger ships in the container shipping industry.




The trend to larger ships has been accompanied by strong growth in available liner
capacity. Most trade routes have been oversupplied with ships since the 1970s.
According to Trace (1998b, p.  5), the OECD estimated excess capacity1 of
35 per cent in the Trans-Pacific trade and 40 per cent in the Europe–Far-East trade
in 1985, and the situation worsened during the global recession of the early 1990s.
Excess capacity in liner shipping is a result of a number of factors, including,
somewhat counter-intuitively, increased competition in the liner shipping industry.
Increased competition appears to have led to a quest by carriers for lower costs,
which in turn has led to more and bigger ships.
Excess capacity also is due to the provision by governments in some parts of the
world, such as South Korea, of shipbuilding subsidies, vessel operating subsidies,
special taxation provisions relating to investment in shipping and special taxation
treatment for ship operators (LSS, sub.  10, p.  4). Subsidies have the effect of
increasing the supply of ships relative to demand, such that at any given level of
freight rates more ships are chasing a given volume of cargo (Trace 1998b, p. 6).
Further contributing to the problem of excess capacity in the supply of liner ships
are the low scrapping rates in the industry. The Department of Transport and
Regional Services (sub. 3, p. 6) states that in 1996 the rate of scrapping of ships was
only 0.5 per cent of total capacity.
Changes in concentration
The trend to larger ships has been accompanied by a clear tendency toward
consolidation of carriers in liner shipping (see table 2.3) in an attempt to capture
economies of scale and scope.
The increase in global concentration has been achieved via a relatively large number
of mergers of shipping lines in recent years.2 However, despite the mergers and
                                             
1 At the macro level, excess capacity exists when the carrying capabilities of the global liner
fleet exceed the volumes of cargoes shipped. At the micro or trade level, excess capacity exists
when vessels operate at relatively low levels of capacity utilisation. Liner shipping operators
run regular services along a predetermined route and vessels sail according to a prearranged
schedule whether or not they have full cargoes. Thus, it would not be expected for liner vessels
to operate at or close to 100 per cent of capacity.
2 Recent mergers, takeovers and shareholding agreements include: the purchase of Sea-Land by
Maersk; the acquisition of APL by NOL; the merger between P&O and Nedlloyd; the purchase
of CGM by CMA; the acquisition of Lykes and Ivaran Lines by CP Ships; the purchase of Blue
Star by P&O Nedlloyd; and the majority shareholding of Hanjin Shipping Company in DSRTRENDS IN LINER
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increase in concentration, no single line controls more than 6 per cent of the world’s
total container capacity. The top 20 carriers account for only about half of world
liner vessel capacity. (Hoffmann 1998; Mercer 1999, p. I-1)
Table 2.3 Twenty largest carriers’ share of total liner shipping
capacity, 1986 to 1998
Year Share of total liner shipping capacity
1986 35 per cent
1990 39 per cent
1992 42 per cent
1993 44 per cent
1994 46 per cent
1998 53 per cent
Sources: BTCE (1995a, pp. 10–11); Trace (1998b, p. 8); Meyrick & Associates (sub. 5, p. 9).
Besides mergers, the industry has experienced a complex pattern of alliance
formation and dissolution.3 Strategic alliances offer carriers an opportunity to:
aggregate cargo volumes; increase service frequencies; improve asset utilisation
through the sharing of vessels, terminals, equipment and containers; and employ
their collective financial strength for long-term asset procurement and replacement.
(Hoffmann 1998)
In general, however, alliances have been characterised by frequent breakdowns,
mainly as a result of mergers between lines belonging to different alliances.
Although alliances will probably continue to exist for some time, in the long run
they may be superseded by outright mergers. Most industry observers expect more
consolidation in the future. (Trace 1998b, p. 9; Hoffmann 1998)
Growth in round-the-world, pendulum and transhipment services
Prior to the introduction of containerisation in the late 1960s most carriers operated
‘out-and-back’ shipping services between ports in two or more countries.
Opportunities for different types of service have emerged as a result of the increase
in the scale of cargo flows between the three major northern hemisphere trade
regions of North America, Europe and East Asia.
                                                                                                                                        
Senator Line (Hanjin itself was formed through the merger of Hanjin and the Korea Shipping
Corporation) (Hoffmann 1998).
3 Alliances covering the world’s three major trades routes (trans-Pacific, trans-Atlantic, Europe–
Asia) include the Grand Alliance (NYK, Hapag-Lloyd, MISC, OOCL, P&O Nedlloyd), the
New World Alliance (Hyundai Merchant Marine, MOL, American President Lines) and the




‘Round-the-world’ services now link the three major trade regions with vessels
continually circling the globe in an eastbound or westbound direction. ‘Pendulum’
services typically operate from the east coast of North America via Europe and Asia
to the west coast of North America, returning via the same route. Round-the-world
and pendulum operators compete with out-and-back services provided by carriers
specialising in the Europe–Far-East, trans-Pacific or trans-Atlantic trades.
(Trace 1998a, p. 3, 1998b, p. 12)
There also has been a significant increase in transhipment services, whereby cargo is
transported via regional ‘hub’ ports. Hub ports connect mainline east–west trade
routes to destinations off the mainline routes, such as Australia, via feeder shipping
or landbridging (overland transport). The emerging pattern of feeder services to
mainline routes is analogous to the ‘hub-and-spoke’ networks of airline services
which evolved following the deregulation of US domestic aviation. (Trace 1998b,
pp. 12–13)
As part of the development of a hub-and-spoke network in international liner
shipping it appears a number of ‘super hubs’ are emerging. The changing pattern of
port calls by vessels in the Europe–Far-East trade suggests that Singapore,
Hong Kong and Kaohsiung (Taiwan) are strengthening their competitive positions
with respect to other hubs in the Asian region. There also has been strong growth in
recent years in container movements through the port of Shanghai. (Trace 1998b,
p. 13; Hoffmann 1998)
The trend favouring transhipment in liner shipping can be expected to continue.
Whilst early transhipment services proved unreliable and were characterised by
longer transit times than direct services, transhipment services increasingly offer a
reliable and cost effective alternative to direct services. Whilst direct services
usually are quicker than transhipment services, transit times vary between
transhipment operators, and in some cases transhipment services can offer shorter
transit times than direct services. For example, on the Australia–Europe trade the
transhipment operator AAA consortium offers a 30-day transit time between
Melbourne and the United Kingdom. In comparison, the fastest direct service
between Melbourne and the United Kingdom is 31 days (LLDCN, 28 May 1999,
p. 10).
Increased competition in north–south trades
Until the late 1980s, most liner services from northern hemisphere ports to Latin
America, Africa or Australia/New Zealand were provided by lines specialising in
direct north–south services. Recently, major east–west carriers have entered theTRENDS IN LINER
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north–south trades, typically by way of feeder (transhipment) services linking with
their round-the-world or pendulum services at major northern hemisphere hub ports.
The expansion of major east–west carriers into north–south and regional markets
has been a result of the need to fill increasingly larger ships employed in mainline
east–west trades, the cascading of older, medium-sized ships into secondary markets
and a desire to establish global shipping networks (Hoffmann 1998; Trace 1998b,
p. 14).
Growth of multimodal operators and freight forwarders
To meet the increasing demands of global manufacturers (and to seek a better
financial return) more carriers are offering multimodal and door-to-door transport
services rather than just sea carriage (BTCE 1995a, p. 8).
Competing against carriers in offering multimodal and door-to-door services are an
increasing number of freight forwarders. Freight forwarders book and pay for blocks
of container slots, at a discount from carriers, for some or all sailings of liner
vessels, and sell these spaces on to shippers. Though forwarders compete with
carriers for customers, they offer carriers a stable cargo base. In the United States
and Great Britain one third of all liner cargo is handled by freight forwarders and in
Germany the figure is more than three quarters. (Hoffmann  1998; John  Zerby,
sub. 7, p. 9)
Low freight rates
For a number of years shippers have enjoyed relatively low (and often falling in
nominal and real terms) freight rates. Meyrick & Associates stated:
According to UNCTAD (1998), average container freight rates to and from Europe fell,
in nominal terms, by around 10% between 1991 and 1999. This European-based index
does not include rates on the trans-Pacific routes … and those on intra-Asian routes,
both of which have been hit particularly hard by recent events in Asia. The average
worldwide decline in freight rates is therefore likely to be somewhat larger than the
UNCTAD index suggests. (sub. 5, p. 51)
Table  2.4 shows published liner conference freight rates, in nominal values, for
three major trades from 1988 to 1995. Published freight rates do not reflect
accurately actual rates paid, which often are significantly lower. It also should be
noted that nominal rates do not take account of inflation.16 INTERNATIONAL
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Table 2.4 Published conference freight rates, nominal values, 1988 to
1995 ($US per TEU)
Year Europe–Far-East Trans-Atlantic (westbound) Trans-Pacific (westbound)
1988 3 263 2 841 1 157
1989 3 254 2 884 1 473
1990 3 266 3 121 1 498
1991 2 788 3 321 1 506
1992 2 785 3 277 1 657
1993 2 724 3 052 1 614
1994 2 737 2 913 1 419
1995 2 675 2 958 1 640
Source: Trace (1998b, p.  6, taken from OECD Maritime Transport, based on data supplied by Lloyd’s
Shipping Economist).
The main reasons for decreasing real freight rates, apart from short-term demand
fluctuations, appear to be technological progress, economies of vessel size, excess
capacity and increased competition.
Low profitability
The levels of profitability achieved for a selection of liner shipping companies in
1997 are shown in table 2.5.
Table 2.5 Financial results for a cross-section of liner shipping
companies, 1997 (per cent)
Company Gross profit margina Return on investmentb
MISC 19.94 9.22
Wilhelmsen Lines 15.98 na
Maersk Line 13.58 13.38
CP Ships 9.89 10.98
Mitsui OSK 5.64 3.66
Evergreen Marine Corp Ltd 5.46 3.20
Yangming Marine Transport Corp 5.25 4.44
Hanjin Shipping 4.95 2.88
Sea-Land Services 4.64 7.18
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 4.28 3.18
P&O Nedlloyd 2.17 2.00
a Gross profit margin is operating profit as a percentage of total revenue. b Return on investment is operating
profit as a percentage of assets. na Data not available.
Source: Fossey (1998a, in Meyrick & Associates, sub. 5, p. 52).
On the whole, profitability is low and has been so for many years (see
Drewry Shipping Consultants 1993;  Mercer 1999;  and  Meyrick & Associates,
sub. 5). For example, a recent US study (Mercer 1999) concluded that:TRENDS IN LINER
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… in general, ocean carriers have returned less value to shareholders than other
transportation modes and have underperformed US equity benchmarks such as the
S&P 500 and DJTA (Dow Jones Transportation Average). (p. I-2)
Generally, the view is that profitability of liner carriers is poor because of intense
competition rather than lack of efficiency.
Low profits may be a force driving carriers toward strategies involving alliances,
mergers and building larger ships in an effort to capture economies of scale and
scope. P&O Nedlloyd stated:
It is no secret that financial results of all container liner shipping companies are, and
have been for a considerable number of years, mostly unsatisfactory to modest at best.
… This lack of profitability has led to a significant degree of consolidation in the
industry in recent years. (sub. 6, p. 1)
South-East Asian economic downturn
Participants to this inquiry have suggested that the South-East Asian economic
downturn, which began in late 1997, has slowed growth in trade, exacerbating the
problem of excess capacity in global liner shipping and contributing to the situation
of low freight rates. Furthermore, the Asian ‘crisis’ resulted in massive exchange
rate depreciation, which discouraged imports and encouraged exports. This has
caused particular problems of excess capacity on inward Asian trades.
Implications for competition
The picture emerging is of a global liner shipping industry experiencing significant,
and in some cases rapid, change. Thus far, the trend towards greater industry
concentration via mergers and acquisitions does not appear to have reduced
competition. On the contrary, it appears the expansion of global shipping companies
has increased competition on individual routes — Asian lines have entered the
North Atlantic trade, east–west lines are entering north–south markets and the
feeder services of large carriers are competing with traditional regional lines.
(Hoffmann 1998)
Similarly, growth in alternative types of liner shipping service, notably transhipment
services, and the growing role of freight forwarders has placed increasing
competitive pressure on carriers. To a minor extent potential competition in
transporting general cargo exists in the form of alternative modes of transport such
as air transport and tramp shipping (LSS, sub. 10, p. 7).18 INTERNATIONAL
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Many of the factors driving change in liner shipping appear to be long-term rather
than transitory and are having profound effects on Australian liner trades.
2.2 Australian liner shipping market
Shipping is the major mode of transport for Australia’s exports and imports. In
1997-98, 79 per cent of Australia’s $87.7 billion worth of merchandise exports, and
71  per  cent of Australia’s $90.7  billion worth of merchandise imports, were
transported by sea (ACS  1999, p.  19; ICSD  1999). Many of Australia’s major
exports and imports are bulky or dense, and sea transport is the only viable mode of
transport.
The majority of Australia’s exports and imports (coal, iron ore, wheat, petroleum
and fertiliser) are shipped by bulk carriers or tankers. In 1997-98, the liner trades
accounted for only 4.3 per cent and 23 per cent of the weight of Australia’s seaborne
exports and imports respectively. The liner trades are far more significant in value
terms, because liners tend to carry higher value cargoes. In 1997-98 liners accounted
for 48  per  cent and 74  per  cent of the value of Australia’s seaborne exports and
imports respectively (ICSD 1999).
The weight and nominal value of Australian liner exports and imports have
increased significantly over the last decade (see figure  2.1). Liner exports have
increased from 11.4 million tonnes (worth $24.2 billion) in 1994-95 to 18.2 million
tonnes (worth $33.5  billion) in 1997-98. Liner imports have increased from
9.5 million tonnes (worth $36.1 billion) in 1994-95 to 12.1 million tonnes (worth
$47.3 billion) in 1997-98.
Detailed data describing Australia’s sea freight task are presented in appendix C.TRENDS IN LINER
SHIPPING
19
Figure 2.1 Australian liner exports and imports by weight and value,





























a A series break exists in mid-1994 therefore data before 1994-95 cannot be compared in absolute terms with
data from 1994-95 onward.
Data source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Major trade routes
Australian liner trades have been described as ‘long’ and ‘thin’, a product of
Australia’s relative isolation and the size of its economy. Australia is not located on
the major round-the-world or east–west trade routes — its major trade routes run
north–south. Furthermore, while Australia ranked 15
th in the world in terms of the
number of container movements in 1997, the Australian coastal and liner trade of
2.74 million TEU accounted for only 1.67 per cent of the estimated world total in
that year (Containerisation International 1999, p. 8).
Major trade partners for Australian liner exports and imports are East Asia, Europe,
Japan and North Asia, New Zealand, North America, and South-East Asia.4 While
total Australian liner trade is thin by world standards, cargo flows on several major
routes are substantial, for example the Japan and North Asia, New Zealand, East
Asia and South-East Asia routes. Import and export cargo tonnages on major trade
routes in 1997-98 are presented in table 2.6.
                                             
4 A list of countries comprising the trade areas in this chapter is presented in appendix C.20 INTERNATIONAL
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Table 2.6 Cargo on major Australian liner trade routes, 1997-98 (tonnes)
Trade route Exports Imports Ratio of exports
 to imports
Japan and North Asia 4 181 550 1 193 513 3.5
South-East Asia 3 584 569 1 817 367 2.0
East Asia 3 554 003 1 588 433 2.2
Europe 1 621 187 2 955 052 0.6
North America 1 302 940 2 124 893 0.6
New Zealand 1 226 090 1 296 379 1.0
Total 18 231 552 12 076 149 1.5
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
In 1997-98 the total weight of liner exports was around 50 per cent higher than the
total weight of imports. Since 1994-95 the weight of exports has exceeded the
weight of imports on the Japan and North Asia, New Zealand, South-East Asia and
East Asia trade routes, while for Europe and North America the weight of imports
has exceeded the weight of exports.
Due to the fact that Australia’s exports are denser cargoes than its imports, and
vessel deadweight limitations, a relatively large number of empty containers are
carried on outward journeys compared to inward journeys. Australia’s dense export
cargoes also affect the use of forty foot containers, since the weight of a forty foot
container filled with dense cargo can exceed the capacity of cargo handling
equipment. This, combined with Australia’s geographical position at the end of
north–south trade routes, the fact that, in contrast to import cargoes, a relatively high
proportion of Australia’s exports require refrigerated shipping capacity, and the
seasonality of some major export cargoes, makes Australia’s liner shipping
requirements very complex to manage.
In line with global trends, conference shares of Australian liner exports and imports
for major trade routes have declined overall in recent years, although shares on some
trades have run counter to the trend (see figures 2.2 and 2.3). Conference shares of
exports have declined on the South-East Asia, East Asia, Europe, and Japan and
North Asia routes, while conference shares of imports on the South-East Asia,
East  Asia, Europe and North American routes also have declined. In 1997-98
conferences carried 45 per cent of the weight and 56 per cent of the value of liner
export cargoes, and 54 per cent of the weight and 64 per cent of the value of liner
import cargoes. These shares suggest conference vessels tend to carry somewhat
more valuable cargo than non-conference vessels.TRENDS IN LINER
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Figure 2.2 Conference share of the weight of liner exports for selected
















Data source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Figure 2.3 Conference share of the weight of liner imports for selected




















Australia’s major liner export and import cargoes (listed in table 2.7) tend to have
different characteristics and shipping requirements. Exports tend to be commodities
(such as meat, cereals and dairy products) whereas imports are largely manufactured
goods (such as machinery, vehicles and chemicals). In contrast to many export
cargoes, import cargoes generally do not require refrigeration. Australia’s exports
also tend to comprise more dense cargoes than its imports.
Table 2.7 Conference share of major liner export and import commodity
groups by weight, 1997-98 (per cent)
Exports Share Imports Share
Meat and meat preparations 74 Paper, paperboard and articles of paper 50
Iron and steel 29 Chemicals 59
Vegetables and fruit 51 Machinery 58
Dairy products and birds eggs 63 Non-metallic mineral manufactures, nesa 58
Feeding stuff for animals 63 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 62
Chemicals 41 Iron and steel 25
Aluminium and aluminium alloys 28 Cork and wood 47
Cereals and cereal preparations 39 Vegetables and fruit 64
Wool, sheep and lambs 64 Textile yarn, fabrics and made-up articles 72
Machinery 62 Road vehicles and transport equipment 66
Road vehicles and transport equipment 65 Manufactures of metals, nesa 66
Cotton 63 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 39
a Not elsewhere specified.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
The high proportion of refrigerated container slots required to carry Australia’s
exports of meat, dairy products and other refrigerated cargoes significantly increases
vessel and container capital and operating costs. It also increases the need to carry
empty refrigerated containers to Australia, since many of Australia’s imports cannot
be carried in refrigerated containers. Empty dry containers must then be carried from
Australia for subsequent use in other trades. These problems exacerbate those
caused by the trade volume imbalance on a number of major Australian trade routes.
Conferences have a greater share of trade (judging by weight) than independent
operators in some major liner export commodities, such as meat, road vehicles and
transport equipment, dairy products, animal feedstuffs, wool, machinery and cotton.
For a number of other export commodities — including aluminium, iron and steel,
chemicals and cereals — non-conference vessels dominate. These non-conference
operators are often niche operators, specialising in the carriage of particular
commodities or serving particular regional ports. For example, BHP Transport has




As a result of Australia’s relatively thin trade volumes, vessels employed in the
Australian trades typically are much smaller than vessels in the major east–west
trades (vessel sizes in mainline northern hemisphere trades are discussed in
section 2.1). While costs may be reduced, the employment of significantly larger
vessels generally reduces service frequency and thereby could disadvantage
Australian shippers. Nevertheless, in line with global trends, there has been a move
to employ larger vessels in some Australian trades — primarily, though not
exclusively, as a result of the ‘cascading’ of vessels formerly employed in mainline
northern hemisphere trades (see table 2.8).
Table 2.8 Average conference and non-conference vessel capacities on
major Australian trade routes, 1993 and 1998 (TEU)a
Trade route 1993 1998
Conference Non-conference Conference Non-conference
Europe 2 021 1 074 2 284 1 405
North-East Asia 1 585 1 158 1 849 1 521
South-East Asiab 1 169 1 189 1 170 2 117
North Americac 1 178 na 1 252 1 366
a Vessel capacities are optimum capacities and do not take into account deadweight limitations and the fact
that some of this capacity may be used for cargo from other countries. b Significant changes have occurred in
this market over the period, with an increase in transhipment through South-East Asia, and replacement of
the conference with a discussion agreement (along with a significant change in membership). c Data  for
North America are 1999 data. na Data not available.
Sources: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, pp. 12–51); DTRS Liner Service Sheets.
Total liner capacity servicing Australia is determined by vessel capacity and
frequency of service. Average monthly liner shipping capacities for major
Australian trade routes in 1993 and 1998 are summarised in table  2.9. Average
monthly capacity has increased significantly on the Europe, North-East Asia and
South-East Asia routes.
Table 2.9 Average monthly capacities for major Australian trade routes,
1993 and 1998 (TEU)
Trade route 1993 1998
dry reefer total dry reefer total
Europe 34 885 7 150 42 035 56 383 12 244 68 627
North-East Asia 39 763 7 007 46 770 67 474 9 621 77 095
South-East Asia 31 499 4 604 36 103 44 710 8 046 52 756
North Americaa na na na 27 844 8 323 36 167
a Data for North America are 1999 data. na Data not available.
Sources: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, pp. 12–51); DTRS Liner Service Sheets.24 INTERNATIONAL
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Conference shares of average monthly capacity are presented in table  2.10.
Conference shares of total average monthly capacity have remained relatively
constant on the European and Asian routes, while conference shares of average
monthly reefer capacity have declined on these routes.
Table 2.10 Conference share of average monthly capacity for major
Australian trade routes, 1993 and 1998 (per cent)
Trade route 1993 1998
dry reefer total dry reefer total
Europe 35 71 41 36 39 37
North-East Asia 30 54 34 29 45 31
South-East Asiaa 51 83 55 56 63 57
North Americab na na na 36 64 43
a  The conference operating in this route in 1993 was replaced by a discussion agreement in 1997.
Membership of the discussion agreement is significantly different to the conference. b Data for North America
are 1999 data. na Data not available.
Sources: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, pp. 12–51); DTRS Liner Service Sheets.
Detailed data on shipping capacity in the Australian market are presented in
appendix D.
Transhipment and landbridging
In the past, cargoes often were carried from country of origin to country of
destination on a direct service. Today, many Australian shippers have a choice
between a direct service and transhipment via a hub port such as Singapore.
Transhipment services to and from Australia generally are provided by
non-conference lines. In the past, transhipment frequently resulted in a lower quality
service to Australian shippers, compared to the service provided by direct shipping
services, due to longer transit times and the possibility of cargo being damaged
during transhipment. Today, however, the quality of transhipment services often is
comparable to that of direct services.
The use of significantly larger (and lower cost per unit of cargo carried) vessels on
mainline east–west routes than on Australian routes, coupled with overcapacity and
greater intensity of competition on northern hemisphere routes, has made
transhipment via Asian ports a viable alternative to direct shipping services.
Estimates of the level of transhipment of Australian cargoes are available from
several sources. For example, around 10  per  cent of containers between
Australia/New Zealand and the US west coast are reported to be transhipped
(LLDCN, 16 July 1999, p. 10), and almost 30 per cent of the southbound Europe–TRENDS IN LINER
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Australia trade is reportedly transhipped through Asian ports (LLDCN,
28 May 1999, p. 1). Liner Shipping Services estimates that around 15 per cent of the
southbound Europe–Australia trade is transhipped, while transhipment on the
northbound trade to Europe via South-East Asia is currently about 10 per cent of the
total trade (sub. 10, att. C, p. 1).
Official estimates of the level of transhipment of Australian cargoes are available
from the International Cargo Statistics database provided by the Bureau of Transport
Economics (BTE). While these estimates suggest that the level of transhipment has
increased, they are lower in absolute terms than industry estimates of transhipment.
The difference between BTE and industry estimates may be partly reconciled by the
fact that the level of transhipment of Australian cargoes has reportedly increased
significantly in recent years (data from the BTE is available only up to 1997-98).
There is also an issue of definition of transhipment which may partly explain the
differences (see page  26). Furthermore, the inclusion of significant volumes of
charter cargo from regional ports (which would not be transhipped) as liner cargo in
the BTE database could result in the percentage of liner cargo transhipped appearing
lower than industry estimates.
Nevertheless, data from the International Cargo Statistics database suggests that
over the past decade the proportion of Australian export cargoes transhipped
through South-East Asian and African ports has increased significantly, albeit from
a low base (see table 2.11). Transhipment of export cargoes through East Asian,
Japanese and North Asian and North American ports also has increased. Over the
same period, transhipment of exports through European ports has decreased.
Table 2.11 Shares of total weight of Australian liner exports and imports
which were transhipped, by region of transhipment, 1989-90
and 1997-98 (per cent)
Country/region of transhipment Exports Imports
1989-90 1997-98 1989-90 1997-98
Africa 0.01 0.25 0.12 0.08
East Asia 0.16 0.26 0.29 0.36
Europe 0.22 0.10 0.32 0.42
Japan & North Asia 0.12 0.28 0.15 0.19
North America 0.05 0.15 0.22 0.23
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.01
South-East Asia 0.13 1.82 0.07 1.59
Total 2.53 2.98 2.27 3.32
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).26 INTERNATIONAL
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There is a similar pattern for Australian imports, with strong growth in transhipment
through South-East Asian ports. Moderate growth in transhipment of import cargoes
through East Asia, Europe and Japan and North Asia also has occurred.
Given Australia’s geographical location, it is not surprising that Singapore has
increased significantly in importance as a major transhipment port for Australian
cargo over the past few years. Transhipment of exports and imports through this
region increased 14-fold and 23-fold respectively between 1989-90 and 1997-98. In
1997-98 transhipment of Australian exports and imports through South-East Asia
were in the order of 332 and 192 kilotonnes respectively (ICSD 1999).
Transhipment of Australian imports and exports by region of origin and destination
are presented in table 2.12.
Table 2.12 Shares of total weight of Australian liner exports and imports
transhipped, by region of destination/origin, 1989-90 and
1997-98 (per cent)
Country/region of destination/origin Exports Imports
1989-90 1997-98 1989-90 1997-98
East Asia 0.6 3.5 1.6 2.4
Europe 1.0 4.7 1.5 3.4
India 2.1 10.4 13.5 6.2
Japan & North Asia 1.6 2.6 2.2 3.5
North America 1.2 4.8 7.0 9.7
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 1.2 32.7 28.4 3.9
South-East Asia 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.7
Total 2.53 2.98 2.27 3.32
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
It should be noted that the transhipment data presented in tables  2.11 and 2.12
include only cargo that is transhipped in a different trade region to its region of
origin or destination. For example, export cargoes bound for Europe which are
transhipped in South-East Asia are included in the transhipment data presented here.
However, export cargo destined for Europe that is transhipped in Europe is not
included, nor is import cargo from East Asia that is transhipped in East Asia.5 The
available data do not differentiate between transhipment and landbridging. Data on
transhipment and landbridging within trade regions therefore have been excluded
from the data presented here in an attempt to identify transhipment services
                                             
5 This is in contrast to transhipment data presented in Brazil et al (1993), which include all
transhipped cargoes, including those transhipped in the region of origin or destination. Data
consistent with the data presented in Brazil et al (1993) are presented in appendix C, and are
an upper bound to official statistics on the total level of transhipment of Australian cargoes.TRENDS IN LINER
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competing with direct services on Australia’s major trade routes. The data presented
thus represent a lower bound to the total level of transhipment of Australian cargoes.
Nonetheless, they confirm increased competition to direct services.
Landbridging is the transporting of cargo by rail or road to or from an exporting or
importing port. Australia’s unique geography, whereby most major cities are located
on a coastline that is easily circumnavigated, generally means that when transporting
cargo within Australia there are not major differences in distance and time, and
sometimes cost, between sea, road or rail transport. However, Australia’s large
geographical size and relatively small population mean it is not always cost effective
for container ships to provide services to all ports. Thus, landbridging may be
utilised where there is insufficient cargo to make it worthwhile for a vessel to call at
a particular port or when a vessel has been delayed and owners wish to maintain a
vessel’s pre-arranged schedule and hence bypass an advertised port of call.
On the other hand, in the United States the lack of a continuous coastline generally
means, when transporting goods between east and west coasts, the route is shorter
and hence it is more timely and cost effective to ship goods by road or rail rather
than by sea via the Panama Canal. Furthermore, many major US cities lie inland and
hence it is necessary that a significant part of containerised cargo is landbridged.
There appears to have been little change in the weight of Australian liner exports
and imports landbridged over the past decade.6 In 1997-98, the total percentage of
Australian exports and imports landbridged (by weight) was 12.9  per  cent and
5.1 per cent respectively. The shares of liner exports and imports landbridged by
each Australian state in 1997-98 are shown in figure 2.4. Compared to cargoes from
other states, a higher percentage of Queensland, South Australian and Tasmanian
cargoes are landbridged, which could suggest these states are less well serviced by
liner vessels. The relatively high percentage of exports from NSW that are
landbridged may reflect the fact that Melbourne is closer than Sydney to regions of
southern NSW.
Over the last decade, most landbridged imports were shipped through NSW and
Victorian ports, while the majority of landbridged exports were shipped through
Victorian ports (ICSD 1999).
Detailed data on transhipment and landbridging of Australian export and import
cargoes are presented in appendix C.
                                             
6 Landbridging data presented here assumes landbridging occurs when the port of loading or
unloading is in a different state to the state of origin or destination.28 INTERNATIONAL
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Figure 2.4 Shares of weight of Australian liner exports and imports

























a All ACT exports and imports are landbridged.
Data source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Supply of liner services and freight rates
Southbound (import) rates on the Europe, South-East Asia and North Asia trades
have declined more than northbound (export) rates since 1989 (see figures  2.5
and 2.6). This is likely to be due at least in part to the trade imbalance in Asia,
which means Australian exports are competing with increased volumes of Asian
exports on northbound routes (except for exports to South-East Asia which are
complementary). Australian imports seem to experience less competition for
capacity from imports bound for Asia on southbound trade routes.
Further freight rates data are presented in the case studies of major Australian liner
trades in chapter 5 and in appendix D.TRENDS IN LINER
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Figure 2.5 Index of nominal freight rates in selected Australian

















a Indices for Europe, SE Asia and Japan/Korea are based on estimates of actual terminal-to-terminal rates in
Australian dollars, averaged over all reefer and dry cargoes. Index for North America is for bulk pack meat in
cartons. Base year for North America is 1993.
Data source: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, p. 12–13).
Figure 2.6 Index of nominal freight rates in selected Australian
















a Based on estimates of actual terminal-to-terminal rates in US dollars, averaged over all reefer and dry
cargoes.






The principal purpose of this inquiry is to report on the appropriate arrangements for
regulation of international liner cargo shipping services. The ultimate objective of
any regulatory regime should be to enhance national welfare. In order to assess the
various regulatory options for international liner cargo shipping, including Part X, it
is necessary to identify where the national interest lies and what arrangements in
liner shipping markets are likely to promote that interest. The next step is to identify
those features of a regulatory regime that might facilitate such an outcome. These
issues are addressed below.
3.1 Identifying the national interest
Australia relies almost entirely on foreign shipping lines for international liner cargo
shipping services — liner cargo shipping therefore is an imported service input. As
explained in appendix B, liner shipping costs act in much the same way as a tax on
imports and exports, with the cost incidence a function of relative demand and
supply elasticities. Unlike taxes, however, shipping is an essential input to
Australia’s international trade.
In general, as discussed in appendix B, a reduction in the (inward and outward) cost
of liner shipping to Australia for a given quality of service, or improved service for
a given cost, will promote Australian economic well-being by reducing the cost of
imports to Australian consumers and users of importable inputs, and by making
Australian exports more competitive in world markets.1 In this way, a reduction in
shipping costs or improved service promotes Australia’s international trade and thus
enhances Australia’s overall economic welfare.
Nonetheless, not all members of the community would gain. From the perspective of
import-competing producers, including Australian flag liner shipping operators, a
reduction in shipping rates is analogous with a reduction in tariffs. Although
national economic welfare generally would increase, local producers of competing
goods would then face increased competition from cheaper imports — the natural
                                             
1 If shipping costs fell worldwide, Australia’s relative competitive position may not change (this
woulc depend on Australia’s shipping costs as a proportion of export costs relative to other
countries), though Australia would still benefit from increased global trade.32 INTERNATIONAL
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protection afforded some local producers by distance will diminish. The extent to
which individual producers are affected will depend on the net effect of shipping
rate reductions on their input costs versus any effect on the price of their output.
Some may consider that this detrimental outcome for some import-competing
producers weakens the case for lower cost or better quality shipping on inward
trades. However, national welfare gains would be reduced if lower shipping rates
were limited to outward trades. Unnecessarily high inward shipping rates will harm
the export sector by keeping intermediate input prices higher than they otherwise
would be and harm consumers by keeping import prices unnecessarily high.
Thus, though not all members of the Australian community will gain, the national
interest is best served by efficient and competitively-priced outward and inward
shipping services which directly promote the interests of Australian exporters and
intermediate users and final consumers of importable goods.
Australian shippers and the national interest
Australian shippers (exporters and importers) generally have a clear interest in
obtaining high quality shipping services at the lowest possible price. Reliable,
low-cost shipping services can give exporters and importers a competitive edge in
foreign and domestic markets respectively. Even if the shipper is a foreign-owned
intermediary (for example, a multinational trader), provided there is competition
between export traders and competition in markets for importables, lower shipping
costs will be passed on to domestic export producers and domestic consumers of
imports.
The Law Council of Australia disagreed with this assessment (trans.,  p.  69)
suggesting that exporters may have little interest in negotiating better arrangements
and rates with shipping lines if they (exporters) merely can pass on costs to foreign
buyers. It is correct that if demand for Australian exports were completely inelastic,
any shipping cost increases could be passed on to foreign consumers without
affecting the quantity of exports sold or the price received for them by Australian
producers. In other words, in this highly improbable situation,2 higher (or, indeed,
lower) shipping costs would not affect Australia’s national welfare and, indeed, it
                                             
2 If this were the case, it would imply that Australian exporters could charge any amount they
chose for their exports or that an export tax levied at an infinite rate should be levied. If
Australian exports were restricted artificially by a quota, rather than inelastic demand, there
would be an upper limit to the price that could be charged. In this case, lower freight rates




would make little sense for Australian shippers to waste effort and resources trying
to obtain lower freight rates.
In reality, however, Australian exporters face intense competition in world markets
and, indeed, generally are regarded as price takers. In this environment, a saving in
shipping costs will translate into a higher producer price for Australian producers
and/or increased exports (see appendix B, section B.2). At worst, the cost saving
will be shared between Australian producers and foreign buyers. Thus exporters
generally will have a very strong incentive to negotiate appropriate quality shipping
at the lowest possible price. Typically importers also operate in competitive markets
and face similar incentives.3
Thus, if Australian shippers seek to maximise profits, there is a broad coincidence
between shippers’ interests and the national interest in relation to international liner
shipping outcomes. In other words, shippers’ interests in relation to international
liner shipping act as a close proxy for the public interest.
3.2 Role of conferences
It follows from the discussion in section  3.1 that the main objective of any
regulatory arrangement for international liner cargo shipping services clearly should
be to promote efficient, adequate, reliable and competitively-priced international
liner shipping services to and from Australia. A threshold issue in this inquiry is to
establish what market arrangements are most likely to achieve this outcome and, in
particular, whether under any circumstances liner shipping conferences are likely to
promote such an outcome.
In contrast to bulk shipping, where each vessel carries one commodity on a charter
basis, demand for liner shipping is diverse in terms of cargo size and type as well as
aspects of service. The costs of coordinating these diverse demands virtually rules
out ship chartering as an efficient form of service delivery.4 On the other hand, the
supply of regular, scheduled liner services provides a means of reducing
                                             
3 As with export markets, if the Australian market were restricted by quota, importers (and/or
foreign exporters) would still have an incentive to obtain lower shipping costs. If Australian
importers held the quota, lower-priced, foreign-supplied shipping would increase national
welfare. However, the benefit is unlikely to be passed on to Australian consumers because the
domestic price is fixed by the quota.
4 Freight forwarders consolidate cargoes to some degree and it is likely that computerisation will
further reduce transactions costs of coordinating shippers’ demands. However, it is unlikely
that liner services will be replaced by charter operations.34 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
transactions costs so that shippers with diverse demands are able to access liner
shipping services.
Liner shipping conferences and other cooperative arrangements such as consortia,
can provide a mechanism for efficient delivery of scheduled, direct shipping
services on a particular trade route. Lower costs of provision of such services
require the various economies of scale and scope, which characterise liner shipping,
to be captured. This might suggest that the service on each trade would be offered
by one or two large operators. However, a single shipping line may be loath to
commit several large vessels (and incur correspondingly large fixed costs) in order
to provide a comprehensive, regular, scheduled service where demand is uncertain
(and subject to large swings as the result of exchange rate movements) and where
that uncertainty is exacerbated by the possibility of rivals encroaching on the trade.
Cooperation with potential rivals offers an alternative way of reducing demand
uncertainty. A lower risk premium will mean that larger ships can be utilised and
filled to optimal capacity (thus capturing economies of scale), while a large
conference fleet may generate additional economies (especially in terms of reducing
container costs) and provide the coordinated scheduling valued by shippers.
Importantly, conferences allow individual carriers to operate a global network, thus
spreading trade risk and allowing them to capture associated economies (for
example, by facilitating improved container logistics). In this sense, conferences
may promote more efficient supply of liner services than a large operator on an
individual trade (also see box 3.1 and appendix B). Clearly, however, they are not
the only viable organisational structure, particularly with the emergence of ‘mega-
carriers’ and rapid transhipment.
Because they involve cooperation, conference arrangements also can deliver market
dominance to conference participants (just as company mergers might lead to
market dominance). The extent to which such market power can be exercised will
depend on the incentives for, and ability of, conference members to take
independent action (that is, cheat), the extent of competition, or potential
competition, from shipping operators outside the conference as well as the
countervailing bargaining power of users of liner services.5
                                             
5 While competition may reduce potential cost savings of conferences (by reducing their market
and scale of operation), it will reduce scope for the exercise of market power and
‘x-inefficiency’ within the conference.ASSESSING
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Box 3.1 Role of conferences
·  The supply of regular, scheduled liner services provides a means of reducing
transactions costs so that shippers with diverse demands are able to access (and
afford) adequate liner shipping services.
·  Liner shipping is characterised by a range of economies of scale and scope which
suggest that low cost supply of coordinated services is likely to require some form
of industry integration.
·  Conferences provide for a looser form of cooperation than a single company or joint
venture and typically are route specific (even limited to one direction on each route).
They may engage in joint price setting, capacity rationalisation, revenue and/or cost
pooling arrangements, discriminatory pricing structures, and forms of customer
loyalty agreement.
·  Much of the behaviour of conferences appears consistent with classical cartel or
monopoly behaviour. However, alternative models have been developed to take
account of the fact that liner shipping operators do not appear to earn monopoly
profits. For example, ‘open cartel’ models suggest that monopoly profits are
dissipated in a process of excessive service competition between conference
members and creation of excess capacity.
·  Though many practices of conferences seem consistent with cartel behaviour, there
may be alternative explanations. For example, apparent price discrimination (with
some prices exceeding marginal cost) may be an efficient means of recovering
high, joint fixed costs.
·  Traditionally it has been argued that industry cooperation is necessary to ensure
market stability. By reducing the risk associated with supplying large vessels to a
trade, conferences may facilitate use of vessels and promote operations of optimal
size, thus providing the regular services shippers demand, at low cost.
·  The key to the impact of conferences in practice is whether they face effective
competition or, at least potential competition from outside the conference (even
though they reduce competition among members). In other words, to what degree
are they constrained to charge competitive prices and to operate efficiently?
·  The extent of market contestability and thus the intensity of competitive forces
ultimately must be a matter for empirical investigation. Nonetheless, the fact that
conferences are common in liner shipping and that they have persisted for over a
century despite massive market expansion, technological change (especially
containerisation) and the absence of significant barriers to entry suggests that they
are not just monopoly cartels. Indeed, in the absence of regulatory barriers to entry,
any entry restrictions must derive from the incumbency advantage of conferences
themselves. In other words, any market power of conferences must derive from the
cost savings they generate. If this is the case, elimination of conferences in a bid to
remove market power inevitably will incur an efficiency cost.36 INTERNATIONAL
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If it is accepted that conferences can play a potentially useful role in service delivery
— and most participants in this inquiry appear to agree on this point — it follows
that an appropriate regulatory regime is one that can identify such beneficial
arrangements and help to ensure that benefits are achieved and shared with
Australian shippers, whilst minimising the potential to exploit monopoly power, to
the detriment of Australian shippers. Conversely, a regime with the objective of
thwarting such arrangements, while possibly weakening any market power of
shipping lines, is likely to eliminate a source of potential benefit to Australian
shippers and the community overall.
3.3 Evaluation criteria
In assessing the advantages and disadvantages of Part X and alternative regulatory
regimes, the Commission has been guided by the terms of reference, the
Productivity Commission Act 1998 (see box 3.2) and the broad regulation review
principles established by the Commonwealth Government together with the criteria
of the Competition Principles Agreement (see chapter 1, box 1.1). These various
criteria may not always be fully compatible and trade-offs sometimes will be
necessary.
Drawing on these various guidelines and recognising the characteristics of liner
shipping markets, the Commission considers that relevant criteria for assessing the
various options include:
·  minimising adverse effects on competition. As a general rule, competition will
generate lower prices and better services for consumers. Nonetheless, care must
be taken in defining and assessing competition. Under the Competition
Principles Agreement (CPA), all legislation that restricts competition is required
to be removed unless it can be demonstrated that the benefits of the restriction
outweigh the costs and that restriction of competition is necessary to achieve the
objectives of the legislation. Shipping conferences may be defended on the
grounds that, while they limit competition between conference members, the
result may be more stable and efficient service provision because they allow
shipping operators to achieve a range of production economies. Nor is it clear
that conferences necessarily limit competition — for example, the alternative to a
conference may be a trade falling into the hands of one or two operators,
especially on thin trades. In addition, the extent of competition in the industry
may not be measured adequately by producer numbers. In particular, the degree
of market contestability is a critical factor in assessing the level of competition in
the market, as is the definition of the extent of the market itself. These issues are
central to this inquiry and are discussed in chapter 6, section 6.2;ASSESSING
REGULATION
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Box 3.2 Section 2.8 of the PC Act: general policy guidelines for the
Commission
In the performance of its functions, the Commission must have regard to the need:
(a)  to improve the overall economic performance of the economy through higher
productivity in the public and private sectors in order to achieve higher living
standards for all members of the Australian community; and
(b)  to reduce regulation of industry (including regulation by the States, Territories
and local government) where this is consistent with the social and economic
goals of the Commonwealth Government; and
(c)  to encourage the development and growth of Australian industries that are
efficient in their use of resources, enterprising, innovative and internationally
competitive; and
(d)  to facilitate adjustment to structural changes in the economy and the avoidance
of social and economic hardships arising from those changes; and
(e) to recognise the interests of industries, employees, consumers and the
community, likely to be affected by measures proposed by the Commission;
and
(f)  to increase employment, including in regional areas; and
(g)  to promote regional development; and
(h)  to recognise the progress made by Australia’s trading partners in reducing both
tariff and non-tariff barriers; and
(i)  to ensure that industry develops in a way that is ecologically sustainable; and
(j)  for Australia to meet its international obligations and commitments.
·  consistency with Australia’s economic power and legal jurisdiction. This inquiry
raises issues concerning the extent of Australia’s jurisdiction over foreign service
providers and Australia’s commercial powers over international business
operations (see appendix  B for a discussion of countervailing power). Any
regulatory approach must recognise these constraints — in other words, it must
be workable and enforceable in a manner that promotes Australia’s interests;
·  compatibility with international regulatory regimes. The terms of reference
require the Commission to take into account the interface of the various
regulatory options with international regulatory regimes and international
agreements;
·  minimal regulation. Underlying Commonwealth guidelines, guidelines in the
Productivity Commission Act (see box 3.2), and the terms of reference for this38 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
inquiry, is a general presumption that regulation should be applied only where it
clearly can be demonstrated that such intervention would be preferable to market
outcomes. An interesting issue in this inquiry is whether an exemption from
competition law (Part X), albeit a conditional exemption, which allows private
operators to enter into various arrangements at their discretion, involves more or
less regulation than the application of national competition law, which might
prevent them from making such arrangements;
·  predictability.  The terms of reference ask the Commission to assess the
‘predictability of outcome on standards of shipping services provided’ under
each regulatory option considered;
·  flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. Commonwealth guidelines for
good regulation suggest that regulation that promotes broad outcomes rather than
prescribing means of achieving those outcomes may be less likely to interfere
with market innovation and development; and
·  low administrative and compliance costs; transparency; and regular reviews.
Commonwealth guidelines  suggest that these features should be taken into
account when assessing various regulatory options.
These criteria provide broad guidelines only — it is highly unlikely that any
regulatory approach will fulfil all requirements. Nonetheless, they provide a useful
and consistent checklist against which to assess relevant options for regulating
international liner cargo shipping services and liner conferences in particular.
Some participants to this inquiry (see ACCC, sub. DR36 and Department of the
Treasury, sub. DR35) argue that the paramount objective in this inquiry should be to
ensure consistent application of domestic competition laws. For example, the
Department of the Treasury states that:
… the  first  concern  is  to  seek  liner  shipping  regulation  which  complies  with  the
domestic competition framework. (sub. DR35, p. 18)
The Commission does not agree that uniform application of domestic competition
laws should be the principal objective of regulation of international liner shipping.
As stipulated in the terms of reference to this inquiry (which are based on CPA
principles), the ultimate objective must be a regulatory regime which best serves the
national interest.
The terms of reference also require the Commission to take into account
compatibility of Australian regulation with international regulation. Of course,
uniform application of domestic competition law may be desirable if it enhances
outcomes for Australian shippers. This possibility is explored in chapter 7.ASSESSING
REGULATION
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The Commision also is required to have regard to the effect of regulatory options on





4 Current regulation of international
liner shipping
This chapter briefly examines recent reviews of Australian regulation of shipping
conferences, considers the current state of regulation in Australia and the rationale
for this approach, outlines competition law applying to shipping in several major
overseas economies and, finally, discusses relevant international agreements.
4.1 Regulation of conferences in Australia
The earliest conferences were formed in the years immediately after the opening of
the Suez Canal in 1869. The opening of the canal significantly reduced the length
and time of the voyage from Europe to Asia, creating substantial excess capacity in
shipping markets. Excess capacity not only led to intense competition, rate cutting
and an erosion of profit margins, but to unpredictable sailing schedules as owners
kept vessels on berth in an attempt to gain additional cargo.
The UK–Calcutta Conference, established in 1875, is generally considered the first
successful conference agreement. Thereafter, shipping conferences were introduced
on all major trade routes, including those linking Australia with Europe, North
America, Asia and New Zealand. At times, notably in the 1950s and 1960s,
conferences appear to have possessed some degree of market power in Australian
trades. However, since the introduction of containerisation in the 1960s, liner
shipping has undergone significant technological and organisational changes.
Amongst these was a change in the institutional and competitive structure of liner
shipping, effectively eroding the market power of conferences, coupled with a
reduction in the market share held by conferences in Australian liner trades.
Over the last 20  years, there have been three major reviews of competition
regulation for liner shipping in Australia, only one of which resulted in legislative
changes being passed (see box  4.1). Common themes running through these
inquiries have been a recognition of the potential cost-saving and service benefits to
Australian shippers from conferences, the need to promote countervailing power of
shippers, a desire to encourage commercial resolution of issues where possible,
some extension of the powers of shippers on inward trades (to the extent considered
feasible) and continued provisions for protection to Australian flag shipping42 INTERNATIONAL
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(provided that it was efficient). Both the 1986 and 1993 inquiries favoured separate
bodies being established to oversee liner shipping regulation.
Box 4.1 Recent reviews of Part X
There has been a long history of Commonwealth regulation providing shipping
conferences with conditional exemption from competition legislation. This continued
when the Trade Practices Act (TPA) was introduced in 1965, with overseas liner
shipping excluded as a special case until new provisions (Part XA) were inserted in
1966. These allowed exemptions from all of the competition rules in Part IV of the TPA
for all registered conference agreements, in return for undertakings to enter into
negotiations and provide information to the designated shipper body. Conference
agreements could be disallowed if conferences or their members failed to comply with
an undertaking or appoint a local agent, or if they failed to have due regard for the
need for services to be efficient, economical and adequate, or if they hindered the
entry of an Australian flag carrier. In 1972 the Australian Shippers’ Council was formed
as the designated shipper body under the TPA. It was divided into ten groups for each
regional conference. Previously there had been separate shipper bodies for each
conference. The Council ceased operation in 1989 after Commonwealth Government
funding was withdrawn. The newly established Australian Peak Shippers Association
became the designated peak shipper body in 1990.
While Part X was not changed significantly until 1989, the extension of the TPA in
1974 to cover a wider range of anti-competitive practices effectively meant that the
exemption granted to conferences became more extensive.
In 1977 the Minister for Transport established a departmental study group to review
overseas cargo shipping legislation. This review (Grigor Report) observed a number of
weaknesses in the legislative backing for shippers in their negotiations with
conferences, but no amendments were made to Part X.
In 1984 the Commonwealth Government established an Industry Task Force to review
overseas liner shipping and its regulation. The Task Force (which reported in 1986)
recommended a separate Shipping Act granting continued allowance of cooperative
agreements between carriers but with stronger pro-competitive safeguards on
agreements, prohibition of predatory and discriminatory practices and establishment of







This report provided the basis for amendments to Part X in 1989, providing greater
regulatory oversight of carriers while improving the bargaining power of shippers. To
the extent that the regulatory regime is able to influence behaviour and outcomes,
these changes generally improved the relative negotiating position of shippers. The
exemption of conferences from Part IV was limited to sections 45 and 47. In particular
the misuse of market power provisions (section 46) became applicable to inward and
outward conferences. In addition price discrimination by conferences between similarly
placed exporters was prohibited. Complementing these changes, shippers were given
powers to require conferences to negotiate minimum service levels (in addition to the
traditional terms and conditions for shipping).
In 1993 the Commonwealth Government commissioned a further inquiry into Part X
(Brazil Review), in particular to examine how well the regulation had achieved its
objectives and the possibility of removal or modification to Part  X exemptions for
carriers (for example, banning of pooling, extension of provisions to inward shipping).
The Brazil Review recommendations included retention of Part  X with a series of
proposed amendments particularly with a view to enhancing shippers’ positions. In
particular it argued that the provisions available to shippers be extended to importers,
that the Commonwealth Government provide funding to a peak shipper body and that
the Minister have powers to refer accords and discussion agreements to a proposed
Liner Cargo Shipping Authority. The review recommended establishment of the Liner
Cargo Shipping Authority to resolve disputes between carriers and shippers and take
over the role of competition regulator under Part X.
While Part  X was retained, the Government did not implement any of the other
recommendations and the 1989 provisions remain in force.
Source: Brazil et al (1993); DoT (1986).
4.2 Objectives and key provisions of Part X
The underlying objectives of the current Part  X are akin to those in earlier
Australian competition regulation applying to liner shipping and those underlying
similar legislation overseas. Governments are seeking to establish a regulatory
regime which captures the cost economies and enhanced service possibilities
provided by conferences, while preventing abuse of the potential increase in market
power given to carriers by allowing explicit price, service and capacity agreements
between them. If successful, such a regime would see cost savings and service
improvements passed on to shippers. It is important to recognise that for many
Australian shippers, quality and reliability of service may be considerably more
important than modest savings in ocean freight rates.44 INTERNATIONAL
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In addition to this objective focussed on efficiency, Part X also aims to foster stable
access to outward shipping in all states and territories and to prevent conferences or
carriers with market power from unreasonably limiting participation of efficient
Australian flag shipping in outward trades. In drafting Part  X, successive
governments also have been mindful to avoid conflicts with overseas competition
policy regimes for shipping.
In pursuing these objectives, Part X gives carriers (on both inward and outward
routes) limited exemption from trade practices laws which could otherwise severely
limit their ability to form conferences, discussion agreements and other forms of
cooperation. These exemptions enable carriers to cooperate in the provision of
shipping services and discuss and reach agreements on capacity, services and prices
that they offer jointly.
In return for these limited exemptions, Part  X imposes certain information
requirements on outward conferences and gives rights and powers to shipper bodies
aimed at improving their countervailing power and limiting conference carriers’
ability to exploit any additional market power that Part X may have given them. In
addition, investigatory roles are provided for the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC) and, to a lesser extent, the Australian Competition
Tribunal (ACT). Delegated representatives of the Minister for Transport (‘the
Minister’) have rights to receive certain information from conferences and to attend
negotiations between shippers and conferences. The Minister has the power to make
orders regarding the registration of conference agreements considered to be in
breach of part X requirements and against any outward carriers breaking certain
provisions of Part X. Some of the key provisions of Part X are outlined below in
more detail.
Objectives
The three specific principal objects (all relating to outward shipping) prescribed in
Part X are:
·  to ensure that Australian exporters have continued access to outward liner cargo
shipping services of adequate frequency and reliability at freight rates that are
internationally competitive;
·  to promote conditions in the international liner cargo shipping industry that
encourage stable access to export markets for exporters in all States and
Territories; and
·  to ensure that efficient Australian flag shipping is not unreasonably hindered





The Act provides registered liner cargo shipping conference agreements with
exemptions from section  45 (arrangements restricting dealings or affecting
competition) and, with the exception of third-line forcing, section  47 (exclusive
dealing) of the TPA. These exemptions only relate to certain activities under a
conference agreement, such as fixing freight rates, pooling of earnings, losses and
traffic, restriction of cargo quantities carried and restriction of new entrants to the
agreement. Loyalty agreements also are specifically given these exemptions,
although a shipper has the option to remove this exemption in relation to its own
dealings with conferences. Other provisions of the conference agreement will also
be exempt if they are necessary for its effective operation and are of overall benefit
to Australian exporters. Inward shipping services are provided with a blanket
exemption from sections 45 and 47, with the exception of third-line forcing.
Since 1989, conferences have not been exempt from the operation of section 46
(misuse of market power). No actions have been brought against shipping lines
under this section.1
Part X defines conferences very broadly as an unincorporated association of two or
more ocean carriers carrying on two or more businesses each of which includes, or
is proposed to include, the provision of liner cargo shipping services. This approach
restricts legal arguments about what forms of cooperation constitute a conference
under Part X. Carriers therefore have registered many different agreements, such as
consortia and joint service agreements under Part X. The shipping industry would
not consider such arrangements to be conferences in the traditional sense.
Shippers’ rights
Shippers (through shipper bodies) are given certain rights in dealing with
conferences, which they could not generally expect to obtain in normal commercial
negotiations. Allowing carriers to form conferences that may otherwise be illegal
enables these requirements to be imposed as a quid pro quo — if conferences do not
wish to meet the requirements they would then come under the ambit of the general
provisions of the TPA. In addition, division 9 places certain requirements on non-
conference operators found by the ACT to possess substantial market power on an
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outward trade route,2 to negotiate with designated shipper bodies. These operators
remain subject to all provisions of the TPA. Hence for operators in this category, the
existence of Part  X potentially increases the extent of regulation faced. These
provisions are discussed further below and in chapter 8.
In a number of ways, there is an attempt to provide countervailing power to outward
shippers in their dealings with conferences. Part  X gives shippers the right to
cooperate in negotiating with shipping conferences. The Minister may declare an
association a designated peak shipper body if it represents the general interests of
shippers on outward liner cargo trades. Currently the designated peak body is the
Australian Peak Shippers Association (APSA). If required by the peak shipper body,
conferences must negotiate concerning minimum levels of shipping services to be
provided (s.10.29). Similarly, section  10.41 requires conference members to
negotiate with a designated shipper body on ‘negotiable’ shipping arrangements
such as freight rates, frequency of sailings and ports of call.
An association representing the interests of shippers in particular products or trades,
or from a particular region, may be declared by the Minister as a ‘designated
secondary shipper body’. Currently twelve such secondary bodies are registered.
While they do not have the automatic right to require conferences to negotiate with
them, the Registrar of Liner Shipping may grant this privilege for particular
agreements. In practice, APSA often has delegated its negotiating rights to
secondary shipper bodies.
Secondary shipper bodies are given the right to require both conference members,
and non-conference lines with substantial market power, to negotiate on freight
rates, terms and conditions of carriage and levels of service. They are given
exemption from sections 45 and 47 for the purposes of negotiating with carriers and
entering into loyalty agreements with them. Critically, there is no requirement for
negotiations to be successful, hence shippers are not provided with a power of veto.
But as noted below, shippers (including shipper bodies) may complain to the
Minister if they believe that the outcome of negotiations, or the content or operation
of a conference agreement, breaches Part X. Shippers and shipper bodies have
similar rights with respect to breaches committed by individual carriers with
substantial market power.
Part X also gives shippers the right to obtain from conference carriers information
reasonably necessary for negotiations. It also allows an authorised officer of the
Department of Transport to attend negotiations between conferences and shippers
and to present suggestions which conferences are obliged to consider, but need not
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accept. Conferences and carriers found to have substantial market power are
required to give at least 30 days notice to the relevant shipper bodies, of changes in
matters such as freight rates or service levels. This provides the opportunity for
shippers to activate the negotiation process and gives them some time to adjust their
own operations.
Further, section  10.06 requires agreements between outward conferences and
shippers to provide expressly for questions arising under the agreement to be
determined in Australia under Australian law, unless otherwise agreed by the parties
and the Minister. This provision gives protection to shippers from having
unfavourable jurisdictions imposed upon them in dealing with their contracts with
carriers. Further, all ocean carriers must be represented in Australia by a registered
agent for the purposes of the Act.
The extent to which the above provisions have delivered some additional
negotiating advantage or additional market power to Australian shippers is
discussed further in chapter 5.
The penalty provisions of Part X (discussed below) potentially offer some additional
support to shippers in negotiations and ongoing dealings with conferences and could
allow action against a conference for matters such as excessive pricing or failure to
provide adequate services.3
Investigations and penalties for conferences
At the request of the Minister, or of a party affected by the operation of a registered
conference agreement, the ACCC may investigate whether a conference agreement
contravenes either the minimum registration requirements contained in
sections 10.06 to 10.08, or the other obligations of Part X. These include failure to
negotiate with designated shipper bodies and failing to have due regard for the need
for shipping services to be efficient and economical and of reasonable capacity and
frequency to meet shippers’ needs. The ACCC reports to the Minister who has the
power to decide what action, if any, to take. Except in special circumstances, the
Minister can act only after having received and considered the Commission’s report.
The possible penalties for conference carriers found by an ACCC investigation to
have breached their obligations under Part X are partial or total deregistration of the
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conference agreement concerned (section 10.44), hence rendering that agreement (or
parts of it) liable to all provisions of the TPA.
However, there is considerable opportunity for possible breaches to be resolved by
conferences agreeing to provide appropriate undertakings regarding the actions
concerned. The Minister can make orders against a conference under section 10.44
only if consultations have been undertaken with the conference members. This is in
line with the philosophy underlying Part X to allow, as far as possible, outcomes to
be determined by commercial negotiations rather than regulatory intervention and
penalties. In addition, it reflects the perceived importance of conferences in
delivering shipping services and hence the desire to avoid deregistration. Chapter 8
considers the issue of possible changes to penalties for breaches of Part X.
Inward shipping
While giving inward shipping conferences the same limited competition law
exemptions as conferences on export trades, Part X provides no offsetting power for
Australian importers. This appears to reflect a desire to avoid conflict with
regulatory regimes of other countries. In addition, conference and shipping
agreements for inward trades traditionally have been made overseas between foreign
exporters and carriers, thus giving only a small role to Australian importers and
raising uncertainties about jurisdictional, enforcement and investigatory matters.
Thus, under Part X, Australian importers are not given the legislative right to
negotiate collectively with carriers. In the import trades, the extent of legislative
counterbalancing of any conference market power at present is left implicitly to the
operation of competition legislation in the source country (as well as market forces).
As with outward shipping, section  46 applies to inward conferences, although
jurisdiction and enforcement may be more difficult. The case for giving Australian
importers greater rights under Part X is considered in chapter 8.
Other provisions
In at least two ways Part X contributes to the goal of encouraging stable access to
export markets for all states and territories. First, because conferences are likely to
be able to provide more frequent and comprehensive services, they may be better
placed to service smaller states and thinner trades than independent lines.4 Hence
allowing conferences to form, requiring them to specify minimum service levels and
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providing shippers the right to negotiate with conferences on a collective basis, may
assist smaller states. Secondly, the Minister may cancel all or part of a conference
agreement registered under Part X if the conference fails to provide the capacity and
frequency of service reasonably required by shippers.
Part X also contains provisions for the Minister to deregister conference agreements,
or make orders against non-conference carriers with substantial market power,
which prevent or hinder efficient Australian flag shipping operators from engaging
reasonably in outward liner cargo shipping. These provisions are discussed further
in chapter 8.
Division 11 of Part X allows the Minister to order carriers (conference or other) on
outward liner services, not to engage in a particular (unfair) pricing practice, if the
relevant prices are less than those rates actually charged on the trades concerned by
carriers not enjoying non-commercial advantages given by a government. Such
pricing has to be of such a magnitude and recurring nature that it inhibits efficient
and economical services being provided at a capacity and frequency reasonably
required by shippers and also must be contrary to the national interest. In
determining the national interest for division  11, section  10.67 draws particular
notice to the needs of Australian exporters for adequate and competitive shipping
services and the extent to which their competitors have access to the benefits of the
pricing practices being examined. These provisions are discussed further in
chapter 8.
The 1986 Industry Task Force (DoT 1986, pp. 111–114) recommended provisions
of this nature and they were introduced as part of the 1989 amendments to Part X.
They appear largely to reflect concerns about the possible impact of subsidised
state-owned shipping lines on the competitiveness of Australian flag shipping and
on the stability of scheduled liner conference services.
Under section  10.05, all outwards carriers are prohibited from discriminating
between shippers requiring similar services, if such discrimination is likely to cause
substantial lessening of competition in a market. Discrimination based on cost
differences due to different origins or destinations, or types or quantities of cargo, is
allowed. Similarly, price differences due to the carrier’s capacity or the time at
which the service is required are also allowed. These issues are examined in
chapter 8.
Part X does not include a number of provisions contained in some overseas shipping
regulation. It does not require publication of agreements with shippers, nor does it
ban loyalty agreements or require conferences to be open. These sorts of provisions,
though ostensibly in shippers’ interests, might in some instances operate to lessen50 INTERNATIONAL
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the benefits of establishing conferences and stifle potential competition between
conference members.
4.3 Rationale for current regulation
As noted in section  4.2, the provisions of Part  X represent a delicate balance
between allowing carriers to cooperate in order to achieve scale and scope
economies, while facilitating countervailing shipper power via negotiation and
information rights. Particularly on relatively thin trades, achievement of the desired
frequency and quality of service may require either cooperation between a number
of carriers or provision of services by only one or perhaps two lines. Conferences
also may generate cost savings by allowing better regional and/or global network
economies for carriers than if a similar service were provided by fewer carriers.
These issues are discussed further in chapter 3 and appendix B.
As discussed in section 4.4 below, different countries have developed a variety of
regulatory regimes for the shipping industry, based on this broad model.
Liner shipping services used by Australian exporters and importers are almost
totally foreign owned and, with the exception of port and stevedoring operations
within Australia, utilise foreign resources almost exclusively. Hence, of themselves,
cost savings generated by conferences provide no benefit to the Australian economy,
while the potential for uncompetitive pricing may have increased by allowing ship
owners to cooperate. In the extreme, if conferences provide carriers with
substantially increased market power they could result in prices increasing despite
costs being lowered. Only if cost savings are translated into lower freight rates
and/or better service for shippers will the Australian economy gain from the cost
advantages of conferences.
Hence if the competitive freight rate objectives of Part X are to be achieved, it is
crucial that offsetting forces exist to channel some or all of the cost savings into
lower shipping charges. These may be the existing market power of shippers,
competition from carriers outside the conference, competition from within the
conference (for example, conference lines undercutting each other) or provisions in
Part  X which operate to improve the operations of any of these factors. If
competition within conferences and between conferences and non-conference lines
were guaranteed to generate efficient market outcomes, cost savings could be
expected to be passed on to Australian shippers and the efficiency objectives of




However, Part  X takes the approach that providing the special privileges to
Australian shippers noted above in section 4.2, will further increase the likelihood of
achieving beneficial outcomes from allowing conferences.
Part X also explicitly seeks to promote access to international liner shipping for
exports from all states and territories. This objective relates to perceptions of
fairness or equity between regions and potentially involves both uniform rates and
access to services. Uniform pan-Australian freight rates were a common feature of
liner cargo shipping for many years, although Part X has never imposed them on the
shipping industry. However, as with other industries where competition has
increased, Australia-wide rates now are far less prevalent in shipping. Availability
of frequent and regular services is the other part of this objective and is of
fundamental importance to regional exporters.
Part  X further aims to defend the position of efficient Australian flag shipping
against unreasonable behaviour of conferences or independent carriers with
substantial market power. Traditionally, such provisions have either reflected
concern that foreign dominated cartels may discriminate unfairly against efficient
Australian carriers, or have aimed to provide an information source on international
shipping costs, presumably to assist Australian shippers in negotiations with
conferences or to maintain conference rates at efficient levels. The significant fall in
the role of Australian flag shipping in recent years has reduced the relevance of
these objectives.
The difficulty of such subsidiary rationales for Part X is the possible conflict with
the primary aim for services of the quality that shippers require at internationally
competitive freight rates. If Australian flag shipping is not cost competitive with
overseas carriers, any efforts to enshrine its place in conferences will tend to lead to
the maintenance of excessive freight rates and/or losses for the Australian flag
carrier. Similarly, any attempt to coerce conferences to adhere to uniform rates or
increase service levels for smaller or outlying ports must generate higher charges or
poorer service for other shippers.
4.4 International regulation
Block exemptions to competition rules for international liner shipping, similar to
Part X, are provided by a number of major trading economies. In most of these
countries exemptions are subject to certain conditions and may apply differently to
inward and outward bound services. There are some economies, most notably in
Asia, which do not in any way regulate liner shipping activities — liner shipping is
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significant trading economy which does not exempt, either fully or conditionally,
liner shipping from its general competition rules. According to Meyrick &
Associates (sub.  5, p.  i), in all countries in which foreign carriers are free to
participate in the carriage of liner cargo, carriers are free to form conferences.
Recent reviews of shipping legislation have taken place in a number of economies.
In the United States and the European Union the role of conferences in providing
timely and cost effective liner shipping services has been implicitly acknowledged
and exemptions for conferences from competition rules have been maintained.
Canada also has commenced a review of its regulatory framework, in part in
response to recent regulatory changes in the United States. The interdependence of
the two economies has meant that Canadian shipping regulation has been closely
aligned with that in the United States. A consultation paper issued in mid-1999
(Transport Canada 1999) canvassed a number of options ranging from maintaining
the existing Act through to abolition of competition policy exemptions for
conferences. Responses from interested parties are due by the end of September
1999.
This section briefly outlines features of regulatory arrangements for liner shipping in
some of Australia’s major trading partners as well as relevant international
agreements. Further details of regulation in the United States, European Union,
Canada and New Zealand are provided in appendix F.
United States
Prior to the 1984 Shipping Act, US liner trades were regulated under the
1916 Shipping Act. The regulatory regime has been characterised as interventionist,
with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) playing a major role in approving
and policing shipping agreements and anti-competitive practices. Under US law,
ocean common carriers5 are exempt from US antitrust laws (subject to prescribed
conditions) so far as the setting of common rates is concerned. Ocean common
carriers are also allowed to enter into agreements to offer joint services and/or to
pool their ship capacity.
The passage of the Shipping Act (1984) effectively reduced the level of government
intervention in liner shipping activities (PSA 1993, p. 13). The 1984 Act applied to
agreements by or among ocean common carriers to:
·  discuss, fix or regulate transportation rates;
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·  pool or apportion traffic, revenues, earnings or losses;
·  allot ports or restrict or otherwise regulate the number and character of sailings
between ports;
·  limit or regulate the volume or character of cargo or passenger traffic to be
carried;
·  engage in exclusive, preferential or cooperative working arrangements;
·  control, regulate, or prevent competition in international ocean transportation;
and
·  regulate or prohibit their use of service contracts.
Under the 1984 Act, shipowners retained the power to form open (but not closed)
conferences,6 with shippers being permitted to join associations to protect them
from potential exploitation by conferences possessing some market power.
Shipowner agreements faced a ‘public interest’ test7 and agreements were required
to:
·  include a self-policing mechanism;
·  be open to new members;
·  include a mechanism for handling shipper complaints;
·  allow independent rate action (conferences must allow their members to charge
rates which differ from conference rates on giving not more than ten days
notice); and
·  file details of service contracts and tariffs with the FMC.
The Act streamlined the approval process for conferences.  While the FMC was still
required to scrutinise conference agreements, its power to disallow such agreements
was curtailed.
The Ocean Shipping Reform Act 1998, which became effective on 1 May 1999, is
technically an amendment to the 1984 Act, and changes the regulatory environment
in significant ways. In particular, it allows individual shipping lines belonging to
one or more rate-making conferences to sign contracts with individual customers
without making the same rates or conditions available to all other, similarly-situated
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customers. Details of freight rates, service commitments, liquidated damages for
non-performance (as well as origin and destination in the case of through intermodal
movements) will be kept confidential. However, details of origin and destination by
port range, the commodity or commodities involved, the minimum volume, as well
as the duration of the contract must be made public. The Act prevents conferences
from retaliating against members who contract individually.
After 1 May 1999 conference rates no longer have to be filed with the FMC, though
they must be available to both the public and the FMC. The Act reduces the notice
period for independent action by conference members from ten to five days.
These changes are intended to encourage both intra-conference competition and
competition between conference members and independent lines operating to and
from the United States. As such, they bring US liner shipping regulation8 more in
line with the existing Australian law.
The major differences between the US regulatory regime for liner shipping and
Australia’s Part X are that under US law:
·  both inward and outward trade are covered by the exemptions and obligations;
·  conferences must be open, so that any ocean carrier can join a conference on the
same terms and conditions that apply to all members; and
·  conference members have the legislated ‘right’ of independent action, which
involves offering a freight rate different from the conference rate for a particular
commodity, while remaining a conference member.
Europe
Member countries of the European Union have developed, and are continuing to
refine, a coordinated approach to the regulation of liner shipping.
While Article  85 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits restrictive agreements and
practices, it allows exemptions — either on an individual or a block basis — under
strictly defined conditions. Regulation  4056/86, issued in 1986, grants liner
conferences on both inward and outward trades a block exemption from the
provisions of Article 85, providing that conferences adhere to one condition and five
obligations. The condition is that a conference must not discriminate between ports
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which has regulatory and antitrust authority, reiterated its opposition in principle to extending
antitrust immunity to liner shipping, it nevertheless recognised that the 1998 Act reflected the




or transport users by applying different rates and conditions of carriage to the same
good carried to the same area unless such differences in rates or conditions can be
justified economically. The obligations relate to: consultation between conference
and transport users concerning rates, conditions and quality of service; loyalty
arrangements; services other than those covered by the freight charges; availability
of tariffs; and notification to the Commission of awards at arbitration and of
recommendations made by conciliators. (Gardner 1997, p.  318) The exemption
covers the price fixing activities of liner conferences for an indefinite period.9
While Regulation  4056/86 contains exemptions from Article  85 of the Treaty, it
does not grant exemption from Article 86, which relates to abuse of a dominant
position.
The European Community grants conditional exemption to consortia as well as
conferences. Regulation 870/95, adopted in 1995, provides automatic exemption
from Article 85 for joint service agreements (consortia) that exclude price fixing.10
However, exemptions are available only to certain classes of consortia. Consortia
having a market share of less than 30  per  cent (35  per  cent in the case of non-
conference consortia) receive a blanket exemption from Article 85. The formation
of consortia with market shares between 30  per  cent (35  per  cent in the case of
non-conference consortia) and 50 per cent must be notified to the Commission.11
Such block exemptions cover, inter alia: the coordination and/or joint fixing of
sailings and the determination of ports of call; the exchange, sale or chartering of
slots; the pooling of vessels; and temporary capacity adjustments (Competition
Directorate 1995, p. 21). The exemptions require a ‘fair share’ of the benefits be
passed on to users, a requirement that is considered to be met when there is effective
price competition within the consortium or where consortium members are subject
to actual, effective or potential competition from non-consortium lines. A
forthcoming review of Regulation 870/95 will determine whether or not consortia
will receive exemption beyond the year 2000 (LSS, sub. 10, p. 26).
Since the adoption of block exemptions for liner conferences there have been a
number of European Commission decisions defining their scope:
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investigated agreements between international liner companies in 1994 and decided to retain
Regulation 4056/86 (sub. 10, p. 25).
10 Consortium members that wish to fix rates jointly, but do not satisfy the conditions of
Regulation 4056/86, must apply for individual exemptions (Competition Directorate  1995,
p. 12).
11 An exemption will be granted unless the Commission decides, within six months of
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·  inland price fixing: the Commission’s stance is that conference members
wishing to fix inland prices must engage in cooperation of a type that
necessitates such price fixing. In the case of the Trans-Atlantic Conference
Agreement (TACA), the Commission opposed the collective pricing of inland
transport services. In the amended TACA tariff, rates to and from European ports
are quoted collectively but members no longer quote collectively for inland
transport. The Commission’s decision is subject to appeal;
·  capacity management: a ‘capacity management’ program is one under which the
parties agree to withhold a proportion of the space on their vessel which might
otherwise be used for the carriage of goods in a particular trade. In its
Trans-Atlantic Agreement (TAA) decision, the Commission argued that the TAA
capacity management program was a control mechanism aimed at reinforcing
price discipline among its members. The Commission concluded that such a
freeze on the use of capacity was not a traditional liner conference practice and
was not envisaged when the block exemption under Regulation  4056/86 was
granted; and
·  service contracts12: one of the questions that arose in the TACA case was
whether TACA joint service contracts fell within the scope of the block
exemption.  The Commission argued that, since TACAs joint service contracts
neither appeared in nor were part of the tariff, it could not be said that the block
exemption covered such contracts. (Wood 1999, pp. 17–21)
The European Commission has noted that it is not at present considering any
proposal to modify or abolish the block exemption for liner conferences. Rather it is
continuing to focus on its correct application and particularly on clarifying the exact
scope of block exemptions (OECD  1999b, p.  3). The Productivity Commission
notes that, since many of the European Commission’s rulings relating to block
exemptions, especially those relating to inland transport and service contracts, are
the subject of appeals, the precise scope of the exemption remains to be determined.
Recent reports suggest that the European Community’s Competition Directorate is
developing a ‘more conciliatory framework’ with respect to liner shipping. Meetings
between the Competition Commissioner and executives from leading carriers (the
so-called ‘Transition Group’) have developed draft proposals confirming:
·  the right of individual conference members to sign service contracts;
·  the abolition of European inland price fixing by conferences;
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·  carriers to be allowed to collectively set port-to-port tariffs and to enter into
port-to-port service contracts with shippers; and
·  the preservation of Regulation 4056/86, granting antitrust immunity to freight
conferences.
The draft proposals do not affect legal cases currently under appeal or the European
Commission’s forthcoming review of its block exemption on consortia
(Fossey 1998b, p. 59).
New Zealand
The  Shipping Act 1987 contains the regulatory provisions for liner shipping in
New  Zealand. Under the Act outward liner shipping is exempt from Part  II
(Restrictive Trade Practices) and Part IV (Control of Prices) of the Commerce Act
1986, meaning liner operators on outward trades are allowed to form conferences
and agree on freight rates.
The NZ Shipping Act is based on the premise that relations between shippers and
carriers should be self-regulating, subject to some safeguards. These safeguards
include: the ability of the Minister of Transport to hold an investigation when it
appears an unfair practice is detrimental to New Zealand shippers’ interests;
requiring reasonable notice be given to New Zealand shippers of changes to the
terms and conditions of outward shipping service contracts; and requiring proof that
carriers have entered into reasonable negotiations with shippers.
There is no provision for the designation of peak or secondary shipper bodies to
represent shipper interests — countervailing power is provided by the major export
shippers, which are statutory marketing authorities or producer boards such as the
Dairy Board, the Meat Board, the Apple and Pear Board, the Kiwifruit Marketing
Board and the New Zealand Wool Board (the activities of producer boards are
exempt from the Commerce Act) (DTRS, sub. 3, p. 18).
Asia
Most Asian countries provide liner conferences with a block exemption from
competition rules, where they exist. Generally, there are not as many obligations or
safeguards attached to the exemptions as there are in most Western countries.
Under Japan’s Maritime Transportation Law, outward shipping agreements and
tariffs filed with the Ministry of Transport are exempt from competition laws
subject to certain prohibitions involving, for example, unfairness, discrimination,58 INTERNATIONAL
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unjust raising of freight rates and divergence from filed tariffs. There are no
requirements that carriers consult with shippers on freight rates or conditions of
service, although consultation may take place in practice (DTRS, sub. 3, pp. 18–19;
Flynn 1999).
In order to further promote fair and free competition among carriers, as well as
secure a stable supply of shipping services, the Japanese Government initiated a
review of its exemption system in March 1998. As a result of the review, Japan has
amended its Maritime Transportation Law. The law preserves the immunity
(exemption) of conferences from antitrust law, while allowing the Ministry of
Transport to issue an order for the prohibition or revision of individual agreements
if it is understood that an agreement is unduly restrictive of competition
(OECD 1999b, p. 12). In assessing an agreement, the Transport Minister and Fair
Trade Commission must consider four criteria:
·  user interests are not unduly impaired;
·  no undue discrimination arises;
·  participation in or withdrawal from an agreement is not unduly restricted; and
·  the content of an agreement is the minimum necessary to achieve its purpose
(LSS, sub. 10, p. 26; Flynn 1999; OECD 1999b, p. 12).
As well as setting stricter standards for cartel immunity, the new rules empower the
Minister of Transport to request detailed information about freight levels and
volumes from both conference and non-conference lines. The Minister may initiate
on-the-spot inspections of ships, offices and other places used for shipping and
passenger transport business. The Fair Trade Commission (the government’s anti-
monopoly ‘watchdog’) has been granted parallel authority to review the Ministry’s
oversight of the industry. (Flynn 1999)
Under Korean maritime law a block exemption is granted to liner shipping
agreements notified to the Korea Maritime and Port Administration, subject to
conditions regarding unfair provisions in agreements and hindering Korean
shipping. Article  29 of the Maritime Transport Act provides that ‘a person
registered as an ocean-going transportation business may enter into a contract
concerning freight rates, vessel allocation, cargo transport and other transport
conditions and other joint activities’ (OECD 1999b, p. 14). The Korean Government
reserves the right to take action to suspend such agreements or alter their provisions
(DTRS, sub. 3, p. 19).
Thailand’s shipping legislation gives the government power to stipulate the
proportion of exports and imports to be carried in national flag vessels and provides




government has not used its cargo reservation powers and has limited its promotion
of the national fleet (DoT 1986, p. 75). A recent article in the Daily Commercial
News (Porter  1999) stated that Thailand currently is considering curtailing
conference practices.
Reflecting its role as a transport hub, Singapore is essentially non-interventionist in
the area of international liner shipping and promotes a free-trade environment. It
does not regulate liner shipping in any way, which in essence means liner shipping
is completely and unconditionally exempt from competition rules.
Issues of comity
Compatibility between Australia and its major trading partners of regulatory regimes
for liner shipping is an issue the Commission has been directed to address in the
inquiry terms of reference. A number of participants in this inquiry have raised the
need for compatibility between regulatory regimes for liner shipping. For example,
P&O Nedlloyd stated:
The more uniformity or, at least, compatibility between types of regulatory regimes in
the world, the more world trade growth will be facilitated and the easier it will be to
meet the challenges posed by changing trade patterns due to globalisation. (sub. 6, p. 2)
One of the objectives of the US Shipping Act of 1984 (and the subsequent Reform
Act) is to provide regulation ‘insofar as possible, in harmony with, and responsive
to, international liner shipping practices’ (section 2(2) of the Act).
A central theme in the Brazil Review is that unilateral measures by Australia to
‘eliminate or reduce the market power of international ocean carriers are unlikely to
be of much effect’ (Brazil  et al  1993, p.  xv) because conference arrangements
would then be made in another less restrictive jurisdiction. This concern about the
limited effectiveness of unilateral reform also has influenced policies in other
economies. For example, a 1992 review of the Canadian transport system objected
to the conference system, but nevertheless recommended against unilateral action by
Canada to repeal conference exemptions, emphasising the risk that conferences
simply would bypass Canadian ports (Brazil et al 1993, p. 47).
Australia is party to a number of international shipping agreements which may
affect the level and extent of action that can be taken in attempting to change liner
shipping legislation. Some relevant agreements are discussed below. Developments
in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) under the General Agreement on Trade in




In 1986 a Task Force under the Department of Transport stated in its Liner Shipping
Report that:
As with most forms of international activity, the conduct of international shipping is
governed by a number of international conventions. The degree of international
acceptance of these conventions, however, varies. While conventions dealing with
standards and rules for ship safety and freedom of navigation are widely accepted, there
are no universally applicable international arrangements for economic regulations of
shipping. (DoT 1986, p. 63)
It appears this is still the case.
Discussed below are some of the main international conventions covering
international liner shipping, although agreements relating to maritime safety and
technical matters are not presented.
Convention on the International Regime of Maritime Ports (1923)
Australia is a signatory to the Convention on the International Regime of Maritime
Ports. Under the terms of the Convention a contracting state is required to treat
vessels of other contracting states on the same basis as its own vessels with respect
to freedom of access to ports, use of ports and use of other navigational and
commercial operations. In other words, any shipping operator should be able to
present their vessels for business in a foreign port and expect (and receive) equal
treatment to national ship operators. The United States, Russia and a range of other
countries, some of which are important trading partners of Australia, are not
signatories to the Convention (DoT 1986, p. 63).
United Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner
Conferences (1972)
Australia is not a signatory to this Code, which was adopted in April 1974 and
entered into force in October 1983. The Code was developed partly as a result of
developing countries’ concerns about the refusal by conferences, dominated by lines
from the developed countries, to admit new shipping lines from the developing
countries (Brittan  1992). Hence, most of the signatory countries are developing
countries. The United States, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and European countries




The Code applies only to liner shipping by conferences in trades between
contracting states (DoT 1986, p. 65). In the Code it is stated that there should be
equal access of the national shipping lines of two countries to the traffic generated
by their trade and a ‘significant’ proportion of that traffic should be carried by third
country flagged vessels, such that there is approximately a 40:40:20 cargo sharing
rule (IAC 1989a, p. 374).
Whilst Australia does not participate in such prescriptive shipping arrangements,
there are provisions in Part X of the TPA to facilitate the participation of efficient
national flag shipping operators in Australian trades.
OECD Common Principles of Shipping Policy for Member Countries
(1987)
In February  1987 members of the OECD adopted a common approach to the
shipping industry known as the Principles of Shipping Policy for Member Countries.
This non-binding policy is based on the following elements:
·  the maintenance of open trades and free competitive access to international
shipping operations (Principle 1);
·  coordinated response to external pressure based on full consultations between
member countries (Principles 5 & 6);
·  recognition of government’s role to preserve free competitive access and the
provision of choice to shippers (Principles 9 & 11); and
·  a common approach to the application of competition policy to the liner shipping
sector (Principle 10).
The first review of these Common Principles took place in 1998. The Maritime
Transport Committee (MTC) concluded that the Principles have served, and
continue to serve, a useful function in underpinning Member countries’
liberalisation of shipping policies. However, the Committee thought it necessary to
consider additional principles reflecting recent maritime developments, such as
multimodal transport, and agreed to complete discussion on these proposals by
mid-1999 (OECD 1998a, 1998b).
OECD Conclusions on Promotion of Compatibility of Competition
Policy
Recognising the fundamental importance of compatibility of liner regimes to
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create a common understanding among members of the need for compatibility of
regimes. After comprehensive discussions, and with extensive input from its
members, the MTC developed Conclusions on Promotion of Compatibility of
Competition Policy Applied to International Liner Shipping and Multimodal
Operations that Include a Maritime Leg (DTRS, sub. 3, p. 16).
The Conclusions identify the need for countries to promote compatibility of
competition policies and the desirability of shipping policies that are adaptable to
changing circumstances. Other issues include the need for: efficient and fair
competition; regular evaluation of liner shipping regulation; and consultation
between member countries when conducting such reviews, with the aim of
promoting compatibility and economic efficiency (DTRS, sub. 3, pp. 16–17).
A recent discussion document on regulatory reform, prepared by consultants for the
OECD Secretariat to the Maritime Transport Committee (OECD 1999a), suggested
that partial withdrawal of blanket exemptions for conference activity might warrant
further consideration by the Committee.  However, when asked to comment on the
discussion document’s recommendations, several OECD members ¾ including
Finland, Germany, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands and the US ¾ either rejected the
proposal outright or called for further study of its long-term effects on trade and the
shipping industry (OECD 1999b).
As well as criticising the consultant’s report for failing to consider what ‘efficiency-
enhancing benefits conferences might yield’, the United States noted that ‘antitrust
immunity for price-setting agreements has not inhibited new entrants from
competing in the market. Nor has antitrust immunity slowed the pace of technical
innovation.’ (OECD 1999b, p. 18).
Similarly, Japan noted that:
The fundamental goal of regulatory reform should not merely be to promote
competition but rather that it must also ensure the stable supply and sound development
of ocean-going services which satisfy shippers’ demands. (OECD 1999b, p. 9)
Further, Japan argues that conferences should not be subject to specific approval by
competition authorities:
Considering the fact that the potential for abuse of market power is disproportionate to
the degree of regulation being proposed, we should not impose such a burden on
shipping carriers. Bringing about such bureaucratic deterrent and uncertainty is far from




Matters related to the World Trade Organisation (and GATS)
The WTO has identified links between competition policy and trade policy as key
issues on the multilateral trade liberalisation agenda (WTO  1997). Each of the
132  WTO members are bound by several general obligations or disciplines that
apply across all sectors. There are two key obligations, to provide market access and
national treatment for foreign service suppliers, which apply only to those sectors a
member chooses to list in its schedule of specific commitments. Only 36 members
(including Australia) listed maritime transport services in their schedules of
commitments. The rest of the members, including the United States and the
European Union, have not committed to meet the market access and national
treatment obligations for maritime transport services.
The sensitivity of maritime transport issues is reflected in the failed attempts to
negotiate a maritime transport agreement in the most recent round of GATS
negotiations. Along with basic telecommunications and financial services, maritime
transport services were singled out for specific negotiations, which were to take
place after the completion of the general GATS negotiations. While specific
agreements subsequently were negotiated for basic telecommunications and
financial services, similar progress was not made for maritime transport
(Ruggiero 1998). The next set of services negotiations is required to commence no
later than 1 January 2000, although as yet it is unclear whether maritime transport
services will be discussed at the negotiations.
Zerby (sub. 7, p. 11) considers that, in view of the upcoming resumption of talks on
international liner shipping services as part of the GATS, it is important Australia
avoids ‘regulatory changes that are likely to be incompatible with a possible





5 Performance of liner shipping
In this chapter, the performance of liner shipping services to and from Australia is
evaluated. In particular, the performance of conference and non-conference services
is compared on Australia’s four major trade routes.
5.1 Services to Australian shippers
In this section, the competitiveness of liner shipping freight rates and shipping
service levels to Australia — including frequency, capacity, transit times, ports of
call and reliability — are examined.
Freight rates
Freight rates for conference and non-conference liner shipping services on most
major Australian trade routes have declined significantly during the 1990s (see
section 2.2 for general trends in freight rates on Australian trades and section 5.2 for
more detailed freight rate data for specific trades). These general trends are
illustrated by various freight rates cited in industry publications (Daily Commercial
News, various; Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News, various), for example:
·  rates from Hong Kong to Australia declined from US$1000–1100 per TEU in
1993 to US$550–600 per TEU in 1999;
·  conference rates from Korea to Australia declined from US$1250 per TEU in
October 1996 to US$900 per TEU in October 1997;
·  conference reefer rates for meat from Australia to Japan/Korea declined from
A$4500 per TEU in 1996 to A$3000 per TEU in 1998;
·  freight rates from Australia to Singapore declined from A$1400  per  TEU in
early 1995 to A$1000–1100 per TEU in early 1997 (prior to the Asian financial
crisis), and as low as A$450 per TEU in April 1998; and
·  freight rates from Europe to Australia have declined from A$1900–2200  per
TEU in 1993 to A$1300 per TEU in 1998.1
                                             




The extent of the decline in rates varies between trades. Falls in rates to South-East
Asia have been amplified by the recent economic downturn in that region.
Nonetheless, there have been significant rate falls on all Australian trades, including
thinner trades such as Australia–Europe and Australia–North America.
Freight rates in Australian trades have been affected by a range of factors. For
example, competitive transhipment rates for Europe–Australia cargo routed via
Singapore reflect surplus capacity and intense competition in the Europe–Far-East
trade, stemming in part from the economic downturn in Asia, as well as the current
surplus capacity and low freight rates between South-East Asia and Australia.
Whilst freight rates to and from Asia undoubtedly have been affected by that
region’s economic problems, excess capacity in the container shipping market — a
product of the relatively high level of ship construction and low rate of scrapping —
appears unlikely to disappear in the near future. While freight rates are unlikely to
remain at the exceptionally low levels recorded in 1999, the Commission expects
rates to remain reasonably low for the foreseeable future.
Discussions with industry participants, evidence presented to the current inquiry, as
well as evidence available from the shipping press suggest that, on average, the
difference between conference and non-conference rates has narrowed since 1993.
The Brazil Review (1993) suggested that conference rates in the Australian trades
typically were ten to fifteen per cent higher than non-conference rates. This may not
have been the case at all times and in all trades.2
Current freight rate differentials reflect the level of service provided. For example,
the Wool Commodity Group, responsible for negotiating freight rates in the
European trade on behalf of wool exporters and European importers, agreed a
1998-99 season rate of A$1900 per TEU with Maersk for a transhipment service via
Singapore, while rates for direct services of A$2122 per TEU and A$2055 per TEU
were agreed with the AELA conference and MSC (an independent operator)
respectively (DCN, 24 July 1998, p. 1).
Liner Shipping Services suggested:
Unlike the situation in 1993, independent operators and Conference operators providing
competitive transhipment services now set rates at times above, at or below the rates set
by a Conference in a specific geographic trade area, depending upon their service
capability. In other words, an independent shipowner may have a faster service via
transhipment or direct to a port in Japan from say Sydney for which he should achieve
a premium, but on the other hand there may be a number of cases where he cannot
                                             
2 For example, Federal Maritime Commission tariff data suggest that non-conference freight
rates for a range of commodities shipped from Australia to North America varied from
90–100 per cent of conference rates over the period 1986 to 1990.PERFORMANCE OF
LINER SHIPPING
67
compete with the Conference so readily in terms of service requirements and would
therefore need to offer a discount. (sub. 10, p. 31)
This view is supported by the Department of Transport and Regional Services:
Recent discussions the Department has had with exporters indicate that there is now
very little difference between freight rates charged by conference and non-conference
carriers. (sub. 3, p. 14)
Whilst it can be shown that freight rates in the Australian trades have fallen, it is
very difficult to assess the international competitiveness of freight rates to and from
Australia for a number of reasons, including varying terms and conditions of
carriage, the confidential nature of negotiated freight rates and difficulties in finding
suitable trades with which to compare Australia’s long, thin trades and its cargo
mixes and volumes (Brazil  et al 1993). Indeed, for these reasons, international
comparisons of freight rates can be of limited value, and, therefore, the Commission
has not attempted to prepare such comparisons. Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10,
p.  13), while noting difficulties in comparing rates between trades, submitted
international comparisons of 1999 freight rates to Europe for three commodities.
These suggest that Australian per kilometre rates are internationally competitive,
but the data may be skewed by the impact of fixed costs such as terminal handling
charges.
Most participants in this inquiry, including representatives of shippers and shipping
lines, argue that freight rates in the major Australian trades are internationally
competitive. No participant expressed a contrary view.
For example, according to APSA:
Taking into consideration the scale of Australia’s liner shipping task and the absence of
economies of scale in the size of vessels in Australia’s export trades … rates  are
generally competitive. (sub. 11, p. 12)
The Queensland Government commented that ‘ocean freight rates in the Australian
trade are low by international standards.’ (sub. DR38, p. 2)
In particular, participants have mentioned the role of competition from independent
operators in ensuring lower rates. In this vein, APSA commented:
Under Part X Conferences can fix or regulate freight rates only to the extent that the
market will allow. No longer do Conferences dominate the market and the extent to
which shipping Conferences have effective control over the setting of rates and
conditions has been significantly diminished. (sub. 11, p. 15)68 INTERNATIONAL
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Interlaine, a European Union wool industry body which, in conjunction with
Australian exporters, negotiates with carriers via the Wool Commodity Group,
stated:
Ocean freight rates … for wool have been considerably influenced by the presence of
independent carriers on the Australian waterfront. (sub. 2, p. 3)
Liner Shipping Services also submitted:
Australia has a highly competitive shipping market, with few barriers to entry or exit,
and shippers enjoy extremely competitive freight rates which must rank amongst the
lowest in the world, despite the limited size of the market, high internal costs, e.g. port
charges, the distance of Australia from its major trading partners, and the frequency of
service which several of its export commodities demand. (sub. 10, p. 36)
And:
For a number of years now the competitive element in the marketplace has been a
greater determinant than any other in terms of setting freight rates … (LSS, sub. 10,
p. 32)
The Department of Transport and Regional Services supported this view:
In real terms, liner freight rates are significantly lower now than ten years ago and the
competition from non-conference operators, and different conferences in the same
trade, has increased. (sub. 3, p. 26)
Of course, lower freight rates, of themselves, do not necessarily imply that liner
shipping markets are competitive (in the sense that conferences cannot earn excess
profits).3 That profitability of liner shipping companies at a global level also
appears to be low (see chapter 2, section 2.1), provides some indication that freight
rates do not exceed costs. However, low profitability may be the result of technical
inefficiency.
The Commission sought further information on the profitability of liner shipping on
Australian trades in its Position Paper and by directly approaching shippers and
shipping operators. Confidential data was submitted to the Commission by several
carriers on Australian trades, which indicated that these carriers — including
conference operators — have incurred significant losses in recent years. Such
estimates, however, are sensitive to allocation of non-trade specific costs. The
Commission also developed a model of liner shipping costs and revenues on the
South-East Asian trade (see chapter 6, figure 6.1 and appendix E), which indicates
that costs have fallen significantly less than prices and revenue. While this model is
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illustrative only, applying to a hypothetical vessel operating on the South-East
Asian trade, the results are consistent with the evidence provided by carriers.
Service levels
The nature of many of Australia’s export cargoes means that frequency, transit time,
ports of call, and reliability are all important characteristics of service quality,
which can, in certain circumstances (for example, ‘just-in-time’ manufacturing or
perishable cargoes), be more important than simple price considerations. This
section summarises trends in the level of service provided by liner shipping services
to and from Australia. Detailed data on service levels of conference and
non-conference lines operating on major Australian trade routes are presented in
appendix D.
Frequency
An increase in service frequency does not of itself indicate that service levels have
improved. For example, if average vessel sizes declined significantly, the level of
service may be reduced even though the frequency of service has increased, since
the monthly capacity available to shippers would be less and voyage duration would
be longer. However, in the case of liner shipping services to Australia, both the
frequency and average vessel size (see chapter  2, table  2.8) of conference and
non-conference services on major routes have increased since 1993, suggesting that
the level of service has improved.
The frequency of liner shipping services in all major trades increased from 1993 to
1998 — most significantly on the Europe and North-East Asia trade routes (see
table 5.1). The frequency of conference services increased on all four major trade
routes over the period 1993 to 1998, whilst the frequency of non-conference
services increased on the Europe and North-East Asia trades, but declined on the
South-East Asia trade.4 On the Europe and North-East Asia routes the increase in
frequency of non-conference services was significantly greater than the increase for
conferences.
While the total frequency of non-conference voyages was greater than that of the
conference lines on the Europe, North-East Asia and North America routes,
conferences provide more frequent services than individual non-conference lines on
all trade routes.
                                             
4 Significant changes have occurred on the South-East Asia trade over the period under review.
Membership of the Trade Facilitation Agreement is different from, and significantly larger
than, the conference membership in 1993.70 INTERNATIONAL
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Table 5.1 Sailing frequency for conference and non-conference lines by
trade route (voyages per month)a






E u r o p e 9 2 3 3 2 1 13 64 7
North-East Asia 10 29 39 13 41 54
South-East Asia 19 17 36 28 11 39
North Americab 9n ana 12 16 28
a Non-conference sailing frequency includes both direct and transhipment services. b Data for North America
are for 1999 rather than 1998.
Sources: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C); DTRS Liner Service Sheets.
This is supported by the views of participants in this inquiry. For example,
Interlaine observed:
Non-Conference carriers have … been in a position to compete with Conference lines.
They clearly cannot offer the overall service frequencies which the Conference can. On
the other hand, they have an ability to take large proportions of cargo from and to those
ports where they have the greatest strength. (sub. 2, p. 3)
Capacity
Capacity of itself is not an indicator of service levels. However, it provides an
indication of the carriers’ ability to meet shippers’ demands.
In 1993, the total (reefer plus dry) average monthly capacity of conferences was
higher than the total average aggregate monthly capacity of non-conference direct
lines on the Europe and South-East Asia trade routes. Conferences also offered
greater capacity, including reefer capacity, than any individual non-conference line
on the Europe, North-East Asia and South-East Asia routes (table 5.2).
From 1993 to 1998, conference and non-conference lines increased average
monthly reefer and dry capacity in almost all cases (conference reefer capacity and
non-conference direct dry capacity declined on the Europe trade). For most trades,
the difference between conference and non-conference service levels in terms of
capacity has narrowed since 1993, although conference lines as a whole still offer a
higher quality service, in terms of total and reefer capacity, than individual
non-conference lines.
It is important to note that vessel capacities presented here are optimum capacities
and do not take into account deadweight limitations and the fact that some of this
capacity may be used for cargo from other countries such as New  Zealand.PERFORMANCE OF
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Furthermore, only a proportion of the capacity of transhipment vessels will be
available to cargo on the trade in question.
Table 5.2 Average monthly capacity on selected Australian trade routes,
1993 and 1998 (TEU)a








1993 Conference Reefer 5 064 3 753 3 800 4 941
Dry 12 137 11 995 16 144 5 604
Non-conference direct Reefer 935 2 340  804 na
Dry 12 552 20 054 15 355 na
Non-conference tranship.b Reefer 1 151 913 0c na
Dry 10 196 7 715 0c na
1998d Conference Reefer 4 788 4 332 5 056 5 304
Dry 20 343 19 249 25 240 10 112
Non-conference direct Reefer 1 200 3 381 2 990 619
Dry 6 800 36 289 19 470 6 132
Non-conference tranship.b Reefer 6 256 1 908 0c 2 400
Dry 29 241 11 936 0c 17 732
Increase Conference Reefer -5 15 33 7
(%) Dry 68 60 56 80
Non-conference direct Reefer 28 44 272 na
Dry -46 81 27 na
Non-conference tranship.b Reefer 444 109 0c na
Dry 187 55 0c na
a  Vessel capacities are optimum capacities and do not take into account deadweight limitations and the fact
that some of this capacity may be used for cargo from other countries. b  This is the total capacity of
transhipment vessels. Only a proportion of this capacity will be available to cargo on the trade in question.
c All services between Australia and South-East Asian hub ports are direct rather than transhipment services.
However, cargo for secondary South-East Asian destinations is transhipped at Singapore. d Data for North
America are for 1999 rather than 1998. na  Data not available.
Sources: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C); DTRS Liner Service Sheets.
Foreign port coverage and transit times
Conferences serviced a wider range of foreign ports than non-conference lines on
major Australian trade routes in 1993 (see tables  D.12 to D.19 in appendix  D).
Whilst non-conference lines since have improved their port coverage, conference
lines generally offer a wider range of port calls than non-conference lines. In some
cases, non-conference lines offer better port coverage in particular geographical
areas than conferences — for example, on the North-East Asia trade, a number of
ports in China are serviced by several non-conference lines but not by ANSCON.
Conferences generally offered shorter transit times than non-conference lines on the
Europe and North America trade routes in 1993. On Asian trade routes, however,72 INTERNATIONAL
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some non-conference lines had transit times comparable to those of the conference.
Since 1993, non-conference lines in some cases have improved transit times.
In  1999, while some non-conference lines still have significantly longer transit
times than conference lines (often due to transhipment), some non-conference lines
on major trade routes offer transit times comparable to those of conference
members.
Australian port coverage
All major Australian ports are serviced by both conference and non-conference lines
in each of the major trades (see tables D.9 and D.10 in appendix D). In the Europe,
North-East Asia and South-East Asia trades, conferences currently call at more
major Australian ports than most individual non-conference lines. However, in the
North American trade, the conference calls at fewer major Australian ports than
some non-conference lines.
Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane are relatively well-serviced by the majority of
conference and non-conference lines compared with smaller ports such as
Fremantle and Adelaide. Fremantle and Adelaide tend to be better serviced by
conference lines than non-conference lines on the Europe, North-East Asia and
South-East Asia routes. On the North America route, Fremantle is serviced by some
non-conference lines but not by the conference. Tasmanian ports are even less
well-serviced by both conference and non-conference lines. A number of niche,
non-conference lines also specialise in servicing smaller Australian ports — for
example, Perkins operate a service from Darwin to South-East Asia and NGPL
operate a service from Brisbane, Gladstone, Townsville and Darwin to North-East
Asia.
The Department of the Treasury (sub.  DR35, p.  9) observes that non-conference
lines serve regional ports5 to a greater extent than conference services. Closer
inspection of the data reveals that a large share of exports from regional ports are
not containerised liner (conference or non-conference) cargoes. For example,
500 000 tonnes of dry bulk cargo from regional Western Australia and 200  000
tonnes of sugar from regional Queensland are classified as liner cargoes. However,
such cargoes usually are not carried by regular liner services but by
company-chartered ships or irregular charter services. Moreover, as Liner Shipping
Services points out, these are not the type of service offered by conferences:
Liner shipping involves a multitude of shippers and multitude of cargoes and therefore,
if one shipper such as Pasminco, charters a ship, it is not a liner service. In fact
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Pasminco only last year, switched their liner services from Risdon and Port Pirie for
their shipments of metals and minerals to charter shipping for all markets. (sub. DR37,
p. 2)
Liner services do carry regional exports via centralisation, for example Tasmania
and South Australian cargoes are centralised via Melbourne. Similarly, in some
trades, Brisbane cargo is centralised via Sydney. This is done because lines wish to
utilise their tonnage as efficiently as possible and offer shippers as frequent services
as possible. The number of containers exchanged in some trades would not warrant
diversion of a vessel to Hobart, Adelaide or Brisbane. (See discussion of
landbridging in section 2.2, chapter 2 and section C.6, appendix C.)
Reliability
Participants have submitted that liner services to Australia generally are reliable.
For example, APSA stated that service and reliability are of paramount importance
and in its view liner cargo shipping services to Australia are sufficiently reliable. It
went on to say:
Fixed day arrivals and departures are virtually the norm. The reform of waterfront
practices firstly in 1992 and more recently in 1998 have contributed to these more
reliable schedules. In addition the older first generation of cellular container vessels
have been phased out in many instances and are [being], or have been replaced by
faster vessels which have reserves of speed to make up for delays. (sub. 11, p. 12)
BHP also stated:
Technology has led to the development of larger and faster vessels, resulting in
improved transit times and schedule integrity. These improvements have enabled
shipping lines to take their services to a new level, offering weekly sailings and fixed
day services for certain trade routes. Such features have been used in marketing to
clearly differentiate services from rival offerings. (sub. 24, p. 3)
The Commission examined one aspect of the reliability of liner services,
punctuality, by estimating the number of days variation from the scheduled arrival
date for conference and non-conference vessels arriving in Australia in July and
August  1999. A sample of 36  conference and 48  non-conference voyages was
considered. Arrivals at the first Australian port of call only were considered, as
departures and arrivals at subsequent Australian ports would be affected by delays
in Australian ports which may not be within the control of shipping operators.
Punctuality was measured by comparing the actual date of arrival with the
scheduled arrival date announced in Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News liner
shipping schedules. Scheduled arrival dates were obtained 21–28 days prior to
arrival for vessels on the North America–Australia and Europe–Australia trades and
14–21 days prior to arrival for vessels on the South-East Asia–Australia and74 INTERNATIONAL
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North-East Asia–Australia trades, taking account of the longer transit times for
vessels on the former two trades.
The results of this study are summarised in figure 5.1, and suggest that conference
vessels are more punctual than non-conference vessels. For both conference and
non-conference vessels, the majority of vessels arrived in Australia on the
scheduled arrival date, with the remainder arriving between 3 days early and 7 days
late. Conference vessels are more likely to arrive on the scheduled date than non-
conference vessels. Of the vessels that do not arrive on the scheduled arrival date,
conference vessels are most likely to arrive one day early, and non-conference
vessels one day late.
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a Punctuality is measured by the number of days between the scheduled date of arrival and the actual arrival
date. Negative variation indicates the vessel arrived ahead of schedule.
Data source: Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News, various.
These results support the views submitted by participants. For example, the Sea
Freight Council of Western Australia submitted:
In general the experience of SFCWA is that conference carriers have been slightly
more reliable than non-conference carriers in terms of frequency and certainty of
service. This is not to say that non-conference carriers have not improved their
performance, but it does appear that conference carriers generally retain an edge over
non-conference carriers in terms of reliability and efficiency of service over the long
term. (sub. DR32, p. 3)
Liner Shipping Services also suggested:PERFORMANCE OF
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As a general view, reliability of Conference services has been increasing, with …
berthing windows becoming the norm and definite strides have been made in the
direction of fixed day arrivals and departures in terms of both published sailing
schedules and actual delivery. (sub. DR28, p. 4)
5.2 Case studies
This section presents brief case studies relating to four Australian trades, to aid in
assessing the extent of competition on those trades (detailed case studies are
presented in appendix  G). The trades selected are Australia–South-East Asia,
Australia–North and East Asia, Australia–Europe and Australia–North America.
These are the major Australian liner trade routes, excluding Australia–New
Zealand. However, since the breakdown of the trans-Tasman Accord, the Australia–
New Zealand trade effectively has been absorbed by the Australia–North America
and Australia–Europe trades.
Australia–South-East Asia
The Australia–South-East Asia trade links Australia with Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Singapore is the major hub for Australian
transhipment cargoes routed to and from Europe and North America. Cargo shipped
on vessels employed in the Australia–South-East Asia trade thus includes exports to
and imports from South-East Asia (trade cargo) as well as cargo originating in or
destined for Europe and North America (transhipment cargo).
Major developments in the trade since 1993 include:
·  the breakdown of the Australia–South-East Asia Outward Shipping Conference
in the northbound trade and its replacement by a Trade Facilitation Agreement;
·  relatively frequent changes in consortia membership, culminating in the
emergence of three major groupings of lines in 1998;
·  relatively frequent entries into and exits from the trade;
·  the growing importance of Singapore as a transhipment hub for Australian
trades, and the consequent growth in the volume of transhipment cargo handled
by vessels employed in the trade; and
·  a stepping-up in the intensity of competition, associated not only with the
expansion of incumbent lines, but also with the entry of new lines and a
reduction in the volume of northbound cargo following the Asian financial crisis.76 INTERNATIONAL
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A summary of the various liner shipping service options available to Australian
exporters on the Australia–South-East Asia northbound trade is presented in
figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2 Summary of northbound liner services to South-East Asia, 1999
Data sources: Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News (various issues); Crichton (1999).
Excess capacity has been a feature of the trade. Assuming vessels operate at load
factors of 75  per  cent, northbound capacity is approximately 470  000  TEU.
Estimated northbound cargo volume for 1998, excluding transhipment cargo, was
approximately 200 000 TEU. Accepting the Containerisation International estimate
that 70  per  cent of cargo volume is ‘trade cargo’ and the remaining 30  per  cent
transhipment cargo, increases the northbound cargo volume to 286  000  TEU.
Vessels employed in the trade in mid-1999 had the capacity to carry approximately
65 per cent more than the cargo volume on offer.  In August and September 1999
attempts are being made to rationalise the trade — the ASA consortium has
transferred vessels employed on one of its two loops to the Australia-North and East
Asia trade, the AAX consortium has cut the number of vessels employed from five
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to four, while Maersk and K-Line plan to operate a joint service from Western
Australia to Singapore.
Freight rates in the Australia–South-East Asia trade have fallen substantially since
the mid-1990s. By October 1998 rates were said to be as low as A$500–550 per
TEU. Falls in rates are the direct consequence of increased capacity in the trade.
Members of the Trade Facilitation Group (TFG) announced a rate increase in May
1999, with the aim of establishing a ‘rate floor’ of A$600 per TEU and A$1000 per
forty foot unit, compared with prevailing rates of A$500–550 per TEU.
Each of the three consortia operating within the TFG offers at least a weekly service
to and from South East Asia.  Non-TFG lines offer a lower service frequency.
Wilhelmsen, Contship and PIL/MISC (Queensland service) offer two sailings a
month, while CGM/Marfret provide three sailings a month.
Vessels operated by TFG and non-TFG lines serve a range of ports in Australia and
South-East Asia. Most vessels call at Fremantle and then sail across the Great
Australian Bight to east coast ports, often choosing to centralise Brisbane cargoes to
Sydney rather than incur the cost of a direct call.
All lines call at Singapore, the pre-eminent hub port in South-East Asia.
Port  Kelang also receives relatively frequent direct calls. Trade flows between
Australia and many South-East Asian ports are not large enough to warrant frequent
direct services. Transhipment via Singapore offers an efficient alternative.
Because of the nature of the trade (it is comparatively short and a direct as well as a
‘feeder’ route) the distinction between conference (TFG) and independent
operators, in terms of service, is less pronounced than on other Australian trades.
Nonetheless, TFG members offer higher reefer capacities, more comprehensive port
coverage and more frequent services than non-TFG operators.
Australia–North and East Asia Trade
Vessels employed on the Australia–North and East Asia trade normally serve one of
two loops, either Australia–East Asia (China, Hong  Kong, the Philippines and
Taiwan), or Australia–North Asia (Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Russia).
Whilst the trade is relatively small by northern hemisphere standards — a recent
estimate suggested that the 1999 northbound volume will total approximately
280 000 TEU — it is relatively well balanced.
Major developments in the Australia–North and East Asia trade include:78 INTERNATIONAL
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·  relatively frequent entry and exit by non-conference lines;
·  intensifying competition from lines offering transhipment services via
Singapore;
·  the adoption of a more aggressive stance by independent lines such as MSC,
leading to competitive responses by conference and non-conference lines alike;
·  intensification of competition over time, especially since 1998 when the Asian
financial crisis affected demand and the entry or threat of entry by
non-conference carriers, including transhipment operators, led to substantial
overtonnaging and a decline in freight rates; and
·  the formation of a Discussion Agreement (Australia–North and East Asia Trade
Facilitation Agreement), involving both conference and non-conference lines, in
an attempt to stabilise a trade characterised by a growing gap between supply
and demand.
Competition in the Australia–North and East Asia trade has intensified during the
past two years as a result of new entry and the competitive response to new entry on
the part of incumbent lines.
New entry and the expansion of incumbent lines on the supply side, together with
the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the demand side, has led to an increase in
the level of surplus capacity in the Australia–North and East Asia trade. If it is
assumed that vessels employed in the northbound trade operate at 75  per  cent
capacity utilisation, total northbound capacity is approximately 570 000 TEU. This
figure does not include the capacity provided by transhipment operators, such as
Hanjin and MISC, offering services to North and East Asia via Singapore.
The trade appears to be substantially overtonnaged — 1998 northbound capacity
(570 000 TEU, assuming 75 per cent vessel utilisation) is roughly twice as large as
northbound cargo volume (260 000 TEU in 1998).
Freight rates in the Australia–North and East Asia trade have declined significantly
during the late 1990s. Tim Smith, P&O Nedlloyd General Manager for Australia–
North and East Asia services, has noted that:
Average rates increased in 1994 and 1995, but then fell back again in 1996 and 1997.
The rate of reduction accelerated in 1998, and has continued in 1999 … average freight
rates in the trade [as of July 1999] are only 78 per cent of their 1996 level. (Smith
1999)
In early 1999, northbound rates from Australia–East Asia were reported to be
approximately A$700–800 per TEU, with transhipment operators reported to be
quoting rates as low as $550 per TEU between Australia–North and East Asia (viaPERFORMANCE OF
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Singapore).  If the transhipment rate was as reported, exporters were able to ship
cargo to North and East Asia via Singapore for little if any more than the rate to
Singapore.
Within Australia, vessels normally call at Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane.
Adelaide may be served directly or via centralisation to Melbourne, while Bell Bay,
Burnie and Devonport cargoes are centralised to Melbourne. In Japan, Nagoya,
Osaka and Yokohama commonly receive direct calls.
Shipping lines in the Australia–North and East Asia trade have restructured their
services, rationalising port calls so as to provide faster transits. The ability to
provide the fastest transit between ports is important in marketing a liner shipping
service. Shipping lines tend to specialise in sub-markets — whilst ANSCON
provides the fastest service from Sydney to Yokohama, Maersk offers the fastest
service from Melbourne to Yokohama.
In general, the conference lines as a whole provide better quality service than
individual non-conference lines in terms of overall frequency of service, port
coverage and reefer and dry cargo capacity.
A summary of the various liner shipping service options available to Australian




Figure 5.3 Summary of northbound liner services to North and East Asia,
1999
Data sources: Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News, various issues; Crichton (1999).
Australia–Europe
The Australia–Europe trade includes Mediterranean countries as well as countries in
North Europe. It is one of Australia’s longest liner trade routes, and in total is the
smallest of Australia’s major liner trades. There is a significant trade imbalance on
the route — in 1998, southbound volumes from Europe were reported to be around
240  000  TEU, while northbound trade was 85  000  TEU (LLDCN, 28  May  1999,
pp. 1, 8).
Although a number of lines have entered and departed from the Australia–Europe
trade since 1993, the number of lines servicing the trade has been relatively stable in
recent years. While the number of direct non-conference operators has declined, the
number of transhipment operators has increased. The trade is currently serviced by
the Australia to Europe Liner Association (AELA) and a number of non-conference




(and other Asian ports)
Transhipment service via
Singapore
-  four operators: Hanjin, MISC,
Evergreen, Contship
-  weekly capacity: 5750+ TEU
(limited capacity available for
Australia–North and East Asia
cargo)
-  transit time: Sydney–Yokohama,
20–30+ days




-  6 operators
-  weekly capacity
5900 TEU (1075 TEU
reefer)
-  transit time: Sydney–
Yokohama,
20–30+ days




-  6 operators
-  weekly capacity
10 100 TEU (800 TEU
reefer)
-  transit time: Sydney–
Yokohama, 13–27 days






direct services from Australia to Europe. However a number of lines offer
transhipment services, including Maersk, APL, OOCL and Evergreen/Lloyd
Triestino.
MSC and the transhipment operators on the Australia–Europe trade are providing
substantial competition to the conference. MSC reportedly has a large share of the
direct market, and the volume of cargo transhipped has increased significantly in the
last few years, particularly southbound.6
The annual capacity of direct conference services on the Australia–Europe trade has
increased significantly since 1993, while the annual capacity of direct
non-conference services has declined (see table G.15, appendix G). This largely is
due to the fact that the number of conference members has increased, while the
number of non-conference lines offering direct services has decreased (although the
capacity of MSC has increased significantly since 1993). The annual capacity of
direct conference services in 1999 is more than twice that of direct non-conference
services. Furthermore, the conference offers greater reefer capacity than MSC.
Significant transhipment capacity to Europe also is available, although inevitably
not all capacity on transhipment vessels is available for Australia–Europe cargo.
Significant excess capacity therefore exists in the Australia–Europe trade relative to
trade volumes. This is particularly the case northbound.
The conference as a whole offers more frequent services to Europe than its
competitor for direct services, MSC. MSC offers a weekly fixed day direct service
from Australia to Europe (with transhipment to the Mediterranean). The AELA
offers three fortnightly fixed day direct services to Europe and the Mediterranean,
as well as a Contship/CGM/Marfret direct service every 11 days. AELA member
Wilhelmsen Lines also offers a round-the-world ro-ro service with destinations in
Europe and the Mediterranean every 15  days. The AELA offers a significantly
wider range of foreign direct ports of call than MSC. Furthermore, where both the
conference and MSC offer direct services, the conference offers shorter transit times
in most cases. The level of service provided by transhipment operators to Europe is
variable, with some operators offering transit times comparable to the AELA, while
others offer considerably longer transit times. Ports of call and frequency also vary
across transhipment operators.
                                             
6  Estimates of volumes of cargo transhipped on the Australia–Europe trade are available from
several sources. While these estimates vary, they all show that transhipment, particularly via
South-East Asia, has increased significantly on this trade in recent years, and could now
account for up to 30 per cent of the southbound trade.82 INTERNATIONAL
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A summary of the various liner shipping service options currently available to
Australian exporters on the Australia–Europe northbound trade is presented in
figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4 Summary of northbound liner services to Europe, 1999
a  Freight rates for wool are for 1998-99 season. Freight rates for wool are among the highest on the
Australian–Europe trade.
Data sources: Liner Shipping Services (sub.  10, att.  C); LLDCN, 24  May 1999, 28  May 1999; Bureau of
Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database; DTRS Liner Service Sheets.
Freight rates on the Australia–Europe trade have fallen steadily and significantly
over the last decade, although not to the same extent as on Asian trades. From 1989
to 1998, nominal freight rate indices for this trade declined by around 30 per cent
(LSS, sub. 10, p. 12). Freight rates in the Australia–Europe trade cited periodically
in industry and other publications also suggest that freight rates on the trade have
declined significantly in recent years.
Transhipment service via
Singapore (ie. change ships
at Singapore) (3 companies
+ 3 consortia)




-  transit time (days) to:
England: 33, 36, 40
Holland: 29, 42
Mediterranean: 40
-  freight rate for wool
A$1900 per TEUa




(and other Asian ports)
Conference (AELA) via Suez (8 operators
excluding Wilhelmsen ro-ros)
-  3 fortnightly ‘loops’ (eg. Mediterranean) plus
Contship/CGM/Marfret service every
11 days
-  weekly capacity » 6200 TEU
-  high reefer capacity
-  transit time (days) to:
England: 22, 31 (depends on loop)
Holland: 35, 29
Mediterranean: 20, 29
-  freight rate for wool A$2122 per TEUa
-  » 50% of trade weight (tonnes)
EUROPE
MSC (via Durban)
-  weekly service » 2300 TEU
-  low reefer capacity




-  freight rate for wool A$2055
per TEUa




In 1997-98 liner shipping carried 1.3 million tonnes of Australia’s exports valued at
over $3.5 billion to North America (United States and Canada) representing about
7  per  cent of Australia’s total liner exports by weight and 11  per  cent by value.
Imports from North America carried by liner shipping totalled 2.2 million tonnes
with a value of over $10  billion. Like the European trade, the Australia–United
States trade is a long route with relatively small volumes. It has a high reefer
requirement with seasonal variations in demand on the outward trade. The density
of some exports limits the use of the more economical forty foot containers.
In 1997-98 the North American shipping conferences carried 45 per cent of exports
to North America using liner shipping, representing over 60 per cent of the value of
liner exports to North America. This is a similar share to that carried by conferences
in all Australian trades. However, over the last ten years the conference share of
North American outward trade has remained fairly stable, unlike the falling share
observed on most other outward trades.
Around 40  per  cent of dry container capacity on the direct outward trade is
independently owned and transhipment provides further independent capacity.
Around 10 per cent of containers to and from Australia and New Zealand to the US
west coast are transhipped.
Only about 10  per  cent of direct refrigerated container capacity (reefers) is in
independent hands. There is also some regular transhipment reefer capacity
available, but this is less competitive with direct services due to shipper concerns
regarding possible risks to product during the transhipment phase. The conference
share of meat exports — the main refrigerated cargo to North America — was close
to 80 per cent in 1997-98.7
Membership of the Australia–North America shipping conferences has been stable,
but shares of capacity between the three members have altered significantly over the
last five years. Although it is an open conference, there has been no new entry in the
last decade,8 suggesting an absence of significant long-run excess profits.
There also is a discussion agreement comprising conference members and the joint
venture between Cool Carriers and Scaldis, which operates a seasonal and irregular
joint service from North Queensland using ships with palletised reefer capacity.
                                             
7 Over  40 per cent of the  weight  of  cargo  carried  to  North  America  by  conferences is  meat
products. One third of monthly conference capacity (in TEUs) is refrigerated containers.
8  P&O Nedlloyd took over Blue Star line in 1998 and assumed its place in the conference.84 INTERNATIONAL
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Figure 5.5 outlines the main outward shipping services available on the North
American route.
Figure 5.5 Summary of northbound liner services to North America, 1999
Data sources: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C); LLDCN, 24 May 1999 and 16 July 1999; Bureau of
Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database; DTRS Liner Service Sheets.
On the inward trade from North America, conference and non-conference liner
services carried almost equal weight of cargo in 1997-98, the conference share
having fallen from 60  per  cent in 1989-90. The volume of liner shipping trade
southbound is considerably greater than northbound. This imbalance, and the small
requirement for reefer containers, creates openings for additional carriers on the
southbound leg and there are a large number of transhipment operators.
As with other trades, there have been significant falls in freight rates on the North
American route over the past decade. Discussions with participants indicate
Non-conference
-  2 operators
-  weekly capacity 1400 TEU
(140 TEU reefer)
-  transit time:
Los Angeles: 18 days
San Francisco: 27 days
New York: 27 days
-  freight rate: A$4200 TEU
(for frozen meat)
-  plus C&S shipping services
from North Queensland
and Cool Carriers from
South Australia
-  plus BHP Transport
carrying mainly steel






-  AUSCLA and ACCLA,
3 operators
-  weekly capacity
3600 TEU (1250 TEU
reefer)
-  transit time:
New York – 29 days
San Francisco –20 days
Los Angeles: 22 days
New Orleans: 30 days
-  freight rate:
A$4600 TEU (for
frozen meat)








-  weekly capacity
3300 TEU (560 reefer)
but only limited amount
available for North
America
-  transit time:
New York: 33-38 days
Los Angeles: 22-26 days
-  freight rate: $A3800 TEU
(for frozen meat)




particularly large falls in freight rates for dairy products, from what were considered
to be high rates. Refrigerated rates for meat products have also fallen with rates for
bulk pack meat in cartons in 1998 being 25 per cent below 1993 rates, although
about 15 to 20 per cent above those achieved during a period of fierce competition
in 1994. Independents and transhipment operators generally offer somewhat lower
freight rates for meat products than the conference. However, meat exporters have
placed a high premium on quality and frequency of service and have tended to
remain with the conference. Freight rates for mixed cargoes have declined by
around 30 per cent since 1993 and those for wool have halved.
The trade from Australia to North America has a high requirement for refrigerated
containers and there is a significant imbalance in the need for these containers
between the northbound and southbound legs, with many returning empty. This
imbalance will tend to add to the freight rates charged for export products requiring
the more expensive reefer containers because costs can only be defrayed on one leg.
In addition, stevedoring charges are very high in the US.
Conference rates for outward refrigerated cargoes often included inland transport
and these usually incorporated some degree of cross subsidy between destinations.
Recent indications are that these cross subsidies are now being removed.
The North American conference lines service Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne and
Adelaide. They call at a wide range of east and west coast ports in the United States.
Non-conference operators cover the same Australian ports as the conference, while
MSC/Safbank provide a transhipment service also stopping at Fremantle. Transit
times of major direct service independents appear to be similar to those of the
conference.
Discussions with shippers of refrigerated products indicated that the northbound
North American conferences provided good service but had been relatively
inflexible in discussing terms and conditions. The previous US regulatory
requirement that agreements with shippers had to be publicly filed may have
inhibited the negotiation process. Early indications are that the removal of these
requirements may have stimulated more flexible negotiations on shipping
arrangements.
The outward trade to North America has fewer carriers, both conference and
non-conference, than on most other trades (see figure 5.5). For outward dry cargoes,
the high non-conference share of the trade is indicative of a competitive
environment. The presence of greater transhipment opportunities on the southbound
trade, together with a very limited reefer requirement, also suggests strong
competition on the inward trade.86 INTERNATIONAL
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Conference share of the more specialised outward reefer trade is much higher. This
would appear to reflect shippers’ preferences for the reliability and service level
provided by the North American conference. Nonetheless, independents operating
direct services have over 10 per cent of northbound reefer capacity and independent
transhipment services also exist. Independents have made incursions into the
conference share of reefer cargoes, the most notable in the price war of 1994, but
shippers have tended to return to using the conference.EVALUATION OF
PART X
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6 Evaluation of Part X
In this chapter, the performance of Part X is evaluated against the criteria outlined
in chapter 3.
6.1 Performance of Part X
The primary objective of Part X is to assist shippers (especially exporters) to obtain
competitively-priced shipping services of adequate frequency and reliability.
Comments from shippers suggest that market outcomes over the 1990s have been
favourable to them and the evidence in chapter  5 confirms these views. The
contribution of Part X in attaining these outcomes is examined below.
Reasons for observed outcomes
The principal reason for lower freight rates and improved service levels for
Australian shippers appears to be market forces in both global and Australian liner
shipping markets, particularly supply-side forces. Growth of and improvements in
transhipment services coupled with increased capacity of direct service operators
are major factors contributing to rate declines. The high level of container ship
orders, especially the building of larger vessels in a bid to capture economies of
scale, combined with low scrapping rates and cascading of ships formerly employed
on mainline northern hemisphere routes to north–south trades, and continued
subsidisation of shipbuilding and shipping by some governments, has generated a
level of vessel capacity which has tended to outstrip the rate of growth of freight
carried. There also have been reductions in stevedoring costs (due to improved
reliability on the Australian waterfront) and bunker costs (though bunker costs are
likely to increase in line with recent oil price increases) which have contributed to
rate declines more recently. On the demand side, economic recession in several
Asian economies has put short-term pressure on regional freight rates, particularly
in the Australia–South-East Asia route.
The role of the market in providing favourable outcomes for Australian shippers is
not new. In 1986, the Industry Task Force observed:88 INTERNATIONAL
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Not for half a century have such competitive pressures existed in world liner shipping.
Australian users generally are benefiting from this market situation through both
favourable freight rates and a wider choice of carriers. (DoT 1986, p. 1)
This feature of liner shipping appears to have continued for over a decade. For
example, the OECD noted that:
… between 1985 and 1995 the worldwide index of standardised container freight rates
declined from 100 to 51.5. The main contributing factor to this was almost permanent
over capacity on certain main trades. (1997, p. 125)
Role of Part X
As outlined in chapter 4, Part X provides a comparatively permissive framework in
which carriers (on outward and inward trades) can achieve the economies offered
by shipping conferences and other cooperative arrangements, including consortia.
Importantly, however, shippers are not restricted to using conference services. And
while Part X allows conferences to form and engage in a range of activities that
normally would be proscribed by competition law, it does not compel formation of
conferences (nor impose certain structures — for example, it does not insist on
‘open’ conferences). And, most importantly, it does not protect conferences from
competition from external sources or, indeed, from competitive forces within the
conference. In this sense, Part X does not thwart market forces which have been
critical in achieving satisfactory outcomes for individual Australian shippers.
The Law Council of Australia argued that market forces operate in the liner
shipping market despite Part  X (trans.,  p.  73), the implication being that, by
allowing conferences to operate, Part X restricts such forces. However, Part X does
not oblige independents to join conferences nor does it impose barriers to entry to
Australian trades. Moreover, while conferences necessarily involve cooperation
between some shipping lines, such cooperation and the coordinated, regular service
they provide, can be regarded as a market solution to low-cost provision of shipping
services for shippers of general cargo. In other words, cooperation in some form,
whether via conferences, consortia, joint ventures or company mergers, will be
required if shipping lines are to be in a position to provide comprehensive, regular
and frequent shipping services.
Thus, by allowing conferences and other cooperative arrangements to operate, albeit
subject to market competition and obligations imposed by Part X, Part X allows
shippers to access a full range of shipping services. The role of conferences in
providing the level of service required by the wool industry was stressed by
Interlaine:
In respect of wool, the following considerations need to be borne in mind:EVALUATION OF
PART X
89
• on average some 14–15 000  TEUs (or close to 300  000  tonnes) are carried from
Australia to the European area each season.
• this wool needs to be shipped from all of Australia's major ports to a wide range of
ports in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean.
• many mills are located at some considerable distance from the nearest ports of
arrival. It is therefore essential that efficient on-carriage arrangements exist to
enable the wool to reach its final destinations without delay, and at a competitive
price.
• in today's difficult trading environment, European receivers and manufacturers
cannot afford to hold large stocks of raw material, they work very much on a "quick
response" or "just in time" basis. Hence their need for high-quality service and
reliability, rapid transit times, linked to competitive ocean freight rates, and space
availability.
The existence of the Australia to Europe Liner Association (AELA) in the form
permitted by Part X of the TPA provides such a service. (sub. 2, pp. 1–2)
Interlaine also noted that potential market power of conferences was effectively
constrained by competition from independent operators:
Even if certain of these [independent] operators are not major wool carriers to Europe
today, they certainly would quickly enter the wool industry in a big way if Conference
lines attempted to significantly increase their rates; this is in itself a guarantee that the
Conference will not enjoy any quasi-monopolistic position. (sub. 2, p. 2)
As discussed in chapter 4, Part X also gives Australian exporters rights to negotiate
collectively with conferences to determine minimum service requirements and
requires conferences to supply information relevant to such negotiations. Collective
negotiation allows Australian shippers to exploit any countervailing power that they
might possess, while access to relevant information improves the negotiating
position of shippers.
Shippers who have participated in this inquiry consistently expressed the view that
this bargaining framework has contributed to satisfactory outcomes for Australian
exporters. For example, according to APSA, the designated peak shippers’
negotiating body under Part X:
APSA submits that without the rights of exporters and the obligations placed on
carriers under sections 10.29, 10.41 and 10.52, exporters would not have achieved the
successes they have achieved, and that carriers would have been able to service their
own interests without regard for exporters. (sub. 11, p. 14)
While it could be argued that APSA may have an interest in justifying its status as
the peak shippers’ body, individual shippers also expressed the view that scope for
collective action under Part X is desirable. The Commission considers that shippers’
views are critical in this inquiry. Given the benefits which accrue to shippers from90 INTERNATIONAL
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lower freight rates and improved service levels, it is unlikely that they will enter
arrangements which do not promote such an outcome. Again quoting Interlaine:
… we  believe  that  in  any  negotiation  on  terms  and  conditions,  wool  shippers  and
receivers will be at a relative advantage if they are in a position to negotiate together
for the volumes of cargo described above, and as a result, to insist that the level,
frequency and quality of service provided should satisfy the requirements of the
industry as a whole.
This is important for the Australian economy itself. Whilst there are in the industry a
small number of major exporters and receivers, there are also a much greater number of
smaller operators. They together make up overall demand. The availability of a quality
service for all shippers and receivers to the destinations they require works to the
advantage of wool growers in Australia, whose current plight, mainly as a result of the
Asian crisis, is well-documented.
In our view, the above comments on service apply equally well to price. In this area too
we believe that WCG [Wool Commodity Group] has been successful in achieving
overall reductions in freight rates on behalf of the industry as a whole. (sub. 2, p. 2)
Shippers claim that collective negotiation under Part  X has allowed them
successfully to negotiate terminal handling charges, bunker adjustment factors and
currency adjustment factors, and minimum service levels. Nonetheless, the role of
APSA in negotiating freight rate changes with conferences increasingly has been
taken over by designated secondary bodies and, within parameters so set, by direct
negotiation between large individual exporters and shipping operators. Smaller
exporters, however, appear to continue to rely on group negotiations under the
umbrella of designated shipper bodies.
Though APSA concedes that the demand by shippers for collective rate negotiations
has weakened, it submitted that Part X:
… allows shippers to demand that Conferences meet and negotiate on other matters
such as:
• Surcharges
• Minimum levels of service
• Bill of lading clauses
• Destination zone/inland haulage charges (sub. 11, pp. 10–11)
Similarly, although BHP noted that the operation of market forces has been
instrumental in achieving current price and service outcomes, it also claimed that
Part X has promoted shippers’ interests:
There are numerous recent examples of instances where shippers, acting collectively in
accordance with Part X, have been successful in avoiding attempts by shipping lines to
impose ancillary charges, covering items such as Port Service Charges (PSCs),EVALUATION OF
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Terminal Handling Charges (THCs) and Currency and Bunker Adjustment Factors
(CABAFs). (sub. 24, p. 4)
APSA and the other designated bodies also may play a role in disseminating
information provided under Part  X by conferences to individual shippers, thus
indirectly enhancing the latter’s negotiating power. It also is argued that the
countervailing provisions of Part  X would become more relevant when, and if,
market conditions tighten. However, it is not clear to the Commission how
collective action by Australian shippers could be more successful in such conditions
than it is currently.
The ACCC (sub. DR36) suggests that Part X may have contributed to inefficient
outcomes for Australian shippers because:
…  preferences for a particular price/quality/timeliness trade-off is likely to vary
between shippers. The interests of some shippers are likely at certain times to be in
conflict with others with regard to their requirements for shipping services. Exporters
requiring frequent services might be well served by arrangements providing regular
service but at the cost of a premium on freight rates. However, for shippers or potential
shippers that don’t require regular services but do want low freight rates the
arrangements would be less satisfactory and might restrict potential shippers/exporters
being able to take up a market opportunity. That is there is a diversity of shippers needs
with regard to their specific requirement for an efficient liner shipping services.
(sub. 36, p. 4)
Certainly shippers have diverse requirements. However, the Commission disagrees
with the ACCC’s assessment that Part X may have prevented such diverse demands
from being met. Evidence presented in chapter 5 shows that shippers have a wide
range of choice on all Australian trades, including direct conference services, direct
non-conference services and transhipment services. These offer different service
characteristics such as frequencies and port coverage at a range of prices. The above
quote seems to assume that the conference is the sole provider of shipping services,
and/or that it is mandatory for existing or potential shippers to use their service.
This is not the case (see chapter 5). Given the degree of competition in the market,
the Commission has little reason to doubt that carriers (conference or non-
conference) quickly would provide a service if there were sufficient demand to
justify it.1
                                             
1 Of course not all demands are likely to be met. As in any market where prices are positive,
some potential shippers will be excluded from the market. That said, however, anecdotal
evidence suggests that very low-valued commodities are being exported from Australia at
present (hay, for example). Moreover, the Commission has received no evidence that excessive




It also should be noted that the coordinated service provided by a conference
provides a low cost means of meeting the requirements of shippers who use services
infrequently. A shipper who, for example, requires a liner service twice a year will
still want a timely service and also may require a quick and reliable service. The
‘bus service’ provided by the conference is likely to be provided at a far lower cost
than a service customised to meet a shipper’s sporadic demand. Indeed, if all
shippers had regular, certain demands the need for traditional liner services and
conferences would diminish — liner shipping essentially could become a charter
operation.
Stable access for all Australian exporters and pan-Australian rates
A secondary objective of Part X is to provide stable access to adequate shipping
services to all Australian exporters, regardless of location.
Shippers and state governments have argued that Part  X has been important in
achieving the current regional spread of international liner shipping services. In
observing strong growth in the number of ships using the Port of Adelaide over the
last decade, the South Australian Government argued:
These trends indicate that the Part X arrangements have provided a critically important
mechanism to ensure that there are frequent, reliable and stable shipping services
available for SA shippers in sometimes thin regional trades which otherwise might not
constitute commercially viable levels of cargo volumes.
These shipping services have also generally been provided to South Australian shippers
at market conservative freight rates … (sub. 12, p. 2)
The Western Australian Shippers’ Council suggested:
By  rescinding  Part X  exclusions  there  is  considerable  risk,  particularly  for  Western
Australia that service levels will be greatly reduced. Conference lines currently are
obliged under agreement to service Fremantle. This may not be considered
commercially viable by lines operating independently. (sub. 20, p. 1)
The Department of the Treasury counters such claims with data which suggest that
smaller regional ports (for example, Newcastle, Bell  Bay, Bowen, Townsville,
Hobart, Darwin) are serviced predominantly by non-conference lines (sub. DR35,
pp.  9–11). However, as noted in chapter  5, the dominant share of these
non-conference exports from regional ports appears to be carried in chartered
breakbulk vessels (for example, meat and fruit by Cool  Carriers) or
company-chartered breakbulk vessels (for example, ores and minerals by
Pasminco). These services are not regular, scheduled, advertised liner services
which carry multi-product cargoes.EVALUATION OF
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It also is suggested that pan-Australian rates may have promoted access to liner
shipping services for shippers in all States. For example, the South Australian
Government has argued:
Pan Australian freight rates offered by Conference shipping lines also ensure regional
Australia, including Adelaide exporters, are not disadvantaged through lack of
sufficient volumes to attract high discounts generally available only at high volume
ports. (sub. 12, p. 3)
While they are still applied in some trades, the use of pan-Australian rates is
significantly less common than in the past. Liner Shipping Services suggested:
… the increasing tendency for Lines to independently set rates has meant that there has
been a significant diminution in the application of pan-Australian rates  … (sub.  10,
p. 15)
Similarly, Meyrick & Associates submitted:
Although it can still be found in some trades — it is common, for instance, in the
carriage of meat in the US trades — the use of pan-Australian rates has declined
substantially over recent years. (sub. 5, p. 54)
The economies and greater certainty for carriers provided by conferences, in
conjunction with the conditions and negotiating framework of Part X, may provide
some encouragement for negotiation of a wider geographic provision of shipping
services and pan-Australian rates. In common with the general thrust of Part  X,
however, there are no regulatory requirements stipulating port coverage or
pan-Australian rates — this is a matter for negotiation between shippers and
conferences within the Part  X framework. Given the extent of competition in
Australian trades, it appears unlikely that conferences are in a position to offer
regional services at the expense of shippers using larger ports. In other words, there
is very little scope for inefficient cross-subsidisation of regional ports by
conferences. To the extent such services are provided they appear to be
market-driven.
Australian flag carriers
One of the principal objectives of Part X is to ‘ensure that efficient Australian flag
shipping is not unreasonably hindered from normal commercial participation in any
outwards liner cargo shipping trade’. Thus Part X contains what is essentially a ‘fair
trading’ clause.
ANL Container Line (ANLCL) argued that:94 INTERNATIONAL
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… it is vital that an Australian Flag operator is protected by legislation from over-
zealous competitors that only serve to enter the market and destroy the competition
through hostile pricing strategies. (sub. 8, p. 2)
And complained that:
ANLCL has certainly been hindered by the actions of several competitors. Freight rates
have plummeted dramatically in the last 2–3 years. The free fall of rates is
unreasonable and has hampered ANLCL from effectively operating in the market
place. The saturation of the market with revised and upgraded services has contributed
to ANLCL’s unprofitability in recent years. (sub. 8, p. 2)
However, the Commission considers that the fall in freight rates has been caused by
market forces in global and Australian liner shipping markets rather than conference
action to preserve market dominance. The role of Part X with respect to Australian
flag shipping is discussed further in chapter 8.
6.2 Other criteria
Additional criteria to be considered in evaluating Part  X were identified in
chapter 3. This section assesses Part X against these criteria.
Impact of Part X on competition
The terms of reference for the inquiry ask the Commission to examine the extent to
which Part X has restricted competition. As noted in chapter 3, as a general rule,
competition is desirable because it generates lower prices and better services for
consumers.
By definition, conferences and other cooperative arrangements between liner
shipping operators (including discussion agreements and consortia) involve
practices that attempt to limit competition between members. These practices may
include joint price setting, coordination and rationalisation of services and capacity
and pooling arrangements.
The Commission has received consistent evidence from shippers and shipping
operators that conference practices have eased — for example, common rates are
less extensive and binding loyalty agreements with customers largely have been
replaced by individual service contracts. In some cases, conferences have been
replaced by non-binding discussion agreements (for example, on the South-East
Asian trade) (see LSS, sub. 10, pp. 4–5, 10–11).EVALUATION OF
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Nevertheless, the essence of conferences, discussion agreements and consortia, is
cooperation rather than competition between members. Although conferences and
other arrangements permitted under Part X inevitably involve practices that limit
competition between members, the Commission does not agree with some
participants (for example, see subs. 15, 19 and 21) who suggest that, in the medium
to long term, there would be more competition and better outcomes for Australian
shippers without such arrangements.
For example, ACCI stated:
The Chamber has a strong philosophic predisposition towards maximising competition
within the Australian economy, which would generally have the ACCI call for the
termination, or failing that the wind-back, of Part X. (sub. 15, p. 1)
And, according to the Law Council of Australia:
The approach we propose [repeal of Part X] would do away with existing government
sanctioned cartelisation, and promote a competitive market. Indeed, it is difficult to see
how the objective of internationally competitive freight rates could be achieved without
encouraging open international competition. (sub. 19, p. 7)
This view is correct if conferences act purely as vehicles for generating and
exercising monopoly power. However, if conferences provide a mechanism for
reducing risk and transaction costs enabling shipping operators to exploit
production economies (generally agreed to exist in liner shipping) while providing a
coordinated shipping service, proscription of conferences will tend to increase the
costs of providing given services (see appendix B). In these circumstances, there
can be no presumption that elimination of conferences and lower industry
concentration will lead to improved outcomes (in the sense of lower prices for given
service levels) for Australian shippers.
In the absence of conferences, alternative means of reducing risk and transactions
costs may be adopted — corporate mergers, for example. In other words, a
conference encompassing several lines might be replaced by a single operator.
Alternatively, some operators may leave a trade entirely and/or direct services may
be replaced by relay and transhipment services via a regional hub. This latter option
might be especially attractive to shipping lines if other countries continued to allow
conferences to operate, enabling lines to operate as a conference from the hub to
foreign destinations. In neither case, however, is it certain that the outcome for
Australian shippers would be beneficial in terms of price or service quality.
Moreover, in neither case can it be certain that competition would be greater than
with conferences. Indeed, a conference is likely to provide more competition as




Prohibition of conferences also could mean that individual shipping operators
reduce the risk of sailing at less than optimal capacity by operating smaller, higher
cost, ships. In this case, while there may be a larger number of competing individual
shipping operators, supply — as measured by available capacity — may have
diminished. Service levels might deteriorate in the absence of coordinated
scheduling. The effect on prices of higher supply costs and lower quality service has
to be balanced against any benefits that might flow from (more) competitive
pricing. Shippers who have participated in this inquiry have stressed that service
levels, in terms of reliability and frequency of service, are critical to the success of
their export businesses, especially when operating under ‘just-in-time’ systems (see,
for example, BHP, sub. 24). This suggests that dismantling of conferences could
lead to significant losses (in terms of forgone trade) for Australian exporters.
The Commission does not consider that, given significant economies of scale and
scope in this industry, it is possible to predict what market structure would develop
in the absence of conferences, whether that structure would be more competitive
and, more importantly, whether it would deliver better outcomes to Australian
shippers in terms of quality and price. That said, however, it is highly unlikely that
each Australian trade currently served by a conference would be served (at the
current level of service) by all former conference members acting as independents.2
In particular, on long, thin trades (such as Australia–Europe and Australia–USA),
oligopoly or monopoly provision of direct services is a strong possibility.
The extent to which conferences can exert market power may be better gauged by
assessing the intensity of competitive forces in liner shipping markets. If
conferences are subject to intense competition (actual and potential competition)
they will not be in a position to earn excess profits.3 If conferences are subject to
sufficiently strong competition, they must operate efficiently in order to survive. In
other words, provided competition from existing players and potential new entrants
constrains the market power of conferences, conferences will be compelled to
operate efficiently, to provide services that shippers demand and, moreover, to price
competitively.4
                                             
2 At the very least, without coordination, the regular, comprehensive ‘bus service’ provided by
the conference ceases to exist. This would tend to increase transactions costs for shippers.
3 However, excess profits could accrue in the short term — for example, during periods of strong
demand growth. But excess profits also would occur in perfectly competitive industries during
periods of demand growth and in such conditions are an efficient signalling mechanism for new
entrants and industry expansion.
4 That is, to price competitively in the sense of not earning persistent excess profits.EVALUATION OF
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Barriers to entry in liner shipping
Market power is sustainable only where there are barriers to entry (or exit).
Potential barriers to entry include regulatory and other essentially man-made or
institutional barriers, or economic barriers driven by characteristics of the market.
On Australian trades there do not appear to be any significant regulatory or
institutional barriers to market entry. Neither Australia nor its major trading partners
reserve cargo for national flag carriers. Though some (conference) shipping
operators also own port-handling operations, the Commission has not been made
aware of any discrimination by stevedores with conference affiliations against non-
conference operators in Australian ports. Though competition in stevedoring may be
limited, an attempt by a stevedore with conference affiliations to discriminate
against a non-conference carrier is likely to be undermined by a stevedore without
conference affiliations.
In the absence of significant regulatory or institutional barriers to market entry, the
extent of any barriers to entry in liner shipping must be a product of any cost
savings and/or consumer loyalty associated with the conferences themselves. In
other words, to the extent conferences allow member lines to capture economies of
scale or scope, or lock in custom, the resulting cost advantages may be used to deter
new entrants, especially if new entrants must incur sunk (irretrievable) costs in
order to enter the market. Sunk costs may not be particularly large on Australian
liner shipping trades because ships generally can be moved to different routes.
Nonetheless, Australian export cargoes require unusually high refrigerated capacity
which may necessitate costly, customised ships and there may be other sunk costs
including marketing costs and goodwill. Overall, given a conference’s incumbency
advantage, it is unlikely that independent operators normally will be in a position to
replicate a full conference service. In this sense, liner shipping markets are not
perfectly contestable.
However, effective competition in practice may not require independent operators
to replicate the full service of a conference. As noted by Meyrick & Associates:
… it  is  fairly  firmly  established  that  individual  submarkets,  or  collections  of
submarkets, are highly contestable. Moreover, the variety of potential competitors —
neo-bulk specialists, air freight, multi-trade services, transhipment operations — makes
it very difficult for a conference to be sure which submarkets will in fact be contested
in the near future. It is also theoretically possible — and in our view quite likely in
practice — that, while the conference market as a whole may not be vulnerable to
simultaneous entry — there is no individual submarket which is safe from large-scale
entry.
Under these conditions, the fact that ‘complete’ entry is implausible is of little practical
importance. The liner shipping market provides an example of ‘workable98 INTERNATIONAL
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contestability’. Since there are no regulatory barriers to entry and a newcomer to the
trade would incur limited sunk costs, entry at a low to medium level is a constant
threat. At the same time, given the variety of possible competing service alternatives,
the conference can have no certainty as to where the next threat to its markets will
come from. These two factors together render the market sufficiently contestable to
impose an effective discipline on conference behaviour. (sub. 5, p. 29)
The Commission agrees that non-conference services that are perceived by the
market to be close substitutes for conference services can constrain market power of
conferences effectively. In addition, where market power derives from cooperative
arrangements between companies, scope for rate competition between members can
act as an important constraint on monopoly pricing.
Competition in practice
It is impossible to prove that a market is competitive and that excess profits are not
earned, especially in an industry such as liner shipping where there are very high
common costs.5 In these circumstances prices are unlikely to equal marginal cost
because they will contain some portion of common costs (see appendix  B). In
practice, pricing of container slots is likely to be driven by opportunity cost — in
other words, whether one shipper’s demand for slots is competing with, or
complementary to, another shipper’s demand for slots. For example, freight rates
for the same commodity may differ on the outward and inward legs of a journey
because of imbalances in cargo flows.
However, the degree of competition in a market can be inferred by market
outcomes, including profitability, market shares, entries and exits, market
dynamism etc.
Movements in freight rates per se do not give an indication of the level of
competition — even in an uncompetitive market freight rates may fall to some
extent as the result of a fall in demand or a reduction in production costs of existing
operators. However, if freight rate reductions reflect increased supply due to new
entry or new services, this could provide some evidence of competitive forces at
work. Nonetheless, even if the observed decline in freight rates in recent years is not
due to increased competition, this does not imply that shipping markets are not
competitive. It implies that competition has not intensified over the period in
question. Analogously, freight rate increases do not necessarily signify any
reduction in market competition.
                                             
5 By the same reasoning, it would be impossible to prove that prices were not competitive.EVALUATION OF
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The Commission developed a model of shipping costs and revenues to assess the
extent to which price reductions might be explained by cost reductions. Figure 6.1
compares costs and revenue indices for a hypothetical 1500 TEU ship purchased in
1990 and operating since then on the South-East Asia trade. Full details of the cost
model are provided in appendix E.














Data sources: Drewry Shipping Consultants 1999 and Commission estimates (see appendix E).
The model factors in cost reductions estimated from Drewry Shipping Consultants
(1999) and other sources, and average price reductions on the Australia–South-East
Asian trade. Though the model incorporates a return to capital in the sense of loan
repayments for the purchase of the ship (at a risk-free rate of interest), the cost
estimates do not include any return for entrepreneurship and risk-taking.
The main point to emerge is that while there has been a reduction in shipping costs
of around 20 per cent (mainly due to reductions in stevedoring costs in Australian
ports, lower bunker costs and some productivity improvements), revenue has fallen
by almost double that amount. It also should be noted that the decline in revenue is
fully attributable to falling prices. Moreover, the fall in prices (and revenue)
precedes the Asian economic crisis, though the revenue decline certainly has been100 INTERNATIONAL
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exacerbated by that event. This cost-price squeeze leads to an estimated internal rate
of return of -4.0 per cent per year.
Of course, the model does not imply that carriers’ profitability has declined to this
extent. It illustrates the profitability of one ship on one trade only. Carriers operate a
range of ships, some owned and some leased. They also are likely to take steps to
minimise the impact of falling revenue, including rationalisation of capacity on the
trade and seeking productivity improvements in all aspects of their operations.
Nonetheless, the model illustrates the exogenous pressures which are driving
efficiency-enhancing measures on Australian and global trades.
Indicators of the presence and strength of competitive forces include:
·  conference market shares and changes in these shares over time;
·  evidence of competition from independent operators and transhipment operators;
·  entries and exits on trade routes;
·  evidence of competition within conferences;
·  evidence of competition from other modes (air transport); and
·  evidence of competition from freight forwarders and cargo consolidators.
Conference market shares, or market concentration, provide a starting point for
considering conference market power and the extent of competitive pressures
exerted on conferences. The Commission notes that a high market share may not be
synonymous with market power if substitute services are available to consumers or
if potential competitors can introduce a service in that trade. Changes in conference
market shares also require close scrutiny. While a declining conference share
indicates competition in some form, it is not of itself an indication of past monopoly
profits.
Conference market shares for major Australian trades and commodities are reported
in chapter 2 (figures 2.2 and 2.3) and appendix C (tables C.9–C.14). On the whole,
conference shares of major inward and outward trades have declined over the
1990s, though some trades and commodities have moved against this trend.
Conferences carried 64 per cent of Australia’s liner imports by value in 1997-98
(compared with 73 per cent in 1989-90) and 56 per cent of liner exports by value in
1997-98 (compared with 73 per cent in 1989-90). On thinner trades (for example,
Australia–Middle-East, East  India–Australia) conference shares have exceeded
70  per  cent and have exhibited considerable volatility from year to year. For
example, the direct conference service to the Middle-East has been replacedEVALUATION OF
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recently by transhipment services so that the current conference market share is
zero.6
Conference market shares also vary by commodity group. Commodities requiring
refrigeration — meat, dairy, fruit — tend to rely more heavily on conference
services. As discussed above, high conference shares may or may not indicate
market power depending on the alternatives available, or potentially available, to
shippers. If substitute services are available, a high conference share merely may
reflect a preference for the service level offered by the conference.7
As discussed in chapter 5, data suggest that service levels of independent operators
have improved over the 1990s and the gap between service levels of conferences
and independent operators has narrowed. In particular, the quality of transhipment
services has improved significantly with the growth of large, specialist transhippers
such as Maersk and Evergreen and development of efficient regional hub ports,
particularly Singapore. With the acquisition of Sea-Land (July 1999), Maersk will
become by far the largest container operator in the world, with roughly twice the
container capacity of its nearest rival, Evergreen. In other words, the world’s two
largest container operators are dedicated transhippers.
Growth in transhipment has been driven by a range of technological developments
(for example, greater efficiency in loading/unloading very large vessels and
computerisation which facilitates scheduling) which have enabled transhippers to
exploit economies of ship size on dense east–west routes and network economies. In
other words, transhipment provides an alternative to conferences (and other direct
services) as a low-cost mode of delivering reliable, frequent liner services.
For example, BHP noted that:
Over the past five years we have also seen the development of transhipment operators
who are now providing reliable and efficient hub and spoke networks around the world.
These operators are a competitive alternative to direct operators and are extensively
used by BHP. (sub. 24, p. 2)
The Department of the Treasury confirms this, observing that:
Independent operators have a strong presence on all trade routes and market segments
…  over the last two decades, the trend had been that non-conference operators are
capturing significant market share from conference operators. (sub. DR35, p. 6)
                                             
6 This development reinforces the point that the alternative to a direct conference service may not
be numerous independent operators offering similar services. It also provides evidence that
conferences are subject to market pressure.
7 On the other hand, the purchase of relatively high-cost substitutes by shippers could indicate
that the low-cost conference is charging monopoly prices (see Posner 1976, p. 57).102 INTERNATIONAL
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And the Queensland Government, noting that conference vessels account for a little
over half of liner vessels serving the Port of Brisbane, concluded:
It is considered that the existence of conferences in itself does not limit competition as
individual conferences are competing against not only other conferences but also
individual liner services. The move by several global shipping lines to enter the
Australian trade as non-conference operators has provided alternatives to Australian
shippers. (sub. DR38, p 1)
It is likely that the trend towards transhipment will continue apace, providing strong
competition for direct service operators, including conferences. The port of
Singapore, for example, is making considerable efforts to improve transhipment of
refrigerated cargoes which will increase competitive pressures on direct reefer
services.
Entry and exit data provide an indication of contestability of trades but, as with
conference shares, must be viewed with some care. For example, zero entry and exit
might indicate that the mere threat of competition is sufficient to constrain market
power of conferences. Alternatively, it might indicate prohibitive entry costs.
Frequent entry and exit on trades might indicate that entry and exit barriers are low
but also could be the result of incumbent operators successfully driving out new
entrants. However, if new entrants replace existing carriers, or if there is evidence
of new entrants or services on trades as soon as profitable opportunities arise, this
suggests relatively low entry and exit costs and thus effective competition against
conferences.
As detailed in the various case studies in chapter 5 and appendix G, there have been
quite a number of entries and exits on Australian trades over the 1990s, though
mergers and takeovers appear to account for major changes in carrier line-up. Major
new entrants include Evergreen and China Shipping on Australia–Asia trades and
MSC on the European and North American trades. Major exits since 1993 include
Baltic Shipping Company and ABC  Container Line from the Australia–Europe
trade. In early 1999, Cape Line entered and exited the South-East Asia trade within
a matter of weeks. Overall, however, the number of lines serving all Australian
trades has remained virtually unchanged at a little over thirty.
In addition, and as discussed above, independent operators have expanded and
deepened their service coverage, increasingly offering services that compete
directly with conference services, rather than operating at the ‘fringe’. In other
words, both the quality and quantity of competition from independent operators
appear to have improved significantly. Most of these independent operators appear
to be committed, efficient providers — there is little support for the view that they
are high-cost operators who have entered trades merely to free-ride on monopoly
prices generated by conferences. While some independent shipping companies mayEVALUATION OF
PART X
103
be subsidised, global operators such as Maersk are harnessing technological
developments and low-cost production methods and thus providing genuine
competition. This process appears consistent with a market which is dynamic and
competitive.
Commercial incentives applying to potential new entrants apply equally to
individual conference members. Though conferences still set common rates, these
appear to be driven as much by the demand of some shippers for a quoted, single
rate as by the conference. Increasingly, however, common rates have been replaced
by individual rates, reflecting customer demands for global shipping deals with
individual lines and specialised service contracts. According to BHP:
Today, in all trades, all rates are negotiable. Traditional practices have given way to
more open approaches where all Australian exporters have access and can negotiate
‘blue water’ freight rates with shipping lines of their choosing. (sub. 24, p. 2)
Attempts by conferences or discussion groups to ‘restore’ rates on some trades — in
one case, the Commission understands, at the urging of Australian shippers
concerned about the impact of persistent low rates on service levels — generally
have failed (see chapter  5, section  5.2). In other words, conference pricing,
including the pricing of individual members, appears to be market-driven.
Freight forwarding operations also place competitive pressures on shipping
operators by reducing transaction costs for shippers and acting as market
arbitragers. Nonetheless, freight forwarding does not appear to be as popular in
Australia as overseas.
The only alternatives to liner shipping available to Australian exporters and
importers are bulk shipping and air freight. At the margin, some commodities
normally carried by liner shipping may be carried in bulk. For example, wool
shipments have on occasions been carried by bulk carrier. The possibility of
utilising bulk carriers, especially in the case of low value, high density
commodities, may act as a constraint on liner freight rates. At the other end of the
scale, air freight is a viable option for high value and/or time-sensitive cargo. Air
freight therefore places an absolute ceiling on the price that liner shipping can
charge for a very limited range of import and export cargoes.
Summary
Given economies of scale and scope in liner shipping, it is highly unlikely that, in
the absence of cooperation, a competitive market equilibrium (in the sense of many
small competing individual shipping operators) would be sustainable or, indeed,
capable of delivering service levels shippers demand. Some form of cooperation104 INTERNATIONAL
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would occur. In these circumstances, the key to ensuring efficient outcomes for
Australian shippers is the degree of market (and regulatory) constraint on
conference behaviour. While the liner shipping market is neither perfectly
contestable nor perfectly competitive, a range of indicators suggests that Australian
trades are sufficiently contestable and competitive to ensure that conference market
power is small. In particular, in recent years, the strong growth of independent
transhippers has placed increased competitive pressure on direct service operators,
including conferences, reducing conference market shares. Moreover, the
Commission agrees with the assessment of both the Australian Consumers’
Association (ACA) and the Business Council of Australia (BCA) that:
Given the current trends in shipping — the emergence of large global shipping
operators, the increasing market penetration of independents, the role of hub and spoke
networking and the increased merger activity — there is no reason to believe that the
level of competitive activity will be diminished. (subs DR39, p. 2 and DR40, p. 1)
Indeed the growth of these non-conference operators has led to the suggestion that
conferences allow smaller operators to attain the critical mass required to compete
with the ‘mega-carriers’. For example, the Government of Japan has observed that:
…  if we do away with immunity from anti-monopoly laws for cooperation via
international carrier agreements, it is possible that most carriers would be forced to
merge with and/or buy out rival carriers in pursuit of economies of scale, and
megacarriers would kick out small and medium size carriers, leading to a monopolistic
or oligopolistic situation and increasing the potential for abuses of power within the
market. (OECD 1999b, pp. 10–11)
On the other hand, the Department of the Treasury, the ACA and the BCA
(subs DR35, p. 12, DR39 and DR40) imply that, with the development of viable
alternative services, conferences are now redundant and therefore Part  X can be
repealed. In the Commission’s view this argument is flawed. First, while
transhipment services and services of independent direct operators are close
substitutes for conference services, they are differentiated in some aspects.
Disallowing conferences would reduce shippers’ choice. Second, as the Department
of the Treasury concedes, there always will be some form of cooperation in
international liner shipping. The Commission queries why a conference with, for
example, the same market share as a single operator providing a similar service
would restrict competition any more than the single operator. It may or may not be
the case that conferences gradually will be replaced by other forms of cooperation
which may be better-suited to new technologies. However, even if alternative
technologies were to displace conferences, this would not warrant regulatory
interference to pick or accelerate the winning market structure.
Given the economics of liner shipping services, the absence of significant barriers
to entry to liner trades, consistent evidence of intense competitive forces in linerEVALUATION OF
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shipping markets globally, and the fact that Part X, in allowing but not enforcing
industry cooperation, does not constrain these forces, the Commission is of the view
that Part  X has not restricted competition in Australian liner trades to any
significant degree.
Minimal regulation and promotion of commercial dispute resolution
Under Part X, freight rates and service levels are determined through commercial
negotiation, with safeguards built in to protect the interests of Australian shippers.
Government influence in commercial negotiations is confined to exercising ‘moral
suasion’ via the provisions of Part  X which enable the Minister or his/her
representative to attend negotiations. However, that moral suasion is reinforced by
the Minister’s power to deregister all or part of an agreement in certain
circumstances (see chapter 4), although this has not occurred to date.
Instead of direct government supervision, Part X provides for the peak shipper body
(APSA) to negotiate terms and conditions with carriers. APSA is not obliged to
participate in negotiations and, in practice, freight rates and service levels are
mostly negotiated between carriers and secondary shipper associations or large
individual shippers. APSA’s involvement has tended to focus on negotiating general
rate increases, service levels and surcharges such as currency and bunker
adjustment factors, as well as port service and terminal handling charges (LSS,
sub. 10, p. 14).8
Part X also contains several provisions intended to provide additional safeguards for
shippers and Australian flag vessels — such as the unfair pricing and price
discrimination provisions, and the process for declaring non-conference carriers
with substantial market power (see chapter 4). While these provisions have not been
invoked officially, they provide further opportunities for regulatory intervention.
These provisions are examined further in chapter 8.
The process of policing possible breaches of Part X is deliberately light-handed.
Several provisions of Part X provide that Ministerial orders can be made only after
consultations have been undertaken with conferences or individual carriers. The
purpose of these consultations is to obtain undertakings from conferences and
carriers to cease certain behaviour or to take specific actions.
                                             
8 Following the TPC (1993a, p. 17), terminal handling charges are defined as container port
charges levied by container liners for the service of moving a container from a ship to a
position some distance away within the confines of the container terminal at the port of
discharge to enable clearance from the port and vice versa at the port of loading.106 INTERNATIONAL
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Participants considered that Part X has been successful in encouraging commercial
resolution of disputes, without the need for government intervention. According to
the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DTRS):
Part X  is  a  simple  system  that  relies  on  conferences  and  exporters  reaching
commercially acceptable outcomes through negotiations. It is largely a self-regulating
system ¼ (sub. 3, p. 5)
Similarly, LSS considered that:
Part  X, since its inception in 1966, has worked extremely well in resolving issues
commercially rather than seeking government intervention or regulatory intervention.
(trans., p. 53)
Where commercial negotiations fail, shippers have the ability to initiate an ACCC
investigation into the efficiency of liner services and whether carriers have met their
statutory obligations under Part X. Indeed, LSS argued that the threat to initiate a
complaint had encouraged commercial resolution of disputes (trans., pp. 53–54).
Given the record of falling freight rates and increasing service levels (see
chapter 5), it is perhaps not surprising that only three formal investigations into
shippers’ complaints have been conducted by the ACCC/TPC under Part  X.9
Another view is that the low number of complaints may reflect flaws in the
complaints process and the remedies available under Part  X. For example, in a
report to the Minister on its investigation of an APSA complaint concerning
terminal handling charges, the TPC (1993a, p. 3) expressed the concern that Part X
does not provide a flexible basis for the commercial resolution of disputes on terms
that are acceptable to all parties and which also preserve the benefits from
conferences. The TPC also considered that the dispute took far too long to resolve,
due in part to the nature of the complaints process and the lack of flexible remedies.
Taken together, discussions with shippers and the low number of formal complaints
suggest that disputes have generally been resolved through agreement between the
parties. An attraction of Part X is that where commercial negotiations fail to resolve
disputes, shippers themselves (rather than third-parties) have scope to invoke the
complaints process.
                                             
9 The ACCC may have also undertaken some informal investigations in response to complaints.
For example, LSS indicated that the ACCC had looked into the introduction of documentation
fees by some shipping agents but decided not to proceed with a formal investigation




Participants considered that Part X is broadly consistent with international regimes
for regulating liner shipping.10 This conclusion mirrors the finding of the previous
review of Part  X (Brazil  et al  1993, p.  44) which found that though there were
differences in detail, there was a high degree of compatibility between the
regulatory regimes in the United States, Europe and New Zealand. As noted in
chapter 4, the liner shipping regimes of Australia and many other countries share a
common feature — shipping conferences are given limited exemptions from
national competition laws subject to a variety of safeguards.
The Commission is not aware of any instance where differences between the liner
shipping regimes of Australia and another country affected outcomes or the
resolution of disputes, to the detriment of Australian shippers. In discussion,
participants stated that carriers conform with the regime that imposes the most
stringent requirements where countries at opposite ends of a trade route have
different regulatory requirements.
There is no direct evidence of this approach having adversely affected the outcome
of dealings between carriers and Australian shippers. A possible exception relates to
the claim made by NACON, in the context of the TPC investigation of a complaint
by APSA, that the anti-rebate provisions of the United States Shipping Act 1984
prevented it from offering a refund to Australian shippers as compensation for
breaching the requirements of Part X. However, LSS stated that it did not consider
that providing for pecuniary penalties (including compensation) in the event of a
contravention of Part X, would contravene US shipping laws (sub. DR28, p. 5).
Australia’s liner shipping regime appears to be compatible with those of our major
trading partners.
Countervailing power
As discussed in appendix B, it is in Australia’s interests to exercise countervailing
power against foreign suppliers in order to obtain lower prices and/or improved
service levels from foreign-owned shipping operators. However, care must be taken
that actions do not exceed the limits of that power — in this situation, outcomes for
Australian shippers may deteriorate rather than improve.
                                             
10 See submissions by the Australian Chamber of Shipping (sub. 1, p. 2), LSS (sub. 10, p. i),
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LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
Part  X attempts to bolster the countervailing power of Australian exporters by
allowing them to form buying coalitions and imposing obligations on conferences to
negotiate and provide information. Shippers also can call for an investigation of
conference behaviour which may lead to deregistration of the conference.
The question is whether these arrangements are adequate. Participants have argued
that the provisions as they stand have promoted improved outcomes (see section 6.1
above).
However, it has been suggested that shippers may be loath to make a complaint
under Part X if the only penalty available is full or partial deregistration of the
conference. Consequently, strengthening the penalties under Part X may enhance
the countervailing power of shippers indirectly, through improving carrier
compliance with Part X obligations. A range of possible modifications to Part X,
designed to improve the negotiating power of importers and exporters, are
examined in chapter 8.
By the same token, Part  X is unlikely to provide a framework which promotes
excessive use of countervailing power. Essentially it allows exporters to exercise
their discretion. Moreover, there is no evidence that carriers consider the obligations
imposed on them by Part X as being too onerous. Indeed, Liner Shipping Services
(sub. 10) has proposed a number of modifications to Part X, some of which would
appear to have the effect of strengthening the obligations on carriers (see chapter 8).
Predictability of outcomes
The terms of reference for the inquiry require the Commission to analyse inter alia
the effect of Part X on the ‘predictability of outcome on the standards of shipping
services provided’. This requirement could be interpreted in different ways — for
instance, it could require the Commission to examine whether the minimum service
levels agreed between shippers and conferences under Part  X will be met.
Alternatively, it could require an examination of whether shippers’ varied and
changing demands for liner services will be met under Part X.11
Part X seeks to provide shippers with some assurance that demand for liner services
will be met by requiring conferences to negotiate minimum levels of service with
designated shipper bodies, and to provide advance notification of changes in
negotiable terms and conditions. As noted in chapter  4, a conference agreement
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cannot be registered unless it sets out the agreed minimum levels of service to be
provided.
In submissions to this inquiry and in discussions, shippers considered that Part X
gives a high degree of predictability of outcomes in terms of conferences meeting
agreed minimum service levels. For instance, shippers’ representative body, APSA,
stated that:
When minimum levels of service agreements have been finalised with APSA the liners
or Conferences have an obligation to perform. Except in cases of loss of vessel or
lockout of ports by strikes, minimum levels of service agreements promote
predictability. (sub. 11, p. 14)
Trends in the quality of liner shipping services as well as the port coverage of
conference and non-conference lines were examined in chapter 5.
The second important aspect of predictability is the degree of certainty for shippers
provided under Part X that their varied and changing demands for liner services will
be met. Some shippers export relatively large quantities throughout the year (such
as Ricegrowers Co-operative) and require the regular services offered by
conferences and some independents. Seasonal shippers, such as seasonal
horticultural exporters, require frequent services for part of the year only. Other
shippers export relatively small volumes infrequently. And, of course, the quantum
and nature of shippers’ requirements change over time.
As discussed in section 6.1, Part X does not appear to have prevented these varied
and changing demands for shipping services from being met. Part X does not oblige
shippers to use conference services. On all Australian trades on which conferences
operate, shippers have a choice of alternative, direct or transhipment services.
Moreover, the regular service provided by the conference enables diverse
requirements to be met at low cost.
Taken together, the views of shippers and the choices available to them suggest that
Australian shippers have a reasonable assurance that their varied demands for
shipping services will be met.
Flexibility
There are two important dimensions to assessing the flexibility of Part  X. One
dimension is the flexibility of the services provided to Australian shippers. This
particular dimension was considered in the previous section. The other aspect of
flexibility relates to Part X processes.110 INTERNATIONAL
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From submissions and discussions, participants generally considered that Part  X
provides a flexible approach to regulating international liner shipping. For instance,
Liner Shipping Services considered that Part X:
… has proved itself in dealing successfully with the many difficult commercial issues
that arise between shippers and shipowners from time to time without the need for
direct government intervention. [And that] The Part X framework ¼ is well geared to
meet [un]foreseen challenges in the international liner shipping market  ¼ (sub. 10,
p. ii)
Similarly, DTRS said that:
Part X  provides  a  flexible  means  of  dealing  with  changes  in  the  way  the  shipping
industry operates … [For instance] Part X is capable of dealing with a wide range of
liner arrangements. The definition of a ‘conference’ in Part  X is very wide, and a
variety of types of agreements, including discussion agreements, joint management
agreements and slot exchange agreements, as well as more traditional liner conferences,
have been scrutinised and registered. (sub. 4, p. 26)
As noted by DTRS, the legislative definition of a conference is wide, thereby
permitting a wide range of cooperative agreements to be registered.12 In this way,
Part X has been able to cope with the changing nature of shipping arrangements,
notably the increased use of consortia and slot exchange agreements.
Part X also gives the responsible Minister and shippers certain powers in relation to
registered conference agreements (see chapter 4). In principle, these powers could
be invoked where existing conditions or changing circumstances alter the
desirability of particular conference arrangements. For instance, the Minister or
shippers may initiate an investigation of conference arrangements by the ACCC.
However, the investigation process has not been used extensively to date — only
three formal investigations by the ACCC under Part X have been initiated. As noted
earlier, the infrequent use of the complaints process by shippers may reflect
inadequate remedies and incentives for the process to be used in this manner by
shippers. For example, the ACCC’s role is confined to investigating the matter and
reporting to the Minister. Only the Minister has powers in relation to conference
agreements and these are limited to the power to deregister agreements or particular
provisions of them.13
As noted by the TPC (1993a, p.  91) deregistering an agreement may not be a
suitable remedy if there is a reasonable chance that a conference would choose to
disband thereby causing significant disruption to trade. In addition, deregistration
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would not prevent a conference from submitting a new, similar agreement for
registration. The new agreement presumably would be registered, providing it met
the basic requirements under the Act in terms of content.14 Thus the remedies
available under Part X may be insufficiently flexible to deal with a broad range of
circumstances.
Several participants called for the penalties and remedies available under the Act to
be strengthened.15 DTRS considered that part of the impetus for shippers’ calls for
stiffer penalties for conferences is that, although commercial negotiations had
successfully resolved most disputes between shippers and carriers, some of the
agreed settlements may not have allowed shippers to recover extra costs that might
have been imposed on them (trans., p. 92).
Possible improvements to the remedies available under Part X are considered in
chapter 8.
Transparency
A number of the processes established under Part X are transparent. For instance,
once a conference agreement has been scrutinised and approved by the Registrar of
Liner Shipping, details of the agreement are placed on a register that is available to
the public. However, the TPA provides for commercially sensitive information to be
removed from the publicly available copy of agreements, provided reasons are
given for the confidentiality claim and an abstract of the confidential information is
provided.16
Although not formally required by the TPA, in practice the ACCC has conducted its
investigations under Part X in an open and transparent manner.17 For example, in
its investigation of a complaint by APSA relating to terminal handling charges, the
TPC (the predecessor to the ACCC), sent an issues paper to parties with an interest
                                             
14 However, as the Registrar of Liner Shipping pointed out, because of the time that elapses
between submitting an agreement for registration and the exemption coming into force, there
may be a window of two to three months where conduct under a deregistered agreement would
be exposed to the provisions of Part IV. Consequently, carriers would be forced to suspend
conference arrangements, possibly at some cost to the carriers, to avoid allegations of collusive
behaviour. (sub. DR29, p. 6)
15 See, for example, DTRS (sub. 3), LSS (subs. 10 and DR28), APSA (subs. 11 and DR27) and
ACCC (sub. 16, p. 4).
16 See Part X, division 6, subdivision C (Confidentiality requests).
17 The only requirement under Part  X is that the ACCC maintain a public register of its
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in the matters under investigation (TPC 1993a, p. 10). Copies of public submissions
received in response to the issues paper were placed on a public register.
APSA (sub.  14, p.  35) considered that Part  X also provides for transparency in
freight negotiations, through the requirement for conferences to provide to shippers
any information reasonably required for negotiations. Liner Shipping Services went
further, arguing that:
Given the monitoring and oversight by the Australian Peak Shippers Association,
Part X  provides  much  needed  transparency  of  Conference/Consortia  operations,
particularly in terms of minimum service levels and the impact on shippers of
day-to-day operations. (sub. 10, p. ii)
However, in a submission to the Brazil Review, the TPC argued that independent
scrutiny of outcomes under Part X is inadequate and that third-party monitoring of
the different types of conference agreements is needed to determine whether the
overall objectives of promoting efficient liner shipping services are being met
(1993b, p. 21). Nonetheless, it should be noted that, including the current inquiry,
the overall performance of Part X has been reviewed four times since 1977.
Not all of the procedures established by Part X are open to participation by a broad
range of interests. Most notably, the process for registering conference agreements
is not open to public input. There are no constraints preventing the Registrar of
Liner Shipping from seeking public comment on conference agreements submitted
for registration but, in practice, this is not done. However, copies of agreements are
routinely sent to the ACCC prior to final registration, providing it with an
opportunity to comment on whether the agreement meets the criteria for
registration. (sub. DR29, p. 5) APSA also has an opportunity, on behalf of shippers
generally, to comment on agreements before they are registered. Nevertheless,
individual agreements are not required to pass a ‘public interest test’ to determine
whether rates are efficient and service levels meet the reasonable needs of shippers.
Instead, Part  X provides the scope for an ex post  public interest assessment of
conference agreements (but only if initiated by the Minister or shippers).
The perceived lack of transparency in the registration process has led to calls for the
introduction of a transparent public process for assessing whether exemptions
should be granted to conference agreements (TPC 1993b). Possible modifications to
the registration process are examined in chapter 8.
Regulatory costs
The regulatory costs of Part X include administrative costs (including the costs of
delays) incurred by shippers, the ACCC and the Department of Transport andEVALUATION OF
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Regional Services (Registrar of Liner Shipping). Some costs, such as those
associated with preparing agreements (and variations to agreements) would
probably be incurred by carriers anyway and thus are not attributable to Part  X
directly.
Due to the emphasis placed on commercial resolution of disputes as well as the
nature of the exemptions for conference agreements, regulatory costs under Part X
are likely to be low.
The direct costs of Part X to shippers are insignificant. It costs shippers nothing to
seek registration of a shipper body under Part X. Since the establishment of shipper
bodies is not subject to a public interest review, the corresponding costs to
government also are likely to be low.
Concerns about the level of costs imposed on carriers (such as the cost of writing
and registering agreements) are relevant to the extent that they will be passed on to
shippers. That said, the costs to carriers of seeking registration of conference
agreements are modest ($570  per agreement), as are the costs to government of
administering registration procedures. For instance the DTRS stated that:
There is a relatively small workload in administering Part  X. The function of the
Registrar of Liner Shipping requires about 20 per cent of one staff year and that of an
‘authorised officer’ a further five per cent of one staff year. (sub. DR29, p. 4)
In principle, regulatory costs of Part X should include indirect imposts arising from
any distortions created by Part X (such as the economic cost to Australia of anti-
competitive conduct engaged in by foreign-owned carriers). However, for the
reasons set out in sections  6.1 and  6.2, the Commission considers that the
competitive characteristics of international liner shipping markets and the choice
available to Australian shippers have been sufficient to limit potential adverse
effects of conference activities.
6.3 Conclusion
The principal driver of favourable price and service outcomes for Australian
shippers has been competition in global liner shipping markets. Part X has impeded
neither market forces nor market arrangements which promote the diversity,
frequency and reliability of service that shippers demand, at internationally
competitive freight rates.
To the extent that Part  X has regulated market behaviour, it appears to have
promoted the interests of Australian exporters. Evidence from shippers suggests that
scope for collective rate negotiation, the requirement for shipping operators to114 INTERNATIONAL
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negotiate minimum service levels and to provide information to shippers, has
bolstered their negotiating position. For example, the Tasmanian Government
claims ‘the major beneficiaries of Part  X are Australian exporters and not the
shipping companies that comprise conferences’ (sub.  25, p.  1). Of course, that
outcomes have been satisfactory under Part X does not necessarily imply that Part X
is the best regulatory option. Major alternatives are considered in chapter 7.
Assessed against the criteria for regulation outlined in chapter 3, Part X:
·  does not appear to have restricted competition in liner shipping markets in the
sense of hindering entry and exit and impeding competitive forces;
·  embodies a comparatively hands-off approach, relying largely on market forces
(including shipper buying power) to regulate conferences;
·  leaves decisions about the exercise of countervailing power to shippers (whose
interest in obtaining efficient liner shipping services appears to be aligned with
the national interest) while providing exporters with some additional negotiating
clout;
·  appears compatible with overseas regulatory regimes;
·  provides for predictable service outcomes for Australian shippers; and
·  is low cost.
However, Part X does not impose an explicit public examination process and its
dispute resolution process and penalty provisions may be somewhat limited and
inflexible.




Part  X has allowed ocean carriers to form efficiency-enhancing conference
arrangements whilst providing countervailing safeguards to Australian shippers to
protect against any abuse of market position arising from those arrangements.
The key question addressed in this chapter is, can the available alternatives deliver
better outcomes than Part  X, or arrive at similar outcomes by a more efficient
process.
7.1 Reform options
The principal alternatives to retaining Part X in its current form (or in a modified
form — see chapter 8) are:
·  abolish Part X, thus requiring that ocean carriers and shipper bodies either cease
to operate as conferences and shipper bodies, or seek individual exemptions
through the authorisation process established under Part  VII of the Trade
Practices Act (TPA) if they wish to continue as conferences and shipper bodies;
·  abolish Part  X and amend the TPA to create a regime for granting block
authorisations;
·  replace Part X with a non-legislative mechanism such as an industry code; or
·  replace Part X with a notification process for the liner shipping industry.
This chapter evaluates these options against the regulatory criteria outlined in
chapter 3.
7.2 Authorisation
The major alternative is the repeal of Part X, which would result in the application
of Part  IV of the TPA, with scope for approval of conference and shipper
arrangements via authorisation (Part VII).
The authorisation process provides for a transparent, case-by-case public review of
exemptions from the anti-competitive conduct provisions embodied in Part IV of
the TPA. Under Part VII of the TPA, anyone wishing to engage in conduct that risks116 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
breaching the provisions of Part IV may apply to the ACCC for an authorisation. An
authorisation is a right of immunity from prosecution for the applicant covering the
proposed conduct. It is designed to provide a safeguard against applying the
prohibitions on anti-competitive conduct, where it can be shown that the public
benefits of the proposed conduct outweigh any anti-competitive detriment.
While the ACCC has primary responsibility for assessing applications for
authorisation, its decisions may be subject to review (on application by an interested
party) by the Australian Competition Tribunal (hereafter ‘the Tribunal’).1
Key features of the authorisation process
Three key elements of the authorisation regime are relevant to assessing how
authorisation may apply to the liner shipping industry, namely:
·  the process of obtaining an authorisation (and what form an authorisation in
liner shipping would take);
·  processes for reviewing and revoking authorisations; and
·  the types of conduct that can be authorised.
Obtaining an authorisation
The processes that the ACCC must follow in assessing authorisation applications
are set out in the TPA and are designed to ensure a rigorous, transparent and
flexible process of reviewing exemptions from Part  IV. To this end, following
receipt of an application for authorisation the ACCC is required to:
·  advertise receipt of the application and inform interested parties;
·  invite submissions on the application from members of the public;
·  release a draft determination outlining the ACCC’s interim decision and giving
reasons;
·  provide interested parties with an opportunity to hold a conference on the draft
determination;
·  publish a final determination; and
·  maintain a public register of documentation relating to the matter.
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A key feature of the authorisation process is that it requires those seeking legal
immunity to demonstrate, to the ACCC’s satisfaction, that their proposed conduct is
likely to lead to a net benefit to the public. This is achieved under Part VII by the
legislative requirement that the ACCC assess applications for authorisation against
prescribed tests, namely whether:
·  the public benefits arising from the proposed conduct outweigh the ‘detriments’
constituted by any lessening of competition in the relevant markets; and
·  the public benefit arising from the conduct is such that the conduct should be
allowed.2
The first of these tests applies to all forms of conduct which may be authorised,
whereas the second test has more limited application.3 For practical purposes, there
is little difference in the way the ACCC and the Tribunal apply these tests
(ACCC 1995b, p. 9).
The explicit public benefit tests are a key feature of Part VII, distinguishing it from
Part X. Both processes provide for public interest assessments of conference and
shipper agreements. However, whereas authorisation provides for ex ante reviews,
those under Part  X only occur ex post, and at the initiation of the Minister or
shippers. Under Part  X limited exemptions from Part  IV may be granted to
registered conference arrangements without the need for a case-by-case public
interest assessment prior to registration. However, a registered agreement may be
subjected, at the initiation of the Minister or shippers, to a review by the ACCC of
whether particular conference agreements are causing harm to shippers (or a public
detriment).4 Under Part  VII, shipping lines and shippers seeking authorisation
would be required to convince the ACCC, and possibly the Tribunal, that the public
benefits of each particular liner shipping industry arrangement outweigh the costs.5
Typically, the ACCC and the Tribunal have taken a broad view of what constitutes
a public benefit6 and a public detriment. In a recent case the Tribunal stated that:
Public benefit has been, and is, given a wide ambit by the Tribunal as ¼ anything of
value to the community generally, any contribution to the aims pursued by society
                                             
2 See section 90(6) to (9) of the TPA.
3 The second test applies to exclusive dealing (under section 45), secondary boycotts and related
arrangements  (sections 45D  and 45E),  third-line  forcing  (sections 47(6)  and 47(7)),  and
mergers (section 51) only.
4 Part X has also been subject to periodic reviews of its overall operation.
5 For the reasons set out below the Commission considers that this process would be followed by
the ACCC for each conference agreement (rather than for groups of agreements).
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including as one of its principle elements (in the context of trade practices legislation)
the achievement of the economic goals of efficiency and progress.7
To date, the ACCC has not undertaken a detailed examination of the public benefits
and detriments of international liner shipping industry arrangements. However, the
ACCC has looked at a variety of similar arrangements in domestic industries.
According to Miller (1999, pp. 549–566), the ACCC has acknowledged the public
benefits arising from arrangements such as: capacity allocation, cooperative buying,
joint ventures, rationalisation agreements, and recommended and uniform pricing.
Whilst not conclusive, the approach of the ACCC in relation to other industry
arrangements is suggestive that a wide range of benefits of conference and shipper
arrangements could be considered by the ACCC and Tribunal in assessing
authorisation applications.
However, demonstrating that particular arrangements, such as uniform pricing and
others common in liner shipping, deliver public benefits would not be sufficient to
obtain an authorisation. The ACCC may refuse to grant an authorisation where it
considers that the applicant has been unable to demonstrate that the public benefits
of the proposed conduct outweigh the anti-competitive detriment.
Alternatively, the ACCC may seek to redress the imbalance between benefits and
costs by imposing conditions on an authorisation and/or by seeking enforceable
undertakings from the applicants as a condition of authorisation. For instance the
ACCC may require the applicant to alter the proposed conduct or agreement in
ways that the ACCC regards as necessary in order to satisfy the public benefit tests
(Miller 1999, p. 571).8 Failure to comply with conditions imposed by the ACCC
may lead to revocation of an authorisation. In addition, the ACCC may accept a
written undertaking given by an applicant relating to an authorisation or one of its
elements.9 These undertakings are enforceable in the courts.
Whilst the ACCC has considerable discretion over the factors that it considers when
assessing authorisation applications and how it evaluates them, its power is not
unlimited. This is because the TPA also provides for any interested parties to apply
to the Tribunal for a review of ACCC decisions.
If an appeal is lodged, the Tribunal’s role is to re-consider the application in its
entirety, not just to examine issues disputed by the parties. The Tribunal may
reaffirm, vary or overturn a decision of the ACCC. Thus in evaluating potential
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outcomes for liner shipping services under Part VII, it is important to consider the
likely approaches of the Tribunal and the ACCC.
Usually, the immunity from the provisions of Part IV does not commence until a
final authorisation is granted by the ACCC or the Tribunal. This process may take a
considerable amount of time and so, to minimise disruption to industry, the TPA
provides the ACCC and Tribunal with the ability to grant an interim authorisation.
In principle, this may enable the ACCC to grant an interim authorisation to all liner
shipping arrangements in their current form, prior to a final decision.10 According
to the ACCC, a strong case may exist for granting an interim authorisation in
circumstances where an industry is making a transition to a new regulatory regime
(ACCC, pers. comm., 5 May 1999).
In principle, an application for authorisation of liner shipping industry arrangements
could take a number of forms.
The first option is to require each shipper body and the members of conferences,
consortia and discussion agreements to submit separate authorisation applications.
There are currently approximately 60  registered conference, consortia and
discussion agreements in effect and 12 registered designated shipper bodies. This
first option implies a ceiling of around 72 separate authorisations.11
A second option is for shippers and carriers jointly to develop a single detailed
industry code describing the types of allowable conduct (such as price fixing,
revenue pooling and vessel sharing), the circumstances in which carriers would be
able to engage in allowable conduct, carriers’ obligations with respect to shipper
bodies, mechanisms for commercial dispute resolution, and a notification
mechanism for minor changes to conference agreements. The code could allocate to
the ACCC the role of determining whether changes are minor or necessitate a
thorough review of the authorisation.12
The Department of the Treasury proposed a third model involving industry
agreeing:
… on a code which encompasses the core restrictive practices to be adhered to by all
conferences. Individual shipping lines and conferences could gain protection through
authorisation of the code, but would be free to tailor individual agreements to
individual conference needs. Additional provisions in such agreements that contain
                                             
10 See sections 91(2) to (2A) of the TPA.
11 In practice, members of some of the shipper bodies and conferences may choose to disband
rather than incur the costs associated with seeking authorisation, implying that the actual
number of authorisations required under this option would be less than 72.
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restrictive practices beyond those already authorised may require separate
authorisation. (sub. DR35, p. 24)13
A fourth option is for the industry to submit a set of similar (but not necessarily
identical) agreements covering, for instance, each major trade. Each separate
shipper body would be required to submit an application for authorisation under this
option.
Under any of these options, carriers’ obligations, similar to those imposed under
Part X, could be given effect through conditions on authorisation or enforceable
undertakings.
The two options involving industry codes (options 2 and 3) probably would be less
costly for carriers and shippers than the alternative of a system of agreements
covering individual trades (option 4). Depending on how the ACCC examines the
authorisation applications, a code may have the potential advantage of enabling the
assessment of benefits and detriments to occur at the level of Australia’s total
export  and import trades, rather than on an individual, trade-by-trade or
commodity-by-commodity basis.
A disadvantage of the industry code approaches is that the ACCC may require that
the parties to the code specify in considerable detail the types of agreements and
practices which are permitted or proscribed under the codes. Also, the Commission
anticipates that the ACCC is unlikely to accept, without substantial modification, an
industry code arrangement that is seen to have the effect of placing the regulation of
potentially anti-competitive conduct in an industry under the control of that
industry.14 Part  VII requires that individual exemptions be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis by the ACCC. In examining an authorisation application the
ACCC’s approach is to assess the proposed conduct in the context of prevailing
circumstances. A proposal involving a code could be viewed as violating the
requirement for case-by-case assessments and delegating the ACCC’s role of
undertaking public benefit assessments to the industry.
While it is not possible to determine with any precision how many authorisation
applications would be required to cover liner shipping nor the nature of the required
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allow a code containing a small number of ‘core’ restrictive practices — implying a large
number of separate authorisation applications would be required. ‘Non-core’ practices that they
may wish to evaluate on a case-by-case basis could include conduct subject to a per se




content of these applications, the Commission considers that the approach most
likely to be acceptable to the ACCC would be for a set of separate, although linked,
liner shipping agreements.15 Each agreement would need to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis by the ACCC.
Review and revocation
Due to the rapidly changing nature of liner shipping industry alliances and services,
it is important that any system for regulating the industry be sufficiently flexible to
accommodate changes in a timely manner.
To permit a degree of flexibility, Part VII enables holders of an authorisation to
make minor variations. Minor variations are those that do not result in a material
change in the effect of the authorisation, such as changes which increase the public
benefits of the arrangements or reduce the public detriments. The ACCC can
approve minor variations after giving all interested parties an opportunity to make
submissions about the proposed changes. From this it appears that Part VII could
easily accommodate minor variations in liner shipping industry arrangements, once
they were authorised.
Part  VII provides additional flexibility to respond to changes in circumstances
through establishing a process for revoking an authorisation that can be initiated by
the ACCC.16
The ACCC has the power to revoke an authorisation where:
·  it was granted on the basis of materially false or misleading information;
·  a condition attached to the authorisation has been violated; and/or
·  there has been a material change in circumstances.
The last point has created the most consternation amongst shipping lines and
shippers (see the discussion below on Uncertainty for industry). Considering
whether there has been a material change involves determining whether the change
of circumstances is likely to have had a significant impact on the public benefits or
detriments of the authorised conduct.17 Miller  (1999, p.  575) argues that any
particular change of circumstances should be regarded as ‘material’ only if it
reduces the public benefits or increases the detriments of the conduct. However, it
has not been the practice to date to subject each change of circumstances which
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existed at the time of authorisation to an analysis of how the change bears on the
public benefits and detriments. Instead, the practice has been to identify the various
changes within the industry, and the environment in which it operates, and then to
reach an holistic conclusion on whether those changes might lead to a different
assessment of the balance of benefits and detriments of the conduct that was
authorised.18
If the ACCC finds that there has been a material change in circumstances it may
decide to revoke, vary or replace the authorisation. The authorisation may be
revoked if the ACCC and on appeal, the Tribunal, consider that the public benefits
of the proposed conduct no longer outweigh the anti-competitive detriment.
It is now common practice for authorisations to be subject to a time limit.19
Expiration of the time limit provides the ACCC with an opportunity to review the
authorisation without establishing that grounds for a review have been triggered.
What types of conduct can be authorised?
Similar exemptions to those granted to shipping companies and shippers under
Part X potentially are available under Part VII of the TPA.
As noted in chapter 4, members of registered conferences and designated shipper
bodies are exempt from section 45 (excluding section 45D) and section 47 of the
TPA.
Authorisation is available for a wide range of conduct, including:
·  agreements which constitute exclusive dealing (covered by section  47 of the
TPA) such as loyalty agreements between a shipper and a carrier;
·  agreements which contain exclusionary provisions (section 45 and section 4D)
such as agreements between carriers to offer a discount to shippers who enter
into loyalty agreements;
·  agreements which might substantially lessen competition (section 45) such as
some market sharing and revenue pooling arrangements;
·  price fixing involving goods and services (section 45A);20
                                             
18 Media Council of Australia (1996) ATPR 41-497, AGL Cooper Basin Natural Gas Supply
Arrangements  (1997) ATPR 41-593 and 7-Eleven Stores (1998) AcompT 3.
19 In North West Shelf Project (1998) ATPR (Com) 50-269 the ACCC said that it had ‘grave
reservations’ about issuing open-ended authorisations. It granted authorisation to partners in a




·  resale price maintenance (section 48);21 and
·  mergers that lead to a substantial lessening of competition in a market
(section 51).
Authorisation is not available for misuse of market power (section 46 of the TPA).
Major concerns about authorisation
In the course of this inquiry several concerns about the potential application of
Part VII to international liner shipping were raised by participants including:
·  whether the same matters covered by Part  X could be covered in an
authorisation;
·  whether the ACCC is likely to authorise core elements of conference
agreements, particularly the price fixing provisions;
·  increased regulatory uncertainty arising from the ACCC’s ability to revoke
authorisations, and uncertainty about the process, the criteria the ACCC would
apply and the conditions that would trigger reviews;
·  the compatibility of authorisation with overseas liner shipping regimes; and
·  relatively high administrative and compliance costs.
This section examines the validity of these concerns.
Would price fixing be authorised?
While the TPA explicitly permits price fixing of goods and services to be
authorised, several participants suggested that the ACCC would be unlikely to
authorise price fixing provisions of conference agreements, principally because
under Part IV of the TPA, price fixing is a per se offence.22 The concern was that
such actions by the ACCC (and implicitly the Tribunal) would cause the breakdown
of conference arrangements by prohibiting one of their central elements. For
instance, the Department of Transport and Regional Services said:
                                                                                                                                        
20 However, as discussed in the following section, there is some doubt about whether the ACCC
would authorise price fixing in practice, due to the per se nature of the offence under Part IV.
21 Resale price maintenance is the practice of requiring purchasers of a product (under threat of
loss of supply or other penalties) to agree not to resell the product at less than a pre-determined
price (ACCC 1995a, p. 27).
22 See submissions by DTRS (sub. 3), LSS (sub. 10) and APSA (sub. 11). A per se offence is one
that is deemed to lead to a substantial lessening of competition rather than requiring an analysis
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… it is by no means clear that joint price setting, a key factor in some conference
agreements and one which is a per se offence under Part IV of the TPA, would be
authorised [by the ACCC]. (sub. 3, p. 24)
These comments appear to echo the views of the Brazil Review which stated that:
¼  in practice, the Part  VII authorisation process would be hostile to price fixing.
(1993, p. 113)
The ACCC stated in discussions with the Commission that the per se nature of the
price fixing provisions of Part IV creates the strong presumption that such conduct
would have a major detrimental effect on society. The ACCC also said that price
fixing conduct could be authorised provided the applicant demonstrated that the
public benefits of the conduct outweighed the costs (ACCC,
pers.  comm.,  5  May  1999). While not ruling out authorisation of price fixing
provisions, this does suggest that the hurdle to be set by the ACCC (demonstrating
offsetting public benefits) may be somewhat higher for conduct that is subject to a
per se prohibition.
The Commission considers that any across-the-board action to eliminate price
fixing provisions from conference agreements could reduce the potential efficiency
gains arising from conferences, to the detriment of Australian shippers. Any
presumption of major detriment due to price fixing, without a proper assessment of
public benefits and costs, would be inconsistent with the public benefit test required
under a review of an application for authorisation.
Uncertainty for industry
Several participants were concerned that moving to authorisation for liner shipping
arrangements would increase regulatory uncertainty for carriers because of the
greater discretion available to the ACCC and the Tribunal. For instance, the
Department of Transport and Regional Services said:
Of particular concern to liner shipping companies is uncertainty of the outcome of
applications for authorisation under Part VII of the TPA. (sub. 3, p. 24)
Similarly, Liner Shipping Services stated that:
Authorisation would have an uncertain outcome and indeed, the ACCC has power to
review and withdraw an earlier authorisation if it believes that there has been a change
in material circumstances. (sub. 10, p. iii)
The nature of the public interest is relevant in assessing the degree of regulatory
uncertainty and any resulting costs under authorisation. As noted in chapter 3, the
public interest in this review generally will lie in achieving lower freight ratesALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES
125
and/or improved liner services to meet the diverse requirements of Australian
shippers. Concerns about the effects of authorisation on carriers are only relevant to
the extent that the cost and quality of liner services are affected.
Increased regulatory uncertainty could lead to higher cost shipping services for
Australian exporters and importers through, for instance, raising the regulatory risk
premium attached to investing in assets to service Australian trades. According to
Liner Shipping Services, shipping lines have invested approximately $1.5 billion in
containers and other facilities to service Australian trades since 1993 (sub.  10,
p.  30). If authorisation resulted in the risk premium attached to this investment
rising by 1  per  cent, and these costs are passed on by carriers, the net cost to
Australian shippers could be upwards of $15  million per annum in extra freight
costs.23
Concern about regulatory uncertainty appears to stem from several key features of
the authorisation provisions which were noted earlier, namely:
·  uncertainty of process, criteria, rules and thresholds that the ACCC and Tribunal
might apply in assessing applications for authorisation;
·  the emphasis on case-by-case assessment, creating concern that different
conclusions may be reached in respect of similar applications;
·  scope for the ACCC (subject to review by the Tribunal) to impose conditions on
authorisation or seek undertakings from applicants; and
·  the facility for review, and possibly revocation, of an authorisation where there
has been a ‘material’ change in circumstances.
Of course, these procedures apply to most other Australian industries which seek
authorisation of their conduct. Moreover, the process of authorisation ultimately is
designed to promote the public interest. However, international liner shipping
conferences are regulated at present under Part  X (which also is designed to
promote the national interest) and, moreover, given similar block immunity by all
major trading economies. In these circumstances, effectively adding to the costs of
conference operators (whose assets are highly mobile) may lead to reduced service
levels on Australian trades.
That said, some regulatory uncertainty for shipping lines and shippers already exists
because of the ad hoc reviews of Part X as a whole. Some regulatory uncertainty
                                             
23 To put this figure into perspective, the Department of Transport and Regional Services




(albeit limited) also stems from the regulatory discretion afforded by Part X (that is,
by the Ministerial powers and complaints processes).
But, on balance, it is likely that moving to authorisation would increase the level of
regulatory uncertainty for shipping companies, and hence, for Australian shippers.
Increased regulatory uncertainty for carriers may stem from the transition from
Part X to a regime based on authorisation.24 There also is a risk that authorisation of
some beneficial conference arrangements will be refused inadvertently or extra
conditions imposed on an authorisation which add to the carrier obligations
currently required under Part  X, but which do not provide sufficient offsetting
benefits to Australian shippers.
Uncertainty for carriers may also arise from the ability of the ACCC to initiate a
review of, and possibly revoke, authorised arrangements. Under Part X this form of
uncertainty currently exists only if conferences do not adhere to their obligations
under Part  X. Under authorisation, the powers now held by the Minister under
Part X would be held by the ACCC. However, the ACCC would have a much wider
power to overturn an authorisation or part of it than the Minister currently has, and
this would increase uncertainty for shippers and shipping lines.
It is difficult to make a robust assessment of the extent of added uncertainty for
carriers, and ultimately shippers, under Part VII in the absence of information on
how the ACCC would view liner shipping arrangements submitted for
authorisation. Nevertheless, the TPC (1993b,  p.  23) has outlined a possible
procedure for accommodating the industry’s desire for minimal uncertainty under a
transition to authorisation, including:
·  granting an interim authorisation for the arrangements as they stand for a
transitional period of five years;25
·  new agreements would be submitted for scrutiny during this transitional period
(earlier authorised agreements would stand in the interim);
·  introducing a fixed time limit for assessing authorisations (a 45-day period was
suggested); and
·  existing agreements would continue to stand in the event of an appeal
concerning ACCC decisions relating to new agreements.
                                             
24 Increased regulatory uncertainty associated with a transition to authorised arrangements is a
concern only if companies decide to defer investments (for example, in new, larger and more
fuel-efficient ships) until they gain sufficient experience with new regulatory arrangements. In
these circumstances, deferral of investment may lead to the deferral of shipper benefits.
25 This option was also suggested by the National Farmers’ Federation (sub. 21, p. 5).ALTERNATIVE
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Another important step could be for the ACCC to issue guidelines relating to how it
might assess liner shipping arrangements.26
The initiatives proposed by the ACCC plus the issuing of guidelines could postpone
and potentially mitigate the uncertainty associated with abolition of Part X.
International compatibility and countervailing power
As discussed in chapter 6, an important criterion by which any alternative to Part X
should be judged is the degree of compatibility with the regulatory regimes of
Australia’s major trading partners. Moreover, attempts to regulate conference
activities must recognise the limits of Australia’s market power.
There seems to be no plausible reason why an authorised conference agreement,
which is identical to those currently in place, would be incompatible with overseas
regimes.
The issue of the extraterritorial application of Australia’s anti-competitive conduct
laws (Part  IV of the TPA) could arise if authorisations are not granted but
conferences continue to form and operate offshore. If the ACCC and Tribunal
decided not to authorise some or all conferences it is possible (but perhaps unlikely)
that conferences would disband and former members would act independently, in
which case the application of Part IV would not be triggered. Therefore, a major
concern with the ‘authorisation option’ seems to be what would happen if an
application were rejected by the ACCC but clandestine collusive agreements
persisted, based offshore (and indeed, were legal in some jurisdictions).
Many participants argued that if a conference were formed without the protection of
Part X or an authorisation, the ACCC would face significant difficulties in gathering
the evidence required for a prosecution under Part  IV. In discussions, several
shippers argued that without Part  X carriers would enter into conference
arrangements offshore, making it more difficult for the ACCC to detect them and
gather information. They also considered that Australia would lose the ability to
impose obligations on conferences (such as the requirement to negotiate minimum
service levels) — in exchange for limited exemptions.
There are no legal constraints preventing legal action against an outward-bound
shipping conference that was alleged to have breached Part  IV of the TPA.
However, several practical impediments make such action against conferences less
                                             
26 The ACCC has issued guidelines covering a number of its other responsibilities under the TPA,




likely. For a start, there may be legal complications if the conduct being complained
of is legal in the country at the other end of the trade. Furthermore, the ACCC and
the courts may face some extra difficulties (above those prevailing in relation to
locally-based firms) in gathering all relevant information, especially if shipping
companies are not required to maintain an office in Australia (which they are
required to do under Part X). Also, there is the risk that, in the event of a successful
prosecution under Part  IV, shipping companies may decide to withdraw from
Australian trades rather than pay fines or comply with other court orders. This
possibility arises because of the potential magnitude of remedies available under
Part VI (fines of up to $10 million for companies and $0.5 million for individuals,
per offence). The possibility that conferences would disband rather than comply
with orders for compensation or to meet other obligations was canvassed in an
earlier Trade Practices Commission (TPC) investigation of a complaint by the
Australian Peak Shippers’ Association (APSA).27
Legal advice provided to the Brazil  Review in relation to the application of
section 46 (prohibiting misuse of market power) to shipping conferences concluded
that Australia would in principle be able to take action against conferences that were
found to have engaged in prohibited conduct (Brazil  et al 1993,  appendix D).
However, the advice also noted the practical difficulties of gathering the
information necessary to prove a case of this type. These difficulties may be
compounded by the potential inability of the ACCC to issue notices to foreign
carriers under the TPA (section 155) requiring them to furnish documents relevant
to the conduct of a prosecution.28
The Law Council of Australia (sub. 19, p. 6) suggested several amendments to the
TPA designed to overcome the practical difficulties in mounting an action against a
conference under Part IV. The Council recommended that if Part X were abolished,
provisions similar to division 12 of Part X (which provides for the registration in
Australia of ocean carriers’ agents) be retained in the TPA. It argued that requiring
shipping lines to maintain a registered office in Australia would provide for more
effective enforcement of the TPA as well as facilitating the gathering of information
relating to potential breaches of the TPA (using section 155 of the TPA).
The Council also stated that although sections 5 and 6 of the TPA (which deal with
the extraterritorial application of the TPA) would apply if Part X were repealed, this
situation could be clarified, by amending section 5 to provide that for the purposes
                                             
27 During the investigation, members of NACON informed the TPC that in the event of a demand
to pay monetary compensation they would choose to disband the conference rather than pay
(TPC 1993a, p. 89).
28 Section  10.91 of the TPA gives the ACCC power to obtain information, documents and
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of section  5(1), an ocean carrier which supplies shipping services to or from
Australia shall be taken to be a body corporate carrying on business in Australia in
relation to the supply of those shipping services.
The Law Council of Australia argued that:
An amendment along these lines should, in our view, suffice to bring the relevant
parties within the jurisdiction, without Australia being able to be criticised for claiming
extra-territorial jurisdiction [and that this proposal] is not intended to extend the
territorial reach of the TPA beyond its present limits. (sub. 19, p. 6)
On balance, the Commission is concerned that the likely effect of the latter
amendment would indeed risk laying Australia open to the criticism which the Law
Council of Australia explicitly seeks to avoid. The proposed amendments to the
TPA also raise a much broader issue of how Australia should best respond to
potential instances of anti-competitive conduct by foreign firms engaged in trade
with Australian companies. This broader issue is beyond the scope of this review.
Administrative and compliance costs
Ideally, any regulatory regime should seek to minimise administration and
compliance costs, including the cost of delays. Under authorisation, administrative
and compliance costs will include the costs to the parties involved in the
authorisation process (mainly shippers and carriers) as well as the cost to the ACCC
of reviewing applications. The costs to carriers are only relevant to the extent that
their incidence may fall on Australian shippers.
Some participants considered that the authorisation process would cause undue
delays and be costly to administer.29
In respect of delays, the Brazil Review (Brazil et al 1993, p.  112) stated that
registration of conference agreements took two months on average (between
lodging an application with the Registrar of Liner Shipping, and the ability of
conference members to operate under the exemptions available). According to the
ACCC, the process of assessing an authorisation can take an average of ten months
(this is the time between lodging an application and a final determination by the
ACCC) (ACCC, pers. comm., 5 May 1999). However, the duration depends on the
complexity of the case. Some straightforward applications have been finalised in
two to three months, whereas in more complex cases (such as those dealing with
arrangements in the electricity industry), the process has taken longer than average.
                                             
29 These concerns were expressed by the Department of Transport and Regional Services (sub. 3),




Tribunal reviews of ACCC determinations may take around 12 months (being for
the time between lodging and ruling on an appeal). Again, the duration of the
review process will be affected by the complexity of the issues.
In discussions, the ACCC also argued that once some experience in assessing liner
shipping arrangements is gained, the process could be streamlined considerably.
Indeed, as noted above, the ACCC has suggested that time limits (45 days) could be
placed on consideration of conference agreements.
Turning to administrative costs, the fees for registration of agreements (and
variations to agreements) under Part X amount to $570. The revenue collected by
the Registrar from fees between 1989 and 1999 was $156 475, at an average of
around $15 650 per annum. (sub. DR29, p. 6) To this amount must be added the
costs incurred by the Registrar over and above those met by application fees. As
noted in chapter 6, DTRS stated that the functions of the Registrar requires about
20 per  cent of one staff year and that of an ‘authorised officer’ a further
five per cent of one staff year. (sub. DR29, p. 4).
Administrative and compliance costs are likely to be significantly greater under
Part  VII by virtue of the need for a case-by-case assessment of conference
agreements. The major additional costs would be the costs to the ACCC and
possibly the Tribunal of reviewing applications for authorisation. Costs also include
those incurred by interested parties in making submissions to ACCC reviews and
the costs arising from possible appeals to the Competition Tribunal. On-going
monitoring by the ACCC may also be required to determine whether there are
grounds for revoking or varying authorisations.
Application fees under Part VII are currently $7500 per application. Where a group
of similar authorisations is submitted, the fee per subsequent application is $2500.30
These fees are likely to be well below the costs to the ACCC of examining
applications. As an indication, the ACCC’s adjudication budget is around
$1.8  million  per  annum enabling it to examine around 40  authorisations per year
(ACCC, pers.  comm., 5  May  1999), giving an average resource cost of around
$45 000 per authorisation.31
                                             
30 To attract the concessional application fee the conduct covered by additional applications must
occur in the same or a closely related market to that involved in the original application and
lodgment must be made within 14 days of the original lodgment (ACCC 1995a, p. 27).
31 This is a minimum figure because staff from other areas of the ACCC are often brought in to
adjudication teams reviewing authorisations. The estimated adjudication budget does not cover
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The magnitude of administrative costs associated with authorising shipping industry
arrangements in practice will depend on the nature of the agreement(s) submitted
for authorisation and the thresholds for review by the ACCC. As discussed above,
the Commission considers that it is likely that the ACCC would require individual
liner shipping agreements to be submitted for authorisation by conferences.
The major administrative and compliance costs are likely to stem from participating
in the authorisation process. This includes the costs of:
·  preparing applications, which may include legal fees;
·  preparing additional submissions to the ACCC (for example responding to an
interim decision or to submissions by other interested parties);
·  appearing at a conference to consider an ACCC interim decision;
·  initiating (or appearing as a party to) an appeal to the Tribunal against an ACCC
decision; and
·  complying with notification requirements or enforceable undertakings (for
example, to inform the ACCC of changes in conference membership).
It is not possible to determine a priori, the likely magnitude of these costs for
shippers, shipping lines, the ACCC and other interested parties. However, it is
likely that administrative costs to government and to carriers would be significantly
greater under Part VII than under Part X. As noted earlier, adding to the cost of
internationally mobile conference carriers may lead to reduced service levels on
Australian trades, to the detriment of Australian shippers.
Other considerations
Chapter  3 set out the criteria to be used to assess various regulatory options.
Authorisation has been assessed against some of these criteria — such as
transparency, predictability, international compatibility, and administrative and
compliance costs — in the previous discussion.
This section briefly assesses Part VII authorisation processes against the remaining
criteria — the objectives of minimal regulation and promotion of commercial
outcomes, recognition of the limits of Australia’s market power, and flexibility.
Further observations are made in respect of criteria such as transparency,
compliance and consistency with arrangements applying to other industries.132 INTERNATIONAL
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Minimal regulation and promoting commercial outcomes
Part X is a comparatively permissive regulatory regime which allows organisational
structures to evolve in liner shipping, subject to competitive market pressures.
Arguably, a presumption underlying Part X is that the competitive characteristics of
liner shipping markets, combined with the countervailing power of shippers,
normally are sufficient to constrain the misuse of market power of conferences and
other cooperative arrangements. Authorisation takes a significantly different
approach by virtue of the presumption of public detriment due to any collusive
behaviour and hence the requirement for a case-by-case approach to assessing
conference and cooperative arrangements.
The extent of competition in liner shipping markets (on particular trades or more
generally) would be a key factor in any decisions taken by the ACCC as part of
their case-by-case reviews under authorisation.
Subject to the substantial concerns, specific to this industry, about the authorisation
process discussed in this chapter, the ultimate outcomes for shippers under
authorisation, in principle, may not be inferior to those achieved under Part  X,
particularly if the ACCC and the Tribunal were to:
·  define markets broadly in assessing competition in liner shipping, rather than
looking at narrow segments only;
·  take a relatively long time horizon; and
·  take a view of the public interest which recognises the close correspondence
between the public interest and shippers’ commercial interests.
However, as far as the Commission is aware, the ACCC has not considered
competition in liner shipping in detail previously. In attempting to understand how
the ACCC may look at liner shipping arrangements, potential sources of guidance
include the TPC’s report on an investigation under Part X (see box 7.1) and other
authorisation cases considered by the ACCC and Tribunal.
Another key difference between Part X and authorisation is that the latter gives a
greater direct role to the regulator. Part X essentially allows shippers or the Minister
to determine when action should be taken against a conference, though the Minister
can also initiate an investigation by the ACCC. Under authorisation, the ACCC may
choose to intervene directly. For example, potential outcomes for shippers under
authorisation will be affected by the conditions imposed on authorisations or
enforceable undertakings accepted by the ACCC. The purpose of conditions and
undertakings may be to ensure that claimed conference benefits are realised and
passed on to shippers. A potential benefit to shippers of this approach is that the
conditions and undertakings strengthen shippers’ negotiating position with respectALTERNATIVE
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to conferences because of the ramifications of non-compliance (pecuniary penalties
and revocation of the authorisation). On the other hand, such intervention must be
targeted so as not to distort efficient market outcomes.
Box 7.1 TPC investigation of a complaint under Part X
In 1992, the Trade Practices Commission (now the ACCC) was asked to look into
alleged breaches of Part X by conference lines on the Australia–United States trade.a
In examining the complaint, the TPC looked at the state of competition in the Australia–
United States trade, based on a number of factors, including:
·  the volume and mix of trade with the United States;
·  recent entry and exit from the trade;
·  the number of companies operating in the trade and their capacity; and
·  conference market share.
In this particular instance, the TPC defined the relevant markets narrowly. It focussed
on competition among lines for the business of particular commodity groups (such as
horticultural products, meat, dairy, wool and metals) arguing that competition can vary
depending on the characteristics of the commodities being transported.b
NACON conference market shares, 1993
Dairy Wool Horticulture= Metals Meat
NACON 77 24 100 8 60
Non-conference 28 76 0 92 40
=  The apple and pear industry stated that it was restricted to using NACON services due to United
States quarantine regulations which prevailed at the time.
Comparisons of the market shares derived under different assumptions about market
boundaries highlight the importance of market definition to the analysis of competition
in liner shipping markets. Competition in liner shipping markets was discussed in
chapter  5 and information on market shares in liner shipping is summarised in
chapter 2 (and appendix C).
a The matter related to the introduction of terminal handling charges by conference and non-conference
lines for the movement of export containers through shipping terminals in the United States (TPC 1993a,
p. 5). b The relevant markets could have been defined more broadly as, for example, the markets for
transportation of dry or reefer cargoes on the Australia–United States trade (including transhipment), or as
the market for liner services on the Australia–United States trade.




Regulatory outcomes also depend on the responsiveness of regulation to changing
market conditions. In principle, moving to the authorisation process could permit
changing market conditions to be incorporated in regulatory decision-making more
rapidly than under Part X, leading to a more responsive regulatory environment for
shippers and shipping lines.
A potential advantage of authorisation over Part X is that at the time a discussion
agreement is submitted for authorisation, the ACCC would be able to determine
whether the benefits of allowing that agreement would outweigh the costs, taking
the prevailing circumstances into account.
However, as noted above, achieving improved outcomes for shippers depends on
how the authorisation process is administered by the ACCC and the Tribunal. The
complaints mechanism under Part X and periodic reviews of Part X both provide
avenues for review of shippers’ concerns about particular discussion agreements.
One area where authorisation may provide greater flexibility than Part X is in terms
of the scope of exemptions. Under authorisation, scope exists for modifying the
scope of exemptions where circumstances or terminology changes. On the other
hand, as already noted, discretion to vary the scope of exemptions under an
authorisation may provide added uncertainty for carriers and shippers.
Transparency
The authorisation process is more transparent than Part X in several respects. For
instance, the ACCC is required to review authorisation applications in an open
manner by inviting public submissions and comment. As noted in chapter 6, there is
no requirement for the Registrar of Liner Shipping to invite public comment on
conference agreements submitted for registration.32
Compliance
A further potential benefit of authorisation is that it may provide an added incentive
for carriers to comply with their obligations to shippers. Breach of a condition
attached to an authorisation could not only lead to revocation of the authorisation,33
                                             
32 However, the Registrar pointed out that copies of provisional agreements are sent to the ACCC
thereby providing an opportunity for the ACCC to comment on whether the proposed
agreement meets the criteria for registration (sub. DR29, p. 5).
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but also, under section 87B of the TPA, if parties to an authorisation breach the
terms of an undertaking, the ACCC may apply to the Federal Court for an order to:
·  direct the parties to comply with an undertaking;
·  pay the Commonwealth an amount up to the amount of any financial benefit
resulting from the breach;
·  compensate any other person who suffered loss or damage as a result of the
breach; and
·  any other order that the court considers appropriate.
Under Part  X the only penalty available is full or partial deregistration of an
agreement. Even if deregistration occurs, shipping companies could immediately
lodge a new agreement incorporating minor changes (see chapter  6). It may be
possible to amend the present arrangements to enable similar remedies to be sought
with respect to non-compliance with Part X (see chapter 8), particularly in respect
of undertakings given by carriers.
Regulatory consistency
A claimed benefit of repealing Part  X, thereby exposing liner shipping
arrangements to the general provisions of the TPA, is that it would achieve greater
consistency with arrangements applying to other domestic industries. For instance,
the Department of the Treasury stated that:
Using the authorisation process [to regulate liner shipping] has several advantages …
[one of which is that it] is the universal standard [in Australia] for assessing whether
anti-competitive behaviour is appropriate.
[Authorisation] would be consistent with … [the approach] which applies to other
industries. (sub. DR 35, p. 25)
While harmonisation of differing competition frameworks between countries is a
desirable objective, the first concern is to seek liner shipping regulation which complies
with the domestic competition framework. (sub. DR35, p. 19)
Removing Part  X would force the liner shipping industry to comply with the
regulatory requirements facing almost all Australian industries. The TPA contains
special provisions for the telecommunications industry but these are intended to be
transitional arrangements. Some other industries have special regulatory regimes,
such as airports and postal services but these are embodied in separate Acts rather
than in individual sections of the TPA.
The principal rationale for uniformity is that no industry receives ‘special’
advantages relative to other industries that could distort domestic resource136 INTERNATIONAL
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allocation. However, international liner shipping is a global rather than domestic
industry, and Australia relies almost totally on foreign liner services (which do not
use Australian resources). Indeed, for Australia, international liner shipping is not
an industry in the normal sense of the word but an imported service.
Compared to the need for international consistency, achieving greater consistency
between Australia’s liner shipping regime and the arrangements applying to
domestic industries is not the first concern as the Department of the Treasury
submitted (above). The Commission’s principal concerns are the efficiency of
outcomes and the efficiency of regulation. Achieving international compatibility in
liner shipping regulations is important for Australian shippers because it reduces the
potential costs to carriers of entering Australian trades. Other countries have granted
exemptions from their competition laws to liner shipping conferences without the
need for case-by-case justifications. Imposing the requirement for a case-by-case
justification on foreign shipping lines may impose additional costs on carriers and
ultimately, Australian shippers.
7.3 Block authorisation
Under the existing authorisation process a case-by-case assessment of conference
agreements would be required. An alternative proposal is to establish a new process
under the TPA for granting block authorisation to a broad range of agreements in a
particular industry. Such a scheme could work in a manner similar to that which
exists in the European Union.
The European Union’s rules on competition are embodied in the Treaty of Rome.
Article  85, which prohibits a range of anti-competitive conduct, enables block
exemptions from the prohibitions on anti-competitive conduct to be granted where
proposed conduct can be shown to contribute ‘to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the benefits’.34
As noted in chapter 4, the European Union has issued Regulation 4056/86 which
grants a conditional block exemption to liner conferences operating on inward and
outward trades. The exemption allows price fixing by conferences (amongst other
things) but does not allow conduct which constitutes a misuse of market power.
Under Regulation  4056/86, conferences need not notify their agreements to the
European Commission (which is the body responsible for administering Europe’s
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competition laws). However, they may seek confirmation from the Commission that
they comply (see chapter 4 and appendix F).
The option of establishing a similar procedure under the TPA raises a variety of
issues that go beyond this current inquiry. For instance, creating such a process
would be a significant departure from the authorisation process and may have
implications for a large number of industries, other than the liner shipping sector.
To avoid creating implications for other industries, application of a block exemption
process could be limited to the international liner shipping industry. However,
arrangements for regulating liner shipping under the block exemption process could
also be achieved under Part  X and would retain the characteristic of being an
industry-specific regime — which is a key argument advanced by some participants
for abolishing Part X.
There are some concerns about the potential magnitude of regulatory costs under a
block exemption process. For instance, the Department of Transport and Regional
Services commented that:
It appears that Part X involves less regulatory intervention than the European Union
system [and that] the [block exemption] system … appears to have involved a relatively
high level of intervention by the Competition Directorate (DGIV) to deal with disputes
and alleged breaches of Regulation 4056/86. (sub. DR29, p. 3)
Concerns about the regulatory costs associated with the European block exemption
process appear to stem from the protracted dispute between the European
Commission (which administers the block exemption) and conference carriers,
which centres on whether the exemption for liner shipping conferences covers
inland price fixing.35 According to Gardner  (1997,  p.  320) the European
Commission is attempting to interpret the European Union’s competition rules in a
way that limits the scope of the exemption for liner shipping. The European
experience underscores the point that regulatory costs will depend on how any liner
shipping exemption is interpreted and applied.
7.4 Industry codes
An alternative to Part X involves conferences and peak shipper bodies agreeing on
an industry code of practices. Such a code could identify permissible conference
                                             
35 The European Commission has sought to address six aspects of the group exemption in recent
decisions, covering: inland price fixing, the meaning of ‘uniform or common’ freight rates,




arrangements modelled on Part  X, as well as an independent dispute resolution
process and provisions for enforcement (ACCC sub. 16, p. 14).
As noted above, it is highly likely than any code agreed between shippers and
carriers would require authorisation in which case the discussion in section 7.2 is
relevant. However, whereas the discussion on authorisation canvassed the
development of an industry code in the context of what an authorisation might need
to look like, it did not consider explicitly whether the ACCC would be likely to
authorise a code resembling Part X.
As noted above, the Department of the Treasury suggested that industry could agree
on an industry code which encompasses the ‘core restrictive practices’ to be
adhered to by conferences (sub.  DR35, p.  24).36 Concerning the prospects for
developing a liner shipping code, the Department of the Treasury also says:
Such an approach would be consistent with that which applies to other industries and
would be transparent. Codes of conduct and collective agreements have been
authorised in the past and can be authorised where the benefit of the conduct to the
public outweighs the anti-competitive detriment.
The ACCC has not authorised any industry codes resembling Part X. In written
advice provided to the Commission on a draft of the Position Paper, Frances Hanks
(senior lecturer in law at the University of Melbourne) said that:
There is nothing in the history of authorisations under the TPA to suggest that an
industry code outlining types of allowable conduct of the kind set out [in conference
agreements] (price fixing, revenue pooling, vessel sharing) would have a chance of
authorisation.
Once the collective agreements are subdivided into specific trades, or specific
conference arrangements, they look more like something that could be authorised.
However, [the authorisation provision] requires that the anti-competitive detriment and
public benefit of each part be established separately. (pers. comm., 15 June 1999)
In addition, Miller’s Annotated Guide to the TPA lists examples of industry codes
of conduct that have been submitted to the TPC/ACCC for authorisation in the past
(Miller  1999, p.  552–553). Miller states that the ACCC has recognised that
self-regulation schemes can play a part in promoting competition and efficiency.
However, the cases listed in Miller do not seem to cover the same ‘core conference
practices’ as the Commission understands them. Instead codes authorised or
considered by the TPC/ACCC cover a narrower range of practices such as
professional accreditation, ethics, advertising, safety and quality control.
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Miller’s list of codes considered by the TPC/ACCC may not be exhaustive.
One arrangement that is not listed but which has received considerable attention
elsewhere is the National Electricity Code (NEC) (see box 7.2).
It is difficult to assess ex ante how the ACCC would be likely to view an industry
code resembling Part X if it were to be submitted for authorisation. The available
evidence suggests that the ACCC has not previously examined any industry codes
for other industries which permit practices similar to those undertaken by liner
shipping conferences. That said, the lack of any prior experience is not proof that
any code for liner shipping that was developed could not be authorised. However, it
is suggestive that practical difficulties may arise in designing an industry code for
liner shipping that would have significant prospects of being authorised.
Box 7.2 National Electricity Code
The NEC provides the institutional arrangements governing the National Electricity
Market (NEM). It comprises two distinct but inter-related elements:
·  the wholesale electricity market arrangements; and
·  the arrangements for access to the transmission and distribution system.
The market arrangements govern the operation of the wholesale spot market and
include the institutional arrangements, system security requirements, the market rules
for bids, offers and dispatch and metering standards. The access arrangements are the
technical rules governing connection to and use of the physical wires infrastructure for
transporting electricity.
The NEC is a complex document that encompasses a range of practices that could
affect competition in the NEM. Amongst other things, the NEC submitted for
authorisation stipulated that a ceiling and floor would be set on wholesale electricity
prices. The ACCC expressed concerns about the potential effects of these price
restrictions and in particular, sought to have the price floor removed from the code.
Source: ACCC (1998).
7.5 Notification
Another alternative to Part  X, raised in discussion with participants and in
submissions, was introduction of a modified form of notification process.
Currently, notification is only available for exclusive dealing (section 47), including
third-line forcing. Section 93 of the TPA allows persons to notify the ACCC of
conduct that may breach the exclusive dealing provisions of the TPA. Notification
provides immunity from prosecution, unless the ACCC decides to review and140 INTERNATIONAL
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revoke a notification. Unlike the authorisation process, a greater onus is placed on
the ACCC to overturn a notification by showing that the public benefit of the
notified conduct is less than the public detriment.37
Due to the limited application of the current regime, establishing a notification
process that could accommodate arrangements in the liner shipping industry would
involve creating a notification process that is specific to the liner shipping industry.
The broad features of such a scheme were outlined by the ACCC (see box 7.3).
Box 7.3 Modified notification process for the liner shipping industry
This model provides for a new notification procedure that would encompass many of
the provisions covered by Part  X and apply to the liner shipping industry only.
The  process was outlined by the ACCC as a possible transitional arrangement.
Key features of the proposed procedure include:
·  Parties to a conference would be required to notify agreements to the ACCC in
order to receive an exemption;
·  Exemptions would extend to all matters covered by Part X, including price fixing;
·  Shippers intending to engage in coordinated negotiations with shipping lines would
be required to notify such arrangements;
·  Notification of conference agreements would be conditional on certain minimum
criteria being met. For instance, it would need to specify minimum services levels
and outline a carrier/shipper agreed mechanism for resolving commercial disputes;
·  the notification would need to include enforceable undertakings concerning matters
such as providing advance notice of changes to shipping arrangements,
negotiating with a notified shipper body whenever reasonably requested and
adherence to a carrier/shipper agreed dispute resolution process;
·  the ACCC would be able to review a notification if evidence arose of substantial
anti-competitive effects of an agreement (two options are to allow reviews to be
commenced without a complaint from shippers or, alternatively, to allow a review
only in the event of a shipper lodging a formal complaint);
·  notification of agreements could be revoked where the ACCC was satisfied that the
costs of the notified conduct outweigh the benefits; and
·  ACCC review decisions would be appealable to the Tribunal.
Source: ACCC (sub. 16, pp. 11–14).
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The modified notification process would work in a similar way to the current
Part X. However, under the proposed notification arrangement:
·  disputes relating to specific carrier obligations, such as the requirement to
negotiate whenever reasonably requested to do so, would be handled via an
agreed commercial dispute resolution mechanism, with involvement of the
ACCC as a last resort;
·  the ACCC may be able to investigate carrier practices without receiving a
formal complaint where evidence of substantial anti-competitive effects arises;
·  remedial action could be taken through the Federal Court where specific carrier
obligations were violated and carriers/shippers could not resolve the issues
through negotiation; and
·  ACCC review decisions would be appealable to the Tribunal.
In principle, the modified notification regime has several attractive features.
Arguably, Part  X explicitly assumes that conference arrangements are desirable
from an efficiency viewpoint (or that they will exist even if banned by Australian
law) and therefore grants a block exemption subject to certain safeguards. Under
authorisation, this presumption would be reversed because a case-by-case
assessment of conferences would be required. Authorisation places the onus on the
applicant to prove that the public benefits of the proposed conduct outweigh the
costs. However, under the proposed notification process, notified conference
agreements would be protected from Part IV unless the ACCC was satisfied, after a
review, that the public benefits were less than the costs of the notified conduct.
Permitting the ACCC to disallow a notification may reduce compliance and
enforcement costs (because only those agreements that are possibly detrimental will
be reviewed). As noted by the ACCC, notification is a less formal process than
authorisation. Notification is also cheaper, costing between $100 and $2500  per
application (the lower end of the fee scale is applicable to small business and to
proprietary limited companies) (sub. 16, p. 11).
However, there are several arguments against the notification approach. Most
obviously, the proposed notification process would still constitute a specific regime
for the liner shipping industry — which is the main ground on which some
participants criticise Part X. As the Commission has argued throughout this report,
it is the efficiency of the process that is most important, not the form or symmetry
of the legislation. More importantly, there is considerable uncertainty as to how
frequently and on what basis, the ACCC would decide to examine a notified
arrangement. At one extreme, it could operate like Part X (reviewing anomalies in
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administered in a manner akin to authorisation, with the ACCC reviewing every
notified agreement (or variation to an existing agreement) in detail.
If the ACCC were to administer a notification regime for liner shipping in a manner
akin to the authorisation provisions then the discussion relating to authorisation in
this chapter is relevant. If the notification regime were to be administered in the
same way as Part X, it would call into question the logic of incurring the transitional
costs of moving to notification.
7.6 Conclusion
The major alternative to Part X is application of the general provisions of the TPA.
This would allow carriers and shippers to apply to the ACCC for authorisation of
conference and shipper body arrangements, respectively.
The process of granting exemptions for conference arrangements would be
significantly different under authorisation. Under Part X, exemptions for conference
agreements are granted automatically, providing certain requirements as to form and
content are met. ‘Public interest’ examinations of conference arrangements can be
initiated by shippers or the Minister only. Under the authorisation procedure,
carriers would be required, ex ante, to convince the ACCC, and possibly the
Tribunal, that the benefits to shippers of conference arrangements would outweigh
any costs (anti-competitive detriment). The ACCC would also be able to initiate a
review of an authorisation, prior to its expiry, if it found that circumstances have
changed ‘materially’.
In principle, authorisation could achieve similar outcomes to those attained under
Part X as a wide range of liner shipping conduct, including price fixing, can be
authorised under the TPA. A key concern for shippers is retaining the
countervailing powers they have under Part X. If Part X were repealed, this could
be achieved by the ACCC authorising agreements subject to conditions or
undertakings (dealing with safeguards such as the requirement on conferences to
negotiate minimum service levels with APSA, and to provide advance notice to
shippers of proposed changes in price and service levels).
There is some uncertainty about the Government’s ability to enforce Australia’s
competition laws, in relation to the conduct of foreign carriers, in the absence of
Part X and in the absence of an authorisation being granted. Compared to a situation
where locally-based companies are trading in Australia, the Government may face
extra difficulties such as gathering information from companies located overseas,




Authorisation has some potential advantages over Part  X. Under authorisation,
carriers would face a broader range of significant penalties for failing to comply
with their obligations to shippers than under Part X as it stands at present. Also,
compared to Part  X, the authorisation process is potentially more flexible and
transparent.
However, the authorisation process, by its nature, inevitably increases scope for
third-party intervention and creates uncertainty about outcomes. It is feasible that
the authorisation process could function in a similar manner to Part X — that is,
allow conferences to operate comparatively freely, albeit subject to certain
requirements to negotiate with shippers coupled with sanctions against abuse of
market power. Indeed, the Commission is of the view that, were Part  X to be
repealed, application of Part VII eventually would see a Part X-type regime (that is,
conditional block exemption) re-emerging. However, the process of implementing
Part  VII could be protracted and costly, and probably would require legislative
amendment to allow block authorisation. Indeed, the industry-code approach of
Part X appears antithetical to the approach of Part VII as it currently stands and as it
has been practiced.
A second major option examined was the possibility of establishing a procedure
under the TPA for granting a block authorisation. The European Union’s block
exemption process is a potential model. However, implementing such an option
may have broad ranging implications for many sectors of the economy, or, if its
application were to be limited to liner shipping only, would still constitute a
‘special’ industry-specific arrangement.
An approach that involved developing an industry code similar to Part  X could
potentially minimise compliance and regulatory costs. However, there are some
concerns about whether an industry code resembling Part  X could be
accommodated under Part VII. It is also unclear whether there would be sufficient
gains to offset the transitional costs arising from any shift to an industry code
resembling Part X.
A further alternative involved notification of agreements to the ACCC. To
accommodate the types of arrangements prevalent in liner shipping, the TPA would
need to be amended to extend the scope of the current notification arrangements
(which apply to exclusive dealing conduct only). A shipping industry notification
regime could operate in practice in a similar way to either authorisation or Part X
and this would add an extra layer of uncertainty for the participants in such a
process. The notification regime would still constitute a ‘special’ arrangement





8 Modifications to Part X
The terms of reference require the Commission to examine possible improvements
to Part X. A number of potential modifications to Part X, drawing on submissions
from participants and the discussion in previous chapters, are examined here.
Possible modifications to Part X examined in this chapter relate to two broad areas:
coverage and content; and administrative processes. Matters relating to the coverage
and content of Part X include:
·  terminal handling charges (THCs);
·  intermodal charges;
·  safeguards for importers;
·  regulation of discussion agreements;
·  open versus closed conferences;
·  declaration of a carrier with substantial market power;
·  discrimination between shippers; and
·  Australian flag shipping.
Proposed modifications to Part X processes include:
·  penalties and dispute settlement;
·  variations to the registration process;
·  funding for the Australian Peak Shippers’ Association (APSA); and
·  a separate shipping Act.
8.1 Terminal handling charges
Several questions relating to the setting of terminal and port charges have been
raised with the Commission. First, whether the Part  X exemptions relating to
collective rate setting currently extend, and/or whether it is in the national interest to
extend them, to terminal-to-terminal charges. Second, if such exemptions are
considered to be in the national interest, whether or not they should extend to
container-handling facilities outside the ports. Third, whether or not the Part  X146 INTERNATIONAL
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exemptions extend to the collective negotiation of stevedoring contracts by
conferences. Fourth, whether it is desirable that terminal handling charges be
itemised separately in the freight bill.
The first issue is whether or not the Part X exemptions relating to collective rate
setting currently extend to terminal-to-terminal charges. The shipping service
contracted between shipper and carrier normally includes sea transport (the
‘blue water’ component) as well as the loading and unloading of containers and
their sorting and stacking within the terminal. The charges for these services are
referred to collectively as terminal-to-terminal rates.
Whilst Part X clearly allows conferences to set blue water rates, the legal status of
terminal-to-terminal charges appears uncertain. Whilst section 10.14 (1) notes that
the exemptions apply solely to the transport of cargo by sea and activities that take
place outside Australia, section 10.14 (2) notes that:
The exemptions provided by this Subdivision extend to:
(a) the fixing of door-to-door freight rates for an outwards liner cargo shipping service,
if freight rates are also fixed for shippers wishing to use only those parts of the
service that consist of:
(i)  the transport of cargo by sea;
(ii)  activities that take place in Australia within the limits of a wharf appointed
under section 15 of the Customs Act 1901 … and
(iii) activities that take place outside Australia at a wharf or adjacent terminal
facilities …
Clearly section 14.2 allows conferences to set door-to-door rates providing shippers
are given the option of a rate covering ‘the transport of cargo by sea’ as well as
activities taking place ‘within the limits of a wharf’. There appears to be uncertainty
as to whether (i) and (ii) may be interpreted as terminal-to-terminal transport, and if
so, whether terminal-to-terminal rates are allowable other than as a component of
door-to-door rates.
Whilst Steinwall and Layton (1997, p. 363) assert that the exemptions granted by
sections 10.14 and 10.22 do not apply to stevedoring (terminal) operations or the
transport of cargo by land or air within Australia, the ACCC has argued that their
precise scope is unclear (see LSS, sub. 10, p. 33).
Several submissions argued that there is a case for clarifying and/or extending
existing exemptions relating to conference charges for stevedoring (terminal)
services. Liner Shipping Services argued that carriers should be permitted to:
… collectively set all charges, [or at least those] involved in the terminal gate-to-
terminal gate as part of a door-to-door movement, including the collective setting ofMODIFICATIONS TO
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Port Service Charges and Terminal Handling Charges … this approach would be fully
consistent with that taken in Europe and in North America in that the basic exemption
at least covers terminal-to-terminal movements. (sub. 10, pp. 33–34)
The discussion raises the issue of whether or not it is in the national interest that
Part  X exemptions relating to collective rate setting cover terminal-to-terminal
charges. It is common practice for shipping lines to quote freight rates on a
terminal-to-terminal rather than a blue water basis. Furthermore, slot chartering
arrangements within consortia and/or conferences, which are considered desirable
in that they enable carriers to operate larger vessels than might otherwise be
employed, imply that vessels usually carry containers consigned on account of a
number of carriers. Given such slot chartering arrangements, there would be
practical difficulties in separating out and assigning stevedoring charges were
consortia or conferences refused permission to charge a common stevedoring fee.
Given doubts regarding the precise scope of Part X exemptions relating to collective
rate setting, especially with regard to terminal-to-terminal charges, and the
arguments favouring collective rate setting on a terminal-to-terminal basis, the
Commission recommends that the relevant sections of Part  X be redrafted (see
recommendation 8.1A below).
Second, the extension of Part  X exemptions relating to collective rate setting to
container terminals outside the confines of a port (that is, outside the limits of the
wharf as defined under section 15 of the Customs Act 1901) is more problematic.
The Department of Transport and Regional Services argued that:
… consideration should be given to … extending Part  X exemptions to container
depots not within the limits of a wharf so as to be consistent with the principle of
facilitating intermodal transport and door-to-door services. (sub. 3, p. 27)
The Commission notes that plans exist for the development of inland container
depots in Sydney’s western suburbs. Such projects, which aim to boost the handling
capacity of the port by minimising wharf congestion, raise questions concerning the
extension of Part  X exemptions to facilities outside the limits of the wharf as
defined under section 15 of the Customs Act 1901. On the one hand, it could be
argued that such container terminals are merely an extension of those within the
port limits, made necessary by congestion within the port area. On the other hand,
were such exemptions granted to container terminals located within the
metropolitan area, it might be argued that they should be extended to existing and
proposed container depots located throughout country New South Wales. Such a
recommendation would by default allow conferences to continue to quote door-to-
door rates (see discussion below on intermodal rates). On balance the Commission148 INTERNATIONAL
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considers that the word terminals should be taken to include terminals within the
metropolitan area of port cities.
The third issue is whether or not the Part X exemptions extend to the collective
negotiation of stevedoring contracts by conferences. The Department of Transport
and Regional Services noted that collective negotiation of stevedoring contracts has
been the customary practice:
While some doubt has been expressed as to whether sections 10.14 and 10.22 provide
an exemption for conferences to negotiate as a ‘block’ with stevedoring companies, this
has been the practice for many years. Accordingly, any changes to the Part X regime
should clarify whether or not conferences should be allowed to negotiate as a ‘block’
with stevedoring companies in Australia. (sub. 3, p. 26)
The Department presented arguments for and against such an exemption:
Some suggestions have been made that the Part  X exemptions, through allowing
shipping companies to collude as cartels, has reduced their incentive to put pressure on
stevedoring companies to reduce costs and improve efficiency.
The Brazil report (p.  151) contains an alternative view to the effect that
conferences/consortia can obtain a lower charge per TEU because of the large volume
of cargo they can offer, and also the fact that conferences/consortia generally present
efficient ships with a reputation for cargo stowage expertise. (DTRS, sub. 3, p. 26)
Whilst the Commission has not been presented with evidence that demonstrates
beyond reasonable doubt that conferences obtain lower stevedoring prices as a
result of collective negotiation, it accepts that in a world in which slot chartering is
common it would be inefficient to require lines to negotiate individually with a
stevedore.
Fourth, APSA has questioned the desirability of separately itemising THCs in the
freight bill. The Commission understands that it was common until the mid-1980s
to subsume THCs into the basic freight rate. However, declining freight revenue
and increased stevedoring costs led carriers to seek to separate out ‘third party’
charges, notably THCs and port service charges (PSCs).
Liner Shipping Services argued that there are clear benefits in separately identifying
and making transparent terminal handling and port service charges, notably the
pressures that can be exerted on poorly performing enterprises, and that this benefit
could be lost if conferences were unable to collectively set such charges (LSS,
sub. 10, p. 34). For these reasons, some shippers support itemisation of charges.
However, in discussions with the Commission some shippers argued that, whilst
transparency may yield some benefits, the application and joint determination ofMODIFICATIONS TO
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THCs and PSCs were designed to put a floor under freight revenue, particularly in
those trades that have experienced the largest price falls.
It is difficult to understand how the itemisation of cost components of itself can lead
to overall rate increases.  If shippers prefer to be quoted a single price for a
complete service, this properly should be the subject of negotiation between
themselves and the carriers rather than required under Part X. The Commission does
not believe it desirable for the outcome to be determined by regulation.
The Commission recommends that Part  X be amended to clarify that the
exemption relating to rate setting extends to land-based charges that normally
form part of a ‘terminal-to-terminal’ shipping contract (that is, one that includes
not only the ‘blue water’ component but also the sorting and stacking of
containers within a container terminal). The Commission favours widening the
definition of terminal from the present ‘within the limits of the wharf as under the
Customs Act 1901’ to include terminals located within the metropolitan area of
port cities.
The Commission further recommends that members of shipping conferences
should be able to collectively negotiate a conference rate with stevedores.
The Commission considers that the issue of whether or not terminal handling
charges should be itemised separately in the freight charge is a matter for
negotiation between shippers and carriers rather one to be determined within the
ambit of Part X.
8.2 Intermodal or ‘door-to-door’ rates
Globalisation of business and the advent of ‘just-in-time’ inventory management
has increased shipper preference for intermodal or door-to-door transport services,
although evidence given to the Commission suggests that this trend has been less
marked in Australia than in the United States or Europe. While a single transport
provider usually coordinates the intermodal service (so that the shipper has a single






may be provided by several land and sea carriers.1 Liner shipping operators have
responded to shipper preferences by offering shippers a range of transport options,
including door-to-door and terminal-to-terminal (blue water plus terminal handling)
services.2
The key issue for the Commission is whether shipping conferences should be
allowed to quote door-to-door rates. Under the existing Part X regime, outward and
inward conferences are allowed to set door-to-door or intermodal rates providing
they offer shippers the option of a rate that excludes the pre- or post-terminal
land-based component. This exemption applies solely to the setting of door-to-door
prices. As interpreted by the Department of Transport and Regional Services, and
accepted by the industry, the exemption is taken to mean that conference members
may not collude when negotiating with land transport providers. The Commission
stresses that the right of individual shipping lines to quote door-to-door rates is not
in question. The issue relates solely to the desirability of conferences being able to
quote door-to-door rates.
Some participants expressed their preference for intermodal services and/or their
support for the present Part X arrangements. For example, Interlaine stated:
…  many mills are located at some considerable distance from the nearest ports of
arrival. It is therefore essential that efficient on-carriage arrangements exist to enable
the wool to reach its final destinations without delay, and at a competitive price.
(sub. 2, p. 1)
Interlaine clearly favours the existing exemptions:
… the exemptions which exist under Part X enable [the conference] to organise a level
of overall service from Australia and into Europe, including inland haulage rates, which
is in proper response to the needs of its customers. A fragmented Conference, unable to
pool its resources, would not be able to achieve these levels of service … (sub. 2, p. 3)
In a similar vein, Australian Wool Industries Secretariat submitted:
… the  operations  of  Conferences  to  the  major  trade  destinations  for  wool  have
benefited wool exporters because of the level and frequency of service provided,
particularly through the multiplicity of ports serviced directly and indirectly (by feeder)
and arrangements for inland distribution in Europe, without restricting the exporters’
ability to use non-conference services where preferred … (sub. 14, p. 1)
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On the other hand, APSA suggested that Part X exemptions should not extend to
intermodal rate-making:
… because the intent, firstly, in the original concept of exemptions from Part IV was to
cover port-to-port pricing only; and secondly, it has the ability to lessen competition.
(sub. 22, p. 2)
Overseas regulatory regimes vary in their attitude to collective fixing of intermodal
rates. For example, under European Union competition policy, agreements between
carriers relating to intermodal operations are not entitled to the block exemption
granted to shipping conferences, although an individual or a specific block
exemption may be sought in such cases. The European Commission has taken the
view that the group exemption in Regulation 4056/86 does not allow shipowners
jointly to fix prices for the inland transport leg of a multimodal transport operation.
The European Commission has handed down two judgements prohibiting inland
price fixing — the Trans-Atlantic Agreement Commission decision (1994) and the
Far-Eastern Freight Conference Commission decision (1994) (OECD 1999a).
In contrast, conferences in the United States trades enjoy antitrust immunity with
respect to US inland transport services, although conference members must
individually negotiate service conditions and prices with land transport carriers
(OECD 1999a, p. 23). The 1984 Shipping Act prohibited carriers from entering into
joint negotiations with railroads, trucking companies or airlines for transportation
within the US. The 1998 Ocean Shipping Reform Act is more permissive, allowing
carriers to ‘discuss, fix or regulate transportation rates, including through rates’
(section 4) as well as ‘negotiate with a non-ocean carrier or group of non-ocean
carriers (for example, truck, rail or air operators) … any matter relating to rates and
services’ (section  7). The exemptions are subject to the proviso that such
negotiations, and any resulting agreements, are subject to antitrust law and are
consistent with the purposes of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act 1998.
The Commission has accepted that cooperation and rationalisation by means of a
conference may provide desirable outcomes for shippers on the ocean shipping leg
of intermodal transport. A lower risk premium may enable carriers to employ larger
vessels, and thus benefit from economies of vessel size, while a sizeable conference
fleet may generate additional economies as well as provide the coordinated
schedules valued by shippers. Furthermore, the Commission has recommended
explicitly extending conference exemptions to cover terminal handling because of
technical efficiencies and practicalities in container handling.
But the Commission sees no reason why the rationale applying to the blue water
component of intermodal transport applies equally to an inland transport industry
with a different pattern of costs and underlying structure. In other words, the152 INTERNATIONAL
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Commission is not persuaded that the benefits stemming from cooperation and
rationalisation in the blue water leg also arise in domestic transport operations.
Providing individual carriers are able to offer a door-to-door rate, and the right to do
so is not in question, it does not appear necessary for conferences collectively to
offer such a rate.
Given the level of competition in the Australian road transport industry, there is
little scope for conferences to obtain economic rents by offering door-to-door rates.
There is even less incentive for a shipper to accept a door-to-door rate that includes
an element of economic rent, since the Part X regime allows the shipper the option
of buying road transport services directly. However, whilst the Commission thus
does not consider that serious economic harm would arise from the ability of
conferences to quote door-to-door rates, the logic of the national competition policy
requires that the exemptions be removed.
The Commission recommends deletion of sections  10.14.2 and 10.22.2 which
allow the fixing of door-to-door freight rates by conferences for outward and
inward liner shipping respectively. Deleting these sections will require the
insertion of a clause in sections 10.14.1 and 10.22.1 permitting conferences to set
terminal-to-terminal rates.
8.3 Safeguards for importers
Under Part X, member lines of inward conferences receive the same exemptions
from Part IV of the TPA as those available to members of outward conferences (see
chapter 4). However, there are major differences between the obligations imposed
on the two types of conference. Unlike conferences serving outbound trades, inward
conferences are not required to apply for registration of their agreements in order to
receive exemptions from Part IV.3 Further, inward conferences are not required to
negotiate with an Australian shipper body over freight rates and service levels.
Several participants called for changes to Part  X that would require inward
conferences to negotiate land-based charges incurred in Australia with importers
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and would allow importers to form a designated importers’ association.4 For
instance, the Department of Transport and Regional Services noted:
Complaints from importers concerning the imposition of terminal handling charges
suggest there is a case for providing importers with at least some of the countervailing
powers provided to exporters under Part X. In this regard, it could be reasonable to
require inward conferences to negotiate with importers over charges for Australian
land-based services. (sub. 3, pp. 21–22)
Qualified support for increasing the countervailing power of importers in respect of
land-based charges in Australia also came from Liner Shipping Services, which
stated:
Lines would be agreeable to a Peak Designated Group of importers being given similar
powers to investigate land-based charges in Australia. The only caution is that APSA
presently negotiates terminal handling charges at destinations for Australia’s exports,
and those countries may also establish groups of importers to discuss the impact of
such charges if Australia were to seek to regulate, in some fashion, THCs in the
inwards trades in Australia. (sub. 10, p. 29)
APSA not only argued that importers should be given powers similar to those
currently available to exporters, but sought to extend conference obligations in the
inward trades:
Australian importers should have some legislative protection [from conferences on
inward trades]. APSA believes there should be a peak body for importers similar to
APSA and its powers could cover: obligations of conferences and consortia to enter
into discussions; land-side costs (for example terminal handling charges); [and] other
issues as appropriate (for example registration of independent carriers [with significant
market power]). (sub. 11, p. 21)
The Importers Association of Australia argued that inward conferences should be
required to negotiate with a peak body of importers on land-based charges (it did
not specify that the obligations be limited to charges in Australia) as well as
ocean-based components of conference charges. The Importers Association argued
that it was desirable to require inward conferences to negotiate ocean-based charges
because it was becoming more common for importers to purchase goods overseas
on a free on board (fob) basis and, consequently, for importers to negotiate directly
with carriers (sub. 18, p. 2).5 The Commission understands that Australian shippers
buying on an fob basis, or agents acting on their behalf, normally would negotiate
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5 However, Liner Shipping Services commented in the public hearings that shipping lines in
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the terms and conditions of carriage with shipping lines or consortia located in the
country of origin rather than in Australia.
The question of whether to extend the regulation of liner shipping to Australia’s
inward trades was examined by the Brazil Review (Brazil et al 1993,  chapter 6).
The Review supported extending the regulation of liner shipping to inward shipping
and set out possible changes to Part X, namely:
·  making exemption depend upon registration of the inward conference agreement
in question;
·  empowering the Minister to cancel registration where the agreement does not
have due regard to the need for inward services to be efficient, economical and
adequate;
·  allowing affected parties to initiate an investigation of practices under registered
conference agreements;
·  requiring inward conferences to negotiate over charges for Australian land-based
services;6 and
·  requiring registered conferences to negotiate on freight rates, service
arrangements and minimum service levels with a designated shipper body
(pp. 128–29).
The Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department advised the Brazil inquiry that
it could see no reason why Australia could not assert jurisdiction over inward liner
shipping in a manner consistent with international legal principles
(Brazil  et al 1993, p. 21). However, as the Department of the Treasury noted in its
submission to the Brazil Review:
… in relation to the actual enforcement of such jurisdiction, it is recognised that certain
practical constraints exist and the question of possible conflict with jurisdictional
claims made by foreign governments may arise. (Department of the Treasury
1993, p. 68)
In principle, the idea of extending Part X safeguards for shippers to importers has
appeal — reducing the cost of transporting Australia’s imports would increase
national welfare — and moreover, it seems even-handed. However, historically,
Australian governments have been cautious about extending Part X provisions to
inward trades because of potential jurisdictional conflict and practical difficulties.
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Extending Part X provisions to importers could impose additional costs on carriers
and, ultimately, on shippers. To be workable, such a regime would require the
registration of inward conferences. However, some participants considered the
administrative costs and registration fees for inward conferences would be small, in
part because of similarities between the membership of inward and outward
conferences. For instance Liner Shipping Services stated that:
Actually in most cases the outward and inward [conference] membership are very
similar, or exactly the same … Every carrier under Part X, whether he's independent or
a member of an agreement, of course has to register an agent in Australia, and it would
be, I would have thought, through that mechanism fairly easy to have a register of the
membership of those inward agreements to clarify if there was any difference.
One major exception … is South-East Asia where the [existing] discussion agreement
is purely relating to the outwards trade, and I do not believe at this point there is any
inward conference operating into Australia. Basically the point I'm making is I think
[that costs] would depend on the extent of the registration and how difficult it would be
[for carriers]. (trans., pp. 44–45)
Additional, and potentially more significant, costs from extending Part X safeguards
to importers might arise if the imposition of obligations on inward conferences
brought Australia into conflict with the liner shipping regimes of other countries. As
noted in chapter 4, it is an accepted convention that the exporting country regulates
outward trades, although Europe and the United States assert jurisdiction over both
inward and outward trades. Whilst the Commission is not aware of any case in
which the stance taken by the United States and Europe has caused significant
conflict affecting Australian exporters, any attempt to extend Australia’s
jurisdiction to carriers on inward trades could increase the potential for
jurisdictional conflict.
Given that the scope for importers to exercise countervailing power under Part X
appears to be limited effectively to land-based charges in Australia, and that the
Commission recommends that terminal-to-customer-door charges should not be
covered by Part  X (see section  8.2), the only area left for potential negotiation
between conferences and importers is THCs.
The Commission doubts that instituting a registration requirement for inward
conferences with the sole or primary purpose of allowing importers collectively to
negotiate Australian THCs would be cost effective. That said, the Commission does
not consider that importers should be precluded from forming a collective buyer
group to negotiate THCs if a cost-effective mechanism can be devised. One
possibility is that APSA represent importers’ interests in negotiation with inward
conferences in relation to THCs.156 INTERNATIONAL
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The Commission accepts the principle that inward shippers should be able to
organise in order to exert countervailing power but considers that imposing
registration requirements and obligations on inward conferences equivalent to
those imposed on outward conferences would impose some costs, and possibly lead
to significant jurisdictional problems, for little benefit. However, the Commission
does not consider that importers should be precluded from forming a collective
buyer group to negotiate Australian THCs if a cost-effective mechanism can be
devised.
8.4 Regulation of discussion agreements
Part X defines a conference quite broadly as an unincorporated association of two or
more ocean carriers carrying on two or more businesses each of which includes, or
is proposed to include, the provision of liner cargo shipping services. This definition
potentially covers much more than the traditional formal conference agreement.
Liner operators have registered a wide variety of agreements under Part X ranging
from full conferences to non-binding discussion agreements, as well as technical
agreements covering slot swapping and rationalisation of sailings. The Department
of Transport and Regional Services has indicated that discussion agreements clearly
meet the Part X criteria for inclusion as conference agreements (trans., p. 80).
Discussion agreements involve both conference members and independent
operators on a particular trade route discussing matters of mutual interest, typically
including freight rates. Liner Shipping Services described discussion agreements:
These agreements are normally more embracing [than conferences] in terms of the
number of lines in any particular geographical trade, but not all-embracing. Their
objective is to reach a non-binding consensus regarding rates, surcharges, rules and
other terms and conditions of service in the trade. Members can withdraw on very short
notice (typically 48 hours to 30 days notice). (sub. 10, att. B, p. 1)
Liner Shipping Services argued that these agreements provide a more competitive
framework than conferences and have been useful in trying to bring some stability
to certain trades:
Discussion Agreements are, in the Lines’ views, to be encouraged as providing the
necessary umbrella, not only for stability but also to be the foundation for many of the
more investment committed arrangements, such as Consortia Agreements. With their
minimum service levels, Discussion Agreements also provide strong commitments to




In contrast, APSA is strongly of the view that discussion agreements should not be
given exemptions from provisions of the TPA:
In APSA’s view accords and discussion agreements operate to lessen competition. For
conference and non-conference lines to compare freight rates is immoral. Lines are
either conference or non-conference. Accords and discussion agreements seek to ensure
that conference and non-conference operators are not disadvantaged in trades where
they compete for the same cargoes. (sub. 11, p. 20)
The Department of the Treasury also argued for stricter control of discussion
agreements:
Discussion agreements seem to be inhibitors of competition. By allowing conference
and non-conference operators to collude on a trade, the competitive impact of
non-conference operators would appear to be reduced. Discussion agreements should
therefore be made subject to the standard authorisation procedures of Part VII of the
TPA. (sub. DR35, p. 25)
At first glance, discussion agreements appear to reduce the competitive forces that
curb potentially detrimental effects of conferences. On closer examination,
however, it must be acknowledged that prohibition of discussion agreements may
drive independents to join into full membership of an existing conference in some
cases. In light of that, discussion agreements may well be the better alternative, as
they are a less restrictive form of co-operation than enlarging the conference to
include independent lines. To elaborate, the impact of discussion agreements on the
strength of competition is quite complex. To the extent that they involve carriers
that would otherwise remain completely independent, discussion agreements will
tend, at least initially, to lessen competitive forces on a trade. However, as they are
non-binding, they may not have lasting or profound effects.7 On the other hand, if
discussion agreements represent an alternative to an independent operator joining a
full conference, then they are likely to provide a relatively more competitive
framework but would offer less opportunity for generating the efficiency and
service benefits provided by conferences. At present in most shipping trades, even
where such arrangements occur, the market remains reasonably contestable.
A problem created if discussion agreements were to be regulated differently is the
need to define them. At the margin, differentiating discussion agreements from the
somewhat more restrictive and comprehensive conference structure and the
somewhat looser consortium agreements covering slot swapping may prove to be
difficult. Definitional issues eventually may involve complex legal argument, the
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absence of which appears to have been a notable advantage of the operation of
Part X.
APSA suggested a more formal review process for examining new discussion
agreements than is the case for conferences:
If, within three months after the provisional registration of a "Discussion Agreement"
the ACCC determines that such an agreement is likely, by a reduction in competition,
to produce an unreasonable reduction in transportation service or an unreasonable
increase in transportation cost, the ACCC may inform the Registrar that the said
agreement should not be finally registered. Under such circumstances the Registrar
shall not finally register the agreement. Such a decision may be appealed against.
(sub. DR34, p. 2)
The Department of Transport and Regional Services also argued for more stringent
testing of discussion agreements:
… a discussion agreement can have some benefits in that it might induce participants in
that discussion agreement to reduce say X per cent or something of their capacity.  But
certainly there are two sides of that to consider and for that reason we think that if
Part X  is  retained  that  discussion  agreements  do  require  probably  more  thorough
examination before they are approved than the normal conference type of agreement.
(trans., p. 79)
If existing discussion agreements create concerns about competition, the
requirements of section 10.45(a)(iv) for economic and efficient shipping services of
reasonable capacity and frequency, provide shippers with some recourse to ACCC
investigations and Ministerial intervention. However, in common with other forms
of cooperative agreements between carriers, there is no explicit, third-party public
interest test for the initial registration of discussion agreements (as conference
agreements) under Part X.
The Brazil Review (Brazil  et al  1993) recommended that accords and discussion
agreements be subject to the same registration procedures as traditional conferences,
but that in exceptional cases the Minister for Transport obtain a report on whether
the agreement paid due regard for provision of adequate, efficient and economical
services. This report would then form a basis for deciding on the final registration of
the agreement. No action was taken on this recommendation. The Commission
notes, however, that under existing Part X provisions, the Minister could request
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The Commission finds that discussion agreements should not be treated differently
from other forms of cooperation among carriers. The Commission has not been
able to identify clear benefits to offset the costs and difficulties (including problems
of definition) that would be created by denying discussion agreements the
exemptions currently provided under Part X. Safeguards exist to protect shippers
against exploitive practices under discussion agreements.
8.5 Open versus closed conferences
Shipping conferences may be open or closed to new members. While admission to
closed conferences requires the consent of all or a majority of conference members,
open conferences do not impose restrictions on entry as long as potential entrants
agree to abide by an agreed set of rules. Most conferences operating in Australia’s
outward trades are closed. However, since US law insists on free and equal access
in the liner trades, open conferences operate in the trades linking Australia to North
America.
Part X currently permits, but does not require, carriers to form closed conferences,
albeit subject to certain constraints. For example, section  10.06  (2) of Part  X
requires that a conference agreement expressly permit any party to the agreement to
withdraw from the agreement on reasonable notice without penalty. Similarly,
conferences are prohibited from hindering the reasonable participation of efficient
Australian flag shipping in outward shipping services. In allowing carriers to choose
their preferred form of conference organisation, Australia’s stance is similar to that
of the European Union and most other countries except the US.
Relatively few submissions commented on the relative merits of open versus closed
conferences. The Department of Transport and Regional Services, citing the Brazil
Review, suggested that open conferences may result in wasteful duplication of
services and chronic excess capacity, while closed conferences ‘may facilitate a
greater capability to provide adequate, economic and efficient shipping services as
required by Part X.’ (sub. 3, p. 20). Liner Shipping Services also favoured closed
conferences (sub. DR28, p. 8).
In contrast, the Department of the Treasury favoured ¾ assuming Part X were to be
retained8 ¾ open rather than closed conferences:
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The ability of new entrants to join a conference readily, and compete on freight rates
with other conference members, would have the effect of placing significant additional
pressure on incumbents to pursue productivity gains and to place downward pressure
on freight rates.  Further, the ease of joining conferences reduces a competitor’s entry
costs, which heightens competitive pressures. (sub. DR35, p. 14)
APSA too favours open conferences:
Open Conferences serve to increase competitive pressures within a shipping grouping.
APSA believes there should be no restrictions on entry to a Conference. (sub. 22, p. 1)
The Commission notes that there has been considerable debate over the relative
merits of open and closed conferences. In general, closed conferences are associated
with higher levels of technical efficiency, while open conferences are said to offer
superior allocative efficiency (see appendix B). As noted earlier, cooperation and
rationalisation by means of a closed conference may provide desirable outcomes for
shippers. A lower risk premium may mean the employment of larger vessels
operating at high load factors (thus capturing economies of vessel size), while a
large conference fleet may generate additional economies and provide the
coordinated schedules valued by shippers. However, under certain circumstances
closed conferences may be able to exploit shippers by charging monopolistic prices.
In contrast, open conferences not only allow existing members to expand capacity at
will but allow new firms to enter the conference freely. Under such conditions, as
the Department of the Treasury infers (sub. DR35, p. 14), excess profits will be
dissipated. However, the existence of open cartels may give rise to excess capacity
and higher costs (Meyrick, sub.  5, pp. 30–36;  Brazil et al 1993,  appendix C,
pp. 39–47). Whilst economists have developed several open cartel models,9 each of
which lays stress on somewhat different features, there is broad agreement as to the
mechanism which gives rise to excess capacity and rising costs. The key feature of
an open cartel is that, while prices are fixed at levels above costs by cartel members,
the entry of new firms and expansion of capacity by firms within the cartel are
freely permitted. With price fixed, lines compete on a service rather than a price
basis. Competition between lines for market share leads to increased frequency of
sailings and/or to higher speeds and hence increased costs. Whereas a closed
conference is able to control service competition and rationalise its services, an
open conference is unable to exert the required discipline. Hence the underlying
                                                                                                                                        
Treasury recommends conferences be open to the free entry or exit of members as is the case in
the US trades. (sub. DR35, p. v)
9 See Devanney et al (1975) and Jansson and Schneerson (1985). See also discussions of the




rationale for allowing conferences — to effect the efficient rationalisation of
services — is significantly restricted.
In summary, closed conferences are more likely to generate cost-savings through
cooperation between carriers, but they may exhibit less internal competition in
practice. In such a case, it is necessary to rely more on competition from existing
non-conference carriers, potential entrants, transhipment operators, and the
countervailing power of shippers to ensure that the cost savings are passed on to
shippers as lower rates or more frequent or regular services.
The Commission’s view is that the current Part X approach, permitting (but not
requiring) carriers to form closed conferences, offers scope for efficiency gains
through the employment of larger vessels and cooperative vessel scheduling. The
Commission believes that sufficient competitive pressures exist (notably through
internal competitive pressures, the operation of non-conference carriers, the threat
of entry, the operation of transhipment carriers, and the countervailing power of
shippers) to negate any potential monopoly power of closed conferences.
8.6 Declaration of a carrier with substantial market
power
Division 9 of Part X provides for the declaration of non-conference carriers with
substantial market power. The effect of a declaration is to require the
non-conference carrier to meet the same obligations that apply to registered
conferences. However, unlike conferences, these carriers receive no offsetting
benefits under Part X. Hence Part X increases the extent of regulation faced by such
carriers. The task of declaring carriers rests with the Minister acting on a report
from the Australian Competition Tribunal.
To the Commission’s knowledge there have been no such declarations under Part X.
This suggests that the provisions have had no effect on the provision of liner
shipping. Consequently, repealing these provisions may be warranted on the basis
of economy of regulation. It is always possible that the declaration process could
have a detrimental effect on liner shipping services through deterring large
independent lines from operating in Australian trades, in competition with
conferences. However, there has been no evidence of such problems to date. As
noted in chapter  2, independent carriers have become increasingly potent
competitors in liner shipping markets. Large non-conference carriers have acquired
the ability to compete head-to-head with conferences and consortia in the provision




However, it is possible that the declaration provisions may deliver benefits to
shippers if, in the future, further significant concentration in liner shipping occurs,
leading to a situation where mega-carriers assume the role previously played by
conferences and consortia on some trades.
In the Position  Paper, the Commission requested further comments from
participants on division  9. The Department of Transport and Regional Services
argued for the retention of these clauses:
In today’s environment, where there are some very large non-conference carriers
around such as Evergreen or COSCO, it’s probably best to have provisions in there that
can provide the same sorts of safeguards to Australian shippers in respect of large
carriers like that in regard to conferences. (trans., p. 91)
APSA also saw value in provisions relating to carriers with substantial market
power:
We have actually entered four years ago into an agreement with COSCO because they
were the only service which serviced China which gave them substantial market power
in that market, and we did negotiate minimum levels of service etcetera with them.  So
I would like to see that clause retained because the market will change, there is no
doubt about that. The wheel turns … and we would expect to make use of those clauses
when the wheel does turn … (trans., p. 94)
The mere existence of these provisions may be sufficient to encourage a carrier to
negotiate with shippers without the need for the formal Tribunal report and
declaration of a carrier by the Minister.
The Commission considers that division  9 is worth retaining because, if used
judiciously, it does not appear to impose costs on shippers, while offering them
additional defences against misuse of market power by any carrier which might
come to dominate a particular trade.
8.7 Discrimination between shippers
Section 10.05 of Part X prohibits carriers from discriminating (in relation to rates,
levels of service or other matters) between similarly situated outwards shippers on a
particular trade route, if the discrimination is likely to lead to a substantial lessening
of competition in a market.10
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There are several arguments for removing these provisions. To the Commission’s
knowledge the provisions have not been used to date and thus at best may have little
practical effect. In these circumstances, the provisions could be repealed in the
interests of economy of regulation. Another consideration is that the discrimination
provisions were modelled on the price discrimination provisions of the TPA
(section  49) which were repealed in 1995 due to difficulties in enforcement
(Willis  1989). Similar problems could be expected to bedevil any attempt to
implement section 10.05.
Finally, the discrimination provisions may lessen economic efficiency by reducing
the pricing flexibility of carriers. In potentially limiting discrimination, the
provisions might (in extreme circumstances) lead to a reduction in Australia’s
exports or imports by preventing carriers from recovering proportionally less of
their fixed costs from (that is, discriminating in favour of) shippers who are
relatively price sensitive. John Zerby observed:
The requirement for non-discrimination "in relation to freight rates, levels of shipping
services, the provision of equipment and facilities or otherwise" interferes with the
ability of the carriers to use flexible pricing policies for the purpose of reducing the
excess capacity. Although section  5 of Part  X allows a defence for discrimination
between shippers under certain conditions, it is not clear that excess capacity arising
from compliance with other requirements of the Act would comprise an acceptable
basis for discrimination. If it were so intended, it is reasonable to expect that the Act
would specify it. (sub. 7, p. 7)
In the event that discrimination led to a lessening of competition in a market, the
ACCC or affected parties may be able to take action against carriers under
section 46 of the TPA (which deals with the misuse of market power).11 This would
provide some protection against unwarranted discrimination in the event that the
discrimination provisions were to be repealed.
The Sea Freight Council of Western Australia supported retention of section 10.05:
…  the price discrimination provisions are part of the package providing some
countervailing power to shippers. Again, the presence of the provision constitutes part
of the shippers’ countervailing power and should be seen as such. (sub. DR32, p. 6)
Liner Shipping Services saw no problems in repealing the price discrimination
provisions:
                                                                                                                                        
defence if the carrier was acting in good faith to meet benefits offered by a competitor (see
section 10.05(2)(c)).
11 Section 46(1) of the TPA prohibits a corporation which has a substantial degree of power in a
market from using that power to: damage a competitor, prevent the entry of a person, or prevent
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LSS has no concern with the deletion of the price discrimination provisions of Part X as
they have not been used since their introduction in 1989, and it is not seen how their
removal would, in practice, result in any disadvantages for shippers. (sub. DR28, p. 13)
The Commission considers that the price discrimination provisions of Part  X
serve no useful purpose and indeed are potentially harmful if they discourage
efficient price discrimination. In addition they would be extremely difficult to
implement. Hence it is recommended that section 10.05 be repealed.
8.8 Australian flag shipping
As outlined in chapter 4, an explicit objective of Part X is to ensure that ‘efficient
Australian flag shipping is not unreasonably hindered from normal commercial
participation in any outwards liner cargo shipping trade’ (section 10.01(c)). This
objective is put into effect by sections 10.45.(a)(v) and 10.53 which essentially are
fair trading clauses, designed to ensure that a conference or non-conference carrier
with substantial market power does not misuse market power to hinder an
Australian carrier. If these provisions are breached, the conference agreement may
be deregistered, while a non-conference carrier may face penalties under Part VI of
the TPA.
Australian flag shipping also may be assisted by division 11 (sections 10.61–10.67),
relating to unfair pricing practices of carriers.12 These provisions essentially allow
anti-dumping action to be taken against carriers whose prices are below ‘normal’
rates, where these rates threaten viability of the liner trade, and where the practice is
contrary to the national interest. The latter clause (section 10.67) requires shippers’
interests to be taken into account, including the effect of ‘denial of any advantages
provided by the practice would have on the competitiveness of Australian
industries’. However, the Commission is not aware of any use of the unfair pricing
provisions.
The decline in Australian-flag liner capacity in recent years raises the question
whether this objective is redundant. The Australian Shipowners’ Association argued
that although the Part  X provisions relating to Australia-flag shipping could be
described as dormant, there was some prospect that Australian liner shipping would
re-build in future (trans. p. 61).
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Another, and arguably more important, criticism of section 10.45(a)(v) is that, while
action to prevent genuinely predatory behaviour of shipping conferences could
serve the national interest, there is a risk that action will be taken in the interests of
comparatively high-cost Australian carriers and increase freight rates. For example,
Dick (1983) observes that in the 1970s:
… as the highest cost operator in its trades, ANL would seem to have been more
dependent upon the maintenance of conference rates than foreign operators. (p. 14)
This potential tension between the interests of Australian carriers and shippers is
highlighted by ANLCL’s observation to this inquiry that it has been severely
disadvantaged by intense competition in recent years (see sub. 8, p. 2). Yet it is
precisely this competition which has driven good outcomes for Australian shippers.
The Commission notes that the future of the Australian shipping industry, including
liner shipping, currently is under review. For the purposes of Part X, while scope for
action against genuine predatory behaviour and pricing by conferences and non-
conferences carriers may be worth retaining, the interests of shippers should be
considered explicitly.
The Commission recommends that a national interest test, similar to that in
section 67 of Part X, apply to any determination by the Minister in relation to
sections 10.45(a)(v) and 10.53.
Having examined the proposed modifications to coverage of Part X, the remainder
of this chapter examines procedural modifications that have been proposed.
8.9 Penalties and dispute settlement
As discussed in chapter 6, there have been few occasions on which shippers have
resorted to the complaints process available under Part X. This is explained partly
by Part X which encourages (or does not impede) commercial resolution of disputes
between shippers and carriers. But the small number of investigations may also
reflect the inflexible remedies available to the Minister under Part X (full or partial
deregistration of an agreement). Consequently, there is a case for considering
whether there should be changes to the remedies available under Part X, to provide
added flexibility in dealing with disputes that cannot be resolved through




Several ways of strengthening the remedies for non-compliance with Part X were
suggested by participants.13 One option involves amending Part X to provide for
Part VI of the TPA (Enforcement and remedies) to apply to breaches of carrier
obligations.14 Under this option courts would, for example, be able to issue court
enforceable injunctions and other orders, impose fines for breaching conference
obligations and award compensation in the event that costs are imposed on shippers
directly as a result of conferences breaching their obligations under Part X.
Modifications to the penalties and civil remedies available to shippers under Part X
were also proposed by the Brazil Review (see box 8.1).
Box 8.1 Recommendations of the Brazil Review (penalties and
remedies)
To address perceived deficiencies in the remedies available under Part X the Brazil
Review proposed that the TPA be amended to:
·  permit the Minister to seek enforceable undertakings from carriers where they
submit a conference agreement that is substantially similar to a deregistered
agreement;
·  apply the penalty provisions of the TPA (Part VI) where there is a contravention of
any undertaking by a party to a registered conference given under section 10.49 of
Part X;
·  enable the Federal Court to grant an injunction under section 80 of the TPA where it
is satisfied that a party to a registered conference has breached an undertaking;
and
·  allow a person(s) who has suffered loss or damage as a result of a contravention of
Part X (for example, contravening an undertaking or failing to provide information
requested by shippers) to recover the amount of the loss or damage.
Source: Brazil et al (1993, p. 162).
The ACCC stated that shippers placed a premium on the stability and reliability of
existing services and that on occasion they may not wish to suffer a disadvantage by
initiating a formal complaint (sub. 16, p. 6). To overcome this perceived reluctance
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(sub. 11, pp. 4, 19, 23), and Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, pp. 33–34).
14 Part VI of the TPA sets out the remedies, including pecuniary penalties, injunctions, divestiture
and other orders, which are available in the event of a breach of Part IV and the consumer
protection provisions (Part V) of the TPA. Part VI also deals with enforcement of undertakings
given to the ACCC in relation to matters covered by the TPA other than Part X (such as
authorisation undertakings). Part VI applies to breaches of section 46 of the TPA (which is
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on the part of some shippers to initiate a complaint, some participants also
suggested that the ACCC be permitted to initiate an investigation as to whether
conferences had met their obligations to shippers.15 For example, Liner Shipping
Services said that:
The role of the ACCC could be expanded under Part X to include investigation of any
issues relating to its operation that causes concern, which could be triggered by the
ACCC itself rather than waiting for a complaint from shippers or referral from the
Minister. (sub. DR28, p. 13)
In principle, allowing ACCC-initiated investigations could benefit shippers if there
are cases of shippers who wish to lodge a formal complaint but do not because of
concerns that they may suffer some disadvantage or disruption to liner services as a
direct result of lodging the complaint.
Several factors suggest that there will be very few cases of shipper reluctance to
initiate a complaint. Carriers face strong actual and potential competition, providing
shippers with choice of supplier. Also, the Minister and designated shipper bodies
already have the power to initiate investigations — these powers seem to be
adequate to protect shippers who fear retribution. For these reasons the Commission
considers that changes involving a broadening of the ACCC’s investigative role
under Part X are unnecessary.
Strengthening the remedies and penalties available to shippers through the
application of Part  VI to Part  X has the potential further to discourage
non-compliance with the Act. Additional remedies could provide shippers with a
more credible threat of last resort.
However, any modification to the current regime must consider the limits of
Australia’s market power and be enforceable. For instance, imposing weighty
penalties on carriers, such as those available under section 76 of the TPA, for failure
to comply with the requirements of Part  X may disadvantage shippers if
conferences choose to disband rather than pay fines or meet other obligations that
they consider to be commercially unacceptable.16
Providing for increased penalties to apply for breaches of Part  X will also
necessitate amendments to Part X to define the nature of the obligations on shippers
and carriers much more precisely. For instance Liner Shipping Services stated that:
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… if a penalty was to apply [to a breach of Part X], it needs to be clear what [the
breach] relates to and of course [if] it relates to being notified of any general rate
increases [or surcharges] giving 30 days' notice or the kinds of issues that we negotiate
with the peak designated shipper body, [these obligations] need to be defined and the
penalties [in the event of a breach] equally need to be appropriate. (trans., p. 52)
In addition to the need better to define conferences’ obligations, subsidiary
questions relating to the appropriate nature and magnitude of penalties also arise.
The Commission is concerned that the option of applying Part  VI, without
qualification, to breaches of Part X would result in additional costs to shippers and
carriers due to the potentially costly and protracted nature of any actions to prove in
a court of law that a breach of Part X had occurred and to determine appropriate
remedies.
There have been relatively few instances where commercial negotiations have failed
to resolve disputes that have arisen between shippers and carriers. There seems little
prospect that amending Part  X to provide for Part  VI of the TPA to apply to
breaches of conference obligations would deliver sufficient benefits (in terms of
increased compliance with the Act) to justify the potentially significant
administrative and enforcement costs. Expanding the involvement of the Courts in
resolution of disputes between shippers and carriers is at odds with the philosophy
of Part X which is to allow commercial forces to operate with minimal third-party
intervention. The ultimate sanction available to shippers is to move their custom to
another supplier of liner services.
That said, there may be some scope for amending Part X to enable the Minister to
seek a court order in the event of a breach by conferences of an undertaking given
to the Minister under section 10.49 of Part X. One way to provide for this change
would be to amend Part  X to include provisions relating to the enforcement of
undertakings. Such provisions could be modelled on section 87C of the TPA (see
box 8.2).
An amendment to Part X along the lines of section 87C could provide for more
effective and flexible enforcement of Part X while minimising the need to better
define conferences’ obligations with respect to shippers and minimising the
potential for costly and protracted legal action to resolve commercial disputes.17
Such an amendment would also be consistent with the remedies available under
section 10.60 of Part X which provides that remedies available under Part VI shall
                                             
17 In this case, the requirement to define an obligation would only arise in the event of an
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be available if a non-conference carrier with substantial market power breaches the
terms of an undertaking given to the Minister or a Ministerial direction.
Box 8.2 Enforcement of undertakings (section 87C)
Section 87C allows the Secretary to the Treasury to accept a written undertaking given
by a person in connection with a matter in relation to which the Secretary has a power
or function. The section provides that if an undertaking has been breached, the
Secretary may apply to the Federal Court for an order under subsection (4).
Section 87C(4) provides that if the Court is satisfied that a breach has occurred it may
make all or any of the following orders:
(a)  an order directing a person to comply with the terms of the undertaking;
(b)  an order directing the person to pay to the Commonwealth an amount up to the
amount of any financial benefit that the person obtained as a result of the
breach;
(c) any order that the Court considers appropriate directing the person to
compensate any other person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of
the breach; and
(d)  any other order that the Court considers appropriate.
Source: Section 87C of the TPA.
The Commission recommends that the Commonwealth Government consider
amending Part  X to provide for more effective and flexible enforcement of
undertakings. The provisions of section 87C of the TPA could serve as a useful
model.
8.10 Variations to the registration process
The registration process is a central element of Part X. It was noted in chapter 6 that
the process involves checking that agreements meet the requirements of Part  X,
rather than directly assessing whether they are in the public interest. Shipper bodies
have the right to waive negotiations under a conference agreement, hence limiting
the possibility of undue delays over minor changes to agreements.
Some participants suggested that the Commission examine whether scope exists for
streamlining some aspects of the registration process. For example, Liner Shipping
Services said that:
…  a Varying Conference Agreement should be redefined to limit the need for




registered Agreement and in conformity with its provisions. [And that] The registration
process should be accelerated, with a 45 calendar day period from provisional to final
registration if all obligations have been met, unless in exceptional circumstances, the
Minister otherwise directs. (sub. 10, p. 34)
The registration process, including the process of registering variations to
conference agreements, enables scrutiny of conference agreements and assists
shipper associations to undertake negotiations with conferences on the terms and
conditions of shipping. As noted by the Brazil Review (Brazil et al 1993, p. 182) it
also promotes the transparency of conference arrangements. Hence it is an
important part of the assistance provided to shippers under Part X. However, if it
imposes any undue costs these are likely to be eventually, at least partially, borne by
shippers.
In respect of the broader question of placing time limits on the registration process,
the Commission notes that Part X does not stipulate a fixed time limit for the overall
registration period.18 Consequently, there is scope for conferences and shippers to
agree if they wish on measures to expedite registration.
The Commission considers that the process for registering conference agreements
and variations to these agreements provide important transparency benefits and
that they be retained. Measures to expedite the registration process are matters for
negotiation between shippers and conferences, not for regulation.
8.11 Funding for APSA
APSA was formed in 1990 as the designated peak shipper body representing the
interests of Australian shippers in relation to outward liner cargo shipping services.
The principal goal of APSA is to ensure that exporters have the opportunity (where
desirable) to negotiate with shipping conferences and non-conference carriers with
substantial market power (sub. 11, p. 5).
In its submission, APSA stated that its annual budget in 1997 and 1998 was around
$60 00019 and that it requires additional funding and the provision ‘in-kind’ of
                                             
18 Some time limits are imposed by Part  X for decisions on an application for provisional
registration and on decisions on an application for final registration (14  days for both).
However, there is no time limit for the negotiation of minimum service levels which can occur
between provisional registration and final registration.
19 APSA’s funding comes from membership fees paid by eight designated secondary shipper




services in order to continue to meet the Association’s objectives (sub. 11, p. 22).
APSA said that additional funding was required to enable it to ‘do research into
various areas’, including ‘monitoring shipping operations’ (trans., pp. 107–109).
APSA proposed that three options for obtaining increased funding for its activities
be considered, namely:
·  funding similar to that provided to statutory marketing authorities (such as
producer levies);
·  funding via a business support program such as the export market development
grants; or
·  a Commonwealth Government grant.
The direct beneficiaries of APSA’s efforts are shippers, particularly exporters. The
Commission considers that additional funding for APSA, if required, should come
from shippers. If additional funds are not forthcoming this will presumably reflect
shippers’ views of the benefits they are likely to receive from any increase in
APSA’s activities. Indeed, many large shippers and those involved in secondary
shipper bodies may be capable of looking after their own interests without APSA’s
assistance and smaller shippers may be the major beneficiaries of APSA’s efforts.
However, many shippers may have an incentive to free-ride on the contributions of
other shippers. A possible solution to this free-rider problem would be to require
secondary shipper bodies (which must be accredited under Part  X) to pay a
compulsory annual membership fee to APSA instead of the voluntary subscription.
But, while funds for APSA may solve the free-rider problem in relation to APSA’s
funding, it may create other problems such as removing an element of choice
amongst shipper representative services and crowding-out of voluntary
contributions to APSA.
The Commission considers that funding for APSA should come from the
beneficiaries of its activities, namely Australian shippers.
If, nonetheless, the Government decides that additional funding for APSA is
warranted, any government support would best come from general revenue (through
either a grant or via an existing government program). Given the relatively small
sums likely to be required, the administration and compliance costs of collecting a




8.12 A separate shipping Act?
The Taskforce on Liner Shipping (DoT  1986,  pp.  34–35) examined the issue of
whether liner shipping regulatory arrangements should continue to be embodied in
the TPA or whether they should be contained in a specially created Australian
shipping Act. It concluded that there were two key arguments for creating a
shipping Act. The Taskforce argued that the fundamental objectives underpinning
Part X and the TPA differ. According to the Taskforce report, Part X is based on the
premise that enforcing strict competition between carriers may be inimical to the
efficient operation of liner shipping services on Australia’s trades. It stated that, in
contrast, the TPA proceeds on the basis that competition is more likely to produce
the most efficient services at the lowest possible cost. The Taskforce also judged
that the complex policy objectives embodied in Part  X, together with the
organisational characteristics of liner shipping, constituted a further case for
developing separate liner shipping industry legislation.20
Brian Makins submitted:
Part X does not sit comfortably in the Trade Practices Act. This may well be a source
of irritation to the ACCC but it is not a ground for removing Part X from the Act and
dropping conference shipping into Part IV. It may however be a ground for repealing
Part X and re-enacting it in a separate Australian Shipping Act. (sub. 4, p. 6)
Establishment of a separate shipping Act was opposed by the Department of
Transport and Regional Services (sub. DR29, p. 4) and the Sea Freight Council of
Western Australia (sub. DR32, p. 6). For instance, the Department stated that:
Part X has important links to other parts of the Trade Practices Act [and that] there does
not seem to be sufficient arguments to justify a separate shipping Act. (sub. DR29, p. 4)
Certainly there is a different approach to enforcing competition policy between
Part  X and Parts  IV and  VII of the Act. However, there remain important links
between them. These three parts of the TPA implement competition policy and have
the same underlying objective of promoting efficient outcomes. The discussion in
chapter 7 indicates that regulation of shipping could be handled (but not necessarily
optimally) under Part VII.
However, introducing a separate shipping Act covering competition policy for liner
shipping may institutionalise the different approaches to enforcing competition
policy embodied in Parts X, IV and VII of the TPA. Creating a separate shipping
                                             
20 In its response to the Taskforce report (the Trade Practices (International Liner Cargo Shipping)
Amendment Act) the Government accepted a number of the recommendations of the Taskforce
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Act also may encourage introduction of provisions covering more than just
competition policy.






9 Appropriate regulation: the
Commission’s assessment
The Commission’s task
The terms of reference for this inquiry ask the Commission to report on appropriate
arrangements for regulation of international liner shipping, taking into account three
objectives. The complete terms of reference are reproduced on pages V–VI,  but
briefly, these three objectives are:
·  that regulation/legislation should be retained only if the benefits to the
community as a whole outweigh the costs and if the objectives cannot be
achieved  more efficiently by other means. (It should be noted that this test differs
somewhat from the Competition Principles Agreement guiding principle outlined
in box 1.1);
·  to have regard to: access of Australian exporters to competitively priced
international liner cargo shipping services that are of adequate frequency and
reliability; public welfare and equity; economic and regional development;
consumer interests; the competitiveness of business including small business;
and efficient resource allocation; and
·  the Government’s commitment to improve the competitiveness of markets,
especially infrastructure services.
Why regulate liner shipping?
The principal reason for regulating international liner shipping is the industry’s
propensity to form cooperative structures — that is, conferences. As discussed in
chapter 3 and appendix B, there appear to be sound economic reasons for allowing
such cooperation. In contrast to bulk shipping where each vessel carries a single
commodity on a charter basis, demand for general cargo shipping is diverse in terms
of cargo size and type as well as aspects of service. The costs of coordinating these
diverse demands virtually rule out ship chartering as an efficient form of service
delivery. The supply of regular, scheduled liner services provides a means of




Liner shipping conferences and other cooperative arrangements such as consortia,
can provide a mechanism for efficient delivery of scheduled, direct shipping
services on a particular trade route. Given economies of scale in ship size, as well as
economies of fleet size, high fixed costs relative to variable costs, demand
uncertainty, and the absence of regulatory or significant economic barriers to entry
to liner trades, cooperative arrangements can reduce risk and costs for individual
lines and thus facilitate the provision of efficient, frequent and reliable shipping
services in accord with market requirements. Moreover, it appears that cooperation
between several lines to provide a regular service on a particular route may be more
efficient than provision of the service by a single large company. A frequent, regular
service requires the commitment of a number of ships (especially on long trades),
which may reduce flexibility and increase risk exposure for a single operator.
By definition, conferences constrain competition between member lines. But it is
highly unlikely that, if conferences (and other cooperative arrangements which are
covered by Part X) were prohibited, equivalent levels of service would (or could) be
provided by all former conference members operating individually on each trade. It
is more likely that, if conferences were proscribed, carriers would merge, thus
internalising the conference, or that some lines currently operating within a
conference would leave the trade, allowing remaining providers to expand and take
a larger share of the trade. In either case, however, one form of cooperation, the
conference, essentially is replaced by another — a larger, formal company. But as
noted above, while the market might reorganise to provide the regular liner service,
an alternative mode of delivery may not be first-best.
Nonetheless, market concentration (however it comes about) increases the potential
for market power and abuse of that power. It is concern about the potential for
market domination by liner shipping conferences that rightly attracts the attention of
governments worldwide.
Role of the market
There are two broad ways in which potential market power of conferences can be
constrained — by the market itself and via regulatory intervention. Evidence
presented in chapters 5 and 6 suggests that market forces have acted as an effective
constraint on market power of conferences and that competition from independents,
especially those providing transhipment services, has intensified significantly in
recent years. This is reflected in declining conference shares in almost all of
Australia’s liner trades. Competition between conference members also appears toAPPROPRIATE
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have been an additional source of competition in liner shipping markets.1 As
discussed in chapter  6, conference arrangements appear to have adapted to the
increasing demands of shippers for more tailored service arrangements.
Though no examples have been drawn to the attention of the Commission, there
may be instances where conferences have dominated a particular trade, or segment
of that trade, and earned excess profits. However, if this has occurred, given
comparatively low barriers to entry to liner trades, and overwhelming evidence that
lines aggressively pursue profitable opportunities, quickly redeploying ships and
providing new services, new entry will have been encouraged relatively quickly.
It has been suggested that precisely because shippers have a wide menu of shipping
services from which to choose, and because conferences face intense competition
from non-conference carriers, the conference structure is redundant (see Australian
Consumers’ Association, sub. DR39; and Department of the Treasury, sub. DR35).
The Commission disagrees. The intensity of competition in liner shipping markets
ensures that no carrier can earn persistent excess profits. If conferences survive in
this environment they must be delivering a specialised type of service that shippers
demand and, moreover, be providing it efficiently. In these circumstances, their
removal would not deliver any benefits. Indeed it would reduce efficiency,
competition and choice in the marketplace.
Evidence collected by the Commission and provided by shippers supports this view
— conferences provide a high quality service which attracts a commensurate price
premium. In this regard the shipping market is like many others where a range of
differentiated services and goods is provided and produced by a variety of
production units. Even if conference market shares were to continue to decline due
to aggressive competition, this would not imply that regulators should second-guess
an efficient market structure and procure or hasten the demise of conferences.
Appropriate regulation
Although market forces appear to have ensured good outcomes for Australian
shippers, there are two main reasons for regulation of conferences. First, several
conference practices constitute prima facie breaches of Part  IV of the TPA.
Therefore, if conferences are to operate at all, they require some form of exemption
                                             
1 On US trades, where actual rates had to be published and adhered to and made available to all
shippers (in force until May 1999), there was limited incentive for ‘chiselling’ by individual
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movement in rates as well as an increase in the range of rates available to customers (see
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or authorisation. Second, and more fundamentally, as an importer of liner shipping
services, it is in Australia’s interests to exercise countervailing power appropriately.
This may be facilitated by legislation or regulation.
The ultimate objective of any regulatory regime should be to enhance national
well-being. As discussed in chapter 3 and appendix B, given that Australia relies
almost entirely on foreign liner shipping services, the national interest in relation to
international liner shipping is congruent with the interest of Australian shippers in
obtaining appropriate quality services at the best possible price.
If it is accepted that conferences and other cooperative structures which characterise
liner shipping services can promote efficiency and service levels, an appropriate
regulatory regime will be one that allows such arrangements but which, at the same
time, ensures that the efficiency gains and lower costs made possible by such
arrangements are shared with Australian shippers and, through them, the Australian
public.
Given the characteristics of international liner shipping and where the national
interest lies, the Commission considers that a desirable regulatory regime will:
·  allow market arrangements in liner shipping that can generate efficient
outcomes;
·  minimise adverse effects on competition;
·  promote Australia’s bargaining power and provide effective constraints against
abuses of market power by foreign liners;
·  involve minimal regulation to achieve desired outcomes;
·  be compatible with international regulatory regimes (that is, be workable and
enforceable);
·  promote predictable outcomes for Australian shippers (in the sense of providing
them with adequate frequency and reliability of service); and
·  involve low compliance and administration costs, and be transparent and
flexible.
In addition, an appropriate regulatory regime must be able to cope with
developments in international liner shipping markets. There is some suggestion that
current price levels are unsustainable and that capacity rationalisation is inevitable.
Certainly global shipping markets are in a state of disequilibrium and industry
concentration via mergers and global alliances is likely to increase in an effort to
reduce costs. Whether this process leads to rate increases is unclear — capacity
rationalisation will tend to increase rates while cost savings will reduce them.
However, even if rationalisation were to result in higher (equilibrium) prices, thisAPPROPRIATE
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would not necessarily indicate the emergence of an uncompetitive market. Indeed,
there appears to be no reason why the fundamental contestability of liner shipping
trades and competitive forces will diminish. Nonetheless, a regulatory regime as far
as possible should be able to protect the interests of Australian shippers were global
competition to abate substantially.
Regulatory options
There are two major alternative approaches to regulation of international liner
shipping — that currently embodied in Part X of the TPA, and application of the
general provisions of the TPA, including Part VII authorisation provisions. Other
options include an industry-specific notification procedure, block authorisation or an
industry code.
Part X allows individual shipping firms to enter into cooperative arrangements that
otherwise would contravene certain sections of the TPA. Though the exemptions
from the TPA allow shipping lines to enter into conferences and similar
arrangements (which reduce competition between members), it does not compel
them to do so. Nor does it constrain liner carriers from entering the market and
operating outside the conference, as is the case for most other legislation deemed to
restrict competition. In this sense, Part X could be described as taking a permissive
stance towards production of liner shipping services.
However, Part X does not take a permissive approach to the effects of cooperative
arrangements on Australian shippers. Indeed, the overriding objective of Part X is to
promote the interests of Australian shippers (and thus the national interest).
Specifically, Part  X attempts to promote the negotiating strength of Australian
shippers by allowing (but not requiring) them to form buying groups and requiring
conferences to negotiate with these groups and commit to minimum service levels,
and providing for Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)
investigations of breaches of Part X obligations by shipping lines (with scope for
full or partial deregistration of conference agreements by the Minister). Moreover,
Part X does not exempt liner shipping operators from application of section 46 of
the TPA.
While Part X does not contain an explicit ex ante ‘public interest’ test, the public
interest is monitored continually by shippers whose interest is aligned with the
public interest and who have a vested interest in ensuring they obtain the best-
possible outcomes. Shippers can request intervention by the regulators — the
Minister and the ACCC — at any time they consider that conferences have breached
their obligations under Part X, including the requirement that shipping services are
‘economic and efficient’. The ACCC also can take independent action under180 INTERNATIONAL
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section 46 but it has never exercised this option. Part X also has been subject to
regular public reviews. In addition to the current inquiry, it has been reviewed in
1977, 1986 and 1993 (see chapter 4).
The general provisions of the TPA, on the other hand, proscribe certain actions such
as joint price setting (see chapter 7). If the general provisions of the TPA were
applied to liner shipping, conferences (and shipper bodies) would have to be
authorised under Part  VII, almost certainly on a case-by-case basis, and
demonstrate,  ex ante, that they would operate in the public interest. To satisfy the
ACCC that the public interest would be served, it is possible that conferences would
be required to enter into price or other undertakings. Authorisation could also be
revoked if the ACCC considered that circumstances had changed materially.
Depending on how it was implemented, a notification procedure could, at one
extreme, resemble Part  X or, at the other extreme, resemble case-by-case
authorisation. An industry code might operate in a similar fashion to Part X but
probably would be subject to (block) authorisation under Part VII. An authorised
industry code also may codify behaviour to a greater extent than Part X. Both a
notification procedure and block authorisation would require amendment of the
TPA — the former applicable to liner shipping only while the latter could be
industry-specific or available to industry generally.
The Commission’s assessment
In assessing the regulatory regime most likely to deliver the best outcomes for
Australians generally and shippers specifically, the Commission has taken into
account a number of factors relevant to the liner shipping industry, including:
·  shippers’ interests in relation to shipping services coincide with the public
interest. Shippers as profit-maximisers generally will have a strong incentive to
obtain the best-possible service for the lowest-possible price (failure to do so
typically will mean lower sales and/or lower producer prices);
·  Australia relies almost entirely on foreign liner services. If the Australian
shipping market became relatively costly, carriers (whose assets are highly
mobile) could reduce their commitment to Australian trades or even discontinue
the conference service;
·  evidence of substantial production economies in liner shipping coupled with the
need for regular, coordinated services suggests that cooperation in some form
will characterise the industry even if conferences were proscribed;APPROPRIATE
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·  consistent evidence of effective competition in liner shipping markets and low
barriers to entry to liner trades suggest that market forces provide effective
regulation of conference market power;
·  all countries with which Australia trades currently not only allow the formation
of conferences but also provide general, automatic exemptions from competition
law. There is no indication that this situation will change in the foreseeable
future; and
·  the nature of the industry is extremely dynamic.
The regulatory approach embodied in Part  X is tailored to these market
characteristics. Part X essentially operates as an industry code where the market
operates relatively free of intervention on a day-to-day basis and where regulators
take action only in the event that Australian exporters (whose competitiveness
depends on efficient shipping) are dissatisfied with the behaviour or performance of
conferences. Evidence available to the Commission suggests that this approach has
been successful by promoting efficient supply of regular shipping services by
allowing conferences, counter-balanced by market competition and the
countervailing role given to Australian shippers. Shippers who participated in this
inquiry claim that conferences provide comprehensive services (especially to
smaller capital-city ports). They also observe that they have a wide range of
conference and non-conference services from which to choose. Moreover, Part X
has operated at comparatively low administrative cost to government and industry
and in harmony with overseas regimes.
That said, Part X has been criticised by some for lack of transparency and as being
not sufficiently flexible to deal effectively with any unacceptable behaviour of
conferences. While not all criticisms appear warranted, there is scope for some
improvement in the operation of Part X (see chapter 8).
The Commission has explored in some detail how the main alternative regime,
authorisation, might operate with respect to liner shipping (see chapter 7), but any
discussion necessarily is hypothetical.
As described above, a fundamental difference between Part X and authorisation is
that the authorisation mechanism provides greater scope for direct third-party
intervention on public interest grounds before carriers can give effect to a
conference agreement. The Commission agrees that promotion of the public interest
is paramount. But a key issue in this inquiry is determining the best way of
representing and upholding that interest. Given the degree of market competition
and the fact that the public interest coincides with the interest of shippers in
obtaining the best-possible shipping services as cheaply as possible, the question is182 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
whether providing scope for discretionary third party intervention is necessary or
desirable. The public interest is vigilantly represented by the shippers themselves.
Given the degree of competition in liner shipping markets and the complexity of
pricing and heterogeneity of services provided, the Commission does not consider it
likely that there would be any benefits from more rigorous regulation of, or
intervention in, conference arrangements. There also are serious doubts as to
whether, in practice, Australia could enforce its competition laws against foreign
service providers in the event that authorisation were not granted.
Administrative and compliance costs also would appear to be significantly higher
under case-by-case authorisation. While the Commission accepts that these costs
apply to other Australian industries which seek authorisation under Part VII of the
TPA, from the point of view of an international liner carrier, the relevant
comparison is regulatory costs (and profits) in non-Australian trades. If Australia
imposes higher costs on foreign liners than other governments, which reduce carrier
profitability, conference services to and from Australia, at the margin, are likely to
decline.2
It is feasible that the authorisation process could function in a similar manner to
Part X — that is, allow conferences to operate comparatively freely, albeit subject to
certain requirements to negotiate with shippers coupled with sanctions against abuse
of market power. Indeed, the Commission is of the view that, were Part X to be
repealed, application of Part VII eventually would see a Part X-type regime (that is,
conditional block exemption) re-emerging. The process could be protracted and
costly, however, and probably would require legislative amendment to allow block
authorisation.3 Indeed, the industry-code approach of Part X appears antithetical to
the approach of Part VII as it currently stands and as it has been practiced.4
While acknowledging the intensity of competition in liner shipping markets and the
role of conferences in providing efficient services, some participants to this inquiry
                                             
2 In other words, if a country is essentially a price taker, imposition of an import ‘tax’ will
reduce national welfare by increasing price or reducing quantity. In this case the tax is in the
form of higher regulatory costs imposed on conferences only. While other forms of service
might expand to fill the gap, the conference service will diminish. It is difficult to see how this
could be considered an improvement if conferences supply a differentiated service which
shippers value.
3 It is interesting to note that European regulators currently are moving towards a common
understanding with carriers after several years of unresolved legal disputes regarding the limits
of the EU block exemption from competition laws (see chapter 4 and appendix F for discussion
of the EU model).
4 As noted in chapter 7, the Commission has been unable to find any extant industry codes
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have argued that consistent application of domestic competition laws should be the
principal criterion for assessing appropriate regulation of this industry (see
Department of the Treasury, sub. DR35; ACCC, sub. DR36).
The Commission agrees that it is desirable that no industry or sector of the economy
be given special favours which may result in resource misallocation, inefficiency or
undesirable income transfers. However, virtually all liner shipping to and from
Australia is provided by foreign carriers who use very few Australian resources. The
major potential for resource misallocation is if Australian shippers cannot access
adequate quality liner shipping at competitive rates. If rates are distorted, activity
and investment in export and import-competing sectors likewise will be distorted.
The irony is that imposition of additional costs on some foreign carriers in the
interests of uniformity of treatment of industries may distort resource allocation by
effectively increasing transport costs for Australian exporters and importers.
At any rate, Part X does not give international liner shipping conferences a protected
monopoly nor does it give an unfettered right to form conferences. Liner shipping
conferences are required to meet certain obligations to Australia shippers and are
not granted exemption from section 46 of the TPA. In short, competition policy is
applied to liner shipping, albeit in an unusual way. But insofar as the interests of
Australian shippers are concerned (and through them the national interest), this
approach appears to be performing well and doing so more efficiently than the
available alternatives.
Even if the Part  X-type approach could be replicated in an industry code or
notification procedure, at the very least transitional costs would be incurred.
Moreover, with notification, and with an industry code (unless it had block
authorisation), there would be an additional level of uncertainty — that is, the
uncertainty of not knowing whether in practice it would be administered in a manner
similar to Part X or similar to Part VII authorisation. In the event of the latter type of
administration, the advantages and disadvantages of Part  VII authorisation, as
already discussed, would apply. Moreover, liner shipping in effect would continue to
receive ‘special’ treatment. If a concern of regulators is the undesirable signal
‘special’ treatment sends to industries, it is a moot point whether that signal is
stronger with the existence of Part  X or a Part  X-type regime embodied in the
‘general’ provisions of the TPA which are accessible to all industries.184 INTERNATIONAL
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The Commission has been asked to report on appropriate regulation for
international liner cargo shipping taking into account, inter alia, the objective
that regulation/legislation should be retained only if the benefits exceed the costs
to the community and if alternatives cannot achieve the objectives of the
regulation/legislation more efficiently.
The Commission concludes that, given competition and market contestability, the
benefits to Australian shippers (and hence the community overall) of allowing
conferences and other cooperative arrangements to operate exceed any costs.
Moreover, given the fact that the interests of Australian shippers are aligned with
the national interest, and that they will vigilantly represent their interests, the
Commission considers that regulation of conferences under Part X is appropriate.
In particular, Part X:
·  involves minimal regulation and promotes commercial relationships and
commercial dispute resolution;
·  is neutral with respect to market arrangements and has not hindered efficient
market outcomes or hindered competitive forces in liner shipping markets;
·  has supported the negotiating position of Australian shippers and assisted in
providing them with predictable service outcomes;
·  is compatible with international regulatory regimes; and
·  is low cost.
Repeal of Part X and its replacement by the general provisions of the TPA (as
they currently stand and as they have been applied) is unlikely to produce
outcomes as good or better than Part  X, or do so more efficiently. While the
Commission accepts that a Part  X-type approach could be applied within the
general provisions of the TPA, this may require industry-specific legislation (a
notification procedure) or possibly general amendment of the TPA (block
authorisation). More importantly, there can be no certainty that the level and type
of regulation embodied in Part X, which the Commission assesses is appropriate,
would be implemented under these options. The Commission therefore concludes
that the alternatives cannot achieve the objectives of the legislation more
efficiently than the current legislation. The Commission therefore recommends
that Part X be retained, albeit with the minor amendments outlined in chapter 8.
The Commission also recommends that the situation be re-examined in 2005 to
ascertain whether the conclusions of this review are substantially altered as a
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1 Retain Part X Part X has achieved its major objectives.
Exporters have the ability to use conference
or independent service providers depending
on commercial considerations. Competition
and service levels in liner shipping are high.
Interlaine 2 Retain Part X Part X has enabled wool shippers and
receivers to negotiate adequate service
levels and lower freight rates. Repealing
Part X would lead to loss of direct services
which are valued by wool shippers and






3 & DR29 Retain Part X Part X is a simple system that relies on
conferences and exporters reaching
commercially acceptable outcomes through
negotiations. Part X is a self-regulatory
system that involves significantly less
intervention and regulation than Part VII.
Despite falling freight rates conference
service levels continue to meet the needs of
shippers.
Consideration should also be given to
improvements to Part X covering penalties,
accords and discussion agreements,
collective negotiation of stevedoring
contracts, intermodal rate setting, increasing
the role of the ACCC, and protection for
importers.
Brian Makins 4 Retain Part X Part X is a sensible approach to regulation
and consistent with international practice.
Automatic exemption for conferences
provides certainty. Authorisation would be
unworkable. May be grounds for creating a
separate Shipping Act to replace Part X.
Meyrick &
Associates Pty Ltd
5 Reviews economic issues that need to be
considered in examining the regulation of
Australia’s liner trades. Acceptance of
shipping conferences stems from
characteristics of the industry which require
coordination and rationalisation. Argues
conditions in liner shipping markets are such
that the benefits of conference activities will
flow to shippers.
P&O Nedlloyd 6 Retain Part X Removing Part X will result in less choice for
shippers, fewer direct services, fluctuating
freight rates, and lower investment by
carriers in Australian trades. Authorisation
will create uncertainty. International





Submission Submission no.View on Part X Participant’s comments
John Zerby 7 Retain Part X Outlines the development of liner shipping
regulation especially in the United States.
Argues that a primary goal of the review
should be to establish the type of multilateral




8 Retain Part X Despite the recent sale of ANL to a foreign
company, ANCL still meets the criteria for an
Australian flag carrier. ANLCL has been
hindered by competitors actions. Large falls
in freight rates have hampered ANCL from
effectively operating in the marketplace.





9 & DR32 Retain Part X The nature of international liner shipping
warrants a different treatment to domestic
industries. Countervailing powers for
shippers are critical to achieving appropriate






Retain Part X The objectives underpinning Part X have
been achieved by a cost-effective and
light-handed system of regulation that is
compatible with the systems of our major
trading partners.
Liner shipping conferences provide a
bus-like service and require an exemption if
they are to continue cooperating.
Conferences enhance efficiency and market
competition and low barriers to entry ensure
that the gains are passed on to shippers.
Removal of Part X would lead to bunching
and gapping of vessel arrivals and
departures and price fluctuations. There
would be a reduction in refrigerated services
and possibly conflicts with the liner shipping
laws of our major trading partners.
Authorisation would have an uncertain
outcome, proceedings are slow and costly
and each time a conference arrangement is
altered there would be a need for a new
authorisation. Difficulties would be
encountered in obtaining authorisation for
common rate setting and the authorisation
process would not be compatible with the
regulatory regimes of our major trading
partners.
Suggested reforms to modernise Part X
include the following areas: streamlining
existing provisions (eg. service contracts to
replace loyalty contracts); exemption for
collective negotiation of stevedoring
charges; collective rate setting allowed for
land-based and intermodal services;
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Submission Submission no.View on Part X Participant’s comments
streamlined registration procedures;
designation of a peak importer body;








Retain Part X Countervailing powers and safeguards for
shippers are required to balance the
considerable power of conferences in
shipping markets. Removal of Part X
exemptions would result in the loss of these
countervailing powers even though
conferences would continue to operate
without regard for Australian law.
Authorisation would not provide an
environment as stable and predictable as
that facilitated by Part X.
Part X should be strengthened to provide
for: application of Part VI penalties and
remedies; the ACCC to be given powers to
prosecute and apply penalties; shippers to
be given the right to pursue damages for
breaches of conference obligations; and
additional funds to be provided to APSA.
Discussion agreements are immoral and
conferences should be required to be open.




12 Retain Part X Part X has provided benefits to shippers
through facilitating services to ports in SA
that would otherwise be unavailable.
Changes to Part X would not be supported if
they had adverse regional impacts and
discouraged the development and retention
of shipping services in SA.
CENSA 13 Retain Part X Part X has worked well and is consistent
with international liner shipping regimes.
International comity should be an important




14 Retain Part X Supports the position put in the Interlaine
submission. The exemption for liner
conferences has not adversely affected
competition in liner shipping markets.
Operations of conferences have benefited
wool exporters through providing higher
service levels, greater port coverage and






15 Retain Part X A predisposition to maximising competition
would normally lead ACCI to advocate
abolishing Part X. However, shipper
members of the Chamber consider that
abolishing Part X could prejudice liner










16 & DR36 Repeal Part X The current treatment of liner shipping is not
justifiable nor consistent with the
fundamental tenets of Australian competition
policy that provides for consistency of
regulatory approach from a national rather
than industry specific regulator.
Liner shipping exemptions should be subject
to review under authorisation procedures.
Advantages of authorisation include
transparency and uniformity. Industry’s need
for certainty timeliness and
cost-effectiveness have to be balanced
against the requirement that anti-competitive
practices have to be assessed after detailed
public consultation.
The submission also outlines a possible










The decline in Australian flag shipping is not
a reason for removing the Australian flag
shipping provisions of Part X. The decline in
Australian shipping is caused by inadequate





18 Extend Part X
protections to
importers
Part X should be amended to provide for:
designation of a peak importer body; and a
requirement that carriers negotiate and
consult with importers on ocean and
landside charges and other issues deemed
appropriate. Alternatively, Part X should be
removed so that importers have full
protection under Part IV of the TPA.
Law Council of
Australia
19 Repeal Part X Part IV of the TPA should be of general
application to the provision of all goods and
services unless exceptional circumstances
require that an industry be treated
differently. The special circumstances of
liner shipping do not justify its exemption
from Part IV. The characteristics of liner
shipping can be addressed by minor
changes to the TPA. The objectives of
Part X can then be achieved through Part VII





20 Retain Part X Despite changes in shipping markets since
1993, abolishing Part X adds to the risk that
service levels to WA would be reduced.
Current low rates and excess capacity have
already resulted in some service withdrawals
from WA. If Part X is repealed there would
be a need for carriers to be able to form
consortia arrangements.
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National Farmers’
Federation
21 & DR31 Repeal Part X There should be a measured and
predictable withdrawal in the protection
offered by Part X, utilising one of the options
outlined in the inquiry issues paper or





23 Retain Part X The consensus among Australian exporters
is that Part X: should be retained;
guarantees that services are provided to
smaller ports, thereby assisting exporters;
and provides essential countervailing
powers for exporters. The focus of the
review should be on ensuring that
appropriate safeguards are in place to
prevent possible abuse of market power
arising from cartels permitted under Part X.
The submission also outlines developments
in the WTO on maritime issues.





under Part X or
alternatives.
Operation of market forces in liner shipping
has resulted in lower freight rates and
access to adequate and reliable shipping
services. Abolition of Part X would probably
result in added turbulence and volatility in
the liner trades servicing Australia. It might
also lead to lower freight rates and
consolidation of carriers. If shipping cartels
are allowed to form it is important to
maintain the elements of Part X which
enable collective action by shippers.
Tasmanian
Government
25 Retain Part X The major beneficiaries of Part X are
Australian exporters and not conference
carriers. Removal of Part X would not lead to
shipping companies transferring to
authorisation under the TPA. There is no
evidence of abuse of market power that
would warrant removal of Part X.
Australian Dairy
Industry Council
DR26 Retain Part X Part X provides necessary and effective
means for ensuring that conference
exemptions enhance market transparency
and efficiency. Alternative means of
achieving this control would not be as




DR30 Retain Part X Part X is necessary given the characteristics
of Australian liner trades. Information
disclosure is an issue of concern and there
is a need to ensure appropriate mechanisms
exist for monitoring industry arrangements.
Greater transparency of Part X
arrangements should be pursued through
requiring conference agreements submitted
for registration to be made available for





Submission Submission no.View on Part X Participant’s comments
Department of the
Treasury
DR35 Repeal Part X National competition policy requires that
legislation should not restrict competition
unless it can be demonstrated that the
benefits of the restriction outweigh the costs
and the objectives can only be achieved
through restricting competition. Part X is an
anomaly in the competition policy framework
and is not necessary to ensure the
availability of regular liner shipping services.
Given strong shares of non-conference
operators serving regional ports it is difficult
to see how repealing Part X would adversely
affect services to regional ports. The
development of an industry code could
address concerns about compliance costs,
consistency of application across
conferences and business certainty. If Part X
is retained significant amendments are
required including: removing exemptions for
discussion agreements and shipowner
accords; requiring conferences to be open;




DR38 Retain Part X Conference arrangements provide shippers
with access to regular port calls and low
freight rates and are in line with the practice
of Australia’s major trading partners. Current
freight rates and service levels are unlikely





DR39 Repeal Part X Anti-competitive behaviour permitted by
Part X can be historically justified but no
longer passes the test provided under the
national competition policy. It is not clear
that the intent of the legislative review




DR40 Repeal Part X Part X is an anomaly in Australia’s
competition policy framework. While there
have been historical reasons for granting
special exemptions to shipping conferences
Part X is the only part of the TPA that
provides industry specific exemptions. The
need for continued exemptions for liner
shipping conferences must be questioned
given the robust competition in shipping




B.1 Role of conferences and other cooperative
arrangements
This section very briefly canvasses views about the role and impact of shipping
conferences.
Economists hold differing views as to the role and likely effects of liner shipping
conferences. While some argue that conferences operate as cartels and possess
substantial monopoly power, others focus on the potential gains in efficiency and
lowering of costs that may accrue through the joint provision and/or organisation of
shipping services. In practice, both views may be correct — conferences may
exhibit simultaneously both desirable and undesirable characteristics. In common
with other types of organisation (such as companies), they may or may not promote
productive efficiency and may or may not possess and/or exercise market power.
Ultimately, the impact of a conference will depend largely on the intensity of
competitive forces in the trade in which the conference operates and the extent to
which the conference affects those forces.
Characteristics of liner shipping
In contrast to bulk shipping, where each vessel carries one commodity on a charter
basis, demand for liner shipping is diverse. The costs of coordinating these diverse
demands virtually rules out ship chartering as an efficient form of service delivery.1
On the other hand, the supply of regular, scheduled liner services provides a means
of reducing transactions costs so that shippers with diverse demands are able to
access liner shipping services.
Liner shipping also is characterised by significant economies of scale and scope.
There is general agreement regarding the existence of substantial economies of
vessel size arising from economies in capital, crew and fuel costs. Though evidence
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further reduce transactions costs of coordinating shippers’ demands. However, it is unlikely
that liner services will be replaced by charter operations.B.2 INTERNATIONAL
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relating to economies of fleet size is less well documented, operators of larger fleets
may benefit from organisational, information technology and/or marketing
economies. Larger fleet size also may lead to improved container logistics and give
shipping lines greater leverage in dealing with shipyards, ship repairers and
suppliers of bunker fuel. There also may be economies of scope, for example, in the
sense that direct service operators offer several port combinations. In other words,
they combine multiple direct services and thus serve several sub-markets within one
voyage. Network economies also may be achieved if cargoes are channelled to
increase traffic density on particular routes.
While the various production economies and the diverse nature of demand suggest
that the liner shipping industry will display a tendency towards organisational
concentration and provision of regular, scheduled services, they do not explain why
conferences have been the preferred form of organisational structure, rather than, for
example, a few global mega-carriers.
Economic rationale for conferences
Conferences provide for a looser form of cooperation than a single company or joint
venture. Typically they are route specific and even limited to one direction on each
route. Conferences may engage in joint price setting, capacity rationalisation
including vessel sharing arrangements, revenue and/or cost pooling arrangements,
differential pricing structures, and various forms of customer loyalty agreement.
Conferences as cartels
Many conference practices appear consistent with classical cartel or monopoly
behaviour — that is, they appear to have the objective of restricting supply in order
to raise prices and profits above competitive levels. However, given consistent
evidence that liner shipping operators do not earn monopoly profits, alternative
cartel models have been developed. For example, ‘open’ cartel models suggest that
excess profits are dissipated as a result of a high level of service competition
between conference members, leading to excess capacity and higher costs (see
Meyrick & Associates, sub. 5; Brazil et al 1993, appendix C; Devanney et al 1975).
However, the relevance of open cartel models for closed conferences (which are
permitted on all Australian trades except those to the United States where US law
prevails) appears limited. Closed conferences, by means of various internal
enforcement mechanisms as well as the ability to exclude new members, are more
likely to ensure that capacity is rationalised and costs minimised. More
fundamentally, and whether or not excess profits are frittered away as a result of
excess capacity, members of an open cartel characterised by excessive serviceECONOMIC ISSUES B.3
competition will incur higher costs than a closed, rationalised conference and will
attempt to recoup such costs by charging higher freight rates. For such an outcome
to be successful, market entry would have to be restricted.
Conference pricing behaviour, while complex, also may appear consistent with the
existence of market power. Conferences tend to charge different rates for different
commodities on the same voyage, different rates for similar commodities on
different legs of a voyage, and even different rates for similar commodities on the
same voyage. There also is evidence that higher rates are charged for higher-valued
cargoes. If price differences do not reflect cost differences then it suggests
conferences may be exploiting market power.
Much empirical research has been undertaken into whether these rate differences
reflect differences in the cost of carriage or whether liner shipowners practice price
discrimination. Most studies suggest that shipping conferences practice rate
discrimination on the basis of cargo value.
Since price discrimination cannot occur in the economists ‘ideal’, perfectly
competitive market, discrimination is usually taken to be prima facie evidence of
monopoly power. However, not only is liner shipping a decreasing-cost industry but
it has a major problem with the apportionment of large, non-separable, fixed costs.2
On a given voyage, common fixed costs must be apportioned across cargoes but any
such allocation necessarily will be arbitrary. In combination, these cost
characteristics of liner shipping make it necessary to adopt some form of price
discrimination.
A decreasing-cost industry is unable to equate price with marginal cost, since doing
so will not generate sufficient revenue to cover total costs. As privately owned,
profit maximising enterprises, liner shipowners must necessarily set prices above
marginal costs. But this begs the question of how the necessary mark-up above
marginal cost is to be determined. If liner owners charge a common mark-up for
each unit of cargo carried, they run the risk of shutting out cargo that could pay its
marginal cost but is unable to meet its assigned share of common costs. As Meyrick
notes (Meyrick, sub. 5, p. 56), Baumol and Bradford (1970) have shown that society
as a whole gains if the contribution required from each unit of cargo is proportional
to the inverse elasticity of demand for the carriage of that type of cargo. This
approach, commonly referred to as Ramsey pricing, is a form of price
discrimination.
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In practice, pricing of slots is likely to be driven by opportunity cost — in other
words, at the margin price will be determined by whether one shipper’s demand for
slots is competing with, or complementary to, other shippers’ demands. Thus, if
long-run average revenue is just adequate to cover long-run average costs, it would
seem difficult to sustain the argument that such differential pricing is inefficient or
uncompetitive, even though the allocation of the fixed cost ‘tax’ across shippers
may seem somewhat arbitrary. On the other hand, if discriminatory pricing allows
excess profits to be earned (or wasted), such pricing would indicate market power.3
Price leadership and entry-deterring games
Some critics allege that conference lines act as price leaders. That is, the market
power possessed by shipping conferences enables them to set prices without
reference to those charged by non-conference lines. Once the conference has
determined the new level of freight rates, so the argument goes, non-conference
lines tend to raise their rates so as to restore the ‘normal’ relationship between their
own and the conference’s rates.
Price leadership is a pricing strategy in an oligopolistic industry in which one firm
sets the price and, either implicitly or explicitly, other firms follow its example. The
fewer the number of firms in an industry (that is, the greater the number of
interdependencies of output decisions among individual firms), the more effective
price leadership is likely to be. Effective price leadership exists when price
movements initiated by the leader have a high probability of sticking and there are
no maverick or non-conforming firms.
Whilst price leadership may have been a feature of liner shipping prior to
containerisation, the intensity of competition in today’s liner trades suggests that the
model is no longer applicable. The Commission’s case studies (see appendix G)
suggest that while shipping lines are forced to lower freight rates in trades in which
substantial over-capacity exists, rate restoration has proved difficult to implement.
Some lines refuse to raise rates in order to build trade share and rate restoration
programs also tend to  encourage entry.
An alternative view is that the price competition observable in today’s market place
stems from the interaction of competitive strategies adopted by conference and
non-conference lines. Amongst the several models developed to explain strategic
behaviour, that of Stackelberg-Spencer-Dixit appears relevant to liner shipping. The
                                             
3 It would not necessarily imply global resource inefficiency, however, if price discrimination
were Ramsey ‘optimal’. But from Australia’s perspective as a user of shipping rather than a
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original Stackelberg model of a two-firm industry focuses on non-price competition,
assuming that in the first period, incumbent Firm 1 chooses a level of capacity (K1),
which is then fixed. Firm 2, a potential entrant, observes K1 before choosing its own
level of capacity, K2. While the incumbent firm cannot deter entry, it can attain a
higher profit level by limiting the scale of entry of the potential entrant.
In the Stackelberg-Spencer-Dixit model, rivalry in the second period may take the
form of either price or non-price competition. Assuming price competition prevails,
the adoption of a lower price by Firm 1 forces a matching price cut by Firm 2, which
(in turn) lowers the profitability of Firm  1. However, Firm  1’s pricing and
investment strategy will differ according to whether it wants to deter or
accommodate its rival. An aggressive pricing and investment strategy by Firm 1 may
hurt Firm 2 immediately, but lead Firm 2 to adopt a tougher stance in succeeding
rounds. A less aggressive pricing and investment stance may enable Firm 1 to hold
but not increase its market share. (Tirole 1988, pp. 314–37)
If competition takes a non-price form, the decision by Firm  1 to expand output
implies a lower equilibrium output for Firm 2. In this situation, Firm 1 will choose
to invest aggressively — being rough hurts Firm  2 and softens it up for future
rounds.
The Stackelberg-Spencer-Dixit model mimics many of the strategic decisions
observable in liner shipping markets. However, the model deals only with a two-
firm world and it does not explain persistent over-capacity in the liner shipping
market. In other words, while liner carriers doubtless attempt to second-guess the
decisions of competitors and potential competitors, and adopt strategies designed to
scare off rivals, whether they succeed will be a function of the strength of (potential)
competition. In liner shipping markets, conferences face competition from many
actual and potential rivals. Moreover, that firms continually vie with one another to
improve their market position is the engine of dynamic markets and will work to the
advantage of shippers provided liner trades are open to new entry.
Conferences as efficient providers
Traditional arguments supporting the conference structure are based on a view that
competition will be ‘destructive’ in the sense of leading to prices below costs (in
other words, marginal cost pricing is inappropriate where large fixed costs must be
recovered) and thus generate market instability. Developments in game theory have
added some weight to this view (see Telser 1987; McWilliams 1990; Pirrong 1992;
Sjostrom 1988, 1989, 1992; Meyrick & Associates, sub. 5).B.6 INTERNATIONAL
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The ‘theory of the core’ suggests that industries characterised by uncertain and/or
periodic demand, large plant capacities relative to demand, increasing returns to
scale, fixed plant capacity, avoidable fixed costs and costly or zero storage, may
have no stable, competitive equilibrium. The essence of the problem is that if
suppliers with optimal-sized (large) plants compete there may be excess capacity
and prices too low to cover costs. In other words, competition would lead to
instability with optimal-size low-cost plants. Under these conditions, some form of
industry coordination or concentration is necessary to generate an efficient
equilibrium.
Shippers ideally want fast, reliable shipping services on demand. However, few
shippers have sufficient demand to charter an entire vessel. The provision of a
regular ‘bus service’ is a way of accommodating shippers’ diverse demands for
frequency, reliability etc. while allowing various production economies to be
captured by carriers. However, a single shipping line may be loath to commit several
vessels (and incur correspondingly large fixed costs) in order to provide a regular
scheduled service where demand is uncertain and where that uncertainty is
exacerbated by the possibility of rivals encroaching on the trade.4 In order to reduce
this risk, the operator may commit smaller vessels, reduce sailing frequency and/or
contract directly with shippers. But smaller ships mean higher costs, reduced service
frequency imposes additional costs on shippers, while contracting with many small
shippers also is likely to be very costly.5 Cooperation with potential rivals offers an
alternative way of reducing demand uncertainty. A lower risk premium will mean
that larger ships can be utilised (thus capturing economies of scale) while a large
conference fleet may generate additional economies while providing the coordinated
scheduling valued by shippers. In this sense, conferences can provide an efficient
mode of service delivery. It is feasible, of course, that conferences serve to generate
a stable equilibrium but simultaneously give member lines market power. This
possibility is discussed below.
Conferences in practice ¾ ‘open’ vs ‘closed’ conferences
There has been considerable debate over the relative merits of open and closed
conferences. In general, closed conferences are associated with higher levels of
technical efficiency, while open conferences are said to offer superior allocative
efficiency. As noted in chapter 3, cooperation and rationalisation by means of a
closed conference may provide desirable outcomes for shippers. A lower risk
                                             
4 In this sense, conferences may form in response to the absence of restrictions on entry to liner
shipping markets.
5 Thus there may a stable equilibrium in the absence of cooperation but that equilibrium may
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premium may mean the employment of larger vessels operating at high load factors
(thus capturing economies of vessel size), while a large conference fleet may not
only reap additional economies but provide the coordinated schedules valued by
shippers. However, under certain circumstances closed conferences may be able to
exploit shippers by charging monopolistic prices.
In contrast, open conferences allow existing members to expand capacity at will and
allow new firms to enter the conference freely. Under such conditions, as the
Department of the Treasury infers (sub.  DR35, p.  14), excess profits will be
dissipated. However, this seemingly positive feature may arise as a result of a
negative tendency — the existence of open cartels may give rise to excess capacity
and higher costs (Meyrick  &  Associates, sub.  5, pp.  30–36; Brazil  et al 1993,
appendix  C, pp.  39–47). Several open cartel models have been developed in an
attempt to explain the mechanism underlying this tendency.
Devanney, Livanos and Stewart (Devanney et al 1975) were the first to develop a
formal open cartel model applied to liner shipping. The conference initially acts as a
collusive oligopoly, restricting capacity and setting freight rates above average cost.
With prices fixed, lines compete on a service rather than a price basis. Competition
between lines for market share leads to increased service frequency, giving rise to
over-tonnaging, increased costs and higher freight rates. As Meyrick notes, the
process is ‘ratchet’ like, with higher rates encouraging further over capacity and yet
higher rates in a further round (Meyrick & Associates, sub. 5, p. 31). As described,
the process is inherently unstable. Were it to continue, it would pay an independent
operator, with lower costs, to enter the market.
Jansson and Shneerson’s model (Jansson and Shneerson 1978) shares some common
features with Devanney. Firms, assumed to be members of an open conference, have
the ability to operate additional voyages and/or additional vessels in a given trade.
However, assuming the total volume of cargo in the trade is fixed, increasing the
number of vessels and/or voyages serves only to lower load factors. Jansson and
Shneerson assume that this process continues until equilibrium is reached where the
marginal revenue accruing from an additional sailing equals marginal cost. In the
Jansson and Shneerson model, cargo liners attempt to fill their surplus capacity with
tramp cargo — any cargo paying a freight rate above direct handling costs is worth
carrying. Under these assumptions, inefficiency may not appear in the guise of low
load factors, but may instead be associated with the carriage of relatively low paying
cargo and/or the employment of smaller ships than might used by a closed
conference.
There is then broad agreement as to the mechanism leading to excess capacity and
rising costs. In an open cartel, in which prices initially are fixed at levels above costs
by cartel members, the entry of new firms and expansion of capacity by firms withinB.8 INTERNATIONAL
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the cartel are freely permitted. Service competition leads to overtonnaging,
increased costs and higher freight rates. While a closed conference is able to control
service competition and rationalise fleet operation, an open conference is unable to
exert the required discipline. According to Devanney et al (1975),  the degree of
excess capacity will vary inversely with the discipline able to be exerted by a
conference:
A conference which practices control over scheduling is likely to be more efficient than
one that does not; one that practices cargo pooling still more efficient; and one that
practices revenue pooling more efficient yet. In short, the closer the conference
becomes to a single company, the more efficient (in a technical sense) it is likely to be.
(Devanney et al 1975, p. 162)
In summary, open conferences are likely to suffer from overtonnaging, leading to
higher costs and pressure for increased freight rates. Closed conferences are more
likely to generate cost-savings through cooperation between carriers, but may
exhibit less internal competition. In such a case, it is necessary to rely on
competition from existing non-conference carriers, potential entrants, transhipment
operators, and the countervailing power of shippers to ensure that the cost savings
are passed on to shippers as lower rates or more frequent or regular services.
Conferences in practice — market contestability
The key to the role of conferences in practice is whether they face actual or potential
competition. In other words, to what degree are they constrained to charge prices
which do not yield persistent excess profits and to operate efficiently? Evidence of
competition and contestability on Australian trades is discussed in chapter 6. This
section briefly discusses some aspects of contestability.
There is a range of views about the fundamental contestability of liner shipping
markets (see BTE  1986a and 1986b; Trace  1985; Meyrick  &  Associates, sub.  5;
Brazil  et al 1993, appendix C). Unlike aviation markets where bilateral agreements
restrict landing rights and market entry, there are few regulatory or institutional
constraints on entry to line shipping markets.6 Thus any significant entry restrictions
in liner shipping must derive from economic characteristics of liner shipping itself.
Liner shipping markets clearly are not perfectly competitive but provided they are
contestable, conferences will be constrained to operate and price efficiently over the
long-term. Perfect contestability requires no restrictions on access to technology,
zero sunk costs, and no scope for the incumbent to change pricing behaviour in
response to competition. There do not appear to be any artificial constraints on
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access to shipping technology while sunk costs incurred on particular trade routes
may be quite low. Provided ships are not trade-specific they can be deployed
elsewhere. There may be other forms of sunk costs including marketing costs and
reputation. The incumbent (conference) may have an advantage due to economies of
scale or consumer loyalty, however, which could deter a potential rival. For this
reason in particular it generally is agreed that liner shipping markets are not
perfectly contestable.
But lack of perfect contestability does not imply that barriers to entry to a particular
trade are prohibitive or even significant. The conference mechanism allows
members to capture various economies in the provision of a comprehensive,
coordinated service. While conferences may not be especially vulnerable to
competition across their entire activity, they may be vulnerable to rivals competing
in sub-markets. In other words, rivals can target certain services or markets,
operating on a smaller scale than the conference and incurring comparatively low
entry costs, thus making it more difficult for the conference to retaliate.
Over time, increasing demand will increase the scope for further competition while
changes in technology may erode the need for conferences. For example, computer
technology may reduce the transaction costs involved in contracting between
shippers and shipping operators (or promote freight forwarding activities) and thus
reduce demand uncertainty. Transhipping directly exploits network economies
together with economies of scale and thus may provide shipping services at lower
cost than direct services by conferences. In addition, scope for conference members
to ‘cheat’ may be an important competitive constraint on conference market power.
The extent of market contestability and the intensity of competitive forces ultimately
must be an empirical matter. Nonetheless, the fact that conferences are ubiquitous in
liner shipping and that they have persisted for over a century despite massive market
expansion, technological change (especially containerisation) and the absence of
significant barriers to entry suggest that they are more than monopoly cartels.
Indeed, in the absence of regulatory barriers to entry, any entry restrictions must
derive from the incumbency advantage of conferences themselves. In other words,
any market power of conferences must derive from the cost savings they generate.
This suggests that removal of conferences to eliminate market power inevitably will
incur an efficiency cost.
B.2 Shipping services and the public interest
The ultimate objective of any regulatory intervention should be to enhance the
national interest. This section asks where the public interest lies in the case ofB.10 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
international liner shipping. Though there can be little doubt that Australian
economic welfare as a whole is improved by cheaper international liner cargo
shipping, as explained below, not all members of the community are likely to gain.
Australia is not, and never has been, a large supplier of international liner shipping
services. Though a small Australian flag liner fleet (ANLCL) continues to operate, it
is now foreign-owned. While the interests of Australian employees must be taken
into account in the welfare calculus, the point is made that Australia is not a major
exporter of shipping services. Put another way, Australia relies almost entirely on
foreign liner shipping providers to carry its non-bulk imports and exports (see
chapter 2 for details of major commodity cargoes).
Shipping costs affect prices of exports and imports in the same way as trade taxes,
driving a wedge between producer and consumer prices. (Of course, unlike trade
taxes, transport costs represent an essential service input.) An across-the-board
reduction in the cost of international liner shipping services will result in a fall in the
landed price of liner imports and an expansion in the volume of those imports.7
There are some exceptions — for example, the case where Australia’s demand for
imports is perfectly elastic (where imports expand but there is no price change)8 or,
where the supply of imports is fixed (for example, because imports are subject to a
quota). Typically the price of the imported good will not fall by the full amount of
the transport saving — the saving will be shared between seller and buyer, the
distribution being a function of relative supply and demand elasticities. In the
limiting but improbable case where Australia’s demand for imports were fixed, it
could capture the entire saving.
There is a similar story for the export side. Lower transport costs for Australian
exports generally will be shared between Australian producers (higher producer
prices and exports) and foreign buyers (lower import prices and expanded imports),
with the relative price effects being a function of relative demand and supply
elasticities. As in the case of imports, there are special cases where one country may
capture the whole saving — if Australian export supply is fixed (by quotas imposed
by the importing country, for example), producer prices can rise by the full amount
of the freight saving though, of course, there can be no expansion in exports.
                                             
7 The discussion here is based on an assumed reduction in freight rates. More timely delivery or
better service levels which improve the competitiveness of imports or Australian exports will
have similar effects.
8  Though it is implausible that Australia’s demand for an import is perfectly elastic, it may be the
case that its demand for the import from one source is highly elastic. In this case, a single
exporter could capture a transport saving on one route.ECONOMIC ISSUES B.11
The net national gain is measured by the net gains in producer and consumer surplus
which flow from cheaper imports and higher returns to Australian producers of
exports. The impact of lower shipping costs thus is akin to the broad impact of a
terms of trade gain which improves the relative price of exports vis-à-vis imports.
Though there will be net national benefits, higher national income coupled with
higher export producer returns and cheaper imports will generate structural shifts in
the economy. For example, cheaper imports and higher income and national
spending will lead to higher imports and lower domestic production of the import-
competing product. At the same time, higher rewards for export producers will
encourage an expansion in the production of exports. Exports are likely to increase,
though it is possible that higher national income and spending mean that, on
balance, more export production is consumed at home so that exports decline.9
Any expansion of trade also is likely to generate additional dynamic gains by
encouraging more efficient local production and management processes. There may
be additional gains if increased import competition reduces market power of
domestic firms.
Shippers and the public interest
Australian shippers, as profit maximisers, have a clear interest in obtaining high
quality shipping services at the lowest possible price. Even if the shipper is a
foreign-owned intermediary (for example, a multinational trader), as long as there is
competition between export traders and competition in markets for importables,
lower shipping costs will be passed on to domestic export producers and domestic
consumers of imports. This implies that there is a coincidence between shippers’
interests and the national interest in relation to international liner shipping
outcomes. In other words, shippers’ interests in relation to international liner
shipping act as a close proxy for the national interest.
It is possible that, for example, a statutory marketing authority with monopoly
selling powers may not act to maximise profits of commodity exporters. This would
be more likely to occur where the marketing arrangements allowed monopoly prices
to be charged in the domestic market. Higher returns from the domestic market
could be dissipated to some extent if the authority pursued an ‘easy’ life and did not
bargain for the best shipping deal. In other words, the shipper in these circumstances
may not act to maximise profits. But generally-speaking, exporters and importers
                                             
9 This does not imply any deterioration in the trade balance. An improvement in the terms of
trade (or a reduction in imported shipping costs) means that fewer exports need to be sold to
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will go out of business if they fail to maximise profits and few commodities covered
by compulsory marketing use liner shipping (except perhaps rice). Moreover, most
controls over domestic commodity markets have been abolished.
B.3 Countervailing power
Australia is a net importer of international liner shipping services — indeed, it relies
almost entirely on foreign liner shipping services. As discussed above, it is in the
interests of Australian exporters and consumers of imports to obtain efficient service
levels for competitive prices. Discussion in this section focuses on what Australia
feasibly can do to promote this outcome.
Standard trade theory suggests that where a country buying an imported good has
some market power, appropriately levied import restrictions (such as tariffs and
quotas) may improve national income by forcing the foreign supplier to reduce the
selling price. A similar outcome could be achieved by a private importer with
market power. If the country (or importer) has little or no market power (that is, it is
a price taker) any attempt to push down the import price by controlling imports will
back-fire — the quantity consumed will fall but the price will remain unchanged.
Moreover, even where the country has some market power, if the import control is
too restrictive (in the limit, for example, an import prohibition), the costs of the
intervention in terms of reduced consumption are likely to exceed any benefit from
lower prices.
If the foreign supplier exercises market power, restricting the quantity sold in order
to increase the price, the importing country (or importer) may be able to constrain
such behaviour and obtain a better outcome. This will depend on the degree to
which the foreign supplier segments markets. If the foreign supplier has many other
potential customers (where market power also is exercised), an attempt by Australia
to force a lower price may encourage the foreign supplier to divert supplies to other
relatively more profitable markets. If, on the other hand, the Australian market
yields excess profits, there may be scope for retaliatory action. Such intervention
could be exercised by Australian buyers acting in concert to exercise countervailing
power or by strategic regulatory intervention to set an appropriate tariff or price cap.
As with any strategic trade intervention, however, putting the theory into practice is
extremely difficult and risky (see IAC 1989b, pp. 79–86).
In the case of international liner shipping, the product is a service which requires the
providers physically to come to Australia — the production and consumption of the
shipping service cannot be separated. This opens up the possibility of limiting entry
of (some of) these providers (similar to a restriction, indeed an embargo, on importsECONOMIC ISSUES B.13
of goods) and also may open scope for application of domestic laws including
competition law because providers enter Australian territory, and may establish a
local presence. The latter possibility means that Australia potentially could affect the
market structure of the foreign service provider, an option that normally is not
available with respect to foreign-produced goods.10
The question then arises as to whether application of competition law is an
appropriate response to shipping conferences. Application of competition law in
order to proscribe formation of conferences might reduce any market power of the
conference but also deny a source of potential benefit to Australian shippers. Where
cost savings from the existence of conferences are zero or very small — and small
relative to losses arising from market power — the case for dismantling conferences
is strengthened. Where conferences promote significant cost savings, the case for
their proscription is weakened. However, whether or not constraining conference
activity appears sensible, if Australia has little market power in liner shipping
markets, its ability to constrain foreign practices without harming Australian
shippers may be limited. For example, imposition of costs on conference members
(for example, via fines) may result in reduced service levels to Australian shippers
without compensating reductions in price.
Collective action by shippers
If Australian shippers negotiate in concert their negotiating position will be
strengthened and, on average, they may obtain lower shipping rates. It is this
reasoning which underpins the exemption of shipper groups under Part X. However,
exporters have different shipping requirements and collective action is unlikely to be
able to accommodate these differences. For example, larger shippers may possess
sufficient market strength to negotiate a better deal outside a collective agreement.
The corollary is that they are likely to cross-subsidise smaller or more remote
exporters under a system of collective rate negotiation. Thus collective bargaining
could lead to inefficient price signalling and resource misallocation within
Australia.
However, if collective action is not compulsory, such inefficiencies should be
minimised. For example, under Part X, individual shippers are not prevented from
negotiating agreements with individual shipping operators and, it appears, more and
more are doing so. To the extent that collective action is used, it is to negotiate
common, core service requirements. Together with the opportunity for any shipper
to use non-conference services, it is unlikely that any shipper is forced to consume a
                                             
10 In the case of foreign-produced goods, traded at arms length, questions of application of
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service unsuited to his/her requirements or misses out because of lack of choice.
That said, however, the liner shipping market is like virtually all other markets in




C Australia’s sea-freight task
The data presented in this appendix are from the Bureau of Transport Economics
International Cargo Statistics database. The data are based on ABS trade statistics
which have been extended to include vessels details, and are available quarterly.
The database contains data from two different ABS data collections. A series break
exists prior to the June–September quarter of 1994, therefore data before 1994-95
cannot be compared in absolute terms to data from 1994-95 onward (ABS pers.
comm., 19 March 1999). However, the series break does not appear to have affected
shares. Data relating to absolute weights and values of liner trade are therefore
presented in this appendix annually for the period 1994-95 to 1997-98 only. Data
relating to shares of liner trade are presented biannually from 1989-90 to 1997-98.
It should also be noted that the data presented in this appendix include exports and
imports which are loaded and unloaded at Australian regional ports (non-capital city
ports). A significant proportion of cargo loaded/unloaded at regional ports is likely
to be carried by charter or company-owned vessels, which are not liner services as
defined in this inquiry, in the sense that they are not regular scheduled services
operating to set timetables, even though these vessels are identified as liner vessels
in the database. It is not possible to identify precisely cargo carried on charter or
company-owned vessels, and therefore also not possible to exclude these cargoes
from the data presented in this appendix.
Countries comprising each of the trade regions for which data in this appendix are
presented are listed in table C.23.C.2 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
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C.1 Liner trade by commodity group
Table C.1 Liner exports by commodity group, 1994-95 to 1997-98 (tonnes)
Commodity group 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Confidential 1 943 226 1 978 260 2 351 691 2 936 504
Meat and meat preparations 1 002 564 993 121 983 713 1 210 547
Iron and steel 806 699 952 088 1 188 279 993 467
Vegetables and fruit 576 179 636 345 817 521 940 237
Dairy products and birds eggs 563 097 572 464 670 243 725 548
Feeding stuff for animals 525 636 622 084 739 260 738 785
Chemicals 466 798 595 679 597 047 636 728
Aluminium and aluminium alloys 462 620 601 795 831 382 1 118 318
Cereals and cereal preparations 405 051 503 221 1 030 810 1 379 701
Other 4 673 038 5 616 873 6 680 061 7 551 712
Total 11 424 908 13 071 930 15 890 007 18 231 547
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Table C.2 Liner imports by commodity group, 1994-95 to 1997-98 (tonnes)
Commodity group 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Paper, paperboard and articles of paper 1 047 397 1 026 409 1 070 523 1 361 439
Chemicals 843 226 896 363 991 335 1 172 877
Machinery 830 610 917 607 926 584 1 137 590
Confidential 681 024 549 902 588 225 519 001
Non-metallic mineral manufactures, nesa 676 064 615 612 703 866 883 852
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 607 627 663 124 702 298 783 736
Iron and steel 593 301 551 824 688 069 928 614
Cork and wood 467 740 448 461 435 492 491 070
Vegetables and fruit 387 857 332 592 333 829 370 405
Other 3 410 911 3 324 029 3 792 269 4 427 561
Total 9 545 757 9 325 923 10 232 490 12 076 145
a Not elsewhere specified.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).AUSTRALIA’S SEA-
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Table C.3 Liner exports by commodity group, 1994-95 to 1997-98 ($’000)
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Wool, sheep and lambs 3 227 389 2 644 912 2 675 331 3 225 171
Meat and meat preparations 3 149 371 2 836 992 2 509 411 3 417 754
Machinery 2 271 141 2 629 641 2 962 825 3 055 564
Confidential 2 263 539 2 629 510 2 812 544 3 704 509
Dairy products and birds eggs 1 217 536 1 475 982 1 562 164 1 805 178
Aluminium and aluminium alloys 1 185 618 1 507 864 1 767 422 2 715 741
Chemicals 1 073 580 1 294 381 1 343 054 1 522 138
Road vehicles and transport equipment 893 603 1 085 785 1 105 065 1 245 368
Cotton 605 495 677 563 1 009 478 1 356 851
Other 8 329 565 9 650 540 10 433 858 11 500 361
Total 24 216 837 26 433 170 28 181 152 33 548 635
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Table C.4 Liner imports by commodity group, 1994-95 to 1997-98 ($’000)
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Machinery 11 497 014 12 521 149 12 076 100 14 896 419
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 4 109 608 4 439 380 4 501 613 5 498 060
Chemicals 2 562 695 2 895 799 2 940 455 3 775 947
Confidential 1 846 638 1 762 123 1 916 021 1 555 790
Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles 1 842 496 1 772 140 1 680 384 1 968 697
Road vehicles and transport equipment 1 829 585 2 225 168 2 310 570 3 158 979
Paper, paperboard and articles of paper 1 367 526 1 627 338 1 445 045 1 845 581
Manufactures of metals, nesa 1 282 190 1 360 096 1 319 311 1 724 747
Articles of apparel, clothing accessories 1 119 849 1 198 418 1 237 670 1 613 173
Other 8 659 999 9 092 880 8 951 311 11 291 482
Total 36 117 600 38 894 491 38 378 480 47 328 875
a Not elsewhere specified.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).C.4 INTERNATIONAL
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C.2 Conference trade by commodity group
Table C.5 Conference share of liner export tonnage for selected
commodity groups, 1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
Meat and meat preparations 81 70 75 75 74
Iron and steel 51 46 67 51 29
Vegetables and fruit 59 69 65 55 51
Dairy products and birds eggs 70 62 63 61 63
Feeding stuff for animals 62 57 64 59 63
Chemicals 60 58 67 42 41
Aluminium and aluminium alloys 66 62 52 52 28
Cereals and cereal preparations 53 49 63 62 39
Wool, sheep and lambs 64 56 56 68 64
Machinery 76 76 71 52 62
Road vehicles and transport equipment 86 79 58 74 65
C o t t o n 5 44 44 95 9 6 3
T o t a l 6 45 65 65 4 4 5
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Table C.6 Conference share of liner import tonnage for selected
commodity groups, 1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
Paper, paperboard and articles of paper 53 51 59 46 50
Chemicals 67 61 61 60 59
Machinery 71 67 65 65 58
Non-metallic mineral manufactures, nesa 66 60 60 60 58
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 75 67 60 67 62
Iron and steel 73 58 60 32 25
Cork and wood 45 50 51 37 47
Vegetables and fruit 52 48 50 58 64
Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles 66 68 68 74 72
Road vehicles and transport equipment 75 67 70 62 66
Manufactures of metals, nesa 75 56 57 65 66
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 54 29 42 40 39
T o t a l 6 45 95 95 6 5 4
a Not elsewhere specified.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).AUSTRALIA’S SEA-
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C.3 Liner trade by trade region
Table C.7 Liner exports by trade region, 1994-95 to 1997-98 (tonnes)
Trade region 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Africa 185 276 240 949 333 387 357 100
Central America & Caribbean 7 980 36 961 11 209 61 773
East Asia 2 057 960 2 482 418 3 049 130 3 554 003
East India 87 216 90 474 260 520 325 129
Europe – Atlantic 624 604 807 133 694 288 1 022 327
Europe – Baltic 21 234 22 792 17 068 46 491
Europe – Mediterranean 259 400 344 697 291 549 552 369
Japan & North Asia 2 855 056 3 017 906 3 871 587 4 181 550
Middle East Gulf 165 388 148 749 295 414 386 920
New Zealand 828 080 952 914 1 089 309 1 226 090
No Trade Areaa 10 76 11 42 261
North America – East Coast 591 704 619 054 514 438 588 358
North America – West Coast 405 926 375 398 609 963 714 582
Pacific Islands & Other 353 991 371 250 363 503 380 444
Papua New Guinea & Solomon Islands 374 138 522 076 647 473 630 966
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 115 712 107 629 119 311 127 921
South America 81 685 46 663 65 363 76 823
South-East Asia 2 208 368 2 658 979 3 322 531 3 584 569
West India 201 181 225 820 333 962 371 876
Total 11 424 909 13 071 938 15 890 016 18 231 552
a Trade area unspecified.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).C.6 INTERNATIONAL
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Table C.8 Liner imports by trade region, 1994-95 to 1997-98 (tonnes)
Trade region 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Africa 163 451 216 408 244 462 278 589
Central America & Caribbean 3 647 11 632 5 323 5 174
East Asia 1 261 687 1 243 886 1 410 457 1 588 433
East India 68 384 54 461 115 983 95 479
Europe – Atlantic 1 395 320 1 413 420 1 408 989 1 867 924
Europe – Baltic 258 218 179 904 135 476 177 638
Europe – Mediterranean 652 222 657 107 719 828 909 490
Japan & North Asia 1 002 400 916 241 1 025 280 1 193 513
Middle East Gulf 100 231 23 221 35 432 77 392
New Zealand 1 318 977 1 157 298 1 156 796 1 296 379
No Trade Areaa  259  424  587  555
North America – East Coast 655 777 757 885 905 825 959 075
North America – West Coast 796 228 1 034 635 1 145 126 1 165 818
Pacific Islands & Other 41851 42 254 41 062 56 834
Papua New Guinea & Solomon Islands 271 187 60 750 94 529 82 134
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 60 284 48 302 56 497 89 485
South America 236 828 239 024 206 198 220 575
South-East Asia 1 154 742 1 166 363 1 406 459 1 817 367
West India 104 062 102 695 118 187 194 295
Total 9 545 755 9 325 910 10 232 496 12 076 149
a Trade area unspecified.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).AUSTRALIA’S SEA-
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Table C.9 Liner exports by trade region, 1994-95 to 1997-98 ($’000)
Trade region 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Africa 388 629 483 140 605 716 791 659
Central America & Caribbean 18 591 22 081 27 330 199 395
East Asia 493 128 4 693 717 5 225 272 5 635 245
East India 117 351 146 453 201 825 241 991
Europe – Atlantic 1 906 772 2 359 821 2 172 524 3 066 490
Europe – Baltic 54 596 55 557 49 859 114 765
Europe – Mediterranean 1 097 783 1 211 747 1 081 606 1 791 107
Japan & North Asia 5 979 925 5 793 462 5 816 834 6 942 019
Middle East Gulf 266 793 262 116 333 969 439 252
New Zealand 2 101 715 2 378 425 2 644 195 2 765 198
No Trade Areaa  103 79  23 12 009
North America – East Coast 1 220 615 1 267 665 965 938 1 600 805
North America – West Coast 1 009 407 1 019 560 1 303 591 1 920 293
Pacific Islands & Other 432 390 492 179 486 181 566 672
Papua New Guinea & Solomon Islands 515 707 672 429 958 999 893 584
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 147 496 173 105 157 598 196 243
South America 129 634 112 031 140 473 243 586
South-East Asia 4 024 547 4 924 559 5 658 499 5 703 254
West India 311 662 365 042 350 717 425 069
Total 20 216 844 26 433 168 28 181 149 33 548 636
a Trade area unspecified.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).C.8 INTERNATIONAL
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Table C.10 Liner imports by trade region, 1994-95 to 1997-98 ($’000)
Trade region 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Africa 221 958 341 299 346 210 433 600
Central America & Caribbean 68 292 70 933 20 200 25 767
East Asia 5 739 814 5 788 825 6 196 098 7 475 418
East India 138 732 120 883 145 467 172 185
Europe – Atlantic 7 273 146 7 834 707 6 791 390 9 330 399
Europe – Baltic  732 268 687 710 479 815 675 014
Europe – Mediterranean 1872 986 2 165 284 2 107 852 2 728 861
Japan & North Asia 6 411 559 6 128 722 6 097 566 6 827 748
Middle East Gulf 53 335 39 029 54 657 84 117
New Zealand 2 140 454 2 189 475 2 208 372 2 466 117
No Trade Areaa 1 112 2 022 2 511 2 438
North America – East Coast 2 992 871 3 310 318 3 107 924 3 958 551
North America – West Coast 3 596 762 5 072 956 5 112 672 6 111 458
Pacific Islands & Other 127 044 151 584 159 108 187 312
Papua New Guinea & Solomon Islands 208 962 149 464 99 535 136 607
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 130 041 116 125 138 050 176 148
South America 347 859 355 116 325 016 438 748
South-East Asia 3 727 843 4 025 818 4 587 420 5 596 937
West India 332 556 344 218 398 621 501 456
Total 36 117 594 38 894 488 38 378 484 47 328 881
a Trade area unspecified.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).AUSTRALIA’S SEA-
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C.4 Conference trade by trade region
Table C.11 Conference share of liner export tonnage by trade region,
1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
Country/region 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
A f r i c a 8 7 7 9 792 2
Central America & Caribbean 27 94 82 96 36
East Asia 64 39 32 36 28
E a s t  I n d i a 5 47 65 67 5 3 5
Europe – Atlantic 54 60 59 53 44
Europe – Baltic 32 48 29 28 50
Europe – Mediterranean 78 64 82 58 54
Japan & North Asia 68 48 48 57 48
Middle East Gulf 49 81 46 93 47
New Zealand 74 88 78 53 65
North America – East Coast 48 49 50 36 53
North America – West Coast 47 33 29 54 40
Pacific Islands & Other 65 72 51 47 50
Papua New Guinea & Solomon Islands 87 77 67 74 60
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 31 57 69 65 68
South America 38 26 40 17 21
South-East Asia 76 65 70 69 48
W e s t  I n d i a 5 86 67 07 2 5 0
T o t a l 6 45 65 65 4 4 5
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).C.10 INTERNATIONAL
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Table C.12 Conference share of liner import tonnage by trade region,
1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
Country/region 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
Africa 52 53 66 9 8
Central America & Caribbean 77 80 60 33 87
East Asia 63 31 37 48 48
E a s t  I n d i a 7 68 38 38 7 8 1
Europe – Atlantic 67 72 67 53 55
Europe – Baltic 90 86 84 74 15
Europe – Mediterranean 75 65 64 64 60
Japan & North Asia 60 48 55 59 61
Middle East Gulf 93 88 87 84 33
New Zealand 51 56 55 48 61
North America – East Coast 69 63 62 59 43
North America – West Coast 53 41 39 54 55
Pacific Islands & Other 21 40 31 66 47
Papua New Guinea & Solomon Islands 88 92 97 76 64
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 17 3 7 36 39
South America 26 69 61 18 19
South-East Asia 85 70 74 79 67
W e s t  I n d i a 7 17 58 29 2 6 0
T o t a l 6 45 95 95 6 5 4
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).AUSTRALIA’S SEA-
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Table C.13 Conference share of liner export value by trade region, 1989-90
to 1997-98 (per cent)
Country/region 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
Africa 19 83 95 12 17
Central America & Caribbean 62 89 80 86 36
East Asia 73 40 41 39 36
E a s t  I n d i a 7 18 55 58 5 6 4
Europe – Atlantic 64 80 74 51 47
Europe – Baltic 67 66 46 31 55
Europe – Mediterranean 82 80 87 64 59
Japan & North Asia 75 62 68 71 63
Middle East Gulf 52 84 71 96 76
New Zealand 71 92 74 63 72
North America – East Coast 74 65 69 53 59
North America – West Coast 73 60 55 73 66
Pacific Islands & Other 56 59 22 46 52
Papua New Guinea & Solomon Islands 80 81 72 59 52
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 59 68 77 78 76
South America 42 62 62 16 23
South-East Asia 80 69 72 74 63
W e s t  I n d i a 5 57 06 48 1 6 8
T o t a l 7 36 76 76 0 5 6
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).C.12 INTERNATIONAL
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Table C.14 Conference share of liner import value by trade region, 1989-90
to 1997-98 (per cent)
Country/region 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
Africa 52 67 71 13 12
Central America & Caribbean 73 44 29 94 95
East Asia 65 31 34 49 45
E a s t  I n d i a 7 48 28 39 0 8 3
Europe – Atlantic 76 77 68 68 66
Europe – Baltic 89 88 86 77 26
Europe – Mediterranean 70 61 60 75 72
Japan & North Asia 77 61 77 77 83
Middle East Gulf 74 88 74 81 52
New Zealand 52 76 73 56 62
North America – East Coast 83 77 82 67 50
North America – West Coast 69 67 58 72 70
Pacific Islands & Other 40 59 28 69 63
Papua New Guinea & Solomon Islands 88 93 95 48 65
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 14 2 5 28 67
South America 30 75 74 26 24
South-East Asia 82 70 74 80 69
W e s t  I n d i a 7 37 98 09 2 8 3
T o t a l 7 36 66 76 7 6 4
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
C.5 Transhipment
Two sets of transhipment data are presented in this appendix. Tables C.15 and C.16
include only cargo that is transhipped in a different trade region from its region of
origin or destination. For example, export cargoes bound for Europe which are
transhipped in South-East Asia are included in the transhipment data presented here.
However, export cargo destined for Europe that is transhipped in Europe is not
included, nor is import cargo from East Asia that is transhipped in East Asia. The
available data do not differentiate between transhipment and landbridging. Data on
transhipment and landbridging within trade regions have therefore been excluded
from the data presented in tables  C.15  and  C.16 in an attempt to identify
transhipment services competing with direct services on Australia’s major trade
routes. Data presented in these two tables represent a lower bound to the total level
of transhipment of Australian cargoes. This is in contrast to transhipment data
presented in Brazil et al (1993), which include all transhipped cargoes, including
those transhipped in the region of origin or destination.
Data presented in tables C.17 and C.18 include all cargo transhipped or landbridged,
including cargo transhipped or landbridged in the region of origin or destination.AUSTRALIA’S SEA-
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Data presented in these two tables represent an upper bound as far as official
statistics are concerned to the total level of transhipment of Australian cargoes.
Table C.15 Share of total liner export tonnage transhipped by region of
transhipment, 1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
Excluding cargo transhipped within the region of destination
Country/region of transhipment 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
Africa 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.25
Latin America 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.03
East Asia 0.16 0.30 0.10 0.27 0.26
India 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04
Europe 0.22 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.10
Japan & North Asia 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.28
Middle East Gulf 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
New Zealand 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
No Trade Areaa 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23
North America 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.15
Papua New Guinea & Pacific Islands 0.47 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 0.25 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
South-East Asia 0.13 0.29 0.89 1.29 1.82
Total 2.53 1.00 1.36 2.14 2.98
a Trade area unspecified.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Table C.16 Share of total liner import tonnage transhipped by region of
transhipment, 1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
Excluding cargo transhipped within the region of origin
Country/region of transhipment 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
Africa 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.08
Latin America 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05
East Asia 0.29 0.12 0.09 0.41 0.36
India 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Europe 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.30 0.42
Japan & North Asia 0.15 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.19
Middle East Gulf 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
New Zealand 0.28 0.28 0.16 0.21 0.27
No Trade Areaa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
North America 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.23
Papua New Guinea & Pacific Islands 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.09
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
South-East Asia 0.70 0.80 1.02 1.27 1.59
Total 2.27 2.40 2.33 2.98 3.32
a Trade area unspecified.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).C.14 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
Table C.17 Share of total liner export tonnage transhipped by region of
transhipment, 1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
Including cargo transhipped within the region of destination
Country/region of transhipment 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
Africa 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.22 0.34
Latin America 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.26 0.06
East Asia 0.29 0.60 0.44 1.31 1.01
India 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08
Europe 3.08 2.64 2.27 1.85 1.67
Japan & North Asia 0.85 0.23 0.30 0.21 0.32
Middle East Gulf 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.10
New Zealand 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
No Trade Areaa 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23
North America 0.23 0.64 0.87 0.49 0.62
Papua New Guinea & Pacific Islands 0.70 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.05
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 0.25 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01
South-East Asia 0.79 1.46 2.45 3.40 3.43
Total 7.51 6.11 6.83 8.00 7.94
a Trade area unspecified.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Table C.18 Share of total liner import tonnage transhipped by region of
transhipment, 1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
Including cargo transhipped within the region of origin
Country/region of transhipment 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
Africa 0.21 0.18 0.09 0.21 0.14
Latin America 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.15
East Asia 2.45 2.70 2.06 4.34 3.77
India 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
Europe 12.85 8.81 9.96 8.25 8.96
Japan & North Asia 0.18 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.21
Middle East Gulf 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06
New Zealand 0.28 0.28 0.16 0.21 0.27
No Trade Areaa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
North America 0.94 1.37 1.46 1.51 1.56
Papua New Guinea & Pacific Islands 0.07 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.10
Red Sea & Mediterranean Middle East 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
South-East Asia 3.32 3.99 4.44 3.82 3.41
Total 20.45 17.98 18.64 18.89 18.66
a Trade area unspecified.




Landbridging of cargoes usually occurs when there is insufficient cargo to make it
worthwhile for a vessel to stop at the nearest available port to pick up or drop off the
cargo. Cargo is therefore transported by rail or road to or from the nearest port at
which the vessel stops. Landbridging data presented in this appendix assume
landbridging occurs when the port of loading or unloading is in a different state to
the state of origin or destination.
Table C.19 Share of liner export tonnage landbridged by state of origin,
1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
State of origin 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
ACT 100 100 100 100 100
New South Wales 11 20 21 19 19
Northern Territory 6 22 93 17 5
Queensland 9 10 10 12 11
South Australia 29 33 34 43 32
T a s m a n i a 2 82 42 32 1 2 8
Victoria 11 4 4 4 6
Western Australia 2 5 3 3 3
T o t a l 1 21 41 31 4 1 3
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Table C.20 Share of liner import tonnage landbridged by state of
destination, 1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
State of destination 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
ACT 100 100 100 100 100
New South Wales 0 0 0 0 1
Northern Territory 9 18 2 1 1
Queensland 19 13 11 13 13
South Australia 39 38 37 38 29
Tasmania 27 21 20 9 15
V i c t o r i a 0000 1
Western Australia 3 3 1 1 2
Total 5 4 4 4 5
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).C.16 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
Table C.21 Share of liner export tonnage landbridged by state of loading,
1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
State of loading 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
New South Wales 31 19 19 18 17
Northern Territory 0 0 0 0 0
Queensland 11 14 13 11 16
South Australia 2 5 2 2 6
Tasmania 0 1 1 1 1
Victoria 54 61 63 65 59
Western Australia 1 1 2 2 3
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Table C.22 Share of liner import tonnage landbridged by state of
unloading, 1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)
State of unloading 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
New South Wales 45 35 40 46 42
Northern Territory 0 0 0 0 0
Queensland 1 1 1 3 3
South Australia 0 1 0 0 6
Tasmania 0 0 0 0 0
Victoria 51 61 47 39 39
Western Australia 2 2 12 12 9
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).AUSTRALIA’S SEA-
FREIGHT TASK
C.17
Table C.23 List of countries comprising trade regionsa
Trade region Countries
Africa Algeria, Angola, Benin, British Indian Ocean Territory, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Comoros, Congo Republic, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Reunion, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa,
St Helena, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Western Sahara, Zaire
Central America &
Caribbean
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
French Antilles, French Guiana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, St Lucia,
Surinam, Trinidad & Tobago, Turks & Caicos Islands, United States Virgin
Islands, Venezuela, Virgin Islands (Br)
East Asia China, Hong Kong, Macao, Philippines, Taiwan
East India Bangladesh, India, Myanmar
Europe – Atlantic Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, United Kingdom
Europe – Baltic Finland, Germany, Poland, Sweden
Europe –
Mediterranean
Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Gibraltar, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta,
Romania, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia
Japan & North Asia Japan, Korea, North Korea, Russia




Canada, Mexico, St Pierre & Miquelon, United States Of America
North America –
West Coast
Johnston & Sand Island, Midway Islands
Pacific Islands &
Other
Aust Antarctic Terr, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, French Sth Antarct
Terr Guam, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Norfolk Island, Pitcairn
Island, Ross Dependency, Samoa (American), Tokelau, Tonga, Trust Territory
Pac Isld, Tuvalu, U.S. Misc Pacific Islands, Vanuatu, Wake Island, Wallis &








Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, Yemen,
Yemen Arab Republic
South America Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, Peru, Uruguay
South-East Asia Brunei, Christmas Island, Cocos Islands, Indonesia, Kampuchea, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand
West India Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
a These are the countries comprising each trade region as specified by the ABS in its trade statistics data
collection.






D Evaluation of liner shipping services
to Australia
This appendix presents data useful in evaluating liner shipping services to Australia.
Indicators of the service provided by conference and non-conference lines —
including ports of call (foreign and Australian), frequency of services, capacity on
routes and transit times — are presented in section  D.1. Available information
relating to freight rates for liner shipping services is presented in section D.2.
Data presented in this appendix are indicative data only. The Australian liner
shipping market is continually changing. Therefore the data presented in this
appendix may not be precise, but nevertheless give an indication of the current level




Capacity and frequency on major liner trades
Europe
Table D.1 Estimated conference and non-conference liner capacity on
Europe trade, 1993 (TEU)a






Reefer Dry (voyages/mth) Reefer Dry
Non-conference direct:
ABC Container Line 1 942 6 478 5 1 388 1 296
Baltic Shipping Company 600 5 774 8 2 150 1 444
CGMc 450 7 412 5 1 90 1 482
Contship-Eagle 580 11 569 10 4 232 4 628
MSCd na 2 567 6 2 na 1 711
Zim Linee 225 5 974 6 2 75 1 991
Total non-conference direct 3 797 39 774 40 12 935 12 552
Non-conference transhipment:
OOCL 205 2 627 3 2.2 150 1 926
MISC 450 3 150 3 3.0 450 3 150
Hanjinc 170 2 288 3 2.0 113 1 525
NOL 250 2 054 2 3.5 438 3 595
Total non-conference
transhipmentf
1 075 10 119 11 10.7 1 151 10 196
Total non-conference 4 872 49 893 51 22.7 2 086 22 748
Conference:
AESC - ANZECS Eastabout 8 525 10 328 8 3 3 197 3 873
           - ANZECS Westabout 2 000 5 688 5 4 1 600 4 550
           - Wilhelmsenc 1 200 16 713 9 2 267 3 714
Total conference 11 725 32 729 22 9 5 064 12 137
Total trade 16 597 82 622 73 32 7 150 34 885
a Vessel capacities are optimum capacities and do not take into account deadweight limitations and the fact
that some of this capacity may be used for cargo from other countries. b Approximate. c Reefer capacity of
one ship is unknown therefore total capacity of that ship is assumed to be dry. d Reefer capacity unknown.
Total capacity of only three ships is known therefore average monthly capacity is calculated for these three
ships only. e Reefer capacity for two ships is unknown therefore total capacity of those ships is assumed to
be dry. f This is the total capacity of transhipment vessels. Only a proportion of this capacity will be available
to cargo on the Australia–Europe trade. na Data not available.




Table D.2 Estimated conference and non-conference liner capacity on
Europe trade, 1998 (TEU)a






Reefer Dry (voyages/mth) Reefer Dry
Non-conference direct:
MSC 3 600 20 400 12 4 1 200 6 800
Total non-conference direct 3 600 20 400 12 4 1 200 6 800
Non-conference transhipment:
ASA 1 376 6 639 8 8 1 376 6 639
AAA 1 720 7 160 8 8 1 720 7 160
AAX 1 200 8 244 5 4 960 6 595
Maersk (WA service) 300 300 2 4 600 600
Maersk (East Coast service) 1 500 5 000 5 4 1 200 4 000
K Line (WA service) 500 5 308 5 4 400 4 246
Total non-conference
transhipmentd
6 596 32 651 33 32 6 256 29 241
Total non-conference 10 196 53 051 45 36 7 456 36 041
Conference:
AELA – Contship-Eagle 2 200 14 612 6 2 733 4 871
- Wilhelmsen 1 400 18 013 9 2 311 4 003
- P&O Nedlloyd -
Mediterranean
1 750 8 280 5 2 700 3 312
- OSCL/CGM/Marfret 2 400 15 200 8 3 900 5 700
  - P&O Nedlloyd -
Eastabout
6 432 7 371 6 2 2 144 2 457
Total conference 14 182 63 476 34 11 4 788 20 343
Total trade 24 378 116 527 79 47 12 244 56 383
a Vessel capacities are optimum capacities and do not take into account deadweight limitations and the fact
that some of this capacity may be used for cargo from other countries. b Approximate. c Queensland service.
d This is the total capacity of transhipment vessels. Only a proportion of this capacity will be available to
cargo on the Australia–Europe trade.




Table D.3 Estimated conference and non-conference liner capacity on
North-East Asia trade, 1993 (TEU)






Reefer Dry (voyages/mth) Reefer Dry
Non-conference direct:
Bridge Line/EAC (East Coast) 900 1 900 3 2 600 1 267
EAC (West Coast) 516 140 2 2 516 140
Contship 580 11 569 10 4 232 4 628
COSCO (to East Asia) 141 3 031 3 3.5 165 3 536
COSCO (to Japan)b 350 2 296 4 3.5 306 2 009
FESCO 360 3 888 6 3 180 1 944
Southern Cross Linec na 2 200 4 1.5 na  825
Wilhelmsen 1 200 16 713 9 2 267 3 714
Zim 225 5 974 6 2 75 1991
Total non-conference direct 4 272 47 711 47 23.5 2 340 20 054
Non-conference transhipment:
Hanjin 170 2 188 3 2 113 1 459
MISC 800 6 256 3 3 800 6 256
Total non-conference
transhipmentd
970 8 444 6 5 913 7 715
Total non-conference 5 242 56 155 53 28.5 3 254 27 768
Conference:
ANSCON
     - Consortium 4 834 12 040 8 5.5 3 323 8 278
     - OOCL 205 2 627 3 2.2 150 1 926
     - WA service 335 2 149 3 2.5 279 1 791
Total conference 5 374 16 816 14 10.2 3 753 11 995
Total trade 10 616 72 971 67 39 7 007 39 763
a  Approximate. b Reefer capacity for one ship is not available therefore assume total capacity for that ship is
dry. c Reefer capacity not available therefore assume total capacity is dry. d This is the total capacity of
transhipment vessels. Only a proportion of this capacity will be available for cargo on the Australia–
North-East Asia trade. na Data not available.




Table D.4 Estimated conference and non-conference liner capacity on
North-East Asia trade, 1998 (TEU)a






Reefer Dry (voyages/mth) Reefer Dry
Non-conference direct:
Contshipc na 25 612 10 2 na 5 122
COSCO (to East Asia) 162 3 798 3 4 216 5 064
COSCO (to Japan/Korea) 460 4 118 5 4 368 3 294
FESCO 320 4 746 4 4 320 4 746
Maersk/Blue Star/Cho Yang
(East Coast)
1 500 6 000 5 4 1 200 4 800
Maersk (West Coast) 350 1 450 3 4 467 1 933
MSCd 410 5 258 4 4 410 5 258
Wilhelmsend 1 200 18 213 9 3 400 6 071
Total non-conference direct 4 402 69 195 43 29 3 381 36 289
Non-conference transhipment:
Evergreen/Hanjine 845 7 346 7 6 724 6 297
MISC 2 960 14 099 15 6 1 184 5 640
Total non-conference
transhipmentf
3 805 21 445 22 12 1 908 11 936
Total non-conference 8 207 90 640 65 41 5 289 48 225
Conference:
ANSCON
     - Japan/Korea 3 768 9 206 6 4.3 2 700 6 598
     - East Asia 1 063 9 737 5 4.3 914 8 374
     - WA service 834 4 974 5 4.3 717 4 277
Total conference 5 665 23 917 16 13.2 4 332 19 249
Total trade 13 872 114 557 81 54 9 621 67 474
a   In 1993 ANSCON served both North and East Asia, but in 1996 the two trades were separated into
dedicated East Asia and Japan/Korea trades. b Approximate.  c  Contship changed from a direct to a
transhipment service in 1998. Reefer capacity is not available therefore assume total capacity is dry. d Reefer
capacity is not available for one ship therefore assume total capacity of that ship is dry. e Reefer capacity is
not available for two ships therefore assume total capacity of those ships is dry. f This is the total capacity of
transhipment vessels. Only a proportion of this capacity will be available for cargo on the Australia–
North-East Asia trade. na Data not available.
Sources: Liner Shipping Services Ltd (sub.  10, att.  C, pp.  25–27); Liner Shipping Services (pers. comm.,




Table D.5 Estimated conference and non-conference liner capacity on
South-East Asia trade, 1993 (TEU)a






Reefer Dry (voyages/mth) Reefer Dry
NYK/Hanjin/LT/RCL 570 2 334 4 varies na na
COSCO 42 1 430 2 2 42 1 430
CGM 600 7 267 5 1 120 1 453
Contship-Eagle 580 11 569 10 4 232 4 628
Wilhelmsend na 18 304 9 2 na 4 068
Zim 225 5 974 6 2 75 1 991
Southern Cross Line na 2 200 4 1.5 na 825
EAC Lines (West Coast) 260 660 2 2 260 660
Stateships of WA (West Coast) 60 240 2 2.5 75 300
Total non-conference 2 337 49 978 44 17 804 15 355
Conference:
     - ANL (ANRO Consortium) 300 1 088 1 3.5 1 050 3 808
     - ASCL (ANRO Consortium) 404 1 521 2 3.5 707
     - NOL (ANRO Consortium) 500 1 686 2 3.5 875 2 951
     - DJL (ANRO Consortium) 250 2 054 2 3.5 438 3 595
     - MISC 450 3 150 3 3 450 3 150
     - NLL 140 1 320 1 2 280 2 640
Total conference 2 044 10 819 11 19 3 800 16 144
Total trade 4 381 60 797 55 36 4 604 31 499
a  This is the total capacity of vessels in the Australia–South-East Asia trade. As a significant volume of
Australian cargo to other trade areas is transhipped in South-East Asia, not all of this capacity will be
dedicated to the Australia–South-East Asia trade. b  Approximate.  c  Non-conference average monthly
capacity is underestimated as NYK/Hanjin/LT/RCL are not included in calculation. d Reefer capacity is not
available therefore total capacity is shown as dry.




Table D.6 Estimated conference and non-conference liner capacity on
South-East Asia trade, 1998 (TEU)a






Reefer Dry (voyages/mth) Reefer Dry
PIL/MISCc 700 3 186 4 2 350 1 590
OSCL/CGM/Marfret 2 400 15 200 8 3 900 5 700
Contship-Eagle 2 200 14 612 6 2 730 4 870
Wilhelmsen 1 400 18 013 9 2 310 4 000
P&O Nedlloyd -
Mediterranean
1 750 8 280 5 2 700 3 310
Total non-conference 8 450 59 291 32 11 2 990 19 470
Conference:
ASA Consortium 1 376 6 639 8 8 1 376 6 639
AAA Consortium 1 720 7 160 8 8 1 720 7 160
AAX Consortium 1 200 8 244 5 4 960 6 595
Maersk (WA service) 300 300 2 4 600 600
K Line (WA service) 500 5 308 5 4 400 4 246
Total conference 5 096 27 651 28 28 5 056 25 240
Total trade 13 546 86 942 60 39 8 046 44 710
a  The conference operating in this route in 1993 was replaced by a discussion agreement in 1997.
Membership of the discussion agreement is significantly different to the conference. This is the total capacity
of vessels in the Australia–South-East Asia trade. As a significant volume of Australian cargo to other trade
areas is transhipped in South-East Asia, not all of this capacity will be dedicated to the Australia–South-East
Asia trade. b Approximate. c Servicing Brisbane only.




Table D.7 Estimated conference and non-conference liner capacity on
North America trade, 1993 (TEU)






Reefer Dry (voyages/mth) Reefer Dry
Non-conference direct:
Wilhelmsen na na na 2.7 na na
MSC na na na 2.8 na na
Nedlloyd (IMT) na na na 1.1 na na
ABC na na na 1.7 na na
CGM na na na 2.0 na na
SPI na na na 1.2 na na
Cool Carriers na na na irregular na na
Total non-conference direct na na na 11.5 na na
Non-conference transhipment:
NYK na na na na na na
MISC na na na na na na
COSCO na na na 2.8 na na
Total non-conference
transhipment
na na na na na na
Total non-conference na na na na na na
Conference:
ANZDL 1 340 3 260 4 2.5 838 2 038
Blue Star Line (US W.Coast) 1 300 1 224 2 1.3 845 796
Blue Star Line (US E.Coast) 2 720 2 642 4 1.7 1 156 1 123
Columbus Line (US W.Coast) 1 470 744 3 1.9 931 471
Columbus Line (US E.Coast) 2 066 2 075 3 1.7 1 171 1 176
Total conference 8 896 9 945 16 9 4 941 5 604
Total trade na na na na na na
a Approximate. na Data not available.




Table D.8 Estimated conference and non-conference liner capacity on
North America trade, 1999 (TEU)






Reefer Dry (voyages/mth) Reefer Dry
Non-conference directb:
C&S Shipping na na 3 1.4 na na
FESCO 980 8 784 8 4.3 527 4 721
Wilhelmsen 150 2 250 3 1 50 750
BHP/IMTLc 84 1 322 2 1 42 661
Total non-conference direct 1 214 12 356 16 7.7 619 6 132
Non-conference transhipment:
Maersk 1 500 6 000 5 4 1 200 4 800
MSC 3 600 20 400 12 4 1 200 6 800
Total non-conference
transhipment d
 5 100 26 400 17 8 2 400 11 600
Total non-conference 6 314 38 756 33 15.7 3 019 17 732
Conference:
ANZDL (US W.Coast) 1 858 6 501 7 3.75 995 3 483
Blue Star/Columbus
(US W.Coast)
2 975 7 400 8 4.3 1 594 3 964
Blue Star /Columbus
(US E.Coast)
6 334 6 220 10 4.3 2 715 2 665
Total conference 11 167 20 121 25 12.3 5 304 10 112
Total trade 17 481 58 877 58 28 8 323 27 844
a Approximate.  b  CMA/CGM/Contship also operate a southbound service only from east coast North
America.  c BHP operate a breakbulk service primarily to ship BHP steel products. Only a small volume of
cargo is carried in containers. d This is the total capacity of transhipment vessels. Only a proportion of this
capacity will be available to cargo on the Australia–North America trade. na Data not available.
Source: DTRS Liner Service Sheets.D.10 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
Australian ports of call
Table D.9 Australian ports of call, 1999 (northbound)
Trade Conference/line Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Fremantle Adelaide Other
Europe AELA ·· · · · Burnie
MSC ·· · ·
ASA ·· · ·
AAA ·· · · · Burnie/
Bell Baya
AAX ·· · · · Hobart
Maersk ·· ·
North-East Asia ANSCON ·· · ·
COSCO ·· ·
FESCO ·· · ·




MSCb ·· · ·
Wilhelmsen ·· · · Newcastle
MISC ··
Hanjinc ·· · ·
K Line ·
South-East Asia ASA ·· · ·
AAA ·· · · · Burnie/
Bell Baya
AAX ·· · · · Hobart
Maerskd ·· · ·
K Line ·




Wilhelmsen ·· · · Newcastle







North America AUSCLA ·· · ·
MSC/Safbank ·· · · ·
FESCO ·· · ·
COSCO ·· · ·
Wilhelmsen ·· · · ·
Sea-Land ·· ·
a Burnie and Bell Bay are serviced alternately. b After May 1999, MSC will only service Sydney, Melbourne
and Brisbane. c Brisbane and Adelaide serviced alternately. d Fremantle is on a separate service.
Sources: Crichton (1998, pp. 57–63); Liner Shipping Services Ltd (sub. 10, att. C); Daily Commercial News,




Table D.10 Australian ports of call, 1999 (southbound)
Trade Conference/line Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Fremantle Adelaide Other
Europe AELA ····· Newcastle
MSC ·····
ASA ····


















South-East Asia ASA ····























a After May 1999 MSC will only service Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. b Burnie and Bell Bay are serviced
alternately.
Sources: Crichton (1998, pp. 57–63); Liner Shipping Services Ltd (sub. 10, att. C); Daily Commercial News,
24 May 1999; DTRS Liner Service Sheets.D.12 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
Table D.11 Liner arrivals at principal Australian ports by type of vessel,
1997-98
First and all ports of call
Port region Container Conventional Ro-Ro Total
All arrivals
Sydney 1 214 88 285 1 587
Melbourne 1 200 67 264 1 531
Brisbane 733 105 276 1 114
Fremantle 633 67 93 793
Adelaide 289 23 114 426
First port arrivals
Sydney 464 25 32 521
Melbourne 398 20 4 422
Fremantle 346 30 3 379
Brisbane 262 60 1 323
Adelaide na na na na
na Data not available.




Foreign ports of call and transit times
Europe
Table D.12 Foreign ports of call and transit times on Australia to Europe
trade, 1993
Port of Transit time (days)a









La Spezia 22 42
Genoa 21 30 57










Rotterdam 30 45 34





Felixstowe 47 27 45 35
a Transit times are based on last Australian loading port to discharge port. b Eastabout/Westabout transit
times.
Source: Liner Shipping Services Ltd (sub. 10, att. C, p. 15).D.14 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
Table D.13 Foreign ports of call and transit times on Australia to Europe
trade, 1999
Port of Transit time (days)a
Call AELA MSC ASA AAAb AAXc Maersk
(East Coast)




La Spezia 22 39
Marseilles 29 40
Fos-sur-Mer 25 48








Hamburg 33 36 31 · 48
Bremerhaven 30 37 · 40
Gothenburg 31 40 42
Southampton 22 · 40
Rotterdam 35 33 29 ··
Dunkirk 36
Antwerp 29 32 · 42
Le Havre 30 40 27 · 42





a Transit times are based on last Australian loading port to discharge port. b Ports of call and transit times
are not available for AAA. c Transit times are not available for AAX. · Indicates port of call.





Table D.14 Foreign ports of call and transit times on Australia to
North-East Asia trade, 1993





































































Yokahama 14 13 17 26 39 16
Yokkaichi 16
Nagoya 16 25
Osaka/Kobe 18 14 19 24 36 18
B u s a n 2 11 6 3 42 0
Manila 32/22 14 17 24
Keelung 23/18 32 23 17 25
Kaohsiung 26/16 24 23
Hong Kong 26/20 17 20 30 26 19 22 22
a Two conference services operate to East Asian ports.
Source: Liner Shipping Services Ltd (sub. 10, att. C, p. 24).D.16 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
Table D.15 Foreign ports of call and transit times on Australia to
North-East Asia trade, 1999






































































Yokahama – / 1 4 / –1 4 1 21 3 2 82 2 2 7
Yokkaichi –/16/–
Nagoya –/16/– 16c 26
Osaka/Kobe –/18/12 17 14 15 24 20 25
Busan –/20/14 19 16 17 18
Manila 14 15 14 23 17
Keelung 14/–/20 23b 14c 26
Kaohsiung 17/–/– 24b 20 23
Hong Kong 19/–/– 17 19 17 22 22 21 18 17
Shekou –/20/–
Dalian –/–/16 31d 18c 23c 30
Hakata –/–/18 24 16 30c 39
Quindao 28d 26 20c 23 21
















a ANSCON operates three service rotations: East Asia; Japan/Korea; and North China. b Transhipment via
Hong Kong. c Transit time from Fremantle. d Transhipment via Shanghai. · Indicates port of call.





Table D.16 Foreign ports of call and transit times on Australia to
South-East Asia trade, 1993


























































































Jakarta 9-13 22 19-21 14-15 15-16 28
Singapore 12-16 15 11-13 16-17 24 30-32 16-24 18
Port Kelang 13-17 16 14-16 25-27 17
Penang 15-19 19 14-16 27
Bangkok 16-20 18-19 15-17 28 21-29 22
a Where a range is given, transit time depends on routing of vessels through various ports. b Members of
conference. c Transhipment via Taiwan/Hong Kong. d Transhipment via Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong.
Source: Liner Shipping Services Ltd (sub. 10, att. C, p. 38).
Table D.17 Foreign ports of call and transit times on Australia to
South-East Asia trade, 1999





























































































































Jakartae 14 20 11 4 27 7 31 14
Singapore 12 13 14 6 6 25 10 11 28 7 16
Port Kelang 14 12 15 7 26 16 26 17
Penangf 14 17 8 28
Bangkokf 16 19 11 28 22 18 18g
Madras 22 26
Calcutta 20 24 26
Chittagong 30 23
Colombo 20 21 14
Ho Chi Minh 20 21
Surabaya 15 21 11 20 12
Mumbai 24 28
a Member of Trade Facilitation Group. b Transit time from Newcastle. c Transit time from Darwin. d Transit
time from Brisbane. e  Some lines/consortia serve Jakarta by feeder vessel via Singapore. f Penang  and
Bangkok are served by feeder vessels from Singapore. g Transhipment via Hong Kong.




Table D.18 Foreign ports of call and transit times on Australia to North
America trade, 1993
Port of Transit timea (days)












San Francisco 22 35 30
Los Angeles 24 46 37 32 26/35
Honolulu 15 17
a Transit times are based on last Australian loading port to discharge port. b Irregular service to Pt Hueneme
CA via NSW Australia/SE Australia.




Table D.19 Foreign ports of call and transit times on Australia to North
America trade, 1999
Port of Transit timea (days)
Call AUSCLA MSC/
Safbank
FESCO COSCO Sea-Landb Wilhelmsen
Philadelphia 30 41 30





Norfolk 33 33 37
Charleston 23 43 22
New York 29 38 27 29
Houston 28 31
Seattle 26 22 25
San Francisco
/Oakland
20 28 27 22
Los Angeles
/Long Beach




New Orleans 30 30
Portland 30 24c 29
Toronto 28 27
Vancouver 27 25c 32
Montreal 27 26
a Transit times are based on last Australian loading port to discharge port. b Transhipment via Yokohama.
c Transhipment service.












1989 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1990 91.0 107.2 94.9 97.2 101.9 91.0
1991 80.9 102.6 97.3 88.9 89.3 78.0
1992 79.8 101.0 91.2 77.0 72.8 73.0
1993 82.0 112.2 91.5 75.0 64.1 68.0
1994 76.4 103.1 98.7 78.7 53.4 62.0
1995 74.3 100.7 102.7 81.4 53.4 69.3
1996 78.8 97.9 93.3 82.3 52.2 63.8
1997 74.0 76.2 89.9 81.4 40.2 59.0
1998 70.7 53.7 78.7 72.6 26.8 58.0
a Each trade is indexed separately. Northbound indices are based on estimates of actual terminal-to-terminal
rates in Australian dollars, averaged over all reefer and dry cargoes. Southbound indices are based on
estimates of actual terminal-to-terminal rates in US dollars, averaged over all reefer and dry cargoes.
Source: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, p. 12).
Table D.21 Indices of freight rates paid by BHP for exports to Asian
destinations, 1995–1998a
Date Singapore Bangkok East
Malaysia
Hong Kong Taiwan Japan
1995 100 100 100 100 100 100
1997 85 84 100 89 98 94
June 1998 60 58 68 83 90 76
December 1998 48 45 63 75 71 72
a Each destination is indexed separately.




Table D.22 Indices of freight rates in Australia–North America northbound
trade, 1993–1999a
Cargo Date US West Coast US East Coast














Freight all kinds 1/12/1993 100.0 100.0















a Each type of cargo is indexed separately.
Source: Liner Shipping Services (pers. comm., 17 August 1998).D.22 INTERNATIONAL
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Table D.23 Index of freight rates for wool in Australia–North America
northbound trade, 1993–1997a
Twenty and forty foot container rates
Date 20 foot container Date 40 foot container
1/12/1993 100.0 1/12/1993 100.0
9/5/1994 87.3 9/5/1994 94.2
22/11/1994 81.5 22/11/1994 94.2
17/1/1995 71.9 7/4/1995 67.5
16/11/1995 70.8 10/7/1995 62.1
28/6/1996 82.0 2/12/1995 61.0
19/7/1996 76.4 19/7/1996 66.0
11/4/1997 59.3 11/4/1997 51.6
25/6/1997 50.3 25/6/1997 42.6
16/2/1998 55.5 16/2/1998 47.9
a Each container size is indexed separately.
Source: Liner Shipping Services (pers. comm., 17 August 1998).CONTAINER SHIPPING
COST MODEL
E.1
E Container shipping cost model
As part of its investigation of container shipping costs and revenues, the
Commission developed an illustrative container shipping cost model. The model
estimates the streams of costs and revenues for the period 1990–99 for a
hypothetical ship assumed to operate in the Australia–South-East Asia trade. An
overview is provided in this appendix. Further details are available on request.
The vessel is assumed to have been delivered in early 1990 at a cost of
US$30  million (A$44.4  million). The capacity of the vessel is assumed to be
1500  TEU (1200  TEU dry, 300  TEU reefer). The base case calculation assumes
75  per  cent capacity utilisation northbound and southbound. The Commission’s
calculations assume that the vessel benefits from Australian port reform, completing
10 round voyages per year in 1999 compared with 8.75 voyages in 1990.
As noted in chapter 6, the model incorporates a return to capital in the sense of loan
repayments for the purchase of the ship (at a risk-free rate of interest), but the cost
estimates do not include any return for entrepreneurship and risk-taking.
Capital costs
Vessel costs
The economic life of the vessel is assumed to be 20 years. Monthly payments were
calculated, assuming that 100 per cent of the purchase price (A$44.4 million) was
borrowed, repayable over a twenty year period (240  equal payments). The
calculations assume a residual value of 10  per  cent of the purchase price and a
6 per cent rate of interest.
Container costs
The calculations assume that 3600 dry and 900 reefer containers were purchased in
1990, at a price of A$3700  per  dry and A$14  100  per reefer container. Monthly
payments were calculated, assuming that 100 per cent of the purchase price was
borrowed. The containers were assumed to have an economic life of 12 years and toE.2 INTERNATIONAL
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have no residual value at the end of that period. The calculations assume a
6 per cent rate of interest.
Operating costs
Manning costs
The vessel is assumed to have a crew of 16. Estimates of manning costs are derived
from Drewry Shipping Consultants (1999).
Insurance costs
Estimates include both Hull and Machinery (H&M) and Protection and Indemnity
(P&I) insurance. H&M insurance normally is in the range 0.25–0.3  per  cent of
vessel purchase price, and P&I insurance in the range 0.29–0.3 per cent of vessel
purchase price. Therefore, a total insurance cost of 0.6 per cent of vessel purchase
price was assumed in this model.
Repair and maintenance costs
The base (1990 = 100) Repair and Maintenance (R&M) cost for a 1500 TEU vessel
was assumed to be A$400 000 per year. As R&M costs have fallen in the 1990s, the
base figure was adjusted using an index of R&M costs derived from table 6.6 in
Drewry Shipping Consultants (1999).
Other operating costs
This category includes several diverse elements, primarily stores and supplies and
administration. The cost of stores and supplies was estimated using a base
(1994  =  100) estimate of A$240  000. Since the cost of stores and supplies has
tended to escalate in the 1990s, the base figure was adjusted using an index of stores
and supplies costs derived from table 7.1 in Drewry Shipping Consultants (1999).
Administration costs, which vary widely across shipping companies, were assumed





The vessel is assumed to consume 50 tonnes per day of fuel oil and 2 tonnes per day
of marine diesel whilst at sea, and 2 tonnes per day of both fuel oil and marine
diesel while in port. Since the vessel is employed on the Australia–South-East Asia
trade, it is assumed to purchase all its bunkers in the cheapest bunkering port en
route, namely Singapore. The price of fuel oil and marine diesel at Singapore was
obtained from the Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News (and its predecessor Daily
Commercial News), Lloyd’s Shipping Manager, Fairplay, Containerisation
International, as well as price lists issued by oil companies.
Port costs
Base (1996) port charges for Melbourne, Sydney and Fremantle were obtained from
Bureau of Transport and Communication Economics (BTCE), Waterline,
12 September 1997. Base year data were indexed using the national Port Interface
Cost Index published in BTCE, Waterline, 12 September 1997, table 6. Port costs in
Asia (Singapore and Port Kelang) were based on published schedules of port
charges and information from Lloyd’s Maritime Asia.
Cargo handling (stevedoring) costs
Australian stevedoring costs were estimated using data published in Prices
Surveillance Authority, Monitoring of Stevedoring Costs and Charges (various
issues, 1992–95). Stevedoring charges for individual Australian ports are also
published in BTCE, Waterline (various issues). Stevedoring charges in Singapore
and Port Kelang were based on estimates in Bureau of Transport and
Communication Economics, Australian Shipping and the Balance of Payments,
1990.
Revenue
As noted previously, the estimates relate to a 1500 TEU vessel (with capacity for
1200 dry and 300 reefer containers). The vessel is assumed to complete 8.75 round
voyages in 1990, with the number of round voyages increasing over time to
10 voyages in 1999. The calculations assume that reefer cargo is carried northbound
but not southbound (reefer slots are assumed to be available for non-refrigerated
cargo on the southbound voyage).E.4 INTERNATIONAL
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Freight rates are assumed to vary over time in accordance with evidence given to
the Commission by Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, p. 12) and reports of freight
rates in Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News, its predecessor Daily Commercial
News, and Containerisation International (various issues).
The revenue stream, calculated on both a voyage and an annual basis, is compared
with the stream of voyage and annual costs (see chapter  6, figure  6.1). The
sensitivity of the results to changes in interest rates, capital costs, and load factors
were also examined.FOREIGN SHIPPING
LEGISLATION
F.1
F Foreign shipping legislation
Key features of current shipping legislation in Canada, the United States, the
European Community and New Zealand are set out in this appendix.




Act 1987 exempts certain shipping
conference practices from the
provisions of Canada’s antitrust
legislation (the Competition Act).
The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of
1998, which supersedes the
Shipping Act of 1984, confers
exemption from antitrust laws to
conference agreements and




None stated (1) to establish a non-
discriminatory regulatory
process for the common
carriage of goods by water in
the foreign commerce of the
United States with a minimum
of government intervention and
regulatory costs;
(2) to provide an efficient and
economic transportation
system in the ocean commerce
of the United States that is …
in harmony with …
international shipping
practices;
(3)  to encourage the development
of an economically sound and
efficient US flag liner fleet
capable of meeting national
security needs; and
(Continued next page)F.2 INTERNATIONAL
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Key Features Canada United States
(4) to promote the growth and
development of US exports
through competitive and
efficient ocean transportation
and by placing a greater
reliance on the marketplace.
3 Scope of
jurisdiction






Exempt, including consortia that
are members of conferences.
Conference agreements must
establish terms and conditions
respecting the use of service
contracts by members of a
conference.
Exempt — the scope is set out in






Exempt — conferences must
meet with shippers upon request,
in writing, by any designated
shipper group. Information
‘sufficient for the satisfactory
conduct of the meeting’ must be
provided to the shipper group by
the conference.
Conference agreements must
‘establish procedures for promptly




Exempt, although 100% loyalty
agreements are illegal —
agreements may not contain a
requirement for a shipper to offer
a conference all its goods for
transportation with that
conference. A loyalty agreement
may be terminated by either party
at any time after 90 days from the
day notice of intention to







Not exempt — conferences, or
groups of lines within a
conference, are prohibited from
drawing up contracts with inland
carriers that specify payments to
those carriers for inland
transportation of cargo. However,
an individual member line of a
conference may do so.
Exempt — under section 4 of the
Act which states ocean common
carriers may ‘discuss, fix or regulate
transportation rates, including
through rates, cargo space
accommodations and other
conditions of service’.
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Exempt — may be requested of a
















Upon request of a shipper group
(see above). The Minister of
Transport may designate any
organisation or association of
shippers as representing the
interests of shippers.
Necessary — conference
agreements must provide for a
consultation process designed to
promote commercial resolution of
disputes and cooperation with







No provisions No provisions
5.2.1 Minimum levels
of service




No provisions No provisions
6 Misuse  of
market power
sanction
The exemption from the
application of the Competition Act
does not apply in respect of a
conference (or inter-conference)
agreement if any party to the
agreement attempts to: use a
vessel to prevent or lessen
competition from a carrier that is
not a party to the agreement;
refuse to transport goods for a
shipper because that shipper had
used a carrier that is not a party to
the agreement; or prevent or limit
the use by a carrier of port or
other facilities or related services
because that carrier is not a party
to the agreement.
The Act defines certain ‘concerted
actions’ that are prohibited,
including engaging ‘in any
predatory practice designed to
eliminate the participation, or deny
the entry, in a particular trade of a
common carrier not a member of
the conference, a group of common
carriers, an ocean tramp or a bulk
carrier’. ‘No common carrier, either
alone or in conjunction with any
other person, directly or indirectly,
may use a vessel or vessels in a
particular trade for the purpose of
excluding, preventing or reducing
competition, by driving another
ocean common carrier out of that
trade.’
(Continued next page)F.4 INTERNATIONAL
LINER CARGO
SHIPPING
Key Features Canada United States
7 Unfair pricing
sanction
The exemption from the
application of the Competition Act
does not apply to any member of
a conference who engages in or
who conspires, combines, agrees
or arranges with another person
to engage in predatory practices
(as described in paragraph
50(1)(c) of the Act).
Yes — under section 10b(4), no
common carrier may ‘engage in any
unfair or unjustly discriminatory









No provisions No specific provisions. However,
shipping between US ports is
restricted to US flag vessels under
section 27 of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1920 (commonly referred to








11.1 Public filing of
agreements
Required — every member of a
conference must file, not later
than the day on which the
agreement becomes effective, a
copy of every conference
agreement and interconference
agreement to which the member
is a party.
Required — under section 5.
11.2 Confidentiality Provided by the CTA upon filing of
service contracts. However,
member of a conference must
make available to the public for
inspection copies of all tariffs in
force filed by those members.
No, except for supplementary
information.
11.3 Filing of tariffs Required — every member of a
conference must file, not later
than the day on which the tariff
becomes effective, a copy of each
tariff established by the
conference. Every member of a
conference must give notice in
writing, to the CTA and affected
shippers, of a tariff increase at
least 30 days in advance of the
increase.
Required — under section 8c(2),
‘each [service] contract entered into
… by an individual ocean common
carrier or an agreement shall be
filed confidentially with the
Commission. Terms relating to: the
origin and destination of port
ranges; the commodity/ies involved;
the minimum volume or portion; and
the duration must be made
available to the general public. All
other terms, including tariff rates,
may remain confidential.
(Continued next page)FOREIGN SHIPPING
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11.4 Examination of
agreements
No provisions Yes — under section 6c, unless
rejected by the Federal Maritime
Commission, agreements become
effective on the 45th day after filing
or on the 30th day after notice of
the filing is published in the Federal




A Commissioner (of Competition
under the Competition Act) may
on his own initiative, and on
direction from the Minister of
Industry, carry out an inquiry
concerning the operations of any
conference and the effect of
conference practices on
competition. After an investigation
is complete, the CTA may make
an order requiring, for example,
relevant parties to remove the
offending feature of an agreement
or stop a certain practice. Fines
may be imposed upon non-
compliance.
Yes, including the power to make
orders relating to violations. Suit
may be brought in the US District








Yes — a complaint mechanism
exists whereby a person may file
a complaint with the CTA if it is
believed that a conference
agreement or action reduces
competition and results in an
unreasonable increase in price or
reduction in service.  The CTA





Key Features European Community New Zealand
1 Applicable
legislation
Treaty of Rome, with ‘maritime
transport package’ of regulations
passed 1986 (the key regulation
being EC Council Regulation
4056/86) and subsequent
additions (EC Council Regulation
479/92 and Commission
Regulation 870/95) detailing
application of the Treaty to this
industry.
Shipping Act 1987 — exempts
outward shipping from Parts II
(Restrictive Trade Practices) and IV








shipowners and to secure fair
competition on a commercial
basis in the trades to, from and
within the community, with due
respect for the interests of
shippers and ports’.
The purpose of key Regulation
4056/86 is to ensure competition
principles of the Treaty ‘can be
effectively applied to restrictive
agreements or concerted
practices and to abuses of a
dominant position for the aim of
leaving trades open and
protecting the interests of
transport users’.
(1) to promote and safeguard fair
competition in outward shipping
to the benefit of shippers and
carriers, having regard to New
Zealand’s ‘reliance on efficient,





(2) to safeguard against abuse of a
dominant position;
(3) to discourage anti-competitive
practices by carriers;
(4) to encourage reasonable notice
of impending changes to terms
and conditions;
(5) to encourage consultation and
negotiation between shippers
and carriers; and
(6) to recognise that commercial
relations between shippers and
carriers should be self-regulating
while there is satisfactory




Inward and outward Outward
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Exempt — there is a block
exemption from the prohibition of
agreements, decisions and
concerted practices restricting or
distorting competition (prohibited
under Article 85 of the Treaty) for
liner conferences in Regulation
4056/86 (scope set out in
Article 3) and for certain
categories of consortia in
Regulations 479/92 and 870/95.
Regulation 479/92 does not
exempt consortium price fixing.
Accords do not fall within the
conference definition.
Exempt, but collusive action leading
a carrier to refrain from tendering to










Exempt, subject to detailed
conditions relating to content and
consideration with shippers






Not exempt — according to the
interpretation made by the
Commission, Regulation 4056/86
applies to port-to-port operations,
whereas Regulation 1017/68
implementing competition rules to
inland transport applies to the
land leg of multimodal transport
that also includes a sea leg.
There are pending cases before
the EC Court of Justice and
Court of First Instance
concerning this issue.
Not exempt — agreements between
shipowners on common multimodal
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There is an obligation on ship
operators to consult with shippers
regarding general principles
applying to rates, conditions and
quality of services (Article 5 of
Regulation 4056).
Not specified — however,
negotiations may be required
formally to take place in the event of
a Ministerial direction following an
inquiry into a suspected unfair
practice that has or is likely to have
a detrimental effect on the interests


















Yes — Article 86 (abuse of a
dominant position) of the Treaty
of Rome applies. If the
Commission finds a breach of
Article 86 they may withdraw the
benefit of the block exemption
and take action to end the
breach.
Any ‘abuse of a dominant position’
may be investigated by the Minister
of Transport as a suspected unfair
practice under section 4.
7 Unfair pricing
sanction






Yes — Article 4 of Regulation
4056/86 makes the block
exemption conditional upon there
being no discrimination, unless
economically justified, that would
cause detriment to certain ports,
transport users or carriers.
No specific provision
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None, but Regulation 4058/86 is
directed to safeguarding free
access to cargoes by shipping
companies of Member States.
Yes — the Minister of Transport may
make regulations for the defence of
New Zealand shipping or trading
interests if the Minister is satisfied a
foreign government or its agency
has adopted or proposes to adopt
any measure that damages or
threatens to damage New Zealand
shipping or trading interests,
including any that may adversely
affect the access of New Zealand




Council of the European
Commission. Regulations
administered by DG IV
(Competition) in cooperation with
DG VII (Transport).
Minister of Transport, assisted by
the Ministry of Transport and by
qualified persons in the case of
inquiries into unfair practices.
11 Regulatory
controls
11.1 Public filing of
agreements
Not required — because a block
exemption is provided.
Not required
11.2 Confidentiality Not applicable because there is
no filing requirement. However,
the EC protects confidential
information in investigations.
Not applicable because there is no
filing arrangement.
11.3 Filing of tariffs Not required Not required — however, the
Minister may direct this upon the








Yes, including power by decision
of the Commission to impose
fines.
Yes — the Minister is allowed to
make regulations for the defence of












The Australia–South-East Asia trade links Australia with Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The trade is relatively well-balanced, with some
200 000 TEU northbound and 210 000 TEU southbound. Major northbound cargoes
include meat, fruit and vegetables, dairy products, animal feed, cotton, photographic
goods, aluminium and other metals.
Vessels employed in the trade invariably call at Singapore and usually call at Port
Kelang (Malaysia). Cargo shipped to other South-East Asian ports, including
Jakarta, Bangkok and Ho  Chi  Minh  City, is normally transhipped onto feeder
vessels at Singapore. Singapore is a major hub for Australian transhipment cargoes
routed to and from Europe and North America. Cargo shipped on vessels employed
in the Australia–South-East Asia trade thus includes exports to and imports from
South-East Asia (trade cargo) as well as cargo originating in or destined for Europe
and North America (transhipment cargo). The trade has been highly competitive for
some years. The Asian economic crisis, which coincided with changes in consortia
membership and the introduction of new tonnage into the trade, intensified
competition.
Lines servicing the South-East Asian trade
Major developments in the trade (see figure G.1) include:
·  the breakdown of the Australia–South-East Asia Outward Shipping Conference
in the northbound trade and its replacement by a Trade Facilitation (Discussion)
Agreement;
·  relatively frequent entries into and exits from the trade;
·  the growing importance of Singapore as a transhipment hub for Australian
trades, and the consequent growth in the volume of transhipment cargo handled
by vessels employed in the trade; andG.2 INTERNATIONAL
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Figure G.1 Lines servicing the Australia–South-East Asia trade,
1993–1999j
a Member lines of Australia–South-East Asia Outward Shipping Conference. b The Australia–South-East Asia
Outward Shipping Conference disbanded in 1994. It was replaced by Australia–South-East Asia Shipping
Forum. c December 1996 Australia–South-East Asia Trade Facilitation Agreement introduced. Member lines
include ANL, DL, NOL, NYK, P&O, MISC, MOL, Nedlloyd, PIL, & OOCL. d Evergreen entered trade in early
1997 by slot chartering from Lloyd Triestino. Evergreen became a vessel provider in mid-1998, prior to
purchasing Lloyd Triestino. e K-Line, Zim and Hanjin-Lloyd slot charter from RCL, but are not ASA members.
f Zim slot charters from the AAA consortium (as well as from RCL). g Hyundai entered the trade in January
1999 by slot chartering from AAA. h Maersk started a fortnightly service between Singapore and eastern
Australian ports in March 1998, only to end the service after six months. i Wilhelmsen’s RTW service operates
northbound only. j  Contship/COM/Marfret RTW service operates northbound only. k MSC  operated
southbound only (from Singapore) from 1997 to April 1999. * TFG members. j The shaded regions represent
TFG lines.
Data source: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C), Daily Commercial News (various issues), Lloyd’s List











































































































































































































·  a stepping-up in the intensity of competition, associated not only with the
expansion of incumbent lines, but also with the entry of new lines and a
reduction in the volume of northbound cargo following the Asian financial crisis.
The Australia–South-East Asia Outward Shipping Conference’s share of
northbound cargo declined in the late 1980s and early 1990s — conference
members carried 69 per cent of northbound cargo by value (65 per cent by volume)
in 1991-92, compared with 82 per cent (74 per cent by volume) in 1983-84.1
Three consortia operated in the trade in 1993: the ANRO consortium included ANL,
DL, NOL and P&O; a second grouping included MISC, NOL and Nedlloyd; while
Hanjin, Lloyd Triestino, NYK and RCL comprised a third consortium, which
operated outside the conference. Several lines operated services in their own right,
including COSCO, CGM, Contship and Wilhelmsen.
The conference disbanded in 1994, being replaced by a short-lived  (1994–97)
discussion agreement — the Australia–South-East Asia Shipping Forum.
Subsequently, a number of lines formed the Australia–South-East Asia Trade
Facilitation Agreement, which was registered under Part  X of the TPA. Trade
Facilitation Agreement (TFG) members included the lines forming the ‘new’
ANRO,2 together with the MISC/MOL/Nedlloyd consortium and new entrants to
the trade, OOCL and PIL.
Both supply and demand side factors have contributed to the continuing
destabilisation of the trade. On the supply side, the 1998 restructuring of consortia
(see below), together with the fleet enhancement programs undertaken by the
restructured consortia in an attempt to enhance their competitive advantage,
including the introduction of larger vessels, led to a substantial increase in carrying
capacity. On the demand side, the Asian financial crisis led to a substantial fall in
northbound cargo at precisely the time that the new consortia were upgrading their
services.
Substantial changes in consortia membership occurred in 1996 and 1998. These
changes must be seen against a background of mergers, takeovers and shifts in
strategic alliances within the global container shipping industry. For example, NYK
left the ASA consortium in October 1996 to join its fellow Grand Alliance members
                                             
1 ASEACON members included ANRO consortia members (ANL, DL, NOL, P&O) as well as
MISC, MOL and Nedlloyd. A consortium comprising NYK, Hanjin, Lloyd Triestino and RCL,
as well as independent lines including COSCO, CGM, Contship, Wilhelmsen, Zim and
Southern Cross Lines provided non-conference competition. EAC and WA Stateships operated
services between WA and South-East Asia.
2  Members of the ‘new’ ANRO included ANL, DL, NOL, NYK, and P&O.G.4 INTERNATIONAL
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in the ‘new’ ANRO or AAX consortium. Similarly, the merger of P&O and
Nedlloyd meant that P&O Nedlloyd was a member of two of the three consortia
operating in the Australia–South-East Asia trade — P&O was a member of the
AAX consortium while Nedlloyd operated in partnership with MISC and NOL.
P&O Nedlloyd’s 1998 decision to focus solely on the AAX consortium led to a
further restructuring of the Australia–South-East Asia trade — MISC and MOL
joined with OOCL and PIL to form the AAA consortium. The entry of Evergreen
into the ASA consortium was the final strategic play in the creation of the three
consortia which exist in mid-1999.
The pattern of entries and exits suggest that the trade is highly contestable. Entries
include Evergreen, Maersk, OOCL, PIL, and Australia Asia Line, while exits
include COSCO, WA Stateships and Maersk’s east coast (Australian) service.3
Transhipment
The growing importance of Singapore as a transhipment hub for Australian cargo
plays a significant role in the competitive dynamics of the trade. Table G.1, based
on Port of Singapore data, suggests that the volume of Australian cargo shipped
through Singapore grew by 56 per cent between 1995 and 1997.
Table G.1 Transhipment of Australian cargo through Singapore, 1995–97a
1995 1996 1997 Growth rate
1995–97
TEU TEU TEU %
Brisbane 25 700 30 300 44 100 72
Sydney 77 600 85 800 116 500 50
Melbourne 79 500 93 100 117 800 48
Fremantle 54 000 60 900 80 500 49
Australia 264 000 306 900 410 600 56
a Includes both southbound and northbound cargo. Note that Port of Singapore Authority data suggest
transhipment levels are higher than those quoted by other sources.
Source: Port of Singapore Authority data quoted in Daily Commercial News, 16 March 1999.
                                             
3 Maersk continues to operate its WA service but closed its east coast service within six months
of entering the trade.CASE STUDIES G.5
Capacity
The carriage of cargo shipped to/from Europe and North America (transhipment
cargo) as well as cargo shipped to/from South-East Asia (trade cargo) makes it
difficult to determine the precise level of surplus capacity.
Nonetheless, it is evident that surplus capacity in the Australia–South-East Asia
trade has increased both as a result of new entry and of the expansion of incumbent
lines on the supply side, and the impact of the Asian crisis on the demand side.
Estimates of the northbound capacity provided by TFG and non-TFG lines,
assuming 100 per cent capacity utilisation, are shown in table G.2.





AAX consortium 79 200 12 000 91 200
AAA consortium 86 400 21 600 108 000
ASA consortium 79 200 16 800 96 000
Maersk (WA Service) 7 200 7 200 14 400
K-Line (WA Service) 50 400 4 800 55 200
Total TFG Lines 302 400 62 400 364 800
Non-TFG Lines:
CGM/Marfret/Contship (RTW service) 68 400 10 800 79 200
Wilhelmsen 48 000 3 600 51 600
PIL/MISC (Qld service) 19 200 4 800 24 000
Contship–Eagle 57 600 9 600 67 200
P&O Nedlloyd – Mediterranean service 40 800 7 200 48 000
Total non-TFG Lines 234 000 36 000 270 000
Total trade 536 400 98 400 634 800
a Assuming 52-week year, 100 per cent capacity utilisation. Calculations allow for 1999 entries to and exits
from the trade and hence differ from table D.6 in appendix D.
Source: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, pp. 39–41).
According to table  G.2, the theoretical northbound capacity (on a 100  per  cent
utilisation basis) amounts to over 630  000  TEU.4 If it is assumed that vessels
                                             
4 These estimates do not allow for the fact that vessels carrying heavy or dense cargo may reach
their load limit when carrying fewer TEU than their design capacity or for the fact that a
regular, scheduled liner service, by it very nature, tends to operate at less than full capacity.
Note also that some vessels employed in the Australia–South-East Asia trade serve other trades
as well. For example, vessels employed in P&O Nedlloyd’s Mediterranean service carry cargo
from Australia and New  Zealand to the Mediterranean alongside cargo from Australia–G.6 INTERNATIONAL
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operate  at  75 per cent  of  capacity,5 northbound capacity is approximately
470 000 TEU.
According to Containerisation International, 200  000  TEU were carried
northbound and 210 000 TEU were carried southbound in the Australia–South-East
Asia trade in 1998. These estimates include only ‘trade cargo’, that is, they relate
solely to cargo destined for or originating in South-East Asia. The carriage of
transhipment cargo on vessels employed in the Australia–South-East Asia trade
makes it difficult to determine the true level of surplus capacity in the trade.
Containerisation International estimates that approximately 70 per cent of the cargo
volume is trade cargo and the remaining 30  per  cent non-trade or transhipment
cargo.6 If this is correct, northbound cargo is 286  000  TEU and southbound
300 000 TEU.  This suggests the Australia–South-East Asia trade is substantially
overtonnaged. Vessels currently employed have the capacity to carry double the
cargo volume currently on offer. (Containerisation International, April 1999, p. 61)
Freight rates
Rates in the Australia–South-East Asia trade have fallen substantially since the
mid-1990s. In early 1995 it cost approximately A$1400 to ship a twenty foot
container northbound from Sydney or Melbourne to Singapore. By early 1997, prior
to the Asian financial crisis, freight rates had declined to A$1000–1100 per TEU,
and had fallen further to A$900  per  TEU by September1997. Freight rates fell
further following the onset of the Asian financial crisis. By October 1998 rates were
as low as A$550 per TEU. (DCN, 5 September 1997; 1 October 1998)
Despite announced rate increases during 1999, freight rates have continued to fall
— to as low as $250–300 per TEU on the southbound trade.
Service levels
Vessels operated by TFG and non-TFG lines serve a range of ports in Australia and
South-East Asia (see table  G.3). Most vessels employed in this trade call at
Fremantle and then sail to east coast ports. Lines operating in this way often
                                                                                                                                        
South-East Asia. Such voyage patterns imply that the space available for Australia–South-East
Asia cargo is limited.
5 Given that vessels operate according to a pre-arranged schedule, and that vessels may be fully
loaded when carrying fewer containers than their theoretical design capacity, vessels typically
operate at 75–80 per cent capacity in practice.
6  There is some discrepancy between Containerisation International estimates and Port of
Singapore Authority estimates presented in table G.1.CASE STUDIES G.7
centralise Brisbane cargoes to Sydney rather than incur the cost of direct call.
Several lines handle Tasmanian cargoes via Melbourne.
All lines call at Singapore, the pre-eminent hub port in South-East Asia.
Port Kelang also receives relatively frequent direct calls. Other South-East Asian
ports are typically served by feeder services from Singapore. As noted in the
Australia–North and East Asia trade study, a dense network of transhipment
services operates within Asia. Trade flows between Australia and many South-East
Asian ports are not large enough to warrant frequent direct services, and
transhipment via Singapore offers an efficient alternative.
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PIL/MISC (Q’land) – D – – – – – D T T T T




Source: Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News (various).
Table G.4 compares transit times between Melbourne and South-East Asian ports
by TFG and non-TFG lines.
The ability to provide the fastest transit between ports is important when marketing
a liner service. Shipping lines in the Australia–South-East Asia trade have not only
introduced new, faster tonnage but have rationalised port calls so as to improve
transit times. As with the Australia–North-East Asia trade, lines tend to specialise in
sub-markets — one line will arrange its port calls so as to offer the fastest transit
between, say, Melbourne and Singapore, whilst another aims to provide the fastest
transit from Sydney to Singapore.G.8 INTERNATIONAL
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Whilst non-TFG lines offer faster transit times from Melbourne to Singapore, TFG
lines offer more frequent services. Hence the elapsed time (time on wharf plus time
at sea) may be shorter for freight shipped by TFG lines.
Table G.4 Comparison of transit times from Melbourne to South-East Asia
by TFG and non-TFG lines, 1998a
Line/consortium Jakartab Singapore Port Kelang Penangc Bangkokc
TFG Lines:
ASA – 1 2–––
A A A 2 11 31 21 51 8
AAX 18 14 15 20 21
Maersk (WA) 11d 6d 7d 8d 11d
K-Line (WA) 4d 6d –––
Non-TFG lines:




C o n t s h i p - E a g l e – 1 0–––




a Average transit times based on Melbourne sailings advertised in the Daily Commercial News,
December 1998. b Some lines serve Jakarta by feeder vessel from Singapore. c Penang and Bangkok are
normally served by feeder vessel from Singapore. d ex. Fremantle.
Source: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, p. 42); Daily Commercial News, December 1998.
Summary
Overall, the Australia–South-East Asia trade has been characterised by intense
competition driven by the growth of transhipment services via Asian hub ports,
especially Singapore, coupled with the impact of the South-East Asian economic
downturn. As a result, freight rates have fallen to unsustainably low levels. Because
of the nature of the trade (it is comparatively short and a direct as well as a ‘feeder’
route) the distinction between conference (TFG) and independent operators, in
terms of service, is less pronounced than on other Australian trades. Nonetheless,
TFG members offer higher reefer capacities and more comprehensive port coverage
than non-TFG operators.
G.2 Australia–North and East Asia
Vessels employed on the Australia–North and East Asia trade normally serve one of
two loops, either Australia–East Asia (China, Hong  Kong, the Philippines and
Taiwan), or Australia–North Asia (Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Russia).CASE STUDIES G.9
Whilst the trade is relatively small by northern hemisphere standards — a recent
estimate suggested that the 1999 northbound volume will total approximately
280 000 TEU — it is relatively well balanced.7 Japan accounts for about a third of
northbound containerised cargo, Hong  Kong for about 20  per  cent (some part of
which is destined for China), with Taiwan, Korea and direct shipments to China
each accounting for 10–15  per  cent. Northbound cargoes include meat, dairy
products, iron and steel, aluminium, wool, and cotton.
Lines servicing the North and East Asia trade
Major developments in the Australia–North and East Asia trade include:
·  relatively frequent entry and exit by non-conference lines;
·  intensifying competition from lines offering transhipment services via
Singapore;
·  the adoption of a more aggressive stance by independent lines such as MSC,
leading to competitive responses by conference and non-conference lines alike;
·  intensification of competition over time, especially since 1998 when the Asian
financial crisis affected demand and the entry or threat of entry by
non-conference carriers, including transhipment operators, led to substantial
overtonnaging and a decline in freight rates; and
·  the formation of a Discussion Agreement (Australia–North and East Asia Trade
Facilitation Agreement), involving both conference and non-conference lines, in
an attempt to stabilise a trade characterised by a growing gap between supply
and demand.
Membership of the Australia Northbound Shipping Conference (ANSCON) has
been relatively stable during the 1990s.8 Only two lines have left ANSCON —
Knutsen Line exiting the trade in the mid 1990s, while Cho Yang chose to operate
independently following the ending of its joint service and marketing arrangements
with ANL and K-Line (see figure  G.2). Zim, formerly operating outside the
conference, joined ANSCON in 1994 when it began a joint service with OOCL.
                                             
7 Compare the forecast 1999 lifting of 280 000 TEU in the northbound trade (East Australia–
North and East Asia), with the forecast shipment of 5 million TEU in the Far East–Europe trade
(see Smith 1999).
8 ANL, K-Line, MOL, NYK, OOCL, P&O Swire (AJCL, AACS), and Yangming have been
members throughout the period 1993–99. Yangming, which has not operated a vessel in the
trade for some years, slot charters from ANL, K-Line, MOL, NYK, P&O Swire, which operate
a consortium within the conference.G.10 INTERNATIONAL
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Figure G.2 Lines servicing the Australia–North and East Asia trade, 1993–
1999
a AJCL/AACS, MOL, NYK, ANL & K-LINE operate as a consortium within ANSCON. b ANL, K-LINE & CHO
YANG had a joint service/marketing agreement to Japan (ESS) and Korea (KASS). c Yangming, which has
not operated a vessel in the trade for some years, slot charters from the AJCL/AACS, MOL, NYK, ANL,
K-LINE consortium. d  In late 1994 ZIM entered into a joint service with OOCL, simultaneously joining
ANSCON.  e January 1996. End of joint service/marketing relationship between ANL, K-LINE and CHO YANG.
f Bridge Line purchased by Blue Star in 1990 renamed Blue Star (Asia) Line in 1996. Maersk purchased EAC
in 1990. g In 1998 P&O Nedlloyd acquired Blue Star (Asia) and with others, formed the Australia–North-East
Asia Trade Facilitation Agreement. Members include the ANSCON Lines, Blue Star, Maersk and Cho Yang.
This Agreement is registered under Part X. MSC has applied to join the Agreement. h The ANSCON Members
entered into a slot chartering agreement with OOCL & ZIM in 1998. i Late 1998 changes to Blue Star, Maersk
and Cho Yang consortium. Maersk decided to offer its own service. Cho Yang and Sealand now slot charter
from Maersk, Blue Star from ANSCON members.
Data source:  Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C), Daily Commercial News (various issues), Lloyd’s List



















































































































































































Non-conference lines offer both direct and transhipment services. There have been
relatively frequent entries and exits by non-conference lines over the period 1993 to
1999. COSCO, FESCO and Wilhelmsen,9 operating direct services, have served the
trade continuously. Blue Star (Asia), Maersk and Cho Yang operated as a
consortium outside the conference from 1996 to 1998. MSC joined the trade as an
independent in 1997. (Containerisation International, April 1999, pp. 57–61)
Transhipment
Several non-conference lines offer transhipment services via South-East Asia,
especially Singapore. Transhipment operators Hanjin and MISC were joined by
Evergreen in 1996, while Contship switched from direct to transhipment services in
1998.
Competition in the Australia–North and East Asia trade has intensified since 1997
as a result of new entry and the competitive response to new entry on the part of
incumbent lines. Entries and exits since 1997 include:
·  Maersk, formerly in a consortium with Blue Star and Cho Yang, commenced a
weekly, fixed day service in 1998;10
·  Sea-Land entered the trade via slot charter in late 1998, taking 125 forty foot
slots on Maersk vessels northbound and southbound (DCN, 23 November 1998);
·  China Shipping Container Lines entered the trade in March  1999 (DCN,
31 March 1999);
·  the ASA consortium (Evergreen, Hanjin, Lloyd Triestino and Regional
Container Lines) entered the trade in July 1999 by redeploying vessels formerly
operating one of its two Australia–South-East Asian loops; and
·  Cape Line operated twelve voyages over the period March–May 1999 before
exiting, the impending arrival of the ASA consortium being cited as the major
factor in the decision to quit (LLDCN, 19 May 1999).11
                                             
9 Wilhelmsen’s ro-ro vessels operate a northbound only service from Eastern Australia–Asia as
one leg of a complex voyage pattern (Europe–North America–Australasia–East Asia–North
America–Europe).
10 Former Maersk consortium partner Cho Yang now slot charters from Maersk, while Blue Star,
now owned by P&O Nedlloyd, slot charters from ANSCON.
11 Intense competition also led the Taiwanese carrier Kien Hung to drop the Australian leg from




As noted above, there has been a substantial increase in the number of carriers
serving the trade. Further, some of the incumbent lines have introduced additional
and/or larger vessels. Main developments include:
·  Maersk (which has slot charter arrangements with Sea-land and Cho Yang) has
introduced a weekly service, deploying five 2000 TEU in place of four 1500–
2000 TEU vessels;
·  MSC has realigned its service, omitting the South-East Asian leg and
concentrating on northbound and southbound voyages between Australia and
North and East Asia;
·  China Shipping Container Lines has introduced a weekly service operated by
seven 1000 TEU con-bulker vessels;
·  the ASA consortium has entered the trade, offering a weekly service operated by
five 1100–1200 TEU vessels; and
·  ANSCON members have increased fleet size from 11 to 15 vessels and moved
from a two-loop to a three-loop service. (Smith 1999)12
New entry and the expansion of incumbent lines on the supply side, together with
the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the demand side, has led to an increase in
the level of surplus capacity in the Australia–North and East Asia trade. Estimates
of northbound capacity provided by both conference and non-conference lines,
assuming 100 per cent capacity utilisation, are shown in table G.5.
As shown in table G.5, the theoretical capacity (on a 100 per cent utilisation basis)
of northbound direct voyages exceeds 700 000 TEU. If it is assumed that vessels
employed in the northbound trade operate at 75  per  cent of capacity, total
northbound capacity is approximately 570 000 TEU (see footnote 5).
This figure does not include the capacity provided by transhipment operators, such
as Hanjin and MISC, offering services to North and East Asia via Singapore. Whilst
precise details of transhipment volumes are unavailable (see chapter 2, section 2.2,
Transhipment and landbridging), it is clear that transhipment operators have the
                                             
12 From January 1996 ANSCON operated separate services to East Asia (five vessels) and North
Asia (six vessels). In its 1999 restructuring, ANSCON has increased the number of vessels
employed in the Australia–East and North Asia trades from 11 to 15 and added a third loop.
Loop 1 covers Keelung, Kaohsiung, Hong Kong, Shekou, Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, and
Keelung. Loop 2 covers Yokohama, Yokkaichi, Nagoya, Osaka, Hakata or Busan (alternative
voyages), Sydney (discharge), Melbourne, Adelaide, Sydney (loading), Brisbane and
Yokohama. Loop 3 covers Osaka, Busan, Qingdao, Shanghai, Keelung, Sydney, Melbourne,
Brisbane and Osaka. (LLDCN, 4 June 1999).CASE STUDIES G.13
ability to add substantially to the capacity provided by direct services if it is
profitable for them to do so.
Table G.5 Australia–North and East Asia: estimated northbound capacity,
mid-1999a
Monthly Capacity Annual Capacity
Dry Reefer Total Dry Reefer Total
Conference:
Japan/Korea 6 600 2 700 9 300 79 800 32 700 112 500
East Asia 8 400 900 9 300 101 200 11 100 112 300
WA service 4 300 700 5 000 51 700 8 700 60 400
Total conference 19 300 4 300 23 600 232 700 52 500 285 200
Non-conference direct:
China Shipping Cont. na na 4 300 na na 52 000
COSCO - East Asia 5 400 200 5 600 65 800 2 800 68 600
           - Japan/Korea 3 200 400 3 600 38 300 5 200 43 500
FESCO 5 000 400 5 400 61 000 4 200 65 200
MSC 6 300 600 6 900 76 300 7 300 83 600
Maersk 4 300 1 300 5 600 52 000 15 600 67 600
Wilhelmsen 3 500 300 3 800 42 000 2 900 44 900
ASA na na 5 200 na na 62 400
Total non-conference direct 40 400 487 800
Non-conference transhipment:
Hanjin See Australia–South-East Asia case study
MISC See Australia–South-East Asia case study
a Assuming a 52-week year and 100 per cent capacity utilisation. Calculations allow for mid 1999 entries to
and exits from the trade and hence differ from table D.4 in appendix D. na Data not available.
Source: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, pp. 25–27).
The volume of northbound and southbound cargo shipped between Australia–North
and East Asia is shown in table G.6.
Table G.6 Australia–North and East Asia: estimated cargo volume (TEU) a
Year Northbound Southbound
1999 280 000 na
1998b 260 000 290 000
1995 211 000 185 000
1994 199 000 169 000
a Estimates  exclude  transhipment  cargo.  b Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News (30  April  1999, pp. 6–7)
estimated 1998 volumes of 290 000 TEU northbound and 320 000 TEU southbound. na Data not available.
Sources: Smith  (1999); Containerisation International, April  1999, p.  63; Daily Commercial News,
27 March 1995.G.14 INTERNATIONAL
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The estimates of northbound and southbound cargoes exclude cargo carried to/from
Australia–North and East Asia for on-carriage to Europe or North America.
Tables G.5 and G.6 suggest that the trade is substantially overtonnaged — 1998
northbound capacity (570  000  TEU, assuming 75  per  cent vessel utilisation) is
roughly twice as large as the northbound cargo volume (260 000 TEU in 1998).
Transhipment cargo13 is unlikely to account for more than a small proportion of the
surplus capacity. Note also that the Commission’s estimates of overtonnaging do
not allow for capacity provided by lines offering transhipment services to and from
North and East Asia via Singapore.
Freight rates
Freight rates in the Australia–North and East Asia trade declined significantly
during the late 1990s. However, as late as 1995, average rates to and from Japan
actually rose (see chapter 2, figures 2.5 and 2.6). Containerisation International has
noted that the route was stable and profitable until MSC entered the trade in 1997.
Certainly dry cargo rates were reported to have fallen in 1997 from over US$1200
to US$1100. (Containerisation International, April 1999, p. 61)
Tim Smith, P&O Nedlloyd General Manager for Australia–North and East Asia
services, has noted that:
Average rates increased in 1994 and 1995, but then fell back again in 1996 and 1997.
The rate of reduction accelerated in 1998, and has continued in 1999 … average freight
rates in the trade [as of July 1999] are only 78  per  cent of their 1996 level  …
(Smith 1999)
In early 1999 northbound rates from Australia–Hong Kong fell to A$450–
550  per  TEU, while rates from Australia–Shanghai/Dalien have been quoted at
A$800 per TEU and transhipment operators are reported to have quoted rates of
$550 per TEU between Australia–North and East Asia (via Singapore) (LLDCN,
30 April 1999).
Service levels
Table G.7 suggests that a range of ports in North and East Asia are served directly
by conference and non-conference lines. Other Asian ports are served by
transhipment. As mentioned previously, there is a dense pattern of feeder services
within Asia.
                                             
13 Notably Australia–Europe cargo transhipped at Kaohsiung and Australia–west coast North
America cargo transhipped at Yokohama.CASE STUDIES G.15
Within Australia, vessels normally call at Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane.
Adelaide may be served directly or via centralisation to Melbourne, while Bell Bay,
Burnie and Devonport cargoes are centralised to Melbourne. Table G.7 shows port
calls by conference and independent lines in Australia and Japan, distinguishing
between direct and transhipment services.























































































Maersk T D Db DDTD––DDD
C O S C O TD–TDT–D––DD
Hanjin T D D D D – Td Td Td Td Td Td
M S C TDTDD––––DDD
MISC D Tc DDDDT d Td Td Td Td Td
a One of ANSCON’s three loops calls at Adelaide. b Operated by Maersk’s West Australian service, with
cargo transhipped at Singapore. c MISC Brisbane cargo centralised via Sydney. d  Cargo transhipped via
Singapore.  D Direct service. T Indirect service (transhipment or centralisation).
Source: Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News (various).
In general, as noted in chapter 5, the conference lines as a whole provide better
quality service than individual non-conference lines in terms of overall frequency of
service, port coverage and reefer and dry cargo capacity.
Table  G.8 compares transit times between Australian and Japanese ports by
conference and independent lines.
As noted above, shipping lines in the Australia–North and East Asia trade have
restructured their services, rationalising port calls so as to provide faster transits.
The ability to provide the fastest transit between ports is important in marketing a
liner shipping service. As in the Australia–South-East Asia trade, lines tend to
specialise in sub-markets — whilst ANSCON provides the fastest service from




Table G.8 Comparison of transit times by conference and independent
lines: Australia to Japan/Korea, March 1999
Yokohama Yokkaichi Nagoya Osaka/Kobe Busan
Ex Sydney:
ANSCON (Loop 2) 12 14 14 16 18
ANSCON (Loop 3) ––– 1 51 7
COSCO 27 – – 29 31
Maersk/CY/SL 17 – – 19 21
MSC 18 – – 20 22
Ex Melbourne:
ANSCON (Loop 2) 14 16 16 18 20
ANSCON (Loop 3) 12 14
Maersk/CY/SL 13 – – 15 17
MSC 14 – – 16 18
Ex Brisbane:
ANSCON (Loop 2) 9 11 11 13 15
ANSCON (Loop 3) 9 11
Maersk/CY/SL 9 – – 11 13
MSC 9 – – 11 13
Source: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, p. 31); Liner Shipping Services (pers. comm., 19 July 1999).
Summary
As with all other Australian liner trades, competition on the Australia–North and
East Asia trade has been intense, and amplified by the impact of competition from
transhipment via South-East Asia and the South-East Asian economic downturn.
The conference, ANSCON, continues to provide better quality service in terms of
overall reefer capacity and foreign ports of call.
G.3 Australia–Europe
The Australia–Europe trade includes Mediterranean countries as well as countries in
North Europe. It is one of Australia’s longest liner trade routes, and is in total the
smallest of Australia’s major liner trades. However, there is a significant trade
imbalance on the route. Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News recently reported that
southbound volumes from Europe were around 240  000  TEU in 1998, while
northbound trade was 85 000 TEU (LLDCN, 28 May 1999, pp. 1, 8). According to
Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News, ‘the much smaller northbound trade has
benefited positively from the Asian crisis … Total trade grew by 20 per cent [in
1998] to 85 000 TEU’, although growth has reportedly eased in 1999 (LLDCN,
28 May 1999, p. 8).CASE STUDIES G.17
Major exports to Europe include: wool, sheep and lambs; beverages; meat and meat
preparations; vegetables and fruit; raw hides and skins; leather and leather
manufactures; and cotton. Major imports from Europe include: paper, paperboard
and articles of paper; non-metallic mineral manufactures; chemicals; machinery,
iron and steel; miscellaneous manufactured articles; and plastics.
Liner exports and imports on the Australia–Europe trade were relatively stable in
both tonnage and value terms from 1994-95 to 1996-97, but, as noted above,
increased in 1997-98 (see table G.9). Australian exports to Europe also tend to be of
higher unit value than Australian exports on average — in 1997-98, 9 per cent of
Australia’s exports by volume were destined for Europe, representing 15 per cent of
Australia’s exports by value.
Table G.9 Liner exports and imports to/from Europe, 1994-95 to 1997-98
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Liner exports Europe 905 238 1 174 622 1 002 905 1 621 187
(tonnes) % of total Aust. export tonnage 7.9 9.0 6.3 8.9
Liner exports Europe 3 059 151 3 627 125 3 303 989 4 972 362
($000) % of total Aust. export value 15.1 13.7 11.7 14.8
Liner imports Europe 2 305 760 2 250 431 2 264 293 2 955 052
(tonnes) % of total Aust. import tonnage 24.2 24.1 22.1 24.5
Liner imports Europe 9 878 400 10 687 701 9 379 057 12 734 274
($000) % of total Aust. import value 27.4 27.5 24.4 26.9
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
The conference share of Australia’s liner export tonnage to Europe has declined
from 61 per cent in 1989-90 to 48 per cent in 1997-98, and the conference share of
import tonnage from Europe has declined from 71 per cent in 1989-90 to 54 per
cent in 1997-98 (see appendix  C, tables  C.11 to  C.14). Conferences also tend to
carry slightly higher value cargo than non-conference operators in this trade,
although their share by value also has declined over the period 1989-90 to 1997-98
— from 70 to 52 per cent for exports and 76 to 65 per cent for imports.
Lines servicing the Europe trade
The Australia–Europe trade is currently serviced by the Australia to Europe Liner
Association (AELA) and a number of non-conference lines. MSC is the only
non-conference line currently competing with the AELA on direct services from
Australia to Europe. However a number of lines offer transhipment services. Liner
Shipping Services suggested ‘these transhipment operators have grown asG.18 INTERNATIONAL
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competitors over the period under review, especially southbound’ (LSS sub.  10,
att. C, p. 1).
In 1993, member lines of the Australia to Europe Shipping Conference were
members of the ANZECS consortium (namely ANL, Associated Container
Transport (Australia), Hapag-Lloyd, Lloyd Triestino and P&O Containers) plus
Consortium Hispania Lines and Wilhelmsen Lines. Non-conference lines servicing
the Europe trade in 1993 were ABC Container Line, Baltic Shipping Company,
Compagnie Generale Maritime, Contship-Eagle, MSC and Zim Line.
Since 1993, ANL, Columbus Line and Lloyd Triestino have exited the conference,
and CGM, Marfret, Contship and Shipping Corporation of New Zealand have
joined the conference. ABC Container Line has gone into liquidation, the Baltic
Shipping Company and Polish Ocean Lines no longer trade to/from Australia, and
Zim Line, with only one vessel currently (as a member of ANSCON) offers very
limited competition (LSS, sub. 10, att. C, p. 1).
In 1999, member shipping lines of the AELA are Associated Container
Transportation (Australia) Ltd, Compagnie Generale Maritime, Compagnie
Maritime Marfret, Consortium Hispania Lines, Contship Container Lines,
Hapag-Lloyd Container Line, P&O Nedlloyd, Shipping Corporation of New
Zealand and Wilhelmsen Lines. The lines servicing the Australia–Europe trade over
the period 1993 to 1999 are summarised in figure G.3.CASE STUDIES G.19
Figure G.3 Lines servicing the Australia–Europe trade, 1993–1999
a Member of the ANZECS consortium. b  Direct to Northern Europe, transhipment to Mediterranean.
c  Transhipment to Northern Europe, direct to Mediterranean. d APL bought out NOL in 1995. e ASX, AAA and
ASA are consortia operating in the South-East Asia trade. AAX consortium members are ANL, APL, DJL, NYK
and PONL (NYK carry very little cargo to/from Europe); ASA consortium members are Hanjin, Lloyd Triestino,
Evergreen and RCL; AAA consortium members are MISC, MOL, OOCL, PIL, plus non-vessel operators ZIM
and YML.
Data sources: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, p. 1); Liner Shipping Services (pers. comm., 9 August
1999).
Transhipment
A large number of carriers can offer transhipment services in the Australia–Europe
trade, although Maersk, APL, OOCL and Evergreen/Lloyd Triestino are considered
to be ‘dedicated’ transhipment operators. MISC also offers transhipment slots
























































































































































Estimates of volumes of cargo transhipped on the Australia–Europe trade are
available from several sources. While these estimates vary, they all show that
transhipment, particularly via Asia, has increased significantly.
Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News has reported that almost 30  per  cent, or
70 000  TEU, of the southbound Europe–Australia trade currently is transhipped
through Asian ports, up from 5  per  cent in 1996 (LLDCN, 28  May  1999, p.  1).
Liner Shipping Services estimates that over the last five years transhipment in the
southbound trade has grown rapidly and could now account for around 15 per cent
of the total trade, while transhipment on the northbound trade to Europe via
South-East Asia (primarily Singapore) has grown to about 10 per cent of the total
trade (sub. 10, att. C, p. 1). Estimates of southbound transhipment volumes on the
Europe–Australia trade provided by the UK office of Liner Shipping Services
suggest transhipment volumes currently are around 26 per cent (see table G.10).
Table G.10 Estimates of transhipment on the Europe–Australia southbound
trade, 1994 to 1998
Year Trade volume Volume transhipped Percentage of trade volume
transhipped
TEU TEU %
1994 182 000 10 000 5
1995 188 000 15 000 8
1996 193 000 25 000 13
1997 211 000 40 000 19
1998 230 000 60 000 26
Source: Liner Shipping Services pers. comm., 13 August 1999.
Official estimates of the volume of cargo transhipped on the Europe–Australia trade
are available from the International Cargo Statistics database provided by the
Bureau of Transport Economics (BTE) (see table  G.11). While these estimates
suggest that the level of transhipment has increased, they are lower in absolute
terms than the estimates reported above. The difference may be partly reconciled by
the fact that the level of transhipment of Australian cargoes has reportedly increased
significantly in recent years (data from the BTE is available only up to 1997-98).
There are also issues of definition of transhipment and the inclusion of significant
volumes of charter cargo from regional ports, which would not be transhipped, as
liner cargo in the BTE database.
Nevertheless, the official data show the growth of transhipment via Asia, supporting
anecdotal evidence. In 1997-98, 59 per cent of transhipped imports from Europe to
Australia were transhipped via South-East Asia, up from 33 per cent in 1989-90. InCASE STUDIES G.21
1997-98, 48  per  cent of transhipped exports from Australia to Europe were
transhipped via South-East Asia, up from 10 per cent in 1989-90. (ICSD 1999)
Table G.11 Share of total liner export and import tonnage to/from Europe
which is transhipped, 1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)a
Excluding cargo transhipped within Europe
1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
Exports to Europe transhipped 1.0 0.2 0.9 1.9 4.7
Total Australian liner exports transhipped 2.5 1.0 1.4 2.1 3.0
Imports from Europe transhipped 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.3 3.4
Total Australian liner imports transhipped 2.3 2.4 2.3 3.0 3.3
a This data is different to the transhipment data presented in chapter 2 and appendix C, which is share of liner
export and import tonnage transhipped by region in which transhipment occurs.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Capacity
The annual capacity of direct conference services on the Australia–Europe trade has
increased by 75  per  cent since 1993, while the annual capacity of direct
non-conference services has declined by 25 per cent (see table G.12). This is largely
due to the fact that the number of conference members has increased, while the
number of non-conference lines offering direct services has decreased (although the
capacity of MSC has increased significantly since 1993). The annual capacity of
direct conference services is now more than twice that of direct non-conference
services. Significant transhipment capacity to Europe also is available, although
inevitably not all capacity on transhipment vessels is available for Australia–Europe
cargo. Overall, significant excess capacity appears to exist in the Australia–Europe
trade relative to trade volumes. This is particularly the case northbound, whereas
southbound capacity is somewhat tighter.
However, it is important to note that it is not possible to estimate accurately the
extent of excess capacity on the Australia–Europe trade without considering the
New  Zealand–Europe trade. According to Liner Shipping Services, in terms of
volume, priorities for the direct liner service are Europe to Australia, New Zealand
to Europe and then Australia to Europe (sub. 10, att. C, p. 1).G.22 INTERNATIONAL
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Table G.12 Estimated annual conference and non-conference liner capacity
of direct services on northbound Australia–Europe trade, 1993
to 1999 (TEU)
1993 1999
Conferencea 158 640 278 378
Non-conference 161 844 120 438
Total capacity 320 484 398 815
a Excluding Wilhelmsen round-the-world ro-ro service, which had an annual capacity of 47 768 TEU in 1993
and 46 368 TEU in 1999.
Source: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, p. 14); DTRS Liner Service Sheets.
Service levels
The conference as a whole offers more frequent services to Europe than its
competitor for direct services, MSC. MSC offers a weekly fixed day direct service
from Australia to Europe (with transhipment to the Mediterranean). The AELA
offers three fortnightly fixed day direct services to Europe and the Mediterranean,
as well as a Contship/CGM/Marfret direct service every 11 days. AELA member
Wilhelmsen Lines also offers a round-the-world ro-ro service with destinations in
Europe and the Mediterranean every 15 days.
The AELA offers a significantly wider range of foreign direct ports of call than
MSC. Australian and foreign ports of call for lines servicing the Australia–Europe
trade are detailed in tables D.9, D.10, D.12 and D.13 of appendix D.
Average actual and scheduled transit times of regular direct liner shipping services
to Europe for the period September 1998 to February 1999 from major Australian
ports are presented in table G.13. These data also give an indication of the relative
reliability of direct services operating on the Australia–Europe trade.
Where both the conference and MSC offer direct services, the conference offers
shorter transit times in most cases. The exception is Adelaide to UK and
Belgium/Netherlands, where MSC transit times are considerably shorter. Further
details of transit times for lines servicing the Australia–Europe trade are presented
in table D.13 of appendix D.
Where both conference and non-conference direct services are available, the
difference between actual and published transit times tends to be smaller for
non-conference services. However, conference services tend to be more likely to
arrive early.CASE STUDIES G.23
Table G.13 Transit times of regular direct liner shipping services to Europe,
September 1998 to February 1999a
Conference/Line Transit times (days)




AELA A (Eastabout) ––– 50.6 (53) 49.5 (52) 55.2 (57)
AELA B (Med.) 25.8 (23) 28.3 (26) 29.8 (27) –––
AELA C (Eagle) – – – 30.5 (31) 29.5 (30) 32.7 (33)
MSC – – – 33.2 (33) 30.6 (31) –
From Adelaide
AELA A (Eastabout) – – – 46.4 (49) 45.3 (48) 51.1 (53)
AELA C (Eagle)b 40.0 (28) – – 46.7 (35) 45.6 (34) 48.8 (37)
MSC – – – 37.3 (37) 34.7 (35) –
From Melbourne
AELA A (Eastabout) – – – 44.2 (46) 43.2 (45) 48.9 (50)
AELA B (Med.) 30.5 (27) 33.0 (30) 34.5 (31) –––
AELA C (Eagle) 28.6 (30) – – 35.3 (37) 34.2 (36) 37.5 (39)
Contship/CGM/Marfret 27.5 (29) 29.4 (30) – 35.4 (36) 36.5 (37) –
MSC – – – 39.7 (39) 37.1 (37) –
From Sydney
AELA A (Eastabout) – – – 40.5 (43) 39.4 (42) 45.2 (47)
AELA B (Med.) 45.4 (39) 47.8 (42) 49.4 (43) –––
AELA C (Eagle) 37.6 (38) – – 44.3 (45) 43.2 (44) 46.5 (47)
Contship/CGM/Marfret 30.8 (32) 32.5 (33) – 38.4 (39) 39.6 (40) –
MSC – – – 42.9 (43) 40.2 (41) –
From Brisbane
Contship/CGM/Marfret 33.8 (35) 35.7 (36) – 41.7 (42) 42.7 (43) –
a  Average actual port to port transit times, followed by scheduled transit times in brackets. b A  second
Adelaide call was added to the Contship–Eagle service during the period, hence the discrepancy between
actual and scheduled transit times.
Source: LLDCN, 28 May 1999, p. 10.
Freight rates
As discussed in chapter  5, section  5.1, freight rates for conference and
non-conference liner shipping services have declined significantly on most
Australian trade routes, including the Australia–Europe trade, over the last decade.
From 1989 to 1998, nominal freight rate indices for the Australia–Europe trade
declined from 100 to 70.7 northbound, and 100 to 72.6 southbound (LSS, sub. 10,
p. 12). This decline in freight rates occurred fairly steadily, particularly northbound,G.24 INTERNATIONAL
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over the period. Indices of northbound and southbound freight rates in the
Australia–Europe trade are presented in figures 2.5 and 2.6 of chapter 2.14
While negotiated rates usually are confidential, freight rates in the Australia–Europe
trade are cited periodically in industry and other publications. For example, the
Wool Commodity Group negotiated 1998-99 season freight rates in the European
trade on behalf of wool exporters and European importers of A$1900 per TEU with
Maersk for a transhipment service via Singapore, and rates for direct services of
A$2122  per  TEU and A$2055  per  TEU with the AELA conference and MSC
respectively (LLDCN, 24 July 1998, p. 1).
Eller (1993, quoted in BTCE  1995, p.  25) cited freight rates for a number of
conference and non-conference direct and transhipment services in the Europe to
Australia trade in the range US$1400–1650  per  TEU (for ocean freight) and
US$1527–1809 per TEU (terminal-to-terminal) in November 1993. By 1998, rates
of US$900 per TEU were being cited (DCN, 31 August 1998). Various issues of
Containerisation International, DCN and Lloyd’s Maritime cited freight rates for
Europe–Australia of A$1900–2200 per TEU in 1993 and A$1300 per TEU in 1998,
representing a fall in excess of 30 per cent.
In late 1998, the AELA announced a general rate increase effective from
1 February 1999 of $250 per twenty foot container and $300 per forty foot container
for dry cargo, and $350 per twenty foot container and $550 per forty foot container
for reefer cargo. At that time, a subsequent increase from 1 July 1999 of $50 per
twenty foot container and $100 per forty foot container for dry cargo only was also
announced. These rate increases were announced against a backdrop of rapidly
falling southbound rates, which historically have subsidised the thinner northbound
trade, and a steady decline in northbound rates. (DCN, 3  December  1998) The
February rate increase met with mixed results in the marketplace, and the full rate
increase was apparently applied only to a small volume of cargo (LSS pers. comm.,
6 August 1999). Furthermore, the proposed July rate increase was not implemented.
Summary
The Australia–Europe trade is a relatively thin trade, although volumes on the
southbound trade are significant. Volumes of cargo on the trade have remained
fairly stable over the past few years.
                                             
14 These freight rate indices are estimates of actual terminal-to-terminal rates averaged over all
reefer and dry cargoes. Northbound indices are based on freight rates in Australian dollars.
Southbound indices are based on freight rates in US dollars.CASE STUDIES G.25
Although a number of lines have entered and exited the Australia–Europe trade, the
number of lines servicing the trade has been relatively stable in recent years. While
the number of direct non-conference operators has declined since 1993, the number
of transhipment operators has increased.
MSC and the transhipment operators on the route are providing substantial
competition to the conference. MSC reportedly has a large share of the direct
market, and the volume of cargo transhipped has increased significantly in the last
few years, particularly southbound. As a result, conference shares of imports and
exports have declined to around 50 per cent in 1997-98, despite conference capacity
having increased on the Australia–Europe trade in recent years.
While there appears to be some surplus capacity in the Australia–Europe trade,
surplus capacity on the southbound Australia–Europe trade is not as pronounced as
that on the northbound trade.
Conferences tend to offer a better quality service on the Australia–Europe trade than
non-conference operators offering direct services in terms of ports of call, reliability
and transit times. Freight rates on the trade have fallen steadily and significantly
over the last decade.
G.4 Australia–North America
Australia’s exports to North America using liner shipping totalled around
1.3 million tonnes in 1997-98 with a value of $3.6 billion. This represented about
7  per  cent of Australia’s total liner exports by weight and nearly 11  per  cent by
value. Services are provided to a large number of ports on the east and west coasts
of the United States and Canada and to the Gulf of Mexico.
The North American shipping conferences carried 46  per  cent of this volume
representing over 60  per  cent of the value of liner exports to North America, a
similar share to that carried by conferences in all Australian trades. This compares
to estimated conference shares of about 46 per cent and 73 per cent in 1989-90.15
However, if iron and steel and mineral sands (both very heavy products largely
carried by non-conference operators) are excluded, the conference share by weight
in 1997-98 is a good deal higher at 54  per  cent and of value 65  per  cent. The
comparable estimates for 1989-90 were 59 percent and 75 per cent respectively.
                                             
15 All estimates of conference shares are based on BTE data derived from unpublished ABS
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The conference share of total exports to all destinations using liner shipping in
1997-98 was 45  per  cent by weight and 56  per  cent by value. In 1988-89 the
comparable shares were 58 per cent and 67 per cent respectively. Hence the North
American conference’s share of trade was similar to the average for all outward
routes in 1997-98. However, while the conference share to North America over the
last ten years has been fairly stable, conference shares have been declining on most
other outward trades.
Capacity data for direct services in table  D.8 indicates that there is significant
independently-owned dry container capacity on the outward trade (around
40  per  cent of total capacity), but that only about 10  per  cent of direct reefer
capacity is provided by independent operators.
The single-largest liner export to North America is meat products (30 per cent share
by weight when iron and steel are excluded) and the conference share of this trade
was close to 80 per cent for both weight and value in 1997-98. This was well up
from the 60 per cent conference share in 1988-89. Over 40 per cent of the weight of
cargo carried to North America by conferences is meat products, with refrigerated
capacity representing about one third of available monthly conference capacity
(in TEUs).
The other major export commodities carried to North America by liner shipping
were agricultural and mineral products including vegetables and fruit, dairy
products, beverages and iron and steel. Major imports using liner shipping included
chemicals, cork and wood, fertilisers, machinery, paper and paperboard and
transport equipment.
Trade growth to North America over the last 10 years has been only moderate and
has fallen as a share of Australia’s exports carried by liner shipping, from over
13 per cent by volume and close to 12 per cent by value in 1988-89 to 7 per cent
and 11 per cent respectively in 1997-98.
The trade from Australia to North America is characterised by a particularly high
requirement for refrigerated containers (reefers) and a significant imbalance of the
need for these containers between the northbound and southbound legs. This
imbalance will tend to add to the freight rates charged for products requiring the
more expensive reefer containers because costs can only be defrayed on one leg.
On the inward trade from North America, conference and non-conference liner
services carried almost equal cargo weight in 1997-98. However, as with exports,
conferences tended to carry the more valuable cargoes and had a 60 per cent share
of the value of liner imports. There is a much lower requirement for reefer
containers on the inward trade. Shippers of dry cargo are reluctant to useCASE STUDIES G.27
‘non-refrigerated’ reefers because of the risk of damage if the refrigeration is
accidentally turned on. Despite price incentives, many of these containers return
empty.
In 1997-98, conferences carried 49 per cent of the weight of imports carried by liner
shipping from North America, representing 61  per  cent of the value of these
imports. This was considerably lower than the 60  per  cent and 75  per  cent
respectively in 1989-90.
Table G.14 Liner exports and imports to/from the United States, 1994-95 to
1997-98
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Liner exports United States 1 008 222 1 006 297 1 139 875 1 303 988
(tonnes) % of total Aust. export tonnage 8.8 7.7 7.2 7.2
Liner exports United States 2 275 959 2 346 381 2 312 463 3 598 705
(A$000) % of total Aust. export value 9.4 8.9 8.2 10.7
Liner imports United States 1 490 846 1 833 592 2 312 376 2 189 838
(tonnes) % of total Aust. import tonnage 15.6 19.7 22.6 18.1
Liner imports United States 6 905 950 8 608 470 9 816 270 10 393 455
(A$000) % of total Aust. import value 19.1 22.1 25.6 22.0
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
Lines servicing the North American trade
There are two shipping conferences involved in outward liner shipping services
between Australia and the USA and Canada — the Australia–United States
Container Line Association (AUSCLA) and the Australia–Canada Container Line
Association (ACCLA). Both conferences comprise ANZDL (now owned by
CP Ships), Columbus Line — each with about 40 per cent of monthly conference
capacity (in TEUs) — and P&O Nedlloyd with around 20  per  cent of monthly
conference capacity. These same lines made up the conference in 1993.16 ANZDL
operates a weekly service to the west coast of North America with landbridging
services across North America. Columbus and P&O Nedlloyd combine to provide
joint weekly services to both the west and east coasts.
Because of regulatory requirements in the United States, the AUSCLA is an open
conference, but nonetheless its membership has not changed (except for one
                                             




takeover) for ten years. This suggests that there were not excess profits significant
enough to attract new members to the conference.
However, there have been significant changes in capacity shares of individual
conference lines between 1993 and 1999. ANZDL increased its share of average
monthly conference capacity leaving Australia from around 27 per cent to nearly
39 per cent, while Columbus Line’s share rose from 36 per cent to 40 per cent. P&O
Nedlloyd’s share (previously held by Blue Star Line) fell from over 37 per cent to
around 21 per cent from 1993 to 1999.17 While slot swapping between conference
members means that capacity does not equate exactly with market share, it is a good
indicator of changes in a carrier’s market penetration. Such large changes in
capacity shares are suggestive of competition between conference members.
In addition to these conferences, there have been various discussion agreements on
the North American trade. ANZDL originally had been an independent on the US
trade but had been in a discussion agreement with the conference members before
joining the conference in the late 1980s. When Nedlloyd was an independent on this
line it was part of the Australia–United States Discussion Agreement. Currently this
agreement comprises conference members and the joint venturers Cool Carriers and
Scaldis (C&S).18 Although remaining a forum for possible discussions between the
members, this discussion agreement has not been active in recent years.
FESCO is the main independent carrier providing weekly, direct conventional
services on the outward trade to the west coast of North America. C&S provide a
(long) seasonal service from North Queensland and Cool Carriers has a shorter
seasonal service (using chartered ships) shipping fruit from South Australia.
Wilhelmsen offers a monthly ro-ro direct service to the east coast of the United
States, which also carries some containers. Its market share is less than the bigger
transhippers, but its container capacity has recently been expanded. In addition,
BHP Transport (IMTL) operates bulk carriers and several small container vessels,
but possesses only limited spare, largely non-refrigerated, container capacity.
Neither Wilhelmsen nor BHP Transport could be seen as having provided
significant competition to conferences or large independent lines. However, the
                                             
17 Based on Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, pp. 43, 47). Average monthly capacity is the
total capacity of a company’s ships on a trade divided by the number of ships and then
multiplied by the average number of sailings per month. Unless all services are direct to the
US, this capacity figure will not represent available capacity out of Australia for North
America, as space will be needed to load cargo from intermediate countries such as New
Zealand.
18 Cool Carriers and Scaldis operate a seasonal and irregular joint service from North Queensland
(and occasionally Brisbane) to Philadelphia using refrigerated ships. These ships only operate
on the northbound trade. In other countries these companies operate separately.CASE STUDIES G.29
existence of experienced carriers at the fringes of the trade further increases
contestabilty. Expansion can be relatively easy for such operators as indicated by
Wilhelmsen’s recent increase in container capacity on the North American trade
(LLDCN, 16 July 1999).
In recent years there have been a number of changes in the non-conference lines
operating direct services on the North American trade. The ABC Container Line
which offered a direct service approximately every 3 weeks went into liquidation in
1995. Nedlloyd, which had been a relatively small non-conference operator, merged
with P&O in 1996 and that group took over Blue Star Line in 1998, thereby
becoming part of the conference. However, FESCO entered the trade in 1994
providing a weekly direct service to the west coast of North America.
In discussing competition in liner shipping from Australia, BHP expressed some
reservation regarding the extent of competition from independents on the North
American trade:
I guess the one that does spring to mind is the North American trade where independent
lines have been in and out of the trade, depending on their own profitability. They’ve
been there but maybe not as consistently as other trades. (trans., p. 113)
The conference members on the southbound trade are the same as those on the
northbound leg, with all members providing an essentially out and back service to
and from North America. In addition to FESCO, Contship provides a non-
conference direct service from North America.19
The main lines servicing the Australia–North America trade over the period 1993 to
1999 are summarised in figure G.3.
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Figure G.4 Lines servicing the Australian–North America trade, 1993–1999
a  P&O Nedlloyd takeover Blue Star and join the conference. b  Cool Carriers/Scaldis is a member of the
Australia–United States Discussion Agreement along with the three conference members. The two operators
have a joint operation trading seasonal services from Queensland, while Cool Carriers have a separate
seasonal service from South Australia. c BHP/IMT provides a bulk and breakbulk service with a small amount
of container capacity. d P&O and Nedlloyd merge. e Excludes transhippers with small volumes.
Data source: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, pp. 43–47); LLDCN (various issues).
Transhipment
The other independent carriers on the North American trade provide transhipment
services. The major lines (more than one per cent market share) are Maersk and
MSC/Safbank. Around 10  per  cent of containers to and from Australia and
New  Zealand to the US west coast are reported to be transhipped (LLDCN,
16 July 1999).
These services provide important potential competition to conferences, particularly
for non-refrigerated cargoes. However, they are likely to be somewhat less of a
competitive threat for products requiring refrigeration, due to shipper concerns
regarding possible risks to product during the transhipment phase. Nonetheless,
Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News (July  16,  1999) reports that Maersk has
























































































Services (sub. 10, Attachment C) has indicated that other small transhippers include
COSCO, OOCL and NYK. COSCO is unlikely to develop as a significant
transhipper in this trade as under United States maritime regulations it is declared a
government owned shipping service. This places COSCO at a considerable
competitive disadvantage as it is required to notify any changes in rates 30 days in
advance.
Table G.15 shows a growing share of exports and imports on the North American
trade being transhipped. However, as is the case on the European trade the levels of
transhipment indicated by official data are somewhat lower than suggested by
anecdotal evidence from the shipping industry. Given the strong growth trend in
transhipment over the past five years, the official data for 1998-99 may be closer to
industry perceptions of current transhipment levels.
Table G.15 Share of total liner export and import tonnage to/from North
America which is transhipped, 1989-90 to 1997-98 (per cent)a
Excluding cargo transhipped within North America
1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98
Exports to North America transhipped 1.1 2.6 0.6 1.6 2.2
Total Australian liner exports transhipped 2.5 1.0 1.4 2.1 3.0
Imports from North America transhipped 3.1 3.3 2.9 3.4 4.2
Total Australian liner imports transhipped 2.3 2.4 2.3 3.0 3.3
a This data is different to the transhipment data presented in chapter 2 and appendix C, which is share of liner
export and import tonnage transhipped by region in which transhipment occurs.
Source: Bureau of Transport Economics, International Cargo Statistics Database (accessed April 1999).
The volume of liner shipping trade southbound is roughly one third greater than
northbound. This imbalance creates openings for additional carriers on the
southbound leg. Liner Shipping Services observed (trans., p. 8) that the southbound
trade from North America had a particularly large number of transhipment
operators.
Capacity
Annual conference capacity has expanded by around 45  per  cent since 1993,
broadly in line with the growth in trade tonnage. Current non-conference regular
direct capacity is about 30 per cent of total direct conference and non-conference
capacity. Two seasonal services in the reefer trade, for which capacity data are not
available, add significantly to this non-conference share.G.32 INTERNATIONAL
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Data for non-conference capacity in 1993 were not available. However, the fairly
constant share of trade volume held by independents suggests that their capacity has
increased in similar proportion to that of the conference.
Table G.16 Estimated annual conference and non-conference liner
container capacity of direct services on northbound Australia–




Total capacity na 266
a Excludes C&S seasonal palletised reefer service and Cool Carriers seasonal service from South Australia
using chartered ships.
Source: Liner Shipping Services (sub. 10, att. C, p. 14); DTRS Liner Service Sheets.
Table D.8 shows the very large outward capacity of the major operators offering
transhipment services to North America. However, only a proportion of that
capacity will be available for North American cargoes.
Freight rates
As with other trades, there have been significant falls in freight rates on the outward
route to North America over the past decade. Discussions with participants indicate
particularly large falls in freight rates for dairy products when compared to rate
changes for New  Zealand dairy products and for Australian meat exports.
Refrigerated rates for meat products have also fallen somewhat from levels that
shippers considered high. Liner Shipping Services (sub.  10,  p.  13) indicated that
freight rates for bulk pack meat in cartons in 1997 and 1998 were around
A$5600 per container. This was 25 per cent below 1993 rates, although about 15 to
20 per cent above those achieved during a period of fierce competition in 1994.
Freight rates for mixed cargoes have declined by around 30 per cent since 1993,
those for wool and household goods have halved while rates for wine have fallen by
70 per cent. Appendix D (tables D. 21 and D. 22) provides more detail.
One cause of somewhat higher freight rates in the North American trades is the high
price of stevedoring in the United States. Liner Shipping Services (trans.,  p.  8)
observed that terminal handling charges for meat in major US ports are close to
A$850, compared to charges in Australian ports of about A$250. In addition, for
refrigerated cargoes to the United States, conferences have often quoted rates
including inland transport. These have involved cross subsidies between different
origins and destinations. Liner Shipping Services indicated (trans., p. 9) that aroundCASE STUDIES G.33
25 per cent of meat exports required further transport to the United States mid-west,
costing over A$1500 per container. Recent indications are that these cross subsidies
are being removed with shippers being offered a blue water rate with different
add-on costs for different destinations within North America.
The United States maritime regulations have had an important impact on operations
on the outward trade to North America. In particular the requirement that all rate
agreements be publicly available appears to have limited within-conference
competition (chiselling) although they may have limited differences in rates charged
to small and large shippers.
Amendments repealing this requirement from May 1999 are likely to see greater
internal pressure on conference rates. The Managing Director of Columbus Lines (a
member of the conference to North America) observed:
We no longer know what P&O quotes, they don’t know what we quote and we battle
for clients. From only $5600 in the first quarter of this year, we now see rates that are
$3600, $3700, $4200. So you see a movement in a very short period of time and we
still have to learn to live with these because it goes straight into margins which are not
there. (trans., p. 9)
While a good deal of this decline may represent a move away from rates including
inland transport in the United States, it is likely also to indicate more intense
competition among conference members now that rates actually charged to
individual customers may be kept confidential. Initially, such adjustments to a new
regulatory environment may generate freight rates which are not sustainable in the
long term.
Service levels
The North American conference lines service Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and
Adelaide. They call at a wide range of east and west coast ports in the United States.
Non-conference operators cover the same Australian ports as the conference but no
single carrier covers both sides of North America. MSC/Safbank provide a
transhipment service also stopping at Fremantle. Transit times of major direct
service independents appear to be similar to those of the conference.
Discussions with shippers of refrigerated products indicated that the northbound
North American conference provided very good service but had been relatively
inflexible in negotiating terms and conditions. Particularly for reefer cargoes, this




The outward trade to North America has fewer carriers, both conference and
non-conference, than most other trades. The conference has three members, and
there is one independent providing a weekly direct service and two other specialist
carriers offering container services. In addition, independent seasonal services
operate from Queensland and South Australia. There are two main transhipment
services together with a number of other major lines currently carrying only small
volumes of exports for transhipment.
The non-conference share of the trade is indicative of a particularly competitive
environment for dry cargoes. Conference share of reefer trade is much higher. This
would appear to reflect shippers’ preferences for the reliability and service level
provided by the North American conference. Nonetheless, independents operating
direct services provide over 10  per  cent of northbound reefer capacity and
independent transhipment services may have around 5 per cent. There have been
several occasions when independents have made incursions into the conference
share of reefer cargoes but shippers have tended to return to using the conference
because of the importance of high quality service for refrigerated products.
The presence of greater transhipment opportunities on the southbound trade
together with a very limited reefer requirement suggests a particularly competitive
environment on the inward trade.REFERENCES
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